The philosophical interest in the nature, value, and varieties of human understanding has swelled in recent years. This article will provide an overview of new research in the epistemology of understanding, with a particular focus on the following questions: What is understanding and why should we care about it? Is understanding reducible to knowledge? Does it require truth, belief, or justification? Can there be lucky understanding? Does it require ‘grasping’ or some kind of ‘knowhow’? This cluster of questions has largely set the research agenda for the study of understanding in epistemology. This article will conclude by discussing some varieties of understanding and highlight directions for future research. Humans are naturally inquisitive creatures. As Aristotle observed, “All men by nature desire to know.” But knowledge is not the only intellectual achievement at which humans aim, and it might not be the most valuable. As Albert Einstein once said, “Any fool can know; the point is to understand.” It is widely assumed that understanding is a valuable intellectual achievement; however, the cognitive state of understanding is itself poorly understood. What is understanding? Why is it valuable? And how do we achieve it? These questions are at the forefront of recent work in the epistemology of understanding. In this article, I will attempt to give a sense of the range and depth of this new research on the nature, value, and varieties of human understanding. I will also critically evaluate some of this work. 1 The Aristotle quote is from the opening line of his Metaphysics. The Einstein quote can be found in Christian (1990, p. 207).
近年来，哲学对人类理解的性质、价值和多样性的兴趣日益浓厚。本文将概述理解认识论的新研究，特别关注以下问题:什么是理解，为什么我们应该关心它?理解可以简化为知识吗?它是否需要真理、信仰或证明?会有幸运的理解吗?它需要“掌握”或某种“诀窍”吗?这一系列问题在很大程度上为认识论中的理解研究设定了研究议程。本文将讨论一些不同的认识，并指出未来的研究方向。人类是天生好奇的生物。正如亚里士多德所观察到的，“所有人天生都渴望知道。”但知识并不是人类追求的唯一智力成就，也可能不是最有价值的。正如阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦曾经说过的，“任何傻瓜都能知道;关键是要理解。”人们普遍认为理解是一项宝贵的智力成就;然而，人们对理解的认知状态本身却知之甚少。什么是理解?它为什么有价值?我们如何实现它?这些问题是最近在理解的认识论工作的前沿。在这篇文章中，我将尝试对这一关于人类理解的性质、价值和多样性的新研究的范围和深度给出一种感觉。我也将批判性地评价其中的一些工作。这句话出自亚里士多德《形而上学》一书的开篇。爱因斯坦的话可以在Christian (1990, p. 207)中找到。
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{"title":"ANIMALISM IS EITHER FALSE OR UNINTERESTING (PERHAPS BOTH)","authors":"Duncan","doi":"10.2307/48614005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48614005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"58 1","pages":"187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69483468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Where does the impetus towards ethical theory come from? What drives humans to make values explicit, consistent, and discursively justi(able? This paper situates the demand for ethical theory in human life by identifying the practical needs that give rise to it. Such a practical derivation puts the demand in its place: while (nding a home for it in the public decisionmaking of modern societies, our account also imposes limitations on the demand by presenting it as scalable and contextsensitive. This differentiates strong forms of the demand calling for theory from weaker forms calling for less, and contexts where it has a place from contexts where it is out of place. In light of this, subjecting personal deliberation to the demand turns out to involve a tradeoff. systematization by exercising our judgment in a particular case; nor, according to Williams, does that authority derive from the idea that reason itself demands this kind of systematization. To think that systematization is required either by reason itself or by the need for rational con)ict resolution, Williams maintains, betrays an overly rationalistic conception of rationality.3 But even if we agree with Williams that neither the need to resolve con)icts as such nor reason itself pull us in the direction of ethical theory, it does not necessarily follow that there is no such pull. In “Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory,” Martha Nussbaum has argued that there is a practical demand for ethical theory. Williams, she wryly remarks, conveys the impression of thinking that “when we do away with theory we will be left with people like Bernard Williams”: energetically critical and selfcritical people, not captive to any other theory, and sensitive to distortions in their experience (2000, p. We (nd ourselves with a plurality of values which, even within one person, can con)ict in ways that are not resolvable without loss.1 The need to resolve these con)icts can seem to pull ethical thought in the direction of ethical theory and systematization, notably by demanding that values be made explicit in terms of stateable principles, that they be made consistent by using some of them to overturn others in systematic ways, and that they be rendered as far as possible discursively justi!able. It is this bundle of demands—which we shall call “the Demand” for short—that will be our central concern in this paper.2 Bernard Williams has argued that insofar as we yield to the Demand, there will be a question as to where the resulting regimentation of ethical thought derives its authority from. That authority cannot simply derive from the need to resolve con)icts of values, since we are perfectly capable of rationally resolving con)icts of values without such This content downloaded from 188.154.64.229 on Wed, 31 Mar 2021 10:20:34 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 136 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 70). But ordinary life, Nussbaum notes, is not like a Henry James novel with liberal poli
{"title":"WHENCE THE DEMAND FOR ETHICAL THEORY?","authors":"Damian Cueni, M. Queloz","doi":"10.2307/48614001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48614001","url":null,"abstract":"Where does the impetus towards ethical theory come from? What drives humans to make values explicit, consistent, and discursively justi(able? This paper situates the demand for ethical theory in human life by identifying the practical needs that give rise to it. Such a practical derivation puts the demand in its place: while (nding a home for it in the public decisionmaking of modern societies, our account also imposes limitations on the demand by presenting it as scalable and contextsensitive. This differentiates strong forms of the demand calling for theory from weaker forms calling for less, and contexts where it has a place from contexts where it is out of place. In light of this, subjecting personal deliberation to the demand turns out to involve a tradeoff. systematization by exercising our judgment in a particular case; nor, according to Williams, does that authority derive from the idea that reason itself demands this kind of systematization. To think that systematization is required either by reason itself or by the need for rational con)ict resolution, Williams maintains, betrays an overly rationalistic conception of rationality.3 But even if we agree with Williams that neither the need to resolve con)icts as such nor reason itself pull us in the direction of ethical theory, it does not necessarily follow that there is no such pull. In “Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory,” Martha Nussbaum has argued that there is a practical demand for ethical theory. Williams, she wryly remarks, conveys the impression of thinking that “when we do away with theory we will be left with people like Bernard Williams”: energetically critical and selfcritical people, not captive to any other theory, and sensitive to distortions in their experience (2000, p. We (nd ourselves with a plurality of values which, even within one person, can con)ict in ways that are not resolvable without loss.1 The need to resolve these con)icts can seem to pull ethical thought in the direction of ethical theory and systematization, notably by demanding that values be made explicit in terms of stateable principles, that they be made consistent by using some of them to overturn others in systematic ways, and that they be rendered as far as possible discursively justi!able. It is this bundle of demands—which we shall call “the Demand” for short—that will be our central concern in this paper.2 Bernard Williams has argued that insofar as we yield to the Demand, there will be a question as to where the resulting regimentation of ethical thought derives its authority from. That authority cannot simply derive from the need to resolve con)icts of values, since we are perfectly capable of rationally resolving con)icts of values without such This content downloaded from 188.154.64.229 on Wed, 31 Mar 2021 10:20:34 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 136 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 70). But ordinary life, Nussbaum notes, is not like a Henry James novel with liberal poli","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69453758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE (VIRTUE) EPISTEMOLOGY OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE","authors":"Boult","doi":"10.2307/48616057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48616057","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"41 1","pages":"217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69455265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ever since proposals for generalizing the theory of natural evolution have been put forward, the aims and ambitions of both proponents and critics have differed widely. Some consider such proposals as merely metaphors, some as analogies, some aim at a real generalization and unification, and some have even proposed to work out full reductions. In this paper it is argued that these different forms of generalizing the theory of evolution can be systematically re-framed as different approaches for transferring justification from the natural to the cultural realm, and that their differences are basically a matter of degree. With the help of such a classification it should be come clearer what to expect, but also what not to expect from the different approaches.
{"title":"THE MANY FACES OF GENERALIZING THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION","authors":"Baraghith, Feldbacher-Escamilla","doi":"10.2307/48600684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48600684","url":null,"abstract":"Ever since proposals for generalizing the theory of natural evolution have been put forward, the aims and ambitions of both proponents and critics have differed widely. Some consider such proposals as merely metaphors, some as analogies, some aim at a real generalization and unification, and some have even proposed to work out full reductions. In this paper it is argued that these different forms of generalizing the theory of evolution can be systematically re-framed as different approaches for transferring justification from the natural to the cultural realm, and that their differences are basically a matter of degree. With the help of such a classification it should be come clearer what to expect, but also what not to expect from the different approaches.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"58 1","pages":"35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69448681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"EVOLUTION IN NATURE AND CULTURE","authors":"Schurz","doi":"10.2307/48600688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48600688","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"58 1","pages":"95"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69448720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE STANDARD OF CORRECTNESS AND THE ONTOLOGY OF DEPICTION","authors":"Terrone","doi":"10.2307/48619323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48619323","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69457132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE INEVITABILITY OF A GENERALIZED DARWINIAN THEORY OF BEHAVIOR, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE","authors":"Rosenberg","doi":"10.2307/48600685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48600685","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"58 1","pages":"51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69448684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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