Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.051
Mostyn Jones
Neuroelectrical panpsychism (NP) offers a clear, simple, testable mind–body solution. It says that everything is at least minimally conscious, and electrical activity across separate neurons creates a unified, intelligent mind. NP draws on recent experimental evidence to address the easy problem of specifying the mind's neural correlates. These correlates are neuroelectrical activities that, for example, generate our different qualia, unite them to form perceptions and emotions, and help guide brain operations. NP also addresses the hard problem of why minds accompany these neural correlates. Here, the real nature of matter-energy (beyond how it appears to sense organs) is consciousness that occupies space, exerts forces, and unites neuroelectrically to form minds. This doesn't reduce consciousness to observable neural activities, nor posit any radically different entities. NP also deals with panpsychism's combination problem by explaining how the mind's subject and experiences arise by electrically combining simple experiences in brains.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.138
Catherine M. Reason
The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.
无监督 "定理（Reason，2019；Reason and Shah，2021）证明，没有一个完全自我意识的系统能够完全监督任何客观可观测的系统。我在此对该证明进行了简单、非技术性的总结，并展示了它对四种不同意识理论的影响：戴维-查尔默斯的 "属性二元论 "理论；马克斯-维尔曼斯的 "反身一元论"；盖伦-斯特劳森的 "现实一元论"；以及基思-弗兰基什的 "幻觉论"。研究表明，除了查尔默斯的理论之外，所有这些理论的现有形式都被无监督定理排除在外，我的研究表明，查尔默斯的理论要求人类做出非理性的行为。
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Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.031
E. Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk, N. Dissanayaka
Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate dimensions of phenomenal consciousness are identified as the pre-reflective state, phenomenal experience, and reflective thought. Finally, the clinical implications of a deeper understanding of delirium through measurement of phenomenal consciousness is considered.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.149
William S. Robinson
Panexperientialists hold that experience is a fundamental feature of our universe, and that their view avoids radical emergence by providing an intelligible ground for our human experiences. This paper argues that they face a radical emergence problem of their own, and that they can avoid radical emergence only by adopting a strategy that can also be used by dualists (whose view they reject). It also argues that panexperientialists must either hold that all experiential properties they regard as simple must have been actually instantiated since the earliest days of our universe, or accept radical emergence, or avoid radical emergence by a strategy that can also be adopted by dualists.
{"title":"Panexperientialism and Radical Emergence","authors":"William S. Robinson","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.149","url":null,"abstract":"Panexperientialists hold that experience is a fundamental feature of our universe, and that their view avoids radical emergence by providing an intelligible ground for our human experiences. This paper argues that they face a radical emergence problem of their own, and that they can\u0000 avoid radical emergence only by adopting a strategy that can also be used by dualists (whose view they reject). It also argues that panexperientialists must either hold that all experiential properties they regard as simple must have been actually instantiated since the earliest days of our\u0000 universe, or accept radical emergence, or avoid radical emergence by a strategy that can also be adopted by dualists.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139827534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.031
E. Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk, N. Dissanayaka
Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate dimensions of phenomenal consciousness are identified as the pre-reflective state, phenomenal experience, and reflective thought. Finally, the clinical implications of a deeper understanding of delirium through measurement of phenomenal consciousness is considered.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.076
Leiszle Lapping-Carr, Alek E. Krumm, Cody Kaneshiro, C. Heavey
Introspection, or looking inward to observe one's experience, is inherent in many methods used to study feelings, the experiential component of emotion. Challenges of introspection make faithful, high-fidelity descriptions of feelings difficult to attain. A method that (1) cleaves to a specific moment, (2) cleaves to pristine inner experience, (3) brackets presuppositions, and (4) utilizes an iterative process may be particularly well suited to this task. We review some contemporary introspective methods from the perspective of these four methodological constraints, finding that Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) addresses the constraints most fully. We present DES findings on feelings to highlight the unique contributions careful introspective methods make to emotion science. High-fidelity descriptions of feelings are necessary for a complete understanding of emotion.
内省，即向内观察自己的体验，是许多用于研究情感（情感的体验成分）的方法所固有的。内省所面临的挑战使得忠实、高保真的情感描述难以实现。一种（1）紧扣特定时刻，（2）紧扣原始内心体验，（3）括弧预设，（4）利用迭代过程的方法可能特别适合这项任务。我们从这四种方法论限制的角度回顾了当代的一些内省方法，发现描述性经验取样（DES）最能充分地解决这些限制。我们介绍了 DES 在情感方面的研究成果，以强调谨慎的内省方法对情感科学的独特贡献。要全面了解情感，就必须对情感进行高保真描述。
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Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.173
Julien Tempone-Wiltshire
Contemplative scholarship has recently reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, 'awakening'. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. Key definitional and operational issues are identified demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. It is demonstrated that operationalized secular conceptions of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural factors, have little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. This article identifies methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging yet demonstrates also the value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, it is contended that significant problems arise when decontextualizing awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional, operational, and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states.
{"title":"Seeking the Neural Correlates of Awakening","authors":"Julien Tempone-Wiltshire","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.173","url":null,"abstract":"Contemplative scholarship has recently reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, 'awakening'. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. Key definitional and operational issues are\u0000 identified demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. It is demonstrated that operationalized secular conceptions\u0000 of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural factors, have little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. This article identifies methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging yet demonstrates also the\u0000 value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, it is contended that significant problems arise when decontextualizing awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional,\u0000 operational, and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139818471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.080
Miriam Kyselo
I focus on an early article by Francisco Varela, 'Not One, Not Two' (1976), to argue that his non-dualistic epistemology entails a paradigm shift towards a fundamentally co-embodied, and thus social, view of self. Varela argued that the mind–body duality could be resolved by understanding the mind as embodied. Both Varela and Evan Thompson have later elaborated on this and suggested an enactive, essentially embodied view of the self in terms of selforganized, organismic autonomy. I will argue that the enactive view of the self remains ambiguous with regards to the role of social interactions: are they constitutive for the minimal self-organization of the self or do they only play a shaping, secondary factor? I rely on Varela's epistemology in 'Not One, Not Two' to support my argument that the minimal self-organizational network that is the human self entails both individual bodily and joint co-embodied processes so that the self is already and constitutively social.
我将重点放在弗朗西斯科·瓦雷拉早期的一篇文章《不是一个，不是两个》(1976)上，认为他的非二元论认识论需要一种范式转变，即从根本上向共同体现的、因此是社会的自我观转变。Varela认为身心的二元性可以通过将心灵理解为具身来解决。瓦雷拉和埃文·汤普森后来都对此进行了详细阐述，并提出了一种主动的、本质上体现的自我观点，即自组织的、有机的自主。我认为，关于社会互动的作用，自我的行为观仍然是模棱两可的:它们是构成自我的最小自我组织的组成部分，还是只起到塑造的、次要的作用?我依靠Varela在" Not One, Not Two "中的认识论来支持我的观点，即最小的自我组织网络即人类自我包含了个体身体和联合共同体现的过程，因此自我已经并且在本质上是社会性的。
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