Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Cognitive Science最新文献

Countless discussions have been generated by the animal language studies, specifically those utilizing mechanical interfaces, termed here Augmentative Interspecies Communication (AIC) devices (e.g., lexigrams; magnetic chips; keyboards). Overall, three concerns dominate the field: (1) claims that AIC device using animals manifest linguistic skills remain nebulous, and simpler alternative mechanisms have been proposed (e.g., associative learning); (2) such methodology may be unsuitable as some theorize AIC device interfaces are not sufficiently ecologically relevant to foster meaningful use; (3) data may be considered dubious due to potential cueing from experimenters and lack of systematicity in reporting training and performance. Despite such controversy-which eventually led to the field's deterioration around the last quarter of the twentieth century-this research also saw important successes, such as improvements in captive animal welfare, the outcomes of which hold promise for future interspecies communication work. This article is categorized under: Linguistics > Evolution of Language.

Beliefs are, in many ways, central to psychology and, in turn, consistency is central to belief. Theories in philosophy and psychology assume that beliefs must be consistent with each other for people to be rational. That people fail to hold fully consistent beliefs has, therefore, been the subject of much theorizing, with numerous mechanisms proposed to explain how inconsistency is possible. Despite the widespread assumption of consistency as a default, achieving a consistent set of beliefs is computationally intractable. We review research on consistency in philosophy and psychology and argue that it is consistency, not inconsistency, that requires explanation. We discuss evidence from the attitude, belief, and persuasion literatures, which suggests that accessibility of beliefs in memory is one possible mechanism for achieving a limited, but psychologically plausible, form of consistency. Finally, we conclude by suggesting future directions for research beginning from the assumption of inconsistency as the default. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Theory and Methods Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief.

A preference is defined as a dispositional state that helps explain why a person chooses one option over another. Preference understanding is a significant part of interpreting and predicting others' behavior, which can also help to guide social encounters, for instance, to initiate interactions and even form relationships based on shared preferences. Cognitive developmental research in the past several decades has revealed that infants have relatively sophisticated understandings about others' preferences, as part of investigations into how young children make sense of others' behavior in terms of mental states such as intentions, dispositions including preferences, and epistemic states. In recent years, research on early psychological knowledge expands to including infant understanding of social situations. As such, infants are also found to use their preference understandings in their social life. They treat favorably others who share their own preferences, and they prefer prosocial and similar others (e.g., those who speak their language). In reviewing these results, we point out future directions for research and conclude with further suggestions and recommendations. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Development and Aging.

Much developmental (and comparative) research has used Tulving's Spoon test (i.e., whether an individual will select an item needed to solve a future problem) as the basis for designing tasks to measure episodic future thinking, defined as the capacity to mentally pre-experience the future. There is, however, intense debate about whether these tasks successfully do so. Most notably, it has been argued that children may pass (i.e., select an item with future utility) by drawing on non-episodic, associative processes, rather than on the capacity to represent the future, per se. Although subsequent developmental tasks have sought to address this limitation, we highlight what we argue is a more fundamental shortcoming of Spoon tasks: they prompt future-directed action making it impossible to determine whether children have used their episodic future thinking to guide their behavior. Accordingly, we know little about children's thought about the future that is independently generated (i.e., without prompting), or autocued, and is subsequently reflected (and measurable) by children's actions. We argue that this capacity is a critical, and heretofore overlooked, transition in future-oriented cognition that may not occur until middle childhood. We further hypothesize that it is reliant on children developing richer and more detailed future event representations, along with the necessary cognitive control to transform these representations into actions that serve to benefit their future selves. The time is ripe for researchers to explore this aspect of cognitive development and we suggest several novel approaches to do so. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development.

Autobiographical memories are never isolated episodes; they are embedded in a network that is continually updated and prediction driven. We present autobiographical memory as a meaning-driven process that includes both veridical traces and reconstructive schemas. Our developmental approach delineates how autobiographical memory develops across childhood and throughout adulthood, and our sociocultural approach examines the ways in which autobiographical memories are shaped by everyday social interactions embedded within cultural worldviews. These approaches are enhanced by a focus on autobiographical memory functions, namely self-coherence, social embeddedness, and directing future behaviors. Neuroscience models of memory outlined in multiple trace and trace transformation theories and perceptual principles of predictive processing establish mechanisms and frameworks into which autobiographical memory processes are incorporated. Rather than conceptualizing autobiographical and episodic memories as accurate versus error-prone, we frame memory as a dynamic process that is continuously updated to create coherent meaning for individuals living in complex sociocultural worlds. Autobiographical memory is a process of both accuracy and error, an intricate weaving of specific episodic details, inferences and confusions among similar experiences; it incorporates post-event information through reminiscing and conversations, in the service of creating more meaningful coherent memories that define self, others, and the world. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory.

Several decades of research have established reduced autobiographical memory specificity, or overgeneral memory, as an important cognitive factor associated with the risk for and maintenance of a range of psychiatric diagnoses. In measuring this construct, experimenters code autobiographical memories for the presence or absence of a single temporal detail that indicates that the remembered event took place on a single, specific, day (Last Thursday when I rode bikes with my son), or multiple days (When I rode bikes with my son). Studies indicate that the specificity of memories and the amount of other episodic detail that they include (e.g., who, what, and where) are related and may rely on the same neural processes to elicit their retrieval. However, specificity and detailedness are nonetheless separable constructs: imperfectly correlated and differentially associated with current and future depressive symptoms and other associated intrapersonal (e.g., rumination) and interpersonal (e.g., social support) outcomes. The ways in which the details of our memories align with narrative themes (i.e., agency, communion, identity) and the coherence with which these details are presented, are also emerging as important factors associated with psychopathology. The temporal specificity of autobiographical memories may be important, but other memory constructs warrant further attention in research and theory, especially given the associations, and dependencies, between each of these constructs. Researchers in this area must consider carefully whether their research questions necessitate a focus on autobiographical memory specificity or whether a more inclusive analysis of other autobiographical memory features is necessary and more fruitful. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory.

Early cognitive neuroscientific research revealed that the hippocampus is crucial for spatial navigation in rodents, and for autobiographical episodic memory in humans. Researchers quickly linked these streams to propose that the human hippocampus supports memory through its role in representing space, and research on the link between spatial cognition and episodic memory in humans has proliferated over the past several decades. Different researchers apply the term "spatial" in a variety of contexts, however, and it remains unclear what aspect of space may be critical to memory. Similarly, "episodic" has been defined and tested in different ways. Naturalistic assessment of spatial memory and episodic memory (i.e., episodic autobiographical memory) is required to unify the scale and biological relevance in comparisons of spatial and mnemonic processing. Limitations regarding the translation of rodent to human research, human ontogeny, and inter-individual variability require greater consideration in the interpretation of this literature. In this review, we outline the aspects of space that are (and are not) commonly linked to episodic memory, and then we discuss these dimensions through the lens of individual differences in naturalistic autobiographical memory. Future studies should carefully consider which aspect(s) of space are being linked to memory within the context of naturalistic human cognition. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory.

In healthy adults, autobiographical memories (AMs) evoked by music appear to have unique cognitive characteristics that set them apart from AMs evoked by other cues. If this is the case, we might expect music cues to alleviate AM deficits in clinical disorders. This systematic review examines music-evoked autobiographical memories (MEAMs) in clinical populations, focusing on cognitive characteristics, and whether MEAMs differ from AMs evoked by other stimuli. We identified 15 studies featuring participants with Alzheimer's disease (AD), behavioral variant - Frontotemporal dementia (bv-FTD), acquired brain damage, and depression. We found that music evokes AMs in these disorders, and that familiar music was more likely to evoke AMs. Compared with healthy controls, AD participants had a relative advantage for MEAMs over picture-evoked AMs. People with damage to the medial prefrontal cortex showed preserved access to MEAMs in terms of frequency, but a relative disadvantage regarding the episodic richness for MEAMs, but not for memories cued by pictures, compared to controls. Participants with bv-FTD had fewer AMs evoked after both music and pictures than healthy controls. Across conditions, MEAMs were generally specific and retrieved fast, suggesting little retrieval effort. MEAMs were also positive, except in depression, where as many negative as positive AMs were produced. These findings suggest several underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms of MEAMs, including anxiety reduction, increased fluency, music-evoked emotions, reminiscence, and involuntary retrieval, and that these might be moderated by musical abilities and memory for music. In conclusion, MEAMs appear to be relatively well preserved, especially in AD. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory.

Autobiographical memory represents a defining feature of human cognition, enabling us to vividly re-experience salient events from the personal past. By mentally traversing different temporal contexts, humans can maintain an enduring sense of who we are as individuals, as well as envisaging our future goals and behaviors. The relative ease with which we engage in these endeavors, however, belies the remarkable complexity of the autobiographical memory system. Dementia syndromes offer compelling insights into the cognitive neuroarchitecture of autobiographical memory in the face of progressive neural insult to large-scale brain networks. Importantly, the atrophy profiles of many neurodegenerative disorders follow coordinated and predictable trajectories, affecting key regions implicated in episodic and semantic memory. A wealth of evidence suggests that autobiographical memory disruption is a transdiagnostic feature of dementia, yet this impairment takes many forms and arises due to differential neurocognitive disturbances. This review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on autobiographical memory in typical and atypical presentations of Alzheimer's disease, as well as younger-onset dementia syndromes such as frontotemporal dementia and primary progressive aphasia. I will demonstrate how the systematic study of autobiographical memory across dementia syndromes can constrain and inform our fundamental understanding of memory function and, in turn, stimulate new directions in how we conceptualize and assess these cognitive capacities. Consideration will further be given to clinical implications of autobiographical memory dysfunction with a view to developing targeted interventions to better support the person living with dementia. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Neuroscience > Clinical Neuroscience Psychology > Brain Function and Dysfunction.

In contrast to much theoretical work on the topic, Transition Theory (Brown, 2016, 2021) attempts to account for important aspects of autobiographical memory in a way that emphasizes the structure of experience, rather than the relation between personal-event memories and the Self. This article provides the rationale for adopting this minimalist stance. Here it is argued that: (a) an all-inclusive notion of the Self is of little utility to the study of autobiographical memory because virtually all sentient goal-directed activities can be seen as reflecting the Self, hence, adopting this view provides no bias for predicting event memorability; (b) although some event memories are clearly Self-relevant (e.g., life-story events, turning points, self-defining memories), most are not; (c) the formation of and access to Self-knowledge typically does not depend on the availability of specific autobiographical memories; rather, (d) Self-knowledge is generally derived from massive amounts of readily forgotten role-relevant experience. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Representation Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief Psychology > Memory.