Journal of Family Business Strategy最新文献

Extant literature suggests that family firms, due to their desire to retain family control, have a lower propensity to diversify than non-family firms. Contrarily, family business groups (FBGs), especially Asian FBGs, are widely diversified. It was anticipated that FBGs would become more focused during reforms in developing economies. However, these FBGs did not only maintain their diversified portfolio of businesses but also enter newly deregulated sectors during reforms. This paper draws insights from transaction cost theory and knowledge governance literature to investigate this paradox. This paper argues that the family-based governance mechanisms of FBGs can efficiently manage their diversified portfolio by avoiding the “negatives” associated with market-based exchanges and creating “positives” by efficient knowledge sharing among affiliates. Thus, diversification strategies allowed Indian FBGs to create value and preserve the socioemotional and psychic wealth that comes from owning various businesses.

A single family office (SFO) is an organizational entity owned by a single family and primarily dedicated to managing assets and meeting the needs of family members. While a rising number of SFOs around the world emphasize the importance of this specific vehicle for entrepreneurial families, scholarly knowledge on SFOs is surprisingly scarce. To better understand this phenomenon, we conducted and analyzed exploratory interviews with 109 German-speaking SFO-owning families. We answer a call for research on SFO heterogeneity by identifying two relevant, separate dimensions: a) whether the family still owns the original family firm and b) whether the family generation who founded the SFO still owns the SFO. Based on our qualitative insights and theoretical approaches such as socioemotional wealth (SEW) and agency theory, we develop propositions about how the respective heterogeneity of SFOs affects the family-related goals, entrepreneurial investment behaviors, and governance of SFOs.

We study whether differences in shareholder protection by countries are important in explaining lower corporate social performance (CSP) of family firms vis-à-vis non-family firms. We create a dataset covering 46 countries for the period 2002–2016. Using a novel approach, we show that the difference in CSP of family firms relative to similar non-family firms is smaller when family firms experience stronger minority shareholder protection to reduce conflicts of interest than non-family firms do. Moreover, we find that the difference in CSP of family firms relative to similar non-family firms is larger when family firms experience stronger shareholders’ rights in corporate governance than non-family firms do. Our results support the view that differences in country-level shareholder protection play an important role in explaining the differences in CSP between family and non-family firms.

We study conflicting arguments and empirical findings of the socioemotional wealth (SEW)-family firm performance relationship using meta-analysis. We add to the debate by questioning: First, how do major managerial decisions (strategic choices, corporate governance, and non-family stakeholder orientation) play a mediating role in the SEW performance link? Second, how do specific five SEW dimensions act as moderating variables in the SEW-performance link? We show a positive relationship between SEW and performance. Hence there is no evidence that the pursuit of family SEW occurs at the expense of financial utility. Furthermore, we find that major managerial decisions mediate the SEW-performance relation.

Understanding family firms’ debt maturity structure is important because it plays a key role in making strategic decisions and mitigating agency conflicts. This study investigates the relationship between family involvement in governance and debt maturity structure in family firms by drawing on governance literature and insights from the socioemotional wealth perspective. Based on a sample of non-financial Italian public family firms, comprising 383 firm-year observations, we find differences in the proportion of long-term debt depending on variations in components of family involvement in governance. In particular, later-generation involvement on the board is associated with a lower proportion of long-term debt. Furthermore, family ownership positively moderates this relationship such that the proportion of long-term debt is higher with high family ownership. This study contributes to literature by adding further nuance to our understanding of the heterogeneity of family firms, by considering the relationship between variations in family involvement in governance and debt structure. Our study has practical implications that may inform investors about factors related to family involvement in governance, which are likely to influence debt maturity structure, and thus long-term strategies of family firms.

This article addresses the business family, which so far has received only limited scholarly attention. The business family as the group of family members regularly discussing and deciding business matters is key for the functioning of both the business and the family. Specifically, we propose and empirically test the concept of the enterpriseness of business families, which is the ability to handle the potentially contradictory expectations of the family and business systems. We empirically validate the enterpriseness scale using a sample of 451 business families. Results indicate high levels of validity and reliability. The two subscales decision-making ability (six items) and business family identity (four items) offer a methodically rigorous, theoretically sound, and parsimonious measure. The article presents opportunities for potential applications of the enterpriseness concept and scale for family business as well as business family research and practice.

Class hegemony and resource dependence are the traditional perspectives used to explain interlocking directorate formation in publicly listed corporations. A subset of these corporations, family firms, are different because their governance involves non-economic interests. There are few empirical validations of these perspectives for family firms. Through a 16 semi-annual period longitudinal comparison of non-financial family and non-family Italian firms, we show that the traditional perspectives partially explain board formation in family businesses while other considerations such as family ties provide a more complete picture. Over the same period, we find that family and non-family firm interlocks evolve differently, suggesting refinements on theories of board interlocks for family firms.

Several firms around the world are led by multiple CEOs. Our study investigates how co-CEOs affect corporate investment under different conditions of ownership and governance. We argue that while family firms may invest more parsimoniously than non-family firms, the presence of multiple family CEOs raises overinvestment due to a potential divergence of personal agendas. Our analysis confirms that co-CEOs are conducive of excessive investment activities in family firms. This effect is lower when the family firm is subject to strong board monitoring, and higher when the co-CEOs belong to different family branches. Contrary to the view that families represent homogeneous groups with aligned interests and preferences, our study suggests that the fragmentation of leadership among multiple actors may be costly for the family business.

This article studies the relationship between familiness, approached from a new systems theory perspective, and decision-making quality in family firm top management teams. We focus on two potential explanations of this relationship by examining the mediating role of emotional dissonance and perceived team support. A hand-collected multiple-respondent dataset of 212 top managers from 45 Belgian family firm TMTs shows a positive relationship between familiness and decision-making quality, mediated by the level of perceived team support. Moreover, we find that familiness decreases the level of emotional dissonance experienced by these top managers.

This study investigates the relationship between board social activity (i.e., frequency of board meetings) and firm performance in publicly traded family and non-family firms, focusing on the moderating effects of family involvement (i.e., family ownership and at least one family member on the board of directors). Our investigation is based on a database of 172 family and non-family firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange over a 10-year period (1098 observations). The results indicate a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between board meeting frequency and firm accounting performance. Moreover, family involvement positively moderates this curvilinear relationship, leading to an optimal level of board meetings, which is higher in firms with increasing family involvement than in other firms. Applying behavioral governance theory, we contribute to explain how boards of directors influence firm performance through the board context (i.e., family involvement) and arrangements (i.e., frequency of board meetings/social interactions), providing evidence for family firm heterogeneity.