Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Cognitive Science最新文献

According to an influential research program in cognitive science, philosophy, and linguistics, there is a deep, special connection between generics and pernicious aspects of social cognition, such as stereotyping. Specifically, generics are thought to exacerbate our propensity to essentialize, lead us to overgeneralize based on scarce evidence and to other epistemically dubious patterns of inference. Recently, however, several studies have put empirical and theoretical pressure on some of the main tenets of this research program. The goal of this paper is to bring these results together in a comprehensive narrative and systematically evaluate their impact on the hypothesis that generics have a uniquely problematic effect on our social and cognitive capacities.

Mind-wandering (MW) refers to the shift of attention away from an ongoing task and/or external environment towards mental contents (e.g., memories, prospective thoughts) unrelated to the task. Physiological measures (e.g., pupil size, EEG, and fMRI) have often been acquired as objective markers for MW states, which has greatly helped their study as well as triangulation with other measures. Pupillometry in particular has been used as a covert biomarker of MW because it is reliably modulated by several distinct processes spanning arousal, emotion, and attention, and it signals attentional lapses. Yet, coupling MW and the measurement of pupil size has led to seemingly contrasting results. We argue that, common to the studies reviewed here, one reason is resolving to the measurement of tonic pupil size, which reflects low-frequency, slow changes in one's physiological state, and thus implicitly assumes that MW is a static, long-lasting process. We then additionally focus on three major axes of variability in the reviewed studies: (i) the definition and measurement of MW; (ii) the impact of contextual aspects, such as task demands and individual arousal levels; (iii) the identification and tracking of MW in combination with pupillary measures. We provide an overview of these differences and put forward recommendations for using physiological measures-including, but not limited to, pupil size-in MW research effectively. In conclusion, pupillometry can be a very informative tool for MW research, provided that it is used with the due methodological caution.

Perception involves the processing of content or information about the world. In what form is this content represented? I argue that perception is widely compositional. The perceptual system represents many stimulus features (including shape, orientation, and motion) in terms of combinations of other features (such as shape parts, slant and tilt, common and residual motion vectors). But compositionality can take a variety of forms. The ways in which perceptual representations compose are markedly different from the ways in which sentences or thoughts are thought to be composed. I suggest that the thesis that perception is compositional is not itself a concrete hypothesis with specific predictions; rather it affords a productive framework for developing and evaluating specific empirical hypotheses about the form and content of perceptual representations. The question is not just whether perception is compositional, but how. Answering this latter question can provide fundamental insights into perception. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Representation Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics.

This primer describes research on the development of motor behavior. We focus on infancy when basic action systems are acquired-posture, locomotion, manual actions, and facial actions-and we adopt a developmental systems perspective to understand the causes and consequences of developmental change. Experience facilitates improvements in motor behavior and infants accumulate immense amounts of varied everyday experience with all the basic action systems. At every point in development, perception guides behavior by providing feedback about the results of just prior movements and information about what to do next. Across development, new motor behaviors provide new inputs for perception. Thus, motor development opens up new opportunities for acquiring knowledge and acting on the world, instigating cascades of developmental changes in perceptual, cognitive, and social domains. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Neuroscience > Development.

Humans and other animals possess the remarkable ability to effectively navigate a shared perceptual environment by discerning which objects and spaces are perceived by others and which remain private to themselves. Traditionally, this capacity has been encapsulated under the umbrella of joint attention or joint action. In this comprehensive review, we advocate for a broader and more mechanistic understanding of this phenomenon, termed co-perception. Co-perception encompasses the sensitivity to the perceptual engagement of others and the capability to differentiate between objects perceived privately and those perceived commonly with others. It represents a distinct concept from mere simultaneous individual perception. Moreover, discerning between private and common objects doesn't necessitate intricate mind-reading abilities or mutual coordination. The act of perceiving objects as either private or common provides a comprehensive account for social scenarios where individuals simply share the same context or may even engage in competition. This conceptual framework encourages a re-examination of classical paradigms that demonstrate social influences on perception. Furthermore, it suggests that the impacts of shared experiences extend beyond affective responses, also influencing perceptual processes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

Perceptual learning is commonly understood as conferring some benefit to the learner, such as allowing for the extraction of more information from the environment. However, perceptual learning can be biased in several different ways, some of which do not appear to provide such a benefit. Here we outline a systematic framework for thinking about bias in perceptual learning and discuss how several cases fit into this framework. We argue these biases are compatible with an understanding in which perceptual learning is beneficial, but that its benefits are tied to both a person's narrow interests and the training environment or domain, and so if there are changes to either of these, then benefits can turn into liabilities, though these are often temporary. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Learning Philosophy > Value Linguistics > Language Acquisition.

Deep learning has enabled major advances across most areas of artificial intelligence research. This remarkable progress extends beyond mere engineering achievements and holds significant relevance for the philosophy of cognitive science. Deep neural networks have made significant strides in overcoming the limitations of older connectionist models that once occupied the center stage of philosophical debates about cognition. This development is directly relevant to long-standing theoretical debates in the philosophy of cognitive science. Furthermore, ongoing methodological challenges related to the comparative evaluation of deep neural networks stand to benefit greatly from interdisciplinary collaboration with philosophy and cognitive science. The time is ripe for philosophers to explore foundational issues related to deep learning and cognition; this perspective paper surveys key areas where their contributions can be especially fruitful. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Robotics > Machine Learning.

The development of locomotion can be described by its form (i.e., gait) and its function (i.e., mobility). Both aspects of locomotion improve with experience. Traditional treatises on infant locomotion focus on form by describing an orderly progression of postural and locomotor milestones en route to characteristic patterns of crawling and walking gait. We provide a traditional treatment of gait by describing developmental antecedents of and improvements in characteristic gait patterns, but we highlight important misconceptions inherent in the notion of "milestones". Most critically, we argue that the prevailing focus on gait and milestones fails to capture the true essence of locomotion-functional mobility to engage with the world. Thus, we also describe the development of mobility, including the use of mobility aids for support and propulsion. We illustrate how infants find individual solutions for mobility and how the ability to move cascades into other domains of development. Finally, we show how an integration of gait and mobility provides insights into the psychological processes that make locomotion functional. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Psychology > Development and Aging.

Language development is both remarkable and unremarkable. It is remarkable because children learn the language(s) around them, signed or spoken, without explicit instruction or correction. It is unremarkable because children have done this for thousands of years without worldwide incident or catastrophe. Yet, much research on this organic developmental phenomenon relies on an empirical falsehood: "quality" linguistic input is necessary to facilitate language development. "Quality" is a value judgment, not a structural feature of any human language. I argue selectively legitimizing some linguistic input as "quality" is possible only through mischaracterizing what language is. This falsehood is also linguistic racism because it is based on a deficit perspective of the early linguistic experiences of a subset of children, specifically racialized children. I explore how linguistic racism stalls our collective understanding of language development and promotes an environment of bad science. This article is categorized under: Linguistics > Language Acquisition Psychology > Language Neuroscience > Development.

Delusions are a heterogenous transdiagnostic phenomenon with a higher prevalence in schizophrenia. One of the most fundamental debates surrounding the philosophical understanding of delusions concerns the question about the type of mental state in which reports that we label as delusional are grounded, namely, the typology problem. The formulation of potential answers for this problem seems to have important repercussions for experimental research in clinical psychiatry and the development of psychotherapeutic tools for the treatment of delusions in clinical psychology. Problematically, such alternatives are scattered in the literature, making it difficult to follow the current development and state of the target discussion. This paper offers an updated critical examination of the alternatives to the typology problem currently available in the literature. After clarifying the two main philosophical views underlying the dominant formulation of the debate (interpretivism and functionalism), we follow the usual distinction between doxastic (the idea that delusions are a type of belief) and anti-doxastic views. We then introduce two new sub-distinctions; on the doxastic camp, we distinguish between revisionist and non-revisionist proposals; on the anti-doxastic camp, we distinguish between commonsensical and non-commonsensical anti-doxasticisms. After analyzing the main claims of each view, we conclude with some of the most fundamental challenges that remain open within the discussion. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Neuroscience > Cognition.