Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.103
François Kammerer
In 'Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness' (Kammerer, 2022), I argued that phenomenal consciousness is probably normatively insignificant, and does not play a significant normative role. In 'Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience' (Dung, 2024), Leonard Dung challenges my reasoning and defends sentientism about value and moral status against my arguments. Here I respond to Dung's criticism, pointing out three flaws in his reply. My conclusion is that the view that phenomenal consciousness is distinctively significant is still very much under threat.
{"title":"Sentientism Still Under Threat: Reply to Dung","authors":"François Kammerer","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.103","url":null,"abstract":"In 'Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness' (Kammerer, 2022), I argued that phenomenal consciousness is probably normatively insignificant, and does not play a significant normative role. In 'Preserving the Normative Significance\u0000 of Sentience' (Dung, 2024), Leonard Dung challenges my reasoning and defends sentientism about value and moral status against my arguments. Here I respond to Dung's criticism, pointing out three flaws in his reply. My conclusion is that the view that phenomenal consciousness is distinctively\u0000 significant is still very much under threat.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140790365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.144
A. Oblak, Dominik Milotić, B. Škodlar, Jurij Bon
Many methodologies for systematic study of lived experience have been proposed in recent decades. These methods are typically calibrated in terms of the depth and complexity of data collection, and whether they consider reports on pre-reflective experience admissible. Even though it has been shown that lived experience occurs at different timescales (elementary, integrative, narrative), contemporary methods tend to focus on momentary experience. We trace the focus on momentary experience to the current cultural milieu and attitudes in the history of psychology. We point out the need for studying temporally extended experiences in the field of psychopathology. We propose that lived experiences at different timescales are nested within each other and that this principle can be used to organize data collected with qualitative methods for the study of experience. We suggest that temporally extended experiences occur at the narrative level of description (i.e. they consist of experiential reports and sense-making).
{"title":"Phenomenology and Temporality in Psychopathology: Calibrating Qualitative Phenomenological Methods According to the Timescale of Subjective Reports","authors":"A. Oblak, Dominik Milotić, B. Škodlar, Jurij Bon","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.144","url":null,"abstract":"Many methodologies for systematic study of lived experience have been proposed in recent decades. These methods are typically calibrated in terms of the depth and complexity of data collection, and whether they consider reports on pre-reflective experience admissible. Even though it\u0000 has been shown that lived experience occurs at different timescales (elementary, integrative, narrative), contemporary methods tend to focus on momentary experience. We trace the focus on momentary experience to the current cultural milieu and attitudes in the history of psychology. We point\u0000 out the need for studying temporally extended experiences in the field of psychopathology. We propose that lived experiences at different timescales are nested within each other and that this principle can be used to organize data collected with qualitative methods for the study of experience.\u0000 We suggest that temporally extended experiences occur at the narrative level of description (i.e. they consist of experiential reports and sense-making).","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140791901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.006
Thomas Byrne
This essay comprises a first phenomenological semiotics of ChatGPT. I analyse how we experience the language signs generated by that AI. This task is accomplished in two steps. First, I introduce a conceptual scaffolding for the project, by introducing core tenets of Husserl's semiotics. Second, I mould Husserl's theory to develop my phenomenology of the passive and active consciousness of the language signs composed by ChatGPT. On the one hand, by discussing temporality, I demonstrate that ChatGPT can passively demand me to understand its signs. On the other hand, I show that a conflict arises between active and passive consciousness when reading ChatGPT. While I actively know that there is no communicating subject, I still passively experience these signs as made by another. I argue that it is this conflict which lends ChatGPT its 'magical' character. I conclude by showing how these observations can inform future regulation of AI models.
{"title":"The Phenomenology of ChatGPT: A Semiotics","authors":"Thomas Byrne","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.006","url":null,"abstract":"This essay comprises a first phenomenological semiotics of ChatGPT. I analyse how we experience the language signs generated by that AI. This task is accomplished in two steps. First, I introduce a conceptual scaffolding for the project, by introducing core tenets of Husserl's semiotics.\u0000 Second, I mould Husserl's theory to develop my phenomenology of the passive and active consciousness of the language signs composed by ChatGPT. On the one hand, by discussing temporality, I demonstrate that ChatGPT can passively demand me to understand its signs. On the other hand, I show\u0000 that a conflict arises between active and passive consciousness when reading ChatGPT. While I actively know that there is no communicating subject, I still passively experience these signs as made by another. I argue that it is this conflict which lends ChatGPT its 'magical' character. I conclude\u0000 by showing how these observations can inform future regulation of AI models.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140790310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.196
John Wright
One possible challenge for epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution: if the mental has no causal powers, how might it have evolved? The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to some arguments advanced by other philosophers, most particularly William Robinson and Joseph Corabi, considerations from the theory of evolution do pose a genuine difficulty for epiphenomenalism.
{"title":"Epiphenomenalism and the Evolutionary Role of Pleasure and Pain","authors":"John Wright","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.196","url":null,"abstract":"One possible challenge for epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution: if the mental has no causal powers, how might it have evolved? The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to some arguments advanced by other philosophers, most particularly William Robinson and Joseph\u0000 Corabi, considerations from the theory of evolution do pose a genuine difficulty for epiphenomenalism.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140772924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.171
Jae Ryeong Sul
In light of the ongoing validity crisis in psychiatric classification, phenomenologically oriented psychiatric study has gained traction. This paper assesses two modes of investigation proposed by phenomenologists in studying mental disorders: the ideal type approach and the essential type approach. Despite the recent suggestion that they are antithetical approaches, I argue that they should constantly constrain and inform each other. In short, I advance a mutual complementarity thesis. Having established this thesis, I conclude by demonstrating how this proposal can function as an heuristic strategy for effectively facilitating the recently proposed psychiatric research initiative, i.e. the ontological project of phenomenological psychopathology.
{"title":"Ideal Type and Essential Type — They Need Each Other","authors":"Jae Ryeong Sul","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.171","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the ongoing validity crisis in psychiatric classification, phenomenologically oriented psychiatric study has gained traction. This paper assesses two modes of investigation proposed by phenomenologists in studying mental disorders: the ideal type approach and the essential\u0000 type approach. Despite the recent suggestion that they are antithetical approaches, I argue that they should constantly constrain and inform each other. In short, I advance a mutual complementarity thesis. Having established this thesis, I conclude by demonstrating how this proposal can function\u0000 as an heuristic strategy for effectively facilitating the recently proposed psychiatric research initiative, i.e. the ontological project of phenomenological psychopathology.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140770007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.120
Darryl Mathieson
Researchers in the psychological sciences have put forward the thesis that various sources of psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific evidence demonstrate that being conscious of our mental states does not make any difference to our behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the evidence marshalled in support of this view — which I call psychological epiphenomenalism — is subject to major objections, relies on a superficial reading of the relevant literature, and fails to engage with the more precise ways in which philosophers understand mental states to be conscious. I then appeal to work on implementation intentions to demonstrate that an intention's being 'access conscious' enhances its functional role, which makes it more likely that we will successfully carry out our intended behaviour. The result is that consciousness in at least one relevant sense is not epiphenomenal, with further work remaining to be done to show how other kinds of consciousness cause behaviour too.
{"title":"Psychological Epiphenomenalism","authors":"Darryl Mathieson","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.120","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers in the psychological sciences have put forward the thesis that various sources of psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific evidence demonstrate that being conscious of our mental states does not make any difference to our behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the evidence\u0000 marshalled in support of this view — which I call psychological epiphenomenalism — is subject to major objections, relies on a superficial reading of the relevant literature, and fails to engage with the more precise ways in which philosophers understand mental states to be conscious.\u0000 I then appeal to work on implementation intentions to demonstrate that an intention's being 'access conscious' enhances its functional role, which makes it more likely that we will successfully carry out our intended behaviour. The result is that consciousness in at least one relevant sense\u0000 is not epiphenomenal, with further work remaining to be done to show how other kinds of consciousness cause behaviour too.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140766454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.056
Philip Goff
There has recently been a revival of interest in panpsychism as a theory of consciousness. The hope of the contemporary proponents of panpsychism is that the view enables us to integrate consciousness into our overall theory of reality in a way that avoids the deep difficulties that plague the more conventional options of physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other. However, panpsychism comes in two forms — strong and weak emergentist — and there are arguments that seem to show that weak emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of physicalism whilst strong emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of dualism. In this paper, I will develop a new hybrid of the strong and weak emergentist forms of panpsychism, a view according to which subjects of experience are strongly emergent but their phenomenal properties are weakly emergent. I will argue that this hybrid view manages to avoid the challenges facing both physicalism and dualism, and the analogues of those challenges that seem to undermine standard forms of panpsychism.
{"title":"How Exactly Does Panpsychism Help Explain Consciousness?","authors":"Philip Goff","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.056","url":null,"abstract":"There has recently been a revival of interest in panpsychism as a theory of consciousness. The hope of the contemporary proponents of panpsychism is that the view enables us to integrate consciousness into our overall theory of reality in a way that avoids the deep difficulties that\u0000 plague the more conventional options of physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other. However, panpsychism comes in two forms — strong and weak emergentist — and there are arguments that seem to show that weak emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of\u0000 physicalism whilst strong emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of dualism. In this paper, I will develop a new hybrid of the strong and weak emergentist forms of panpsychism, a view according to which subjects of experience are strongly emergent but their phenomenal properties\u0000 are weakly emergent. I will argue that this hybrid view manages to avoid the challenges facing both physicalism and dualism, and the analogues of those challenges that seem to undermine standard forms of panpsychism.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140785491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.083
Richard H. Jones
An examination of analytic philosophers' approaches to and critiques of the intelligibility of experiences of 'pure consciousness', non-intentionality, and selflessness in light of mystical experiences. Whether neuroscience can determine whether experiences of 'pure consciousness' are possible is also examined.
{"title":"Pure Consciousness, Intentionality, Selflessness, and the Philosophers' Syndrome","authors":"Richard H. Jones","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.083","url":null,"abstract":"An examination of analytic philosophers' approaches to and critiques of the intelligibility of experiences of 'pure consciousness', non-intentionality, and selflessness in light of mystical experiences. Whether neuroscience can determine whether experiences of 'pure consciousness' are\u0000 possible is also examined.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140793325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.028
George H. Denfield, Evan J. Kyzar
Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential states as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology — that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states — brings our views of subjective mental states into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another.
心智哲学在以生物学为基础的方法上取得了长足的进步，通过行为主义的视角来理解心智和主观性，但神经科学领域对主观性的研究却没有跟上步伐。事实上，我们还没有将经验现象与神经生理过程联系起来的原则性方法。在此，我们提出了 "嵌套状态模型"（Nested States Model），作为指导主观性与神经生物学之间关系的实证研究的框架。以现象学和心灵哲学的最新研究成果为基础，我们将体验状态描述为分层或嵌套的。我们认为，这种嵌套结构在大脑活动中也很明显。对这种结构同源性的认识--即体验状态和大脑状态都可以被描述为嵌套状态系统--使我们对主观心理状态的看法与我们对大脑活动一般原理和特性的理解大体一致。这种一致性使我们能够以更系统的方法，就这两个领域之间的关系提出具体的假设和预测。
{"title":"The Nested States Model: An Empirical Framework for Integrating Brain and Mind","authors":"George H. Denfield, Evan J. Kyzar","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.028","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential\u0000 phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential\u0000 states as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology — that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states — brings our views of subjective mental states\u0000 into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140786251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.138
Catherine M. Reason
The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.
无监督 "定理（Reason，2019；Reason and Shah，2021）证明，没有一个完全自我意识的系统能够完全监督任何客观可观测的系统。我在此对该证明进行了简单、非技术性的总结，并展示了它对四种不同意识理论的影响：戴维-查尔默斯的 "属性二元论 "理论；马克斯-维尔曼斯的 "反身一元论"；盖伦-斯特劳森的 "现实一元论"；以及基思-弗兰基什的 "幻觉论"。研究表明，除了查尔默斯的理论之外，所有这些理论的现有形式都被无监督定理排除在外，我的研究表明，查尔默斯的理论要求人类做出非理性的行为。
{"title":"The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness","authors":"Catherine M. Reason","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.138","url":null,"abstract":"The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate\u0000 theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except\u0000 for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139874477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：