Pub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.1177/00905917231178295
Dr. Joe Hoover
Discussion of gentrification is ubiquitous in cities around the world. And while criticism of it is common, there is still considerable contestation over whether gentrification is unjust. Political theorists have recently turned their attention to the normative evaluation of gentrification, especially the displacement of long-term residents from neighbourhoods experiencing redevelopment and reinvestment. Two important limitations in this recent work are, first, a narrow focus on the link between gentrification and displacement, and second, the injustice of gentrification has been evaluated in light of abstract ideals of justice divorced from the lived experience of its harms. Although the emerging literature usefully identifies some of the harms of gentrification, it fails to recognise the full extent of the injustice of gentrification. To address these limitations, I argue the normative evaluation of gentrification should start with a conceptualisation of the problem grounded in the experience of its negative effects. Further, employing a more comprehensive conceptualisation of gentrification’s negative effects reveals it to be a distinctive and encompassing urban injustice better understood by examining how gentrification is defined by harmful inequalities of political power, leading to exploitation, dispossession, displacement, marginalisation, and violence.
{"title":"The Injustice of Gentrification","authors":"Dr. Joe Hoover","doi":"10.1177/00905917231178295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231178295","url":null,"abstract":"Discussion of gentrification is ubiquitous in cities around the world. And while criticism of it is common, there is still considerable contestation over whether gentrification is unjust. Political theorists have recently turned their attention to the normative evaluation of gentrification, especially the displacement of long-term residents from neighbourhoods experiencing redevelopment and reinvestment. Two important limitations in this recent work are, first, a narrow focus on the link between gentrification and displacement, and second, the injustice of gentrification has been evaluated in light of abstract ideals of justice divorced from the lived experience of its harms. Although the emerging literature usefully identifies some of the harms of gentrification, it fails to recognise the full extent of the injustice of gentrification. To address these limitations, I argue the normative evaluation of gentrification should start with a conceptualisation of the problem grounded in the experience of its negative effects. Further, employing a more comprehensive conceptualisation of gentrification’s negative effects reveals it to be a distinctive and encompassing urban injustice better understood by examining how gentrification is defined by harmful inequalities of political power, leading to exploitation, dispossession, displacement, marginalisation, and violence.","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48309356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.1177/00905917231178519
Kevin J. Elliott
Is voting a duty of democratic citizenship? This article advances a new argument for the existence of a duty to vote. It argues that every normative account of electoral representation requires universal turnout to function in line with its own internal normative logic. This generates a special obligation for citizens to vote in electoral representative contexts as a function of the role morality of democratic citizenship. Because voting uniquely authorizes office holding in representative democracies, and because universal turnout contributes powerfully to representation being fair, to be a good citizen of such democracies requires one to vote. Whereas previous arguments for a duty to vote have invoked basic moral principles like fairness or a Samaritan duty of rescue, this account is based on citizens occupying a vital functional role within electoral representative institutions. This institutional duty solves the “specificity problem” of justifying a duty to vote better than competing accounts and also immunizes the duty to objections that there is no duty to vote when there are only bad choices and that there is a no duty to vote but rather duty to vote well. By emphasizing the tight connection between institutions and individual conduct, the role morality approach used here supplies a less abstract and more realistic framework than much previous research on the ethics of democratic citizenship and brings the debate closer to constitutive features of democratic politics.
{"title":"An Institutional Duty to Vote: Applying Role Morality in Representative Democracy","authors":"Kevin J. Elliott","doi":"10.1177/00905917231178519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231178519","url":null,"abstract":"Is voting a duty of democratic citizenship? This article advances a new argument for the existence of a duty to vote. It argues that every normative account of electoral representation requires universal turnout to function in line with its own internal normative logic. This generates a special obligation for citizens to vote in electoral representative contexts as a function of the role morality of democratic citizenship. Because voting uniquely authorizes office holding in representative democracies, and because universal turnout contributes powerfully to representation being fair, to be a good citizen of such democracies requires one to vote. Whereas previous arguments for a duty to vote have invoked basic moral principles like fairness or a Samaritan duty of rescue, this account is based on citizens occupying a vital functional role within electoral representative institutions. This institutional duty solves the “specificity problem” of justifying a duty to vote better than competing accounts and also immunizes the duty to objections that there is no duty to vote when there are only bad choices and that there is a no duty to vote but rather duty to vote well. By emphasizing the tight connection between institutions and individual conduct, the role morality approach used here supplies a less abstract and more realistic framework than much previous research on the ethics of democratic citizenship and brings the debate closer to constitutive features of democratic politics.","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47959323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-21DOI: 10.1177/00905917231178288
Vincent Harting
Political theorists concerned with ways to counteract the oligarchic tendencies of representative government have recently paid more attention to the employment of “class-specific institutions” (CSIs)—that is, political institutions that formally exclude wealthy elites from decision-making power. This article disputes a general objection levelled against the justifiability of CSIs, according to which their democratic credentials are outweighed by their explicit transgression of formal political equality—what I call the political equality objection. I claim that, although CSIs do not satisfy political equality fully, their exclusionary thrust is inter alia justified in virtue of the fact that they unfold against the background of badly ordered, class-divided societies. Parallel to recent arguments in nonideal theory arguing for the priority of the right to resist economic oppression over the protection of private property rights, access to the empowering properties of CSIs should take priority over the full satisfaction of formal political equality. Yet, I also claim that the justification of CSIs depends on their orientation toward overcoming class divisions because, otherwise, we might end up wrongly naturalizing those divisions—a conclusion that needs to be avoided to reply to the political equality objection. The result is, I believe, a convincing egalitarian case for the democratic justifiability of CSIs.
{"title":"An Egalitarian Case for Class-Specific Political Institutions","authors":"Vincent Harting","doi":"10.1177/00905917231178288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231178288","url":null,"abstract":"Political theorists concerned with ways to counteract the oligarchic tendencies of representative government have recently paid more attention to the employment of “class-specific institutions” (CSIs)—that is, political institutions that formally exclude wealthy elites from decision-making power. This article disputes a general objection levelled against the justifiability of CSIs, according to which their democratic credentials are outweighed by their explicit transgression of formal political equality—what I call the political equality objection. I claim that, although CSIs do not satisfy political equality fully, their exclusionary thrust is inter alia justified in virtue of the fact that they unfold against the background of badly ordered, class-divided societies. Parallel to recent arguments in nonideal theory arguing for the priority of the right to resist economic oppression over the protection of private property rights, access to the empowering properties of CSIs should take priority over the full satisfaction of formal political equality. Yet, I also claim that the justification of CSIs depends on their orientation toward overcoming class divisions because, otherwise, we might end up wrongly naturalizing those divisions—a conclusion that needs to be avoided to reply to the political equality objection. The result is, I believe, a convincing egalitarian case for the democratic justifiability of CSIs.","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":"51 1","pages":"843 - 868"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43146874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1177/00905917231173442
Mark Reinhardt
Considering formative twentieth-century theories in relation to contemporary technosocial developments, this article examines ideas of spectacle and surveillance as ways of approaching visual politics. I argue that the historically important relationship between the visual and political fields is now intensifying and mutating. First discussing Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle, I show how his influential approach proves inadequate to the politics of image-saturated societies. I next show how critics of imperial and racial spectacles, from Michael Rogin to Claudia Rankine and Tina Campt, provide better ways of engaging power and political contestation in the visual field. Third, I examine how Michel Foucault deployed notions of spectacle in his own work but argued for leaving the term behind, presenting surveillance as not just a different modality of power but also spectacle’s temporal successor. This account remains essential for both historical understanding and reckoning with contemporary surveillance. Fourth, however, as Simone Browne argues, Foucault’s separation between spectacle and surveillance is too stark, his history too prone to occlude race. Furthermore, recent surveillance technologies and practices have changed in ways that confound his terms, while extending and also altering the racial dynamics explored earlier in the essay. Today, even surveillance based on optical media contributes to a “postvisual” image world in which algorithmic, machine-machine communication abets forms of power neither tied to human perception nor graspable as subject formation. With surprising assistance from Debord, I end by discussing the significant theoretical and political challenges posed by the ironies of postvisual visuality.
{"title":"Spectacle, Surveillance, and the Ironies of Visual Politics in the Age of Autonomous Images","authors":"Mark Reinhardt","doi":"10.1177/00905917231173442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231173442","url":null,"abstract":"Considering formative twentieth-century theories in relation to contemporary technosocial developments, this article examines ideas of spectacle and surveillance as ways of approaching visual politics. I argue that the historically important relationship between the visual and political fields is now intensifying and mutating. First discussing Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle, I show how his influential approach proves inadequate to the politics of image-saturated societies. I next show how critics of imperial and racial spectacles, from Michael Rogin to Claudia Rankine and Tina Campt, provide better ways of engaging power and political contestation in the visual field. Third, I examine how Michel Foucault deployed notions of spectacle in his own work but argued for leaving the term behind, presenting surveillance as not just a different modality of power but also spectacle’s temporal successor. This account remains essential for both historical understanding and reckoning with contemporary surveillance. Fourth, however, as Simone Browne argues, Foucault’s separation between spectacle and surveillance is too stark, his history too prone to occlude race. Furthermore, recent surveillance technologies and practices have changed in ways that confound his terms, while extending and also altering the racial dynamics explored earlier in the essay. Today, even surveillance based on optical media contributes to a “postvisual” image world in which algorithmic, machine-machine communication abets forms of power neither tied to human perception nor graspable as subject formation. With surprising assistance from Debord, I end by discussing the significant theoretical and political challenges posed by the ironies of postvisual visuality.","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":"51 1","pages":"814 - 842"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41599321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1177/00905917231167253
Jessica Elbert Decker, Natalie Parker-Lawrence
{"title":"Erratum to “A Recovered Script: Political Theory in the Year 2422”","authors":"Jessica Elbert Decker, Natalie Parker-Lawrence","doi":"10.1177/00905917231167253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231167253","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":"51 1","pages":"592 - 592"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42495415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-02DOI: 10.1177/00905917231169979
R. Douglass
This article analyzes the relationship between the ideas of cruelty and injustice in Judith Shklar’s political theory. Shklar’s The Faces of Injustice is sometimes read as an instantiation of the liberalism of fear, which regards cruelty and the fear that it inspires as the summum malum. I challenge this interpretation and instead argue that her account of injustice should be read independently of her commitment to the liberalism of fear. In doing so, I show how her exploration of the faces of injustice—especially the importance she accords to passive injustice and the sense of injustice—raises important challenges for the liberal case for putting cruelty first. Although democratic attitudes and institutions constitute the best available remedy for the sense of injustice, on Shklar’s account, those who focus too much on the requirements of democratic citizenship risk treating injustice as a greater evil than cruelty, which could, in turn, facilitate cruelty and undermine liberal democracy. I conclude by suggesting that the republican-inspired theory of citizenship from The Faces of Injustice, which Shklar outlines in response to the problem of passive injustice, reflects a distinct strand of her political theory that goes beyond the more familiar defense of law-bound constitutional government associated with the liberalism of fear.
{"title":"Cruelty, Injustice, and the Liberalism of Fear","authors":"R. Douglass","doi":"10.1177/00905917231169979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231169979","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the relationship between the ideas of cruelty and injustice in Judith Shklar’s political theory. Shklar’s The Faces of Injustice is sometimes read as an instantiation of the liberalism of fear, which regards cruelty and the fear that it inspires as the summum malum. I challenge this interpretation and instead argue that her account of injustice should be read independently of her commitment to the liberalism of fear. In doing so, I show how her exploration of the faces of injustice—especially the importance she accords to passive injustice and the sense of injustice—raises important challenges for the liberal case for putting cruelty first. Although democratic attitudes and institutions constitute the best available remedy for the sense of injustice, on Shklar’s account, those who focus too much on the requirements of democratic citizenship risk treating injustice as a greater evil than cruelty, which could, in turn, facilitate cruelty and undermine liberal democracy. I conclude by suggesting that the republican-inspired theory of citizenship from The Faces of Injustice, which Shklar outlines in response to the problem of passive injustice, reflects a distinct strand of her political theory that goes beyond the more familiar defense of law-bound constitutional government associated with the liberalism of fear.","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":"51 1","pages":"790 - 813"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41588727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-28DOI: 10.1177/00905917231167092
C. Henderson
This paper revisits Tocqueville’s famous portrait of the American female, which begins with assertions of her equality to males but ends with her self-cloistering in the domestic sphere. Taking a cue from Tocqueville’s extended sketch of the “faded” pioneer wife in “A Fortnight in the Wilderness” and drawing connections to Tocqueville’s criticisms of the division of industrial labor, I argue that the American girl’s ostensibly free choice to remove herself from public life is not an act of freedom. Rather, it is a manifestation of a particular type of unfreedom that reveals underappreciated connections between the two great dangers about which Democracy in America warns: tyrannical majoritarianism and soft despotism. My argument that the girl’s choice to withdraw from public life is coerced rather than free thus highlights the nonpolitical sources of oppression that exist within democratic societies. The paper concludes by raising questions about the need for coercion within Tocquevillian democracy and the implications of this for Tocqueville’s “new” political science—indeed, for his liberalism more generally.
{"title":"Revisiting Tocqueville’s American Woman","authors":"C. Henderson","doi":"10.1177/00905917231167092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231167092","url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits Tocqueville’s famous portrait of the American female, which begins with assertions of her equality to males but ends with her self-cloistering in the domestic sphere. Taking a cue from Tocqueville’s extended sketch of the “faded” pioneer wife in “A Fortnight in the Wilderness” and drawing connections to Tocqueville’s criticisms of the division of industrial labor, I argue that the American girl’s ostensibly free choice to remove herself from public life is not an act of freedom. Rather, it is a manifestation of a particular type of unfreedom that reveals underappreciated connections between the two great dangers about which Democracy in America warns: tyrannical majoritarianism and soft despotism. My argument that the girl’s choice to withdraw from public life is coerced rather than free thus highlights the nonpolitical sources of oppression that exist within democratic societies. The paper concludes by raising questions about the need for coercion within Tocquevillian democracy and the implications of this for Tocqueville’s “new” political science—indeed, for his liberalism more generally.","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":"51 1","pages":"767 - 789"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45033625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-24DOI: 10.1177/00905917231165686
Erica Townsend-Bell
Deva Woodly’s Reckoning is a deep and illuminating dive into the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL)1 and the shifts in worldview philosophy and future visioning it promotes. It is a difficult book to review because Woodly has done such a masterful job at examining and analyzing the movement itself, its contribution to American Politics specifically, and democracy broadly. But try I will. The big-picture contribution of the book is outlined within the subtitle. At base, Woodly’s argument is that social movements are a necessary and recurring condition of democracy, and an essential part of the democratic apparatus. They are democratic institutions in their own right, and thus it is impossible to offer a full theorization of democracy that does not account for them. In this understanding, movements offer three principal functions— antidote, imagination, and re/politicization. First, the antidote. Movements make apparent the inaccuracies of the interest group pluralism model, and join the extensive set of entities that underscore the point that the powers of voice, inclusion, and representation are not enough. Importantly, they do not accept the fact of systemic inequities as unchangeable status quo, but rather see these as problems in need of intervention on a spectrum ranging from reform to excision. In doing so, movements push back on the lens of despair through which modern politics is commonly viewed, and raise new notions of what public life should look like. This is the imaginative component, and 1165686 PTXXXX10.1177/00905917231165686Political TheoryBook Reviews book-review2023
Deva Woodly的《清算》深入而富有启发性地探讨了黑人生命运动（M4BL）1及其所推动的世界观哲学和未来愿景的转变。这是一本很难回顾的书，因为Woodly在审视和分析这场运动本身，特别是它对美国政治和广泛民主的贡献方面做得非常出色。但我会尽力的。这本书的总体贡献在副标题中概述。基本上，Woodly的论点是，社会运动是民主的必要和反复出现的条件，也是民主机构的重要组成部分。它们本身就是民主机构，因此不可能提供不考虑它们的民主的完整理论。在这种理解中，运动提供了三个主要功能——解药、想象和重新政治化。首先是解药。运动表明了利益集团多元化模式的不准确性，并加入了一系列广泛的实体，这些实体强调了声音、包容性和代表性的力量是不够的。重要的是，他们不接受系统性不平等的事实，认为这是不可改变的现状，而是认为这些问题需要从改革到切除等一系列干预。在这样做的过程中，各运动推翻了人们普遍认为的现代政治的绝望镜头，并提出了公共生活应该是什么样子的新概念。这是富有想象力的组成部分，1165686 PTXXXX10.1177/00905917231165686政治理论书评书评2023
{"title":"Book Review: Reckoning: Black Lives Matter and the Democratic Necessity of Social Movements, by Deva R. Woodly","authors":"Erica Townsend-Bell","doi":"10.1177/00905917231165686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231165686","url":null,"abstract":"Deva Woodly’s Reckoning is a deep and illuminating dive into the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL)1 and the shifts in worldview philosophy and future visioning it promotes. It is a difficult book to review because Woodly has done such a masterful job at examining and analyzing the movement itself, its contribution to American Politics specifically, and democracy broadly. But try I will. The big-picture contribution of the book is outlined within the subtitle. At base, Woodly’s argument is that social movements are a necessary and recurring condition of democracy, and an essential part of the democratic apparatus. They are democratic institutions in their own right, and thus it is impossible to offer a full theorization of democracy that does not account for them. In this understanding, movements offer three principal functions— antidote, imagination, and re/politicization. First, the antidote. Movements make apparent the inaccuracies of the interest group pluralism model, and join the extensive set of entities that underscore the point that the powers of voice, inclusion, and representation are not enough. Importantly, they do not accept the fact of systemic inequities as unchangeable status quo, but rather see these as problems in need of intervention on a spectrum ranging from reform to excision. In doing so, movements push back on the lens of despair through which modern politics is commonly viewed, and raise new notions of what public life should look like. This is the imaginative component, and 1165686 PTXXXX10.1177/00905917231165686Political TheoryBook Reviews book-review2023","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":"51 1","pages":"581 - 585"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44063900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-19DOI: 10.1177/00905917231166753
{"title":"Letter from the Editors","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/00905917231166753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231166753","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47788,"journal":{"name":"Political Theory","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135763136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：