Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1525/as.2023.63.2.258
T. Bui, Edmund J. Malesky
Vietnam in 2022 was beset with numerous dramatic political developments and diplomatic uncertainties but also recorded significant economic achievements. Changes in the top echelons of power took place in an unprecedented manner due to the intensifying anticorruption campaign, exposing the malleability of elite Vietnamese governing institutions and shrinking the space for civil society organizations. Meanwhile, Vietnam was recognized for its outstanding recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic with remarkable economic performance. The country’s “bamboo diplomacy” was put under stress amid challenges caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US–China strategic rivalry. Navigating the turbulence and uncertainty of domestic and international affairs while maintaining the momentum of economic recovery will be the main challenge for Vietnam in 2023.
{"title":"Vietnam in 2022","authors":"T. Bui, Edmund J. Malesky","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.63.2.258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.63.2.258","url":null,"abstract":"Vietnam in 2022 was beset with numerous dramatic political developments and diplomatic uncertainties but also recorded significant economic achievements. Changes in the top echelons of power took place in an unprecedented manner due to the intensifying anticorruption campaign, exposing the malleability of elite Vietnamese governing institutions and shrinking the space for civil society organizations. Meanwhile, Vietnam was recognized for its outstanding recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic with remarkable economic performance. The country’s “bamboo diplomacy” was put under stress amid challenges caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US–China strategic rivalry. Navigating the turbulence and uncertainty of domestic and international affairs while maintaining the momentum of economic recovery will be the main challenge for Vietnam in 2023.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44552314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1525/as.2023.63.2.186
Sang-you Rhyu
Japan’s domestic politics in 2022, though immensely shocked by Abe’s assassination, continued as usual without major changes from 2021. The LDP–Komeito coalition prevails, and opposition coalitions failed to prevent it from dominating. Although the Japanese economy is recovering from COVID-19 with increasing consumption, the recovery rate is slower than expected. The Japanese economy suffered both internally and externally in 2022. While adhering to the principle of exclusive self-defense under the US–Japan Security Treaty, the Kishida government is trying to improve deterrence with a new security strategy focusing on strengthening its counterstrike capability.
{"title":"Japan in 2022","authors":"Sang-you Rhyu","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.63.2.186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.63.2.186","url":null,"abstract":"Japan’s domestic politics in 2022, though immensely shocked by Abe’s assassination, continued as usual without major changes from 2021. The LDP–Komeito coalition prevails, and opposition coalitions failed to prevent it from dominating. Although the Japanese economy is recovering from COVID-19 with increasing consumption, the recovery rate is slower than expected. The Japanese economy suffered both internally and externally in 2022. While adhering to the principle of exclusive self-defense under the US–Japan Security Treaty, the Kishida government is trying to improve deterrence with a new security strategy focusing on strengthening its counterstrike capability.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45171814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is a huge free trade pact which was signed in November 2020 after eight years of laborious talks and deliberations by 15 Asia-Pacific countries. It was ratified on January 1, 2022. Besides 10 ASEAN member countries, the pact includes China, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. However, despite the long negotiations, India withdrew from the pact in November 2019. To explore why, I use the “two-level game” perspective offered by Robert Putnam. The main argument is that by themselves neither domestic nor international/structural factors can account for India’s exit; but the enmeshment of both provides a comprehensive treatment.
{"title":"Understanding India’s Exit from the RCEP","authors":"Arshid Iqbal Dar","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.2007906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.2007906","url":null,"abstract":"The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is a huge free trade pact which was signed in November 2020 after eight years of laborious talks and deliberations by 15 Asia-Pacific countries. It was ratified on January 1, 2022. Besides 10 ASEAN member countries, the pact includes China, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. However, despite the long negotiations, India withdrew from the pact in November 2019. To explore why, I use the “two-level game” perspective offered by Robert Putnam. The main argument is that by themselves neither domestic nor international/structural factors can account for India’s exit; but the enmeshment of both provides a comprehensive treatment.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135263963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social media is the most popular platform for the expression of public opinion, and it is a critical channel through which researchers can observe the dynamics and patterns of public opinion. This study explores the political origins of Chinese nationalism by focusing on how official media shapes mass nationalism in Cyber China. Analyzing 26 million Weibo posts made during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, we found significant variations in nationalism among user types, localities, and stages of the pandemic. Unlike previous studies, we found that the official Chinese media did not always play the expected role of promoting nationalism; instead, it acted as a system of emotional valves that channeled social sentiment. Official media is intended to stabilize social sentiment and prevent social unrest, and nationalistic news stories are used to draw attention away from domestic problems.
{"title":"Official Media as Emotional Valves","authors":"Fangzhu Lu, Zhongbi Huang, Tianguang Meng","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.1831404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.1831404","url":null,"abstract":"Social media is the most popular platform for the expression of public opinion, and it is a critical channel through which researchers can observe the dynamics and patterns of public opinion. This study explores the political origins of Chinese nationalism by focusing on how official media shapes mass nationalism in Cyber China. Analyzing 26 million Weibo posts made during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, we found significant variations in nationalism among user types, localities, and stages of the pandemic. Unlike previous studies, we found that the official Chinese media did not always play the expected role of promoting nationalism; instead, it acted as a system of emotional valves that channeled social sentiment. Official media is intended to stabilize social sentiment and prevent social unrest, and nationalistic news stories are used to draw attention away from domestic problems.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I challenge the dominant Western discourse on China’s rise. This discourse tends to reflect political construction rather than thoughtful scholarship. It is poorly informed by historical evidence and usually evades comparison of China’s conduct with that of other countries, such as the United States, now or in the past. It is also characterized by strong tendencies of groupthink and revisionist scholarship to adjust to prevailing official policies and popular sentiments instead of scrutinizing their validity. This discourse is not only wrong but also dangerous.
{"title":"Bewildered and Befuddled","authors":"S. Chan","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.1999300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.1999300","url":null,"abstract":"I challenge the dominant Western discourse on China’s rise. This discourse tends to reflect political construction rather than thoughtful scholarship. It is poorly informed by historical evidence and usually evades comparison of China’s conduct with that of other countries, such as the United States, now or in the past. It is also characterized by strong tendencies of groupthink and revisionist scholarship to adjust to prevailing official policies and popular sentiments instead of scrutinizing their validity. This discourse is not only wrong but also dangerous.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates, using statistical analysis and case evidence, whether cooperative China–DPRK relations or China’s rise influence the DPRK to act more aggressively toward the ROK–U.S. Statistically, amicable China–DPRK ties have a positive association with the number of DPRK’s aggressive actions toward the ROK–U.S. The increase in China–DPRK’s material capability relative to that of the ROK–U.S. also positively affected this number. These findings are further supported through case evidence: China’s stance toward the DPRK before and after the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010, and the THAAD incident between the DPRK’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016.
{"title":"China–DPRK Relations, China’s Rise, and DPRK Aggressions toward the ROK–U.S., 1990–2021","authors":"Alec Chung","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.2003586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.2003586","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates, using statistical analysis and case evidence, whether cooperative China–DPRK relations or China’s rise influence the DPRK to act more aggressively toward the ROK–U.S. Statistically, amicable China–DPRK ties have a positive association with the number of DPRK’s aggressive actions toward the ROK–U.S. The increase in China–DPRK’s material capability relative to that of the ROK–U.S. also positively affected this number. These findings are further supported through case evidence: China’s stance toward the DPRK before and after the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010, and the THAAD incident between the DPRK’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we trace the strategy of political control employed in North Korea under Kim Jong Un. Using conceptual tools created in the literature on comparative authoritarianism, we consider the roles of repression, co-optation, coercive distribution, and containment with respect to how the North Korean regime responds to external and internal threats. We focus on two areas as case studies in differentiated, contingent political control strategies. First, we consider the role of border as a conduit for unauthorized goods, migrants, and illicit information and the regime’s regulation of it. Second, we examine the regime’s management of internal economic actors, namely urban entrepreneurs and farmers. The main argument of this article is that Kim Jong Un has employed a policy of simultaneous co-optation, repression, and latterly under COVID-19, reemergent coercive distribution, building on but also modifying the strategic approaches pursued under Kim Jong Il.
{"title":"Strategies of Political Control under Kim Jong Un","authors":"P. Ward, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.1826437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.1826437","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we trace the strategy of political control employed in North Korea under Kim Jong Un. Using conceptual tools created in the literature on comparative authoritarianism, we consider the roles of repression, co-optation, coercive distribution, and containment with respect to how the North Korean regime responds to external and internal threats. We focus on two areas as case studies in differentiated, contingent political control strategies. First, we consider the role of border as a conduit for unauthorized goods, migrants, and illicit information and the regime’s regulation of it. Second, we examine the regime’s management of internal economic actors, namely urban entrepreneurs and farmers. The main argument of this article is that Kim Jong Un has employed a policy of simultaneous co-optation, repression, and latterly under COVID-19, reemergent coercive distribution, building on but also modifying the strategic approaches pursued under Kim Jong Il.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Chinese government has effectively adapted to the new environment in which information flow is greatly facilitated by the wide use of social media. This adaptation is aided not only by its resources and learning ability but also by citizens supportive of the regime. Content manipulation and censorship are the two primary approaches used by the Chinese government to manage social media. This paper examines how supportive citizens help the state manage cyberspace by tipping off state agencies. The state encourages tip providers by responding to tips, including political ones, and sometimes by rewarding the provider. Tip providers reduce the cost of monitoring social media, enhance the legitimacy of censorship, and discourage and marginalize regime critics. The presence of tip providers reflects and reinforces the split or ideological polarization among the population.
{"title":"Cooperative Citizens","authors":"Yongshun Cai","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.1814629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.1814629","url":null,"abstract":"The Chinese government has effectively adapted to the new environment in which information flow is greatly facilitated by the wide use of social media. This adaptation is aided not only by its resources and learning ability but also by citizens supportive of the regime. Content manipulation and censorship are the two primary approaches used by the Chinese government to manage social media. This paper examines how supportive citizens help the state manage cyberspace by tipping off state agencies. The state encourages tip providers by responding to tips, including political ones, and sometimes by rewarding the provider. Tip providers reduce the cost of monitoring social media, enhance the legitimacy of censorship, and discourage and marginalize regime critics. The presence of tip providers reflects and reinforces the split or ideological polarization among the population.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the conditional effectiveness of foreign aid for economic growth. Theoretically, I argue that to maximize the chance to stay in office, the leaders of a large winning coalition will spend the aid money as intended, to provide public goods, which aids economic growth. On the other hand, leaders of a small winning coalition will spend the money on private goods, which is less effective for growth. To test this argument, I construct a panel data set for 28 Asian countries (1990–2010) and apply the generalized method of moments. I find that the interaction between ODA and coalition size significantly affects economic growth. Broadly, for large winning coalitions, growth rate increases with higher ODA, while for small winning coalitions it decreases with higher ODA.
{"title":"Foreign Aid, Winning Coalitions, and Economic Growth","authors":"Yunhee Choi","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.1999358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.1999358","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the conditional effectiveness of foreign aid for economic growth. Theoretically, I argue that to maximize the chance to stay in office, the leaders of a large winning coalition will spend the aid money as intended, to provide public goods, which aids economic growth. On the other hand, leaders of a small winning coalition will spend the money on private goods, which is less effective for growth. To test this argument, I construct a panel data set for 28 Asian countries (1990–2010) and apply the generalized method of moments. I find that the interaction between ODA and coalition size significantly affects economic growth. Broadly, for large winning coalitions, growth rate increases with higher ODA, while for small winning coalitions it decreases with higher ODA.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
COVID-19 generated significant anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea. Domestic elite-level narratives regarding China at the pandemic’s onset were highly polarized: conservative parties advocated border shutdowns, emphasizing China as originating the virus, while progressive parties warned that this would incite xenophobia. Did these narratives shape anti-Chinese sentiment, and what are their foreign policy effects? Using social media data, I show that despite the polarized narratives at the elite level, attitudes of both conservative and progressive voters became unfavorable toward China following COVID-19’s onset. Furthermore, statistical analyses of survey data show that this blame is strongly associated with negative perceptions of China. Although substantively not directly linked to foreign policy, blame of China is strongly associated with rejection of foreign policy alignment with China and a shift toward supporting alignment with the US. These results have implications for understanding public support of South Korea’s foreign policy amid US–China bifurcation.
{"title":"COVID-19, Anti-Chinese Sentiment, and Foreign Policy Attitudes in South Korea","authors":"Esther E. Song","doi":"10.1525/as.2023.2008558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.2008558","url":null,"abstract":"COVID-19 generated significant anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea. Domestic elite-level narratives regarding China at the pandemic’s onset were highly polarized: conservative parties advocated border shutdowns, emphasizing China as originating the virus, while progressive parties warned that this would incite xenophobia. Did these narratives shape anti-Chinese sentiment, and what are their foreign policy effects? Using social media data, I show that despite the polarized narratives at the elite level, attitudes of both conservative and progressive voters became unfavorable toward China following COVID-19’s onset. Furthermore, statistical analyses of survey data show that this blame is strongly associated with negative perceptions of China. Although substantively not directly linked to foreign policy, blame of China is strongly associated with rejection of foreign policy alignment with China and a shift toward supporting alignment with the US. These results have implications for understanding public support of South Korea’s foreign policy amid US–China bifurcation.","PeriodicalId":47691,"journal":{"name":"Asian Survey","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67100130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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