Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000314
Nicholas G. Napolio
Abstract Why do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies’ dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling to overseers that their policies are efficient and should be maintained. Bureaucrats form coalitions actively to advance their policy goals in the face of political opposition. Using data on dozens of agencies over seventeen years, I find that agencies are most likely to form coalitions when their preferences are misaligned with the president but aligned with each other. I also find evidence that coalitions send credible signals that bureaucratic policies are efficient since Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is less likely to request regulatory revisions of policies produced by coalitions.
行政机构为什么会形成联盟?立法联盟被广泛地理论化和研究，但对行政联盟的关注较少。行政机构对政治部门的依赖要求有一种独特的联盟建立理论。本文提出了这样一个理论，认为机构在三权分立体系中处于从属地位，通过向监管机构发出信号，表明它们的政策是有效的，应该得到维持，从而形成联盟，以优化它们的自主权。面对政治上的反对，官僚们积极地组成联盟来推进他们的政策目标。我利用几十个机构17年来的数据发现，当机构的偏好与总统不一致，但彼此一致时，它们最有可能结成联盟。我还发现，有证据表明，联合政府发出了可信的信号，表明官僚政策是有效的，因为信息和监管事务办公室(Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs)不太可能要求对联合政府制定的政策进行监管修订。
{"title":"Executive coalition building","authors":"Nicholas G. Napolio","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000314","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies’ dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling to overseers that their policies are efficient and should be maintained. Bureaucrats form coalitions actively to advance their policy goals in the face of political opposition. Using data on dozens of agencies over seventeen years, I find that agencies are most likely to form coalitions when their preferences are misaligned with the president but aligned with each other. I also find evidence that coalitions send credible signals that bureaucratic policies are efficient since Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is less likely to request regulatory revisions of policies produced by coalitions.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135969964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000260
Alexander Kuo, Dulce Manzano, Aina Gallego
Abstract Does the threat of automation of workers’ employment provoke distinct policy preferences from that of globalization? We present hypotheses about how these different threats affect support for policies to prevent such shocks as well as policies to compensate via redistribution. Using vignettes and conjoint experiments embedded in survey evidence from Spain, we find that the threat of automation does not provoke any greater demand for redistribution than does openness. Nor does job loss due to automation provoke beliefs of greater deservingness of compensatory transfers, compared to job loss from openness. While the threat of offshoring and hiring foreign workers increases support for policies to prevent this process from occurring, scenarios of robot substitution do not provoke a similar reaction. These results suggest policies to prioritize automation over openness may gain less political traction.
{"title":"Automation versus openness: support for policies to address job threats","authors":"Alexander Kuo, Dulce Manzano, Aina Gallego","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000260","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Does the threat of automation of workers’ employment provoke distinct policy preferences from that of globalization? We present hypotheses about how these different threats affect support for policies to prevent such shocks as well as policies to compensate via redistribution. Using vignettes and conjoint experiments embedded in survey evidence from Spain, we find that the threat of automation does not provoke any greater demand for redistribution than does openness. Nor does job loss due to automation provoke beliefs of greater deservingness of compensatory transfers, compared to job loss from openness. While the threat of offshoring and hiring foreign workers increases support for policies to prevent this process from occurring, scenarios of robot substitution do not provoke a similar reaction. These results suggest policies to prioritize automation over openness may gain less political traction.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135095983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000296
Long Pham, Yam B. Limbu, Mai Thi Thu Le, Ngoc Lan Nguyen
Abstract This study examines the relationships between e-government service quality, perceived value, satisfaction, and loyalty toward e-government services. Survey data were collected from 340 randomly selected e-government service users in Vietnam. The results reveal that (1) e-government service quality consists of five dimensions: ease of interaction, fulfillment, citizen care, security and privacy, and trustworthiness; (2) among the five dimensions of e-government service quality, only trustworthiness and fulfillment are significantly related to perceived value; however, trustworthiness has a stronger association with perceived value than does fulfillment; and (3) both perceived value and satisfaction are positively associated with loyalty. The results indicate that the e-government can create value for the citizens by improving service quality, which may help satisfy citizens’ needs and build their loyalty.
{"title":"E-government service quality, perceived value, satisfaction, and loyalty: evidence from a newly emerging country","authors":"Long Pham, Yam B. Limbu, Mai Thi Thu Le, Ngoc Lan Nguyen","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000296","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study examines the relationships between e-government service quality, perceived value, satisfaction, and loyalty toward e-government services. Survey data were collected from 340 randomly selected e-government service users in Vietnam. The results reveal that (1) e-government service quality consists of five dimensions: ease of interaction, fulfillment, citizen care, security and privacy, and trustworthiness; (2) among the five dimensions of e-government service quality, only trustworthiness and fulfillment are significantly related to perceived value; however, trustworthiness has a stronger association with perceived value than does fulfillment; and (3) both perceived value and satisfaction are positively associated with loyalty. The results indicate that the e-government can create value for the citizens by improving service quality, which may help satisfy citizens’ needs and build their loyalty.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135350502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000284
Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen, Peter B. Mortensen
Abstract The outbreak of COVID-19 unleashed a severe crisis in society. The suddenness and speed with which the disease spread into a global pandemic makes it an outstanding case for showing how bureaucracy acts in response to a crisis marked by uncertainty and urgency. This article focuses on the role played by the central government bureaucracy in preparing and enacting the Danish government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis. It is based on full access to internal government files related to crisis management during the winter and spring of 2020. These files include memos, e-mails, decision notes, and draft decisions from key civil servants. The article demonstrates the strength of the theory of bounded rationality when it comes to analyzing the interaction between top civil servants and political executives. Moreover, it shows how administrative and political executives can mold a governmental organization to overcome the inertia inherent in bureaucratic organization and procedures.
{"title":"Coping with the unforeseen: bounded rationality and bureaucratic responses to the COVID-19 crisis","authors":"Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen, Peter B. Mortensen","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000284","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The outbreak of COVID-19 unleashed a severe crisis in society. The suddenness and speed with which the disease spread into a global pandemic makes it an outstanding case for showing how bureaucracy acts in response to a crisis marked by uncertainty and urgency. This article focuses on the role played by the central government bureaucracy in preparing and enacting the Danish government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis. It is based on full access to internal government files related to crisis management during the winter and spring of 2020. These files include memos, e-mails, decision notes, and draft decisions from key civil servants. The article demonstrates the strength of the theory of bounded rationality when it comes to analyzing the interaction between top civil servants and political executives. Moreover, it shows how administrative and political executives can mold a governmental organization to overcome the inertia inherent in bureaucratic organization and procedures.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135351769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000302
Evan M. Mistur, Daniel C. Matisoff
Abstract Policy diffusion is an important element of the policy formation process. However, understanding of the micro-level interactions governing policy spread remains limited. Much of the literature focuses on macro-level proxies for intergovernmental connectivity. These proxies outline broad diffusion patterns without specifying the micro-level mechanisms that govern how individuals facilitate that diffusion. The role of stakeholders in diffusion in the policy subsystem is also poorly understood. We construct a panel dataset covering the spread of the US ecotourism programs from 1993 to 2016 to investigate how micro-level movement within stakeholder networks explains state-level policy diffusion over time. Using fixed-effects regression, we find that stakeholder movement significantly drives diffusion, acting as a mechanism of knowledge transfer. Our findings provide a more precise theoretical understanding of how policy knowledge diffuses at the micro level, empirically explain the role of policy stakeholders in diffusion, and highlight the value of citizen-science data for policy research.
{"title":"As the crow flies: tracking policy diffusion through stakeholder networks","authors":"Evan M. Mistur, Daniel C. Matisoff","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000302","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Policy diffusion is an important element of the policy formation process. However, understanding of the micro-level interactions governing policy spread remains limited. Much of the literature focuses on macro-level proxies for intergovernmental connectivity. These proxies outline broad diffusion patterns without specifying the micro-level mechanisms that govern how individuals facilitate that diffusion. The role of stakeholders in diffusion in the policy subsystem is also poorly understood. We construct a panel dataset covering the spread of the US ecotourism programs from 1993 to 2016 to investigate how micro-level movement within stakeholder networks explains state-level policy diffusion over time. Using fixed-effects regression, we find that stakeholder movement significantly drives diffusion, acting as a mechanism of knowledge transfer. Our findings provide a more precise theoretical understanding of how policy knowledge diffuses at the micro level, empirically explain the role of policy stakeholders in diffusion, and highlight the value of citizen-science data for policy research.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135549127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-14DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000235
Adrià Albareda, Bert Fraussen
Abstract Interest groups are key intermediary actors that communicate societal interests and preferences to public officials. Given public officials’ reliance on interest groups’ input in public policy processes, it is essential to understand how groups establish policy positions and assess the democratic nature of this process. Focusing on the leadership perspective, this article examines how interest groups involve their membership base in the process of defining their policy positions. The article relies on qualitative data from interviews with the leaders of interest groups active at the EU level and the statutes of these organizations. The findings show that the nature of policy issues under discussion and unequal resources of members lead to biased membership involvement in policy position-taking. While leaders are aware of these dynamics, their efforts to mitigate unequal participation seem limited, which raises questions about the representative potential of interest groups and the legitimacy of their policy claims.
{"title":"The representative capacity of interest groups: explaining how issue features shape membership involvement when establishing policy positions","authors":"Adrià Albareda, Bert Fraussen","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000235","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Interest groups are key intermediary actors that communicate societal interests and preferences to public officials. Given public officials’ reliance on interest groups’ input in public policy processes, it is essential to understand how groups establish policy positions and assess the democratic nature of this process. Focusing on the leadership perspective, this article examines how interest groups involve their membership base in the process of defining their policy positions. The article relies on qualitative data from interviews with the leaders of interest groups active at the EU level and the statutes of these organizations. The findings show that the nature of policy issues under discussion and unequal resources of members lead to biased membership involvement in policy position-taking. While leaders are aware of these dynamics, their efforts to mitigate unequal participation seem limited, which raises questions about the representative potential of interest groups and the legitimacy of their policy claims.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134913039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000223
Anne Heyerdahl
Abstract Standards developed by standard-setting organisations (SSOs) – sometimes labelled private rulemaking – are part of larger practices of governance in most societies yet are underinvestigated from a policy process perspective. Utilising and developing the multiple streams approach (MSA), this article investigates a policy process moving between government and the SSO Standards Norway (SN). The study finds standardisation by SSOs to be an ambiguous institutional arrangement. Strong institutional barriers in theory did not work as such in the case investigated. This article argues that the differentiation between responsibility for process (SN) and content (committee) makes the standardisation process vulnerable. The concept of “institutional deficit” is introduced to describe a potential mismatch between SSOs producing policy in a government-like institution, but where the SSOs are not capable of taking responsibility for policies in a government-like way. This article finds the adjusted MSA useful in this potentially least likely case.
{"title":"Standardising policy in a nonstandard way: a public/private standardisation process in Norway","authors":"Anne Heyerdahl","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000223","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Standards developed by standard-setting organisations (SSOs) – sometimes labelled private rulemaking – are part of larger practices of governance in most societies yet are underinvestigated from a policy process perspective. Utilising and developing the multiple streams approach (MSA), this article investigates a policy process moving between government and the SSO Standards Norway (SN). The study finds standardisation by SSOs to be an ambiguous institutional arrangement. Strong institutional barriers in theory did not work as such in the case investigated. This article argues that the differentiation between responsibility for process (SN) and content (committee) makes the standardisation process vulnerable. The concept of “institutional deficit” is introduced to describe a potential mismatch between SSOs producing policy in a government-like institution, but where the SSOs are not capable of taking responsibility for policies in a government-like way. This article finds the adjusted MSA useful in this potentially least likely case.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135879247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-17DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000211
Joan Costa‐Font, N. Knust
Exposure to (a liberal) democracy can have an impact on both the political attention and visibility of the needs of marginalized populations, as well as the design of health policies that can influence the distribution of population health. This paper investigates the effect of exposure to democracy, that is, the number of years spent in a democracy as measured by democracy indexes, on various measures of inequality in self-reported health across European countries. We use an instrumental variable strategy to leverage the potential endogeneity of a country’s exposure to democracy, drawing on both bivariate (socioeconomic) and univariate health inequality measures. Our estimates provide evidence that an additional year in a democracy reduces both bivariate (income-related) health inequality and overall (univariate) health inequality. Our preferred specification suggests a two-point rank reduction in inequality with an additional year under a democracy. The effect is mainly driven by a reduction of “health poverty” alongside other effects.
{"title":"Does exposure to democracy decrease health inequality?","authors":"Joan Costa‐Font, N. Knust","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000211","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Exposure to (a liberal) democracy can have an impact on both the political attention and visibility of the needs of marginalized populations, as well as the design of health policies that can influence the distribution of population health. This paper investigates the effect of exposure to democracy, that is, the number of years spent in a democracy as measured by democracy indexes, on various measures of inequality in self-reported health across European countries. We use an instrumental variable strategy to leverage the potential endogeneity of a country’s exposure to democracy, drawing on both bivariate (socioeconomic) and univariate health inequality measures. Our estimates provide evidence that an additional year in a democracy reduces both bivariate (income-related) health inequality and overall (univariate) health inequality. Our preferred specification suggests a two-point rank reduction in inequality with an additional year under a democracy. The effect is mainly driven by a reduction of “health poverty” alongside other effects.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42822212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x23000259
{"title":"PUP volume 43 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x23000259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x23000259","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48320034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x2300020x
J. Jenkins, Nathan W. Monroe, Tessa Provins
The literature on congressional decision-making has largely ignored the influence of the minority party in the legislative process. This follows from the widely held belief that the majority party dominates the agenda-setting process. Though the minority party rarely achieves major policy success in Congress, we argue that the minority has significantly more influence over the legislative agenda than is commonly believed. We posit that, under some conditions, the minority has enough bargaining leverage to get floor votes on their proposals, in the form of both amendments and bills. We test our theoretical expectations with a novel design utilizing whip count data from the House and show that when a whip count on a bill occurs, the likelihood of a minority amendment disappointment and a majority amendment roll increases, respectively. This suggests that the more leverage the minority party has, the more we see their legislative proposals on the floor.
{"title":"Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress: whip counts, amendment votes, and minority leverage in the house","authors":"J. Jenkins, Nathan W. Monroe, Tessa Provins","doi":"10.1017/s0143814x2300020x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x2300020x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The literature on congressional decision-making has largely ignored the influence of the minority party in the legislative process. This follows from the widely held belief that the majority party dominates the agenda-setting process. Though the minority party rarely achieves major policy success in Congress, we argue that the minority has significantly more influence over the legislative agenda than is commonly believed. We posit that, under some conditions, the minority has enough bargaining leverage to get floor votes on their proposals, in the form of both amendments and bills. We test our theoretical expectations with a novel design utilizing whip count data from the House and show that when a whip count on a bill occurs, the likelihood of a minority amendment disappointment and a majority amendment roll increases, respectively. This suggests that the more leverage the minority party has, the more we see their legislative proposals on the floor.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45767840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：