Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.5.103
Nuria Ciofalo
Indigenous psychologies are informed by their cosmogonies and cosmologies, philosophies, spirituality and religions, traditions and customs, and knowledge and praxis systems. This paper reviews some conceptions of consciousness, psyche, spirit, mental and physical health, relations to all Earth Beings (human and nonhuman), ancestors, nature, and altered states of consciousness among the Nahua and Maya of Mexico. Colonization has threatened these rich legacies by imposing the conquerors' cosmologies. However, these Indigenous communities continue to use plants, mushrooms, and some animals to generate altered states of consciousness, enacting sacred rituals and healing. The conclusion recommends learning from these knowledge and praxes systems and their related consciousness and spiritual states to expand the emergence of decolonial psychology that may offer alternatives to address the challenges of our time.
{"title":"Mexican Indigenous Psychologies, Cosmovisons, and Altered States of Consciousness","authors":"Nuria Ciofalo","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.5.103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.5.103","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Indigenous psychologies are informed by their cosmogonies and cosmologies, philosophies, spirituality and religions, traditions and customs, and knowledge and praxis systems. This paper reviews some conceptions of consciousness, psyche, spirit, mental and physical health, relations\u0000 to all Earth Beings (human and nonhuman), ancestors, nature, and altered states of consciousness among the Nahua and Maya of Mexico. Colonization has threatened these rich legacies by imposing the conquerors' cosmologies. However, these Indigenous communities continue to use plants, mushrooms,\u0000 and some animals to generate altered states of consciousness, enacting sacred rituals and healing. The conclusion recommends learning from these knowledge and praxes systems and their related consciousness and spiritual states to expand the emergence of decolonial psychology that may offer\u0000 alternatives to address the challenges of our time.\u0000","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48600437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.5.009
Nicolas Alzetta
This paper develops a new argument against free will, understood as the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). This principle has been central in debates around free will and moral responsibility; however, it is almost always stated in terms of bodily rather than mental action, and it is therefore mainly understood as the possibility to physically act differently, rather than to think differently. The argument presented here is aimed at the latter, which is termed the possibility of alternative thought (PAT). It argues on psychological grounds that it is impossible for a subject to think differently than it does in a given situation. First, I make the possibility of alternative thought explicit, explain what it means for a self to entertain a thought (or conscious content), and I define a notion of conscious control that is required for the argument. I then offer a taxonomy of content types, based on how they are being controlled. In the third section, I analyse the scenarios of content generation for each type of content, to determine whether they can satisfy the PAT. It will be shown that this cannot be the case.
{"title":"Could You Have Thought Differently? An Argument Against Free Will","authors":"Nicolas Alzetta","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.5.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.5.009","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a new argument against free will, understood as the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). This principle has been central in debates around free will and moral responsibility; however, it is almost always stated in terms of bodily rather than mental action, and it is therefore mainly understood as the possibility to physically act differently, rather than to think differently. The argument presented here is aimed at the latter, which is termed the possibility of alternative thought (PAT). It argues on psychological grounds that it is impossible for a subject to think differently than it does in a given situation. First, I make the possibility of alternative thought explicit, explain what it means for a self to entertain a thought (or conscious content), and I define a notion of conscious control that is required for the argument. I then offer a taxonomy of content types, based on how they are being controlled. In the third section, I analyse the scenarios of content generation for each type of content, to determine whether they can satisfy the PAT. It will be shown that this cannot be the case.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135938113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.5.177
E. Frecska, Ágnes Birtalan, M. Winkelman
Soul belief is a universal of human culture and belief in multiple souls is common, especially in pre-modern traditions. This essay illustrates how a three-folded structure appears in the soul concepts of Mongolian shamanistic traditions. The reported accounts of the three souls among various Mongolian ethnic groups are somewhat divergent — especially in their consciousness-related attributes — which may reflect the cultural bias of data collectors, inconsistencies between data providers, and the evolution of these concepts due to historical events, socio-economic changes, and external cultural influences. Despite these confounding effects, the soul concept of Mongolian shamanism is similar in its pluralism to the beliefs of many other cultures. Mongolian Indigenous concepts and their descriptions reveal key elements of consciousness. Although these soul concepts evoke spiritual interpretations, they nevertheless reflect aspects of an innately-disposed mindset which extends conceptualizations of consciousness beyond mind-body dualism.
{"title":"Beyond Mind– Body Dualism: Pluralistic Concepts of the Soul in Mongolian Shamanistic Traditions","authors":"E. Frecska, Ágnes Birtalan, M. Winkelman","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.5.177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.5.177","url":null,"abstract":"Soul belief is a universal of human culture and belief in multiple souls is common, especially in pre-modern traditions. This essay illustrates how a three-folded structure appears in the soul concepts of Mongolian shamanistic traditions. The reported accounts of the three souls among\u0000 various Mongolian ethnic groups are somewhat divergent — especially in their consciousness-related attributes — which may reflect the cultural bias of data collectors, inconsistencies between data providers, and the evolution of these concepts due to historical events, socio-economic\u0000 changes, and external cultural influences. Despite these confounding effects, the soul concept of Mongolian shamanism is similar in its pluralism to the beliefs of many other cultures. Mongolian Indigenous concepts and their descriptions reveal key elements of consciousness. Although these\u0000 soul concepts evoke spiritual interpretations, they nevertheless reflect aspects of an innately-disposed mindset which extends conceptualizations of consciousness beyond mind-body dualism.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47072258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Igbo Consciousness of Healing: Studying Daa Ada Ocha, a Local Healer in Mbaise","authors":"K. C. Nweke","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.5.191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.5.191","url":null,"abstract":"<The westernization of the Igbo people disrupted the stability of indigenousness in various spheres of their socio-cultural reality. In certain spheres, the indigenousness seems irrevocably lost, while in other spheres, there is a re-emergence. Healing is one of those areas in which\u0000 the Igbo people preserved their consciousness, enabling a renewal of Indigenous healing practices. They believe that a human being belongs to both the physical and the spiritual realms. Hence, in a human being is the interconnection of the physical and the spiritual, in all ramifications of\u0000 life, including health. Using both a theoreticalanalytical method and exploring the enigmatic world of a traditional healer in a narrative method, this article aims at expounding on healing and the consciousness behind it with the Igbo people.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44287142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.3.132
Michael Roche
The transparency approach to introspection has received much attention over the last few decades. It is inspired by some wellknown remarks from Gareth Evans (1982). Although this approach can seem quite plausible as applied to belief (and perhaps perception), philosophers tend to be sceptical that it can succeed for other mental kinds. This paper focuses on desire. It lays out in detail a transparency theory of desire introspection and addresses various concerns and objections to such a theory. The paper takes as its launching point Alex Byrne's (2018) influential work on transparency.
{"title":"Introspection, Transparency, and Desire","authors":"Michael Roche","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.3.132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.3.132","url":null,"abstract":"The transparency approach to introspection has received much attention over the last few decades. It is inspired by some wellknown remarks from Gareth Evans (1982). Although this approach can seem quite plausible as applied to belief (and perhaps perception), philosophers tend to be\u0000 sceptical that it can succeed for other mental kinds. This paper focuses on desire. It lays out in detail a transparency theory of desire introspection and addresses various concerns and objections to such a theory. The paper takes as its launching point Alex Byrne's (2018) influential work\u0000 on transparency.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48583490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.3.155
Lyu Zhou
The specious present (James, 1890/1950) is the phenomenal temporal structure of the representational content of my present experience. This article is a study of the mereological structure of the specious present and what it reveals about the nature of the mind. I argue that the specious present has certain features that cannot be easily explained within the framework of physicalism about the mind — the view that consciousness is nothing over and above what is physical. In particular, the specious present is a phenomenally extended (i.e.non-instantaneous) whole whose parts are conceptual abstractions and are therefore dependent on this whole. However, unlike the specious present, what is physical does not have this special property of the parts being dependent on the whole. Therefore, it is unclear how the specious present can be explained in physicalistic terms.
{"title":"Specious Present, Phenomenal Extension, and Mereological Inversion: A Problem for Physicalism about the Mind","authors":"Lyu Zhou","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.3.155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.3.155","url":null,"abstract":"The specious present (James, 1890/1950) is the phenomenal temporal structure of the representational content of my present experience. This article is a study of the mereological structure of the specious present and what it reveals about the nature of the mind. I argue that the specious\u0000 present has certain features that cannot be easily explained within the framework of physicalism about the mind — the view that consciousness is nothing over and above what is physical. In particular, the specious present is a phenomenally extended (i.e.non-instantaneous) whole whose\u0000 parts are conceptual abstractions and are therefore dependent on this whole. However, unlike the specious present, what is physical does not have this special property of the parts being dependent on the whole. Therefore, it is unclear how the specious present can be explained in physicalistic\u0000 terms.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45234688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.3.034
N. Gligorov
The use of brain technology that contributes to psychological changes has spurred a debate about personal identity. Some argue that neurotechnology does not undermine personal continuity (Levy, 2011) while others argue that it does (Kreitmair, 2019; Schechtman, 2010). To make these assessments, commentators fail to identify psychological changes that cause personal discontinuity. In this paper, I present a view that identifies personal continuity with the maintenance of a self-concept. I argue that a concept of self requires the ability to self-ascribe physical and psychological features and that the diachronic self emerges with self-ascriptions of features that require endurance over time. I maintain that an adequate concept of self does not depend on the maintenance of any particular combination of self-ascriptions and that it can be maintained despite even significant changes in psychological or physical traits. Finally, I apply the self-concept view to identify changes that can result in discontinuity of self.
{"title":"What is an Identity Crisis?","authors":"N. Gligorov","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.3.034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.3.034","url":null,"abstract":"The use of brain technology that contributes to psychological changes has spurred a debate about personal identity. Some argue that neurotechnology does not undermine personal continuity (Levy, 2011) while others argue that it does (Kreitmair, 2019; Schechtman, 2010). To make these\u0000 assessments, commentators fail to identify psychological changes that cause personal discontinuity. In this paper, I present a view that identifies personal continuity with the maintenance of a self-concept. I argue that a concept of self requires the ability to self-ascribe physical and psychological\u0000 features and that the diachronic self emerges with self-ascriptions of features that require endurance over time. I maintain that an adequate concept of self does not depend on the maintenance of any particular combination of self-ascriptions and that it can be maintained despite even significant\u0000 changes in psychological or physical traits. Finally, I apply the self-concept view to identify changes that can result in discontinuity of self.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44558474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.3.059
Spencer Ivy
What occurs in the mind of an expert who is performing at their very best? In this paper, I survey the history of debate concerning this question. I suggest that expertise is neither solely a mastery of the automatic nor solely a mastery of intelligence in skilled action control. Experts are also capable of performing automatic actions intelligently. Following this, I argue that unconscious-thought theory (UTT) is a powerful tool in coming to understand the role of executive, intelligent action control in the fluidly automatic performance of expertise. Relying on a body of empirical evidence concerning the cognitive structures and perceptual strategies employed by experts, I show that the realm of skilled action is an ideal environment within which the powers of unconscious cognitive processing can have positive effects on action. I conclude that experts rely upon unconscious thinking in the production of intelligently automatic skilled actions.
{"title":"Unconscious Intelligence in the Skilled Control of Expert Action","authors":"Spencer Ivy","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.3.059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.3.059","url":null,"abstract":"What occurs in the mind of an expert who is performing at their very best? In this paper, I survey the history of debate concerning this question. I suggest that expertise is neither solely a mastery of the automatic nor solely a mastery of intelligence in skilled action control. Experts\u0000 are also capable of performing automatic actions intelligently. Following this, I argue that unconscious-thought theory (UTT) is a powerful tool in coming to understand the role of executive, intelligent action control in the fluidly automatic performance of expertise. Relying on a body of\u0000 empirical evidence concerning the cognitive structures and perceptual strategies employed by experts, I show that the realm of skilled action is an ideal environment within which the powers of unconscious cognitive processing can have positive effects on action. I conclude that experts rely\u0000 upon unconscious thinking in the production of intelligently automatic skilled actions.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45420825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.3.106
Pekka Rechardt
The dimensional structure of phenomenal space and its relation to the brain have not been widely focused on in brain and consciousness studies. This paper postulates that focusing on the dimensional structures displayed in the relation between phenomenal space and the brain is necessary for understanding the integration of distributed brain events in binding. A related issue is why items and events of phenomenal space and consciousness as they appear in experience seem to be beyond the reach of natural scientific empirical observation. The proposed solution to these issues is postulated to require a fourth spatial dimension. A transcendence principle of detection (TPD) is introduced, which states that transcendent degrees of freedom of an n+1 dimension are a necessary condition for experiencing or detecting an n-dimensionally extended physical structure as an n-dimensionally extended phenomenal structure. It is postulated that the phenomenal outcome of binding, i.e. the threedimensionally distributed and extended phenomenal structure of human experience, is the expected first-person outcome of threedimensionally distributed neurophysical structures being monitored at the domain of a fourth spatial dimension.
{"title":"The Phenomenal Hyperspace: A Study of the Dimensional and Spatio-temporal Structures of Phenomenal Space and Binding","authors":"Pekka Rechardt","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.3.106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.3.106","url":null,"abstract":"The dimensional structure of phenomenal space and its relation to the brain have not been widely focused on in brain and consciousness studies. This paper postulates that focusing on the dimensional structures displayed in the relation between phenomenal space and the brain is necessary\u0000 for understanding the integration of distributed brain events in binding. A related issue is why items and events of phenomenal space and consciousness as they appear in experience seem to be beyond the reach of natural scientific empirical observation. The proposed solution to these issues\u0000 is postulated to require a fourth spatial dimension. A transcendence principle of detection (TPD) is introduced, which states that transcendent degrees of freedom of an n+1 dimension are a necessary condition for experiencing or detecting an n-dimensionally extended physical structure as an\u0000 n-dimensionally extended phenomenal structure. It is postulated that the phenomenal outcome of binding, i.e. the threedimensionally distributed and extended phenomenal structure of human experience, is the expected first-person outcome of threedimensionally distributed neurophysical structures\u0000 being monitored at the domain of a fourth spatial dimension.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47143850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.3.181
D. Stokes
Thinking and Perceiving defends the claim that thought not only affects perceiving, thought improves perceiving. It thus defends a malleable architecture of the mind, opposite strong modularist views that claim that perception is informationally encapsulated and thus cognitively impenetrable. The argument for this view centers around cases of perceptual expertise. Experts in a wide variety of domains—radiology, birdwatching, elite athletics, fingerprint examination—have been empirically studied using behavioral, neural-physiological, and computational methods. This convergence of evidence is best explained in terms of cognitively sensitive perceptual improvements. And these improvements amount to epistemic virtue, where the virtue is partly resident in perception and credited to the perceiving agent. The view has far-reaching implications for a wide range of issues, including the epistemology of perception, the contents of perception, theory-ladenness in science and social perception, understanding and self-understanding, and aesthetic taste.
{"title":"Précis of Thinking and Perceiving","authors":"D. Stokes","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.3.181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.3.181","url":null,"abstract":"Thinking and Perceiving defends the claim that thought not only affects perceiving, thought improves perceiving. It thus defends a malleable architecture of the mind, opposite strong modularist views that claim that perception is informationally encapsulated and thus cognitively impenetrable. The argument for this view centers around cases of perceptual expertise. Experts in a wide variety of domains—radiology, birdwatching, elite athletics, fingerprint examination—have been empirically studied using behavioral, neural-physiological, and computational methods. This convergence of evidence is best explained in terms of cognitively sensitive perceptual improvements. And these improvements amount to epistemic virtue, where the virtue is partly resident in perception and credited to the perceiving agent. The view has far-reaching implications for a wide range of issues, including the epistemology of perception, the contents of perception, theory-ladenness in science and social perception, understanding and self-understanding, and aesthetic taste.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46664561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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