Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Cognitive Science最新文献

Through daily exposure to the surrounding input structured in conversations, children's language gradually develops into rich linguistic constructions that contain multiple cross-modal elements subtly used together for rich communicative functions. Children demonstrate their skills to resort to multiple semiotic resources in their daily interactions and expertly use them according to their expressive needs and communicative intents. Usage-based (Tomasello, 2003) and cognitive linguistics (Langacker, 1988) as well as construction grammar (Goldberg, 2006) have enriched our comprehension of the processes at work. Those approaches need to be combined to gesture studies (Kendon, 1988; McNeill, 1992) and multimodal approaches (Andren, 2010; Morgenstern, 2014) to fully capture the orchestration of the semiotic resources at play (Cienki, 2012; Müller, 2009). But child language development cannot be understood outside its interactional, dialogic context (Bakhtin, 1981) and without taking into account the role of expert languagers (Vygotsky, 1934) in routines or formats (Bruner, 1975). The first section thus extensively focuses on a productive combination of theoretical approaches and methods, which have been essential to understand child language development, but analyzing child language is also necessary in turn to ground socio-cognitive and interactional approaches to language. The salient features of the variably multimodal child's development are presented in the second section. The third section illustrates longitudinal pathways into multimodal languaging thanks to detailed analyses of adult-child interactive sequences. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Computer Science and Robotics > Natural Language Processing Linguistics > Language Acquisition Linguistics > Cognitive Linguistics.

Stroke is the leading cause of disability globally in need of novel and effective methods of rehabilitation. Intermittent theta burst stimulation (iTBS) has been adopted as a Level B recommendation for lower limb spasticity in guidelines on the therapeutic use of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). Nonetheless, the methodological differences and deficits of existing work bring about heterogenous results and therefore limit the universal clinical use of rTMS in lower extremity (LE) rehabilitation. The variation of stimulated targets across motor cortex contributes mainly to these heterogeneities. This narrative review includes studies of rTMS on LE motor function rehabilitation in patients after stroke until now. Some analyses of brain imaging and electromagnetic simulation and quantification through computational modeling were also performed. rTMS appears capable of fostering LE motor rehabilitation after stroke, but the actually stimulated targets are considerably bias making it difficult to confirm effectiveness. The main reason for this phenomenon is probably inaccurate targeting of motor cortical leg representation. An underlying updated method is proposed as Individual-Target TMS (IT-TMS) combined with brain imaging. rTMS is a promising validated method for LE function regaining. Future studies should systematically compare the effects of IT-TMS with traditional rTMS using large samples in random clinical trials. This article is categorized under: Neuroscience > Clinical Neuroscience.

A lot of what humans communicate about concerns cognitive contents of various kinds produced by others or themselves: speech, thought, writing, emotional states, attitudes, hopes, and the like. Languages have developed specialized ways to structure the representation of such contents, especially in various dedicated forms of speech and thought representation. Represented content can also include embodied behavior, such as gesture, whether in cospeech gesture or in sign language. What is represented need not actually have been previously produced: represented contents can be future, hypothetical or nonexistent, and forms of so-called fictive interaction can be used in which the model of face-to-face interaction is used to talk about a variety of other meaning types. Speech and thought representation presupposes the existence of two speech events-a current and a represented one-and each comes with a speaker, defined linguistically in terms of their central deictic coordinates, I-here-now. The interplay of deictic features and different forms of structural integration can define specific types of construction, showing different degrees of access to the embedded mental space of the represented speaker's speech or thought, such as direct, indirect, and free indirect speech or thought. Social media forms of direct speech or thought merit separate investigation, as do subjective uses of reporting clauses such as I think, which form a distinct construction type, using a subset of the grammar of speech and thought representation for different purposes. This article is categorized under: Linguistics > Cognitive Linguistics > Linguistic Theory Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain.

To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called "confidence-based procedures," which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate enough for our practical and scientific purposes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy > Consciousness.

Cognitive effort is thought to be familiar in everyday life, ubiquitous across multiple variations of task and circumstance, and integral to cost/benefit computations that are themselves central to the proper functioning of cognitive control. In particular, cognitive effort is thought to be closely related to the assessment of cognitive control's costs. I argue here that the construct of cognitive effort, as it is deployed in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, is problematically unclear. The result is that talk of cognitive effort may paper over significant disagreement regarding the nature of cognitive effort, and its key functions for cognitive control. I highlight key points of disagreement, and several open questions regarding what causes cognitive effort, what cognitive effort represents, cognitive effort's relationship to action, and cognitive effort's relationship to consciousness. I also suggest that pluralism about cognitive effort-that cognitive effort may manifest as a range of intentional or non-intentional actions the function of which is to promote greater success at paradigmatic cognitive control tasks-may be a fruitful and irenic way to conceive of cognitive effort. Finally, I suggest that recent trends in work on cognitive control suggests that we might fruitfully conceive of cognitive effort as one key node in a complex network of mental value, and that studying this complex network may illuminate the nature of cognitive control, and the role of consciousness in cognitive control's proper functioning. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Neuroscience > Cognition.

This perspective piece discusses a set of attentional phenomena that are not easily accommodated within current theories of attentional selection. We call these phenomena attentional platypuses, as they allude to an observation that within biological taxonomies the platypus does not fit into either mammal or bird categories. Similarly, attentional phenomena that do not fit neatly within current attentional models suggest that current models are in need of a revision. We list a few instances of the "attentional platypuses" and then offer a new approach, that we term dynamically weighted prioritization, stipulating that multiple factors impinge onto the attentional priority map, each with a corresponding weight. The interaction between factors and their corresponding weights determines the current state of the priority map which subsequently constrains/guides attentional allocation. We propose that this new approach should be considered as a supplement to existing models of attention, especially those that emphasize categorical organizations. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Neuroscience > Cognition.

We define attention as "the set of evolved brain processes that leads to adaptive and effective behavioral selection." Our emphasis is on understanding the biological and neural mechanisms that make the behavioral properties of attention possible. Although much has been learned about the functional operation of attention by postulating and testing different aspects of attention, our view is that the distinctions most frequently relied upon are much less useful for identifying the detailed biological mechanisms and brain circuits. Instead, we adopt an evolutionary perspective that, while speculative, generates a different set of guiding principles for understanding the form and function of attention. We then provide a thought experiment, introducing a device that we intend to serve as an intuition pump for thinking about how the brain processes for attention might be organized, and that illustrates the features of the biological processes that might ultimately answer the question. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

We build on the existing biased competition view to argue that attention is an emergent property of neural computations within and across hierarchically embedded and structurally connected cortical pathways. Critically then, one must ask, what is attention emergent from? Within this framework, developmental changes in the quality of sensory input and feedforward-feedback information flow shape the emergence and efficiency of attention. Several gradients of developing structural and functional cortical architecture across the caudal-to-rostral axis provide the substrate for attention to emerge. Neural activity within visual areas depends on neuronal density, receptive field size, tuning properties of neurons, and the location of and competition between features and objects in the visual field. These visual cortical properties highlight the information processing bottleneck attention needs to resolve. Recurrent feedforward and feedback connections convey sensory information through a series of steps at each level of the cortical hierarchy, integrating sensory information across the entire extent of the cortical hierarchy and linking sensory processing to higher-order brain regions. Higher-order regions concurrently provide input conveying behavioral context and goals. Thus, attention reflects the output of a series of complex biased competition neural computations that occur within and across hierarchically embedded cortical regions. Cortical development proceeds along the caudal-to-rostral axis, mirroring the flow in sensory information from caudal to rostral regions, and visual processing continues to develop into childhood. Examining both typical and atypical development will offer critical mechanistic insight not otherwise available in the adult stable state. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention.

This article presents theories of attention that attempt to derive their answer to the question of what attention is from their answers to the question of what it is for some activity to be done attentively. Such theories provide a distinctive account of the difficulties that are faced by the attempt to locate processes in the brain by which the phenomena of attention can be explained. Their account does not share the pessimism of theories suggesting that the concept of attention is defective. Instead it reconstrues the explanatory relationship between attention and the processes that constitute it, in a way that is illustrated here by considering the relationship between attention and the processes that are identified by the biased competition theory. After considering some of the ways in which an adverbialist approach might be developed, the article concludes by suggesting some possible solutions to a problem concerning distraction, by which prominent adverbialist theories of attention have been dogged. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Metaphysics Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science.

Everyone knows what paying attention is, yet not everybody knows what this means in cognitive and brain function terms. The attentive state can be defined as a state of optimal activation that allows selecting the sources of information and courses of action in order to optimize our interaction with the environment in accordance with either the saliency of the stimulation or internal goals and intentions. In this article we argue that paying attention consists in tuning the mind with the environment in a conscious and controlled mode in order to enable the strategic and flexible adaptation of responses in accordance with internal motivations and goals. We discuss the anatomy and neural mechanisms involved in attention functions and present a brief overview of the neurocognitive development of this seminal cognitive function on the grounds of self-regulated behavior. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention (BEAB) Brain Function and Dysfunction (BEAC) Cognitive Development (BAAD).