Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Cognitive Science最新文献

Everyone knows what paying attention is, yet not everybody knows what this means in cognitive and brain function terms. The attentive state can be defined as a state of optimal activation that allows selecting the sources of information and courses of action in order to optimize our interaction with the environment in accordance with either the saliency of the stimulation or internal goals and intentions. In this article we argue that paying attention consists in tuning the mind with the environment in a conscious and controlled mode in order to enable the strategic and flexible adaptation of responses in accordance with internal motivations and goals. We discuss the anatomy and neural mechanisms involved in attention functions and present a brief overview of the neurocognitive development of this seminal cognitive function on the grounds of self-regulated behavior. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention (BEAB) Brain Function and Dysfunction (BEAC) Cognitive Development (BAAD).

This opinion piece is part of a collection on the topic: "What is attention?" Despite the word's place in the common vernacular, a satisfying definition for "attention" remains elusive. Part of the challenge is there exist many different types of attention, which may or may not share common mechanisms. Here we review this literature and offer an intuitive definition that draws from aspects of prior theories and models of attention but is broad enough to recognize the various types of attention and modalities it acts upon: attention as a multi-level system of weights and balances. While the specific mechanism(s) governing the weighting/balancing may vary across levels, the fundamental role of attention is to dynamically weigh and balance all signals-both externally-generated and internally-generated-such that the highest weighted signals are selected and enhanced. Top-down, bottom-up, and experience-driven factors dynamically impact this balancing, and competition occurs both within and across multiple levels of processing. This idea of a multi-level system of weights and balances is intended to incorporate both external and internal attention and capture their myriad of constantly interacting processes. We review key findings and open questions related to external attention guidance, internal attention and working memory, and broader attentional control (e.g., ongoing competition between external stimuli and internal thoughts) within the framework of this analogy. We also speculate about the implications of failures of attention in terms of weights and balances, ranging from momentary one-off errors to clinical disorders, as well as attentional development and degradation across the lifespan. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Neuroscience > Cognition.

'Everyone knows what attention is' according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: 'attention' was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science.

Conceptual fragmentation is when a term assumed to have one meaning is found to have many. When these different definitions overlap in meaning and application confusion and wasted effort follows. "Attention" is such a fragmented term. The response to conceptual fragmentation is simple. Stop using the original term. Our reticence to do so reflects false beliefs about attention. "Attention" is not an old term, but a modern one. Its original meaning is not related to our contemporary intuitions. Attention is not a necessary concept; psychology made substantial progress, even in cognitive areas, during the years when its use was banished. Attention is just one among many examples of conceptual fragmentation in psychology. The root cause is a dearth of theory driving cognitive experimentation. Theoretical clarity is enhanced when fundamental concepts can be expressed in a mathematical form. When theories are stated in mathematical language it opens the door to rigorous cross-domain comparisons using tools like category theory. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Neuroscience > Cognition.

Attention prioritizes certain information at the expense of other information in ways that are similar across vision, audition, and other sensory modalities. It influences how-and even what-information is represented and processed, affecting brain activity at every level. Much of the core research into cognitive and neural mechanisms of attention has used visual tasks. However, the same top-down, object-based, and bottom-up attentional processes shape auditory perception, largely through the same underlying, cognitive networks. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention.

Cognitive linguists are increasingly extending their paradigm to include the study of gestures. The bottom-up, usage-based approach in cognitive linguistics has advanced the methods for identifying gesture functions, starting from a detailed analysis of gesture forms. Theoretical notions from cognitive linguistics also help explain the means by which the forms of gestures can be interpreted as meaningful functions. Principles of conceptual metonymy explain how gestures indicate referents through the partial representation of their features that are relevant in the context of use. Conceptual metaphor theory sheds light on how abstract notions can be represented in gesture via comparison with physical source domains. Furthermore, every gestural representation inherently requires the gesturing speaker to employ a specific viewpoint for their depiction-something which is normally not expressed verbally. These aspects of gesture provide insights into processes of thinking for speaking that can be exploited in various fields of cognitive science research. Referential gestures also normally combine pragmatic and interactive functions (showing stance-taking, for example) with representational or deictic functions. The multiple functions of gesture combined with those of speech raise questions for further research about how viewing-listeners interpret and combine information from the multiple semiotic systems employed by gesturing-speakers. Finally, gesture use has been shown to correlate not only with lexical concepts but also in some ways with grammatical constructions. This gives rise to fundamental questions about what constitutes the grammar of a language. Gesture analysis thus raises issues for consideration in any research in cognitive science that concerns spoken language. This article is categorized under: Linguistics > Cognitive Linguistics > Linguistic Theory Psychology > Language.

Spoken language, as we have it, requires specific capacities-at its most basic advanced vocal control and complex social cognition. In humans, vocal control is the basis for speech, achieved through coordinated interactions of larynx activity and rapid changes in vocal tract configurations. Most likely, speech evolved in response to early humans perceiving reality in increasingly complex ways, to the effect that primate-like signaling became unsustainable as a sole communication device. However, in what ways did and do humans see the world in more complex ways compared to other species? Although animal signals can refer to external events, in contrast to humans, they usually refer to the agents only, sometimes in compositional ways, but never together with patients. It may be difficult for animals to comprehend events as part of larger social scripts, with antecedent causes and future consequences, which are more typically tie the patient into the event. Human brain enlargement over the last million years probably has provided the cognitive resources to represent social interactions as part of bigger social scripts, which enabled humans to go beyond an agent-focus to refer to agent-patient relations, the likely foundation for the evolution of grammar. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Linguistics > Evolution of Language Psychology > Comparative.

We have a wide breadth of computational tools available today that enable a more ethical approach to the study of human cognition and behavior. We argue that the use of computer models to study evolving ecosystems provides a rich source of inspiration, as they enable the study of complex systems that change over time. Often employing a combination of genetic algorithms and agent-based models, these methods span theoretical approaches from games to complexification, nature-inspired methods from studies of self-replication to the evolution of eyes, and evolutionary ecosystems of humans, from entire economies to the effects of personalities in teamwork. The review of works provided here illustrates the power of evolutionary ecosystem simulations and how they enable new insights for researchers. They also demonstrate a novel methodology of hypothesis exploration: building a computational model that encapsulates a hypothesis of human cognition enables it to be tested under different conditions, with its predictions compared to real data to enable corroboration. Such computational models of human behavior provide us with virtual test labs in which unlimited experiments can be performed. This article is categorized under: Computer Science and Robotics > Artificial Intelligence.

The three human at-rest postures of sitting, standing, and lying are basic, recurring features of human behavior and may reasonably be called primary postures. The three postures share the property of being stable through time, but they are also differentiated in terms of their overall shape, their physiological properties, and typical associated behaviors such as the association of sitting with social interaction, and lying with sleeping. The experiential realities of the three postures underlie and motivate a range of cross-linguistic phenomena involving morphemes with meanings of "sit", "stand," and "lie". The relevant linguistic phenomena include higher frequencies of occurrence compared with other kinds of posture verbs and differential behavior with respect to some morphosyntactic patterns involving notions such as agentivity. The posture morphemes can also be the source for a variety of semantic extensions reflecting experiential realities of the postures, such as the extension of "lie" to mean "sleep" in some languages. Extensions also include grammaticalizations of the posture morphemes to locative and aspectual markers which reflect the temporal stability and spatial fixedness of the postures themselves. This article is categorized under: Linguistics > Cognitive Linguistics Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain.