Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.158
M. Michel, R. Malach
The role of prefrontal cortex in conscious perception: a joint proposal As prefrontalist and localist the the concerning the role of PFC in experience. To the two opposing localist perspective views the entire cortical mantle as a mosaic of local cortical areas—each underlying a different and unique category of conscious contents. By contrast, the prefrontalist view, at least the one outlined here—proposes a general, enabling function for PFC for all types of conscious experience. Specifically, following higher-order theories of consciousness, this role is derived from the proposal that conscious experience includes an essential metacognitive element—without which perceptual states remain unconscious. The PFC is proposed to underlie this obligatory metacognitive element, and participate in each and every kind of conscious experience.
{"title":"Making Progress on the Prefrontal Debate","authors":"M. Michel, R. Malach","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.158","url":null,"abstract":"The role of prefrontal cortex in conscious perception: a joint proposal As prefrontalist and localist the the concerning the role of PFC in experience. To the two opposing localist perspective views the entire cortical mantle as a mosaic of local cortical areas—each underlying a different and unique category of conscious contents. By contrast, the prefrontalist view, at least the one outlined here—proposes a general, enabling function for PFC for all types of conscious experience. Specifically, following higher-order theories of consciousness, this role is derived from the proposal that conscious experience includes an essential metacognitive element—without which perceptual states remain unconscious. The PFC is proposed to underlie this obligatory metacognitive element, and participate in each and every kind of conscious experience.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47782953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.185
M. Chirimuuta
This commentary focuses on Piccinini's claim that neural signalling uses medium-independent vehicles, a claim which is crucial in the arguments given for the computational theory of cognition. I argue that Piccinini overestimates the role of spiking in the brain, and underestimates the significance of chemical signalling within and between neurons. There are important implications for how we should understand sui generis neural computation.
{"title":"The Case for Medium Dependence: Comment on Neurocognitive Mechanisms by Gualtiero Piccinini","authors":"M. Chirimuuta","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.185","url":null,"abstract":"This commentary focuses on Piccinini's claim that neural signalling uses medium-independent vehicles, a claim which is crucial in the arguments given for the computational theory of cognition. I argue that Piccinini overestimates the role of spiking in the brain, and underestimates\u0000 the significance of chemical signalling within and between neurons. There are important implications for how we should understand sui generis neural computation.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44543622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.115
M. Michel
Is perceptual processing in dedicated sensory areas sufficient for conscious perception? Localists say, 'Yes — given some background conditions.' Prefrontalists say, 'No: conscious perceptual experience requires the involvement of prefrontal structures.' I review the evidence for prefrontalism. I start by presenting correlational evidence. In doing so, I answer the 'report argument', according to which the apparent involvement of the prefrontal cortex in consciousness stems from the requirement for reports. I then review causal evidence for prefrontalism and answer the 'lesion argument', which purports to show that prefrontalism is wrong because lesions to the prefrontal cortex do not abolish consciousness. I conclude that multiple sources of evidence converge toward the view that the prefrontal cortex plays a significant role in consciousness.
{"title":"Conscious Perception and the Prefrontal Cortex A Review","authors":"M. Michel","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.115","url":null,"abstract":"Is perceptual processing in dedicated sensory areas sufficient for conscious perception? Localists say, 'Yes — given some background conditions.' Prefrontalists say, 'No: conscious perceptual experience requires the involvement of prefrontal structures.' I review the evidence\u0000 for prefrontalism. I start by presenting correlational evidence. In doing so, I answer the 'report argument', according to which the apparent involvement of the prefrontal cortex in consciousness stems from the requirement for reports. I then review causal evidence for prefrontalism and answer\u0000 the 'lesion argument', which purports to show that prefrontalism is wrong because lesions to the prefrontal cortex do not abolish consciousness. I conclude that multiple sources of evidence converge toward the view that the prefrontal cortex plays a significant role in consciousness.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47169105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.218
Nico Orlandi
Neurocognitive Mechanisms is a well-informed and provocative book. In these comments, I raise questions about the distinctiveness of Piccinini's positive proposals when it comes to the status of the special sciences and to the notion of mental representation.
{"title":"Why Not Reductionism?","authors":"Nico Orlandi","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.218","url":null,"abstract":"Neurocognitive Mechanisms is a well-informed and provocative book. In these comments, I raise questions about the distinctiveness of Piccinini's positive proposals when it comes to the status of the special sciences and to the notion of mental representation.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47299801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.069
Chris Letheby
An emerging body of research suggests that psychedelic experiences can change users' religious or metaphysical beliefs. Here I explore issues concerning psychedelic-induced belief change via a critique of some recent arguments by Wayne Glausser. Two scientific studies seem to show that psychedelic experiences can convert atheists to belief in God, but Glausser holds that academic and popular discussions of these studies are misleading. I offer a different analysis of the relevant findings, attempting to preserve the insights of Glausser's critique while setting the record straight on some important points. For one thing, the studies provide stronger evidence for atheist 'deconversion' than Glausser allows. For another, Glausser's arguments against the 'Metaphysical Belief Theory' of psychedelic therapy involve scientifically dubious claims and inferences. Finally, in evaluating this theory, we ought to focus on its strongest version, which posits belief shifts from metaphysical naturalism to nonnaturalism, rather than from atheism to classical monotheism.
{"title":"Psychedelics, Atheism, and Naturalism Myth and Reality","authors":"Chris Letheby","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.069","url":null,"abstract":"An emerging body of research suggests that psychedelic experiences can change users' religious or metaphysical beliefs. Here I explore issues concerning psychedelic-induced belief change via a critique of some recent arguments by Wayne Glausser. Two scientific studies seem to show that\u0000 psychedelic experiences can convert atheists to belief in God, but Glausser holds that academic and popular discussions of these studies are misleading. I offer a different analysis of the relevant findings, attempting to preserve the insights of Glausser's critique while setting the record\u0000 straight on some important points. For one thing, the studies provide stronger evidence for atheist 'deconversion' than Glausser allows. For another, Glausser's arguments against the 'Metaphysical Belief Theory' of psychedelic therapy involve scientifically dubious claims and inferences. Finally,\u0000 in evaluating this theory, we ought to focus on its strongest version, which posits belief shifts from metaphysical naturalism to nonnaturalism, rather than from atheism to classical monotheism.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48268722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.007
Marcelino Botin
The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem promises to help us solve the hard problem. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) promises to solve both problems at once while allowing for a metaphysics of mind that avoids dualism, which is hard to defend, and illusionism, which is hard to accept. I argue that the strategy fails to fulfil this promise. Standard accounts of the PCS cannot provide an adequate response to the meta-problem because the cognitive isolation of phenomenal concepts is not the basis of our problem intuitions.
{"title":"The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Cannot Explain Problem Intuitions","authors":"Marcelino Botin","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.007","url":null,"abstract":"The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem promises to help us solve the hard problem. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) promises to solve both problems at once while allowing for a metaphysics\u0000 of mind that avoids dualism, which is hard to defend, and illusionism, which is hard to accept. I argue that the strategy fails to fulfil this promise. Standard accounts of the PCS cannot provide an adequate response to the meta-problem because the cognitive isolation of phenomenal concepts\u0000 is not the basis of our problem intuitions.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46846236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.167
G. Piccinini
I introduce three themes: egalitarian ontology, explanatory integration, and neural computation-cum-representation. I argue that all levels of composition and realization are ontologically on a par (no level is more fundamental than the others). In addition, I argue that all levels and their relations must be studied and integrated within multilevel mechanistic explanations. Finally, I argue that neural computation and representations ought to be understood in their own right and cognition explained in their terms. In the end, biological cognition is explained by situated, multilevel, neurocomputational, representational mechanisms.
{"title":"Neurocognitive Mechanisms A Situated, Multilevel, Mechanistic, Neurocomputational, Representational Framework for Biological Cognition","authors":"G. Piccinini","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.167","url":null,"abstract":"I introduce three themes: egalitarian ontology, explanatory integration, and neural computation-cum-representation. I argue that all levels of composition and realization are ontologically on a par (no level is more fundamental than the others). In addition, I argue that all levels\u0000 and their relations must be studied and integrated within multilevel mechanistic explanations. Finally, I argue that neural computation and representations ought to be understood in their own right and cognition explained in their terms. In the end, biological cognition is explained by situated,\u0000 multilevel, neurocomputational, representational mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47324385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.195
C. Gillett
I outline an integrative pluralist account of the models/ explanations in a case in physiology, cell biology, and molecular biology, including compositional models/explanations positing realization between properties. I then use this integrative pluralist framework to assess both the older 'flat' theory and Piccinini's (2020) new 'aspect' view as accounts of realization in the sciences. Using our concrete scientific case, I show that these philosophical views of realization should be rejected for two reasons. First, the flat and aspect views of realization fail to accommodate the layers of individuals, and/or powers, we find with realization relations in the sciences. And, second, because the flat and aspect accounts of realization cannot allow the integration between the models positing realization between properties, and the models positing composition between activities, that we find in actual scientific practice.
{"title":"Engaging the Plural Parts of Science: Assessing Flat and Aspect Realization through an Integrative Pluralist Lens","authors":"C. Gillett","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.195","url":null,"abstract":"I outline an integrative pluralist account of the models/ explanations in a case in physiology, cell biology, and molecular biology, including compositional models/explanations positing realization between properties. I then use this integrative pluralist framework to assess both the\u0000 older 'flat' theory and Piccinini's (2020) new 'aspect' view as accounts of realization in the sciences. Using our concrete scientific case, I show that these philosophical views of realization should be rejected for two reasons. First, the flat and aspect views of realization fail to accommodate\u0000 the layers of individuals, and/or powers, we find with realization relations in the sciences. And, second, because the flat and aspect accounts of realization cannot allow the integration between the models positing realization between properties, and the models positing composition between\u0000 activities, that we find in actual scientific practice.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47394262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.175
J. Bickle
I recommend replacing Piccinini's elaborate metaphysics that grounds his approach in Neurocognitive Mechanisms with metascience. Reconceived as metascience, Piccinini's discussion of numerous case studies from recent neuroscience in his book's final chapters makes a strong case for his proposal that current neuroscience trades in neural representations and a special kind of computation over them. But I contrast this account with what a metascience focused on recent developments in 'molecular and cellular cognition' reveals, namely an account that no longer has use for 'levels', a notion that has long infected new mechanism and remains prominent in Piccinini's latest contribution.
{"title":"Metascience, Not Metaphysics, of Neuroscience","authors":"J. Bickle","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.7.175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.175","url":null,"abstract":"I recommend replacing Piccinini's elaborate metaphysics that grounds his approach in Neurocognitive Mechanisms with metascience. Reconceived as metascience, Piccinini's discussion of numerous case studies from recent neuroscience in his book's final chapters makes a strong case for\u0000 his proposal that current neuroscience trades in neural representations and a special kind of computation over them. But I contrast this account with what a metascience focused on recent developments in 'molecular and cellular cognition' reveals, namely an account that no longer has use for\u0000 'levels', a notion that has long infected new mechanism and remains prominent in Piccinini's latest contribution.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49273733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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