In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a). Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible. I. Pluralism in Truth and Logic The relation between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism has been discussed by a number of philosophers. A natural link between the two is the fact that the main logical (or rather, meta-logical) relation, logical consequence, is defined in terms of truth. A classical reference is Tarski (1936), according to which the sentence X is a logical consequence of the set of sentences K iff (if and only if) in every model in which all the sentences of K are true X is true too. It is common to say that logical consequence is defined in terms that significantly include preservation or transmission of truth. Now, if truth is plural—that is, there are different types of truth—then the preservation (transmission) of different types of truth might be based on different principles, giving rise to, or requiring, a plurality of logics. This potential connection is laid down in Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2014), and I share their view. But whether this potential connection materializes depends on what truth-pluralism is and what is required for the transmission of different types of truth. If the plurality of truth is so deep that it allows both realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, and if transmission of realist truth requires, say, a bivalent logic while the transmission of antirealist truth requires a non-bivalent logic, then logic in some fields is bivalent, in others non-bivalent, i.e., there are different types of logic for different fields. But if truth, as truth, is essentially (hence, always) realist and its plurality is limited to variations within the domain of realist truth (e.g., truth is always based on correspondence but the patterns of correspondence vary in, say, physics and mathematics), then the plurality of truth, by itself, would not lead to logical pluralism in the way delineated above. This, however, does not rule out other connections between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism. For example, both truth and logic might share some traits, or combinations of traits, that are potentially conducive to This content downloaded from 70.179.3.18 on Sun, 18 Oct 2020 01:46:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism. And indeed, they both share such a c
在本文中，我研究了真理和逻辑方法的差异(特别是对这些领域的通货紧缩主义和实体主义方法)如何影响哲学家对这些领域的多元主义和规范性的看法。我对真理和逻辑的看法在很大程度上是认识论的，关注真理在知识中的作用(而不是自然语言中“真”和“真”这两个词的使用)，我的参考小组包括卡尔纳普(1934)、哈曼(1986)、霍维奇(1990)、赖特(1992)、比尔和莱斯托尔(2006)、菲尔德(2009)、林奇(2009)和谢尔(2016a)。只要有可能，我就关注所涉及问题的积极观点，而不是消极观点，尽管在某些情况下这是不可能的。真理多元主义与逻辑多元主义的关系已经被许多哲学家讨论过。两者之间的一个自然联系是，主要的逻辑(或者更确切地说，元逻辑)关系，逻辑结果，是根据真理来定义的。一个经典的参照是Tarski(1936)，根据他的理论，句子X是句子集K的逻辑推论，如果(当且仅当)在每个模型中，所有K的句子都为真X也为真。我们通常会说，逻辑结果的定义包含了对真相的保存或传递。现在，如果真理是多元的——也就是说，有不同类型的真理——那么，不同类型的真理的保存(传递)可能基于不同的原则，从而产生或要求逻辑的多元性。Lynch(2009)和Pedersen(2014)提出了这种潜在的联系，我同意他们的观点。但这种潜在的联系能否实现，取决于什么是真理多元主义，以及传播不同类型的真理需要什么。如果真理的多元性如此之深，以至于它允许现实主义和反现实主义的真理概念，如果现实主义真理的传递需要二价逻辑，而反现实主义真理的传递需要非二价逻辑，那么在某些领域的逻辑是二价的，在其他领域则是非二价的，即不同领域有不同类型的逻辑。但是，如果真理，作为真理，本质上(因此，永远)是现实主义的，它的多元性仅限于现实主义真理领域内的变化(例如，真理总是基于对应，但对应的模式在物理和数学中有所不同)，那么真理的多元性本身就不会导致上述方式的逻辑多元性。然而，这并不排除真理多元主义和逻辑多元主义之间的其他联系。例如，真理和逻辑可能共享一些特征，或特征的组合，这些特征可能有利于本内容下载自70.179.3.18(星期日，2020年10月18日01:46:55 UTC)所有使用受https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism约束。事实上，它们都有这样的特征组合，例如，具有高度广泛和高度多样化的范围的组合。两者都适用于许多知识领域，包括其主题和抽象程度不同的领域。这为两者开辟了多元化的可能性。但多样性和广度本身并不意味着多元主义。在本文中，我想探讨与多元主义及其对立面一元论相关的其他两个因素，这些因素与真理和逻辑上的多元主义和一元论的相关性以前没有被研究过。这些因素与我们对真理和逻辑的态度或概念有关，具体来说，无论是通缩主义者还是实体主义者。从真理开始，我将研究通货紧缩主义和实体主义，以及实体主义内部的变化，是否以及如何导致关于真理的多元主义的不同观点。然而，在讨论这个问题之前，让我简单地澄清一下我在本文中谈论真理的“层次”，例如，我是要谈论真理的概念还是真理的性质。这种区别在一些哲学家思考真理时起着重要的作用，但在我自己的思考中却起着不那么重要的作用。一个原因是，对我来说，哲学上重要的概念是表示概念，因此，鉴于真理概念的哲学重要性(在我看来)，真理不仅仅是一个概念。另一种观点是，如果真理的概念表示某物，它就表示一种性质，这种情况并不自动发生。另一种选择是，真理的概念表示一种规范，还有其他选择。由于我将在下面解释的原因，我认为真理本身(真理的概念代表什么)首先是一种规范，其次是一种属性——满足真理规范的属性。所以，对我来说，谈论真理的概念、规范和属性都很重要。 在本文中，我研究了真理和逻辑方法的差异(特别是对这些领域的通货紧缩主义和实体主义方法)如何影响哲学家对这些领域的多元主义和规范性的看法。我对真理和逻辑的看法在很大程度上是认识论的，关注真理在知识中的作用(而不是自然语言中“真”和“真”这两个词的使用)，我的参考小组包括卡尔纳普(1934)、哈曼(1986)、霍维奇(1990)、赖特(1992)、比尔和莱斯托尔(2006)、菲尔德(2009)、林奇(2009)和谢尔(2016a)。只要有可能，我就关注所涉及问题的积极观点，而不是消极观点，尽管在某些情况下这是不可能的。真理多元主义与逻辑多元主义的关系已经被许多哲学家讨论过。两者之间的一个自然联系是，主要的逻辑(或者更确切地说，元逻辑)关系，逻辑结果，是根据真理来定义的。一个经典的参照是Tarski(1936)，根据他的理论，句子X是句子集K的逻辑推论，如果(当且仅当)在每个模型中，所有K的句子都为真X也为真。我们通常会说，逻辑结果的定义包含了对真相的保存或传递。现在，如果真理是多元的——也就是说，有不同类型的真理——那么，不同类型的真理的保存(传递)可能基于不同的原则，从而产生或要求逻辑的多元性。Lynch(2009)和Pedersen(2014)提出了这种潜在的联系，我同意他们的观点。但这种潜在的联系能否实现，取决于什么是真理多元主义，以及传播不同类型的真理需要什么。如果真理的多元性如此之深，以至于它允许现实主义和反现实主义的真理概念，如果现实主义真理的传递需要二价逻辑，而反现实主义真理的传递需要非二价逻辑，那么在某些领域的逻辑是二价的，在其他领域则是非二价的，即不同领域有不同类型的逻辑。但是，如果真理，作为真理，本质上(因此，永远)是现实主义的，它的多元性仅限于现实主义真理领域内的变化(例如，真理总是基于对应，但对应的模式在物理和数学中有所不同)，那么真理的多元性本身就不会导致上述方式的逻辑多元性。然而，这并不排除真理多元主义和逻辑多元主义之间的其他联系。例如，真理和逻辑可能共享一些特征，或特征的组合，这些特征可能有利于本内容下载自70.179.3.18(星期日，2020年10月18日01:46:55 UTC)所有使用受https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism约束。事实上，它们都有这样的特征组合，例如，具有高度广泛和高度多样化的范围的组合。两者都适用于许多知识领域，包括其主题和抽象程度不同的领域。这为两者开辟了多元化的可能性。但多样性和广度本身并不意味着多元主义。在本文中，我想探讨与多元主义及其对立面一元论相关的其他两个因素，这些因素与真理和逻辑上的多元主义和一元论的相关性以前没有被研究过。这些因素与我们对真理和逻辑的态度或概念有关，具体来说，无论是通缩主义者还是实体主义者。从真理开始，我将研究通货紧缩主义和实体主义，以及实体主义内部的变化，是否以及如何导致关于真理的多元主义的不同观点。然而，在讨论这个问题之前，让我简单地澄清一下我在本文中谈论真理的“层次”，例如，我是要谈论真理的概念还是真理的性质。这种区别在一些哲学家思考真理时起着重要的作用，但在我自己的思考中却起着不那么重要的作用。一个原因是，对我来说，哲学上重要的概念是表示概念，因此，鉴于真理概念的哲学重要性(在
{"title":"PLURALISM AND NORMATIVITY IN TRUTH AND LOGIC","authors":"Sher","doi":"10.2307/48584451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584451","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a). Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible. I. Pluralism in Truth and Logic The relation between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism has been discussed by a number of philosophers. A natural link between the two is the fact that the main logical (or rather, meta-logical) relation, logical consequence, is defined in terms of truth. A classical reference is Tarski (1936), according to which the sentence X is a logical consequence of the set of sentences K iff (if and only if) in every model in which all the sentences of K are true X is true too. It is common to say that logical consequence is defined in terms that significantly include preservation or transmission of truth. Now, if truth is plural—that is, there are different types of truth—then the preservation (transmission) of different types of truth might be based on different principles, giving rise to, or requiring, a plurality of logics. This potential connection is laid down in Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2014), and I share their view. But whether this potential connection materializes depends on what truth-pluralism is and what is required for the transmission of different types of truth. If the plurality of truth is so deep that it allows both realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, and if transmission of realist truth requires, say, a bivalent logic while the transmission of antirealist truth requires a non-bivalent logic, then logic in some fields is bivalent, in others non-bivalent, i.e., there are different types of logic for different fields. But if truth, as truth, is essentially (hence, always) realist and its plurality is limited to variations within the domain of realist truth (e.g., truth is always based on correspondence but the patterns of correspondence vary in, say, physics and mathematics), then the plurality of truth, by itself, would not lead to logical pluralism in the way delineated above. This, however, does not rule out other connections between truth-pluralism and logical pluralism. For example, both truth and logic might share some traits, or combinations of traits, that are potentially conducive to This content downloaded from 70.179.3.18 on Sun, 18 Oct 2020 01:46:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 338 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY pluralism. And indeed, they both share such a c","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophers look to the realization relation as a way to make sense of the possibility that special science kinds are physical, yet not reducible to kinds in physics. A realized property fails to reduce because it can be realized in multiple ways, thus blocking its identification with lower-level properties. One prominent analysis of realization, subset realization, distinguishes multiple realizers on the basis their “left-over powers,” that is, those that don’t contribute to the individuative powers of the realizer. However, I argue, the subset analysis of realization fails to mark an important distinction between different ways that a property might be realized, and also makes questions about the reducibility of kinds—presumably an empirical issue—tractable from the armchair. I offer as an alternative mechanistic multiple realization, which avoids both these problems.
{"title":"THEORIES OF MULTIPLE REALIZATION","authors":"Lawrence Shapiro","doi":"10.2307/48570643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48570643","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Philosophers look to the realization relation as a way to make sense of the possibility that special science kinds are physical, yet not reducible to kinds in physics. A realized property fails to reduce because it can be realized in multiple ways, thus blocking its identification with lower-level properties. One prominent analysis of realization, subset realization, distinguishes multiple realizers on the basis their “left-over powers,” that is, those that don’t contribute to the individuative powers of the realizer. However, I argue, the subset analysis of realization fails to mark an important distinction between different ways that a property might be realized, and also makes questions about the reducibility of kinds—presumably an empirical issue—tractable from the armchair. I offer as an alternative mechanistic multiple realization, which avoids both these problems.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41705932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE “ALETHIC PLURALISM AND THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH”","authors":"Ferrari, Moruzzi, Pedersen","doi":"10.2307/48584448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584448","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God desires the existence and activity of free creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and such activity without also allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because there are an infinite number of possible people and because we have no reason to suppose that such creatures will choose one way rather than another. Arguments like this depend on the principle of indifference. But that principle is rejected by most philosophers of probability. Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because doing otherwise violates intuitions about freewill. But such arguments can be addressed through strategies commonly employed to defend theories with counterintuitive results across ethics and metaphysics.
{"title":"WHAT ARE THE ODDS THAT EVERYONE IS DEPRAVED?","authors":"Scott Hill","doi":"10.2307/48574440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48574440","url":null,"abstract":"Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God desires the existence and activity of free creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and such activity without also allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because there are an infinite number of possible people and because we have no reason to suppose that such creatures will choose one way rather than another. Arguments like this depend on the principle of indifference. But that principle is rejected by most philosophers of probability. Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because doing otherwise violates intuitions about freewill. But such arguments can be addressed through strategies commonly employed to defend theories with counterintuitive results across ethics and metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69436718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim. This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem, as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism. We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter is accepted, a local counterexample to IA can be constructed. We focus on the domain of basic taste and we develop two variants of a subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology that seems palatable in that domain. Although we undertake no commitment to this being the right metaphysical cum epistemological package for basic taste, we contend that if the metaphysics and the epistemology of basic taste are understood along these lines, they call for a truth property whose nature is not distinctively normative—contra what IA predicts. This result shows that the success of IA requires certain substantial metaphysical and epistemological principles and that, consequently, a proper assessment of IA cannot avoid taking a stance on the metaphysics and the epistemology of the domain where it is claimed to be successful. Although we conjecture that IA might succeed in other domains, in this paper we don’t take a stand on this issue. We conclude by briefly discussing the significance of this result for the debate on alethic pluralism.
{"title":"DEFLATING TRUTH ABOUT TASTE","authors":"Ferrari, Moruzzi","doi":"10.2307/48584454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584454","url":null,"abstract":"In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim. This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem, as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism. We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter is accepted, a local counterexample to IA can be constructed. We focus on the domain of basic taste and we develop two variants of a subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology that seems palatable in that domain. Although we undertake no commitment to this being the right metaphysical cum epistemological package for basic taste, we contend that if the metaphysics and the epistemology of basic taste are understood along these lines, they call for a truth property whose nature is not distinctively normative—contra what IA predicts. This result shows that the success of IA requires certain substantial metaphysical and epistemological principles and that, consequently, a proper assessment of IA cannot avoid taking a stance on the metaphysics and the epistemology of the domain where it is claimed to be successful. Although we conjecture that IA might succeed in other domains, in this paper we don’t take a stand on this issue. We conclude by briefly discussing the significance of this result for the debate on alethic pluralism.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE FORCE OF ALETHIC PLURALISM","authors":"Strollo","doi":"10.2307/48584450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48584450","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69441782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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