{"title":"EDITOR’S FOREWORD TO SPECIAL ISSUE","authors":"D. Dennett","doi":"10.2307/48600681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48600681","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69448384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of the agent’s intentions? An influential answer invokes two distinct kinds of intention: intentions for the future (also known as prior intentions or distal intentions ), responsible for action planning, and intentions for the present (also known as intentions in action or proximal intentions ), responsible for action performance. I argue that there is something wrong with this influential answer: the notion of intention for the present is either superfluous (because intentions for the future can exercise functions associated both with action planning and with action performance) or ambiguous (because it conflates temporal, functional, and content-related aspects). Developing this criticism will lead to an alternative account of action planning and performance based on intentions of just one kind
{"title":"AGAINST THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND INTENTIONS FOR THE PRESENT","authors":"Chiara Brozzo","doi":"10.2307/48619318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48619318","url":null,"abstract":"How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of the agent’s intentions? An influential answer invokes two distinct kinds of intention: intentions for the future (also known as prior intentions or distal intentions ), responsible for action planning, and intentions for the present (also known as intentions in action or proximal intentions ), responsible for action performance. I argue that there is something wrong with this influential answer: the notion of intention for the present is either superfluous (because intentions for the future can exercise functions associated both with action planning and with action performance) or ambiguous (because it conflates temporal, functional, and content-related aspects). Developing this criticism will lead to an alternative account of action planning and performance based on intentions of just one kind","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69456981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"INCOMPARABILITY AND THE HUGE-IMPROVEMENT ARGUMENTS","authors":"Andreou","doi":"10.2307/48619316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48619316","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69457436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：