Kyklos最新文献

This study revisited the impact of fiscal decentralization on China's economic growth, focusing on the role of the revenue-sharing system in providing local fiscal incentives. Using city-level data from 2003 to 2016, we construct the revenue retention rate at the sub-provincial level to test the impacts of fiscal incentives on economic growth. The results show that the sub-provincial revenue retention rate is significantly and positively associated with the local economic growth rate. Further, we find that a higher revenue retention rate encourages sub-provincial governments to spend more on infrastructure, borrow more debt, distort land price, and relax environmental regulatory standards. Our findings indicate that the positive economic effect of fiscal decentralization is accompanied by a social cost and increased financial risk.

How does government recentralization reform affect corruption? We utilize the pilot recentralization reform that transforms the legislative function, power, and responsibility of the district-level authorities to the higher level of the government organ in Vietnam as a quasi-natural experiment to address the aforementioned question. We find strong evidence that recentralization reform leads to lower corruption. The result illustrates that, among the firms which have the highest probability of making a bribe payment, those incorporated in jurisdictions experiencing the recentralization reform are 4.3% less likely to pay a bribe. In addition, the perception that bribery is a common and necessary practice is also significantly lowered in the post-recentralization period. We further show that the impact of recentralization is stronger for firms which lack a political connection. Overall, these results shed light on the real impact of the government recentralization reform and also the determinants of corruption, thereby providing important policy implications for policymakers to create a more conducive business environment.

We leverage theoretical insights from political economy to study several aspects of the institutional development of the Italian city-states during the High Middle Ages (1000–1350). A society's regime type depends on its domestic balance of power. When the ruled can credibly threaten to punish a rogue ruler, the rule of law prevails. If the ruler can easily overpower the ruled, despotism results instead. The transition from one regime to the other results when exogenous shocks and endogenous dynamics disturb the prevailing balance of power. This framework accounts for the rise and eventual decline of rule of law regimes in the towns of central and northern Italy between the 10th and 14th centuries.

The paper analyzes the role of the 1948 currency and economic reform in West Germany for growth and social cohesion in Germany and Europe. It describes the theoretical foundation by Walter Eucken and the implementation and defense of the new economic order by Ludwig Erhard. The paper stresses the positive impact of the market economy on growth and welfare in Germany and Europe. Then, it is shown that Eucken's constituting principles of the market economy were gradually eroded after euro introduction in course of crises, with the negative repercussions on growth and equality being explained. The policy conclusion is that only the reconstitution of price stability in the euro area can prevent a further decline of welfare in Europe. The 1948 economic reforms provide an important blueprint for the necessary reform process.

Politicians are commonly believed to gain financially from holding and/or having held office. We argue that there may often also be economic downsides to pursuing a political career and investigate whether and when politicians can (not) capitalize on their political experience. We thereby study both entry into and exit from political office and directly compare the returns to politics across government levels and types of politicians. Empirically, we build on detailed information from Norwegian administrative register data over the period 1970–2019 to study individual-level income developments before, during and after a political career at the national and local levels (covering nearly 22,000 individuals and 700,000 person-years). Using an event-study methodology, we show that politicians on average witness a significant income boost during their time in office. In sharp contrast, leaving political office is on average associated with a substantial drop in income, which generally outweighs the income gain from entry into office. These findings suggest that most politicians face a net present value loss from holding office.

Using pooled cross-sectional data (eight waves of the European Social Survey), this work analysed how the regional unemployment rate influences the well-being disadvantages of the unemployed. We estimate region fixed effects and slopes models that, unlike the standard region fixed effects approach, provide an unbiased estimate of the cross-level interaction term (between being unemployed and the unemployment rate) in the absence of unobserved time-variant confounders. The results show that the satisfaction disadvantage of the unemployed (relative to the employed) is larger when the regional unemployment rate is higher. Smaller and insignificant differences were found regarding happiness. These results are in line with the argument that worse re-employment perspectives in high-unemployment regions may be particularly harmful to unemployed people. These results do not contradict the claim that, in regions with a weaker social norm to work, unemployed people may be more satisfied. Instead, they suggest that the unemployment rate does not reflect the social norm to work.

Friendship-and-love affords bonding that satisfies what can be called “transcendental preferences”—in contradistinction of “substantive preferences” afforded by, for example, food, clothes, and shelter. Substantive preferences involve ordinary “substantive cost,” whereas transcendental preferences involve “bonding cost” that includes heartaches, obsession, and emotional turmoil. What about the cost of gifts such as flowers, time, and other carriers of friendship-and-love? The greater is the expenditure on gifts, the greater the bonding cost. This paper investigates the following question: How should we model bonding cost, which includes the cost of gift, in relation to substantive cost? Given bonding cost and substantive cost share the same budget, neoclassical economists treat them as commensurable and, hence, transcendental and substantive preferences make up a unidimensional objective function. This treatment, however, originates the “gift anomaly”: If people easily substitute between the two genera of preferences, why do they consider the demand of payments for visiting their grandmothers—or payments for voting and sexual intercourse—as repugnant (taboo)? To solve the gift anomaly, this paper is critical of the standard economist's entry point. This paper proposes bonding and substantive costs as incommensurable and, corollary, transcendental and substantive preferences as incommensurable as well. This paper further shows how, without undermining the incommensurability thesis, the incommensurability is up to a limit: the two genera of costs and, corollary, the two genera of preferences are still linked via the income effect—as opposed to the substitution effect.

This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self-acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily. Such properties reduce voter mistakes. However, a voter's normative interests may conflict with these practical interests, because ideas about a good life or good society often support tax system complexity. Tradeoffs between these two aims of democratic tax systems imply that the optimal tax system for a democracy neither minimizes voter errors nor maximizes a social welfare function.

Political selection is crucial for the functioning of democracy. However, the practice—in education and sports contexts—of artificially dividing school-age children into different age groups leads to a considerable bias in this selection. The probability of becoming a (successful) politician depends on individuals' relative age. Being born shortly after the cut-off date significantly increases the probability that an individual will be politically successful later in life. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find strong evidence of such relative age effect (RAE) among a large sample of Belgian federal parliamentarians over the period 1950–2019 (N = 4032), but not among municipal councillors (N = 7387), nor among municipal candidates (N = 36,740) in the 2018 election. The estimated overrepresentation of federal members of the parliament (MPs) born immediately after the cut-off date is up to 90% compared to politicians born just before the cut-off date. The overrepresentation is observed over the whole period and thus seems to be deeply rooted in the political system. We find the RAE to have a gendered dimension: The effect is driven by early-born male politicians' overrepresentation. No significant RAE was found among female politicians.

Short-time work (STW) is a policy measure whose prominence increases during economic crises and is intended to stabilize the labor market. Employers can temporarily reduce employees' working hours, which are in turn paid by the social security system in the meantime. Although short-time work—by design—saves employers a fraction of their wage costs, little is known about free riding behavior when using this option. Accordingly, we analyze the employee-reported free riding experience with respect to longer actual working hours than accounted for in employees' short-time work allowances, the unchanged workloads experienced by these employees, and announced lay-off decisions. Since these questions are certainly sensitive, we employ the crosswise model, a privacy-preserving technique, in a random half of the sample. Our results show significant employee-reported prevalences across all dimensions and a significant association between free riding and workers' job dissatisfaction. These findings thus highlight the importance of the crosswise model in uncovering these findings and demonstrate a specific drawback in the application of short-time work.