Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

This paper attempts to reconcile the claims that the mind is both flat (Chater, 2018) and highly rational (Oaksford & Chater, 2020). According to the flat mind hypothesis, the mind is a mass of inconsistent and contradictory fragments of experience. However, standard accounts of rationality from formal epistemology argue that to be rational, our beliefs must be consistent, and we must believe all the logical consequences of our beliefs. A social account of rationality is developed based on Brandom's (1994) logical expressivism, in which respecting the norms of logic and probability theory is still central but where these standards apply to our public commitments in social dialogical contexts rather than to our individual belief systems (Skovgaard-Olsen, 2017). According to this account, even if someone's individual beliefs are inconsistent, they cannot be condemned as irrational if they acknowledge the inconsistency and seek to resolve it. It is shown how this approach interacts with people's fragmented and shallow world knowledge, and its social distribution yields some counterintuitive consequences, such as it sometimes being rational individually not seeking to resolve contradictions. Other consequences of this social expressivist approach are considered, including for dual process theories of reasoning, our view of beliefs, the status of logic, and Fodor's (1983) view of central systems. It is concluded that people can have flat minds and yet be highly rational.

Studies of homesigns have shed light on the human capacity for language and on the challenging problem of language acquisition. The study of homesign has evolved from a perspective grounded in gesture studies and child development to include sign language linguistics and the role of homesigns in language emergence at the community level. One overarching finding is that homesigns more closely resemble sign languages used by linguistic communities than they resemble the gestures produced by hearing people along with spoken language. Homesigns may not exhibit all of the linguistic properties of community languages, but the properties they do exhibit are language properties, and for the people who use them, homesigns are their language. Further, the linguistic structures in homesigns are innovated by the deaf people who use them and are imperfectly learned by their hearing communication partners. I close with a call to action: We cannot celebrate discoveries about the mind made possible by studies of homesigns and emerging languages while ignoring the pervasiveness of language deprivation among deaf people, and the relative lack of deaf participation in science, even in studies of sign languages. While the scientific community learns much from studying homesigns and sign languages, we also have a responsibility to work toward ensuring that every deaf person has access to language, communication, and education.

How should we identify interesting topics in cognitive science? This paper suggests that one useful research strategy is to hunt for, and attempt to resolve, paradoxes: that is, apparent or real contradictions in our understanding of the mind and of thought. The rationale for this strategy is the assumption that our current thinking, and our various partial theories, of any topic are typically ill-defined, inconsistent or both. Thus, contradictions and confusions abound. Isolating paradoxes helps us expose vagueness and contradictions and demands that we formulate our ideas more precisely. From this point of view, finding a robust and puzzling contradiction in our current thinking should be celebrated as an achievement in itself. Ideally, of course, we then make further progress by clarifying how the paradox may be resolved, by clarifying our theories or finding new data that may decide between inconsistent assumptions. This approach is illustrated through examples from the author's research over several decades, which seems in retrospect to involve a repeated, if largely unwitting, application of this strategy.

Susan Goldin-Meadow is the 2021 Recipient of the Rumelhart Prize. Goldin-Meadow's body of research addresses the roles of gesture in language creation, communication, learning, and cognition. In one major strand of her research, Goldin-Meadow has studied gestures in children who are not exposed to any structured language input, specifically, deaf children of hearing parents who do not expose their children to sign language. These children create a highly structured, language-like system with their hands-a homesign. In another major strand, Goldin-Meadow has focused on the gestures that people produce along with speech. She has examined how gestures contribute to producing and comprehending language at the moment of speaking or signing, how gestures contribute to learning language and to learning other concepts and skills, and how gestures may actually constitute and change people's thinking. This topic collection is made up of papers that represent and extend these strands of Goldin-Meadow's work. This introductory article provides a brief biography of Goldin-Meadow, and it highlights ways in which the contributions to the topic collection exemplify several notable characteristics of Goldin-Meadow's body of work, including (1) a focus on multiple timescales of behavior and behavior change; (2) use of diverse methods, approaches, and populations; and (3) considerations of equity and inclusion, both in research and in educational and clinical practice.

People's choices of food and drink, the attitudes they express, and the beliefs that they state are influenced by their political and other identities. At the same time, people's everyday choices depend on the context of available options in ways that are difficult to explain in terms of the choosers' preferences and beliefs. Such phenomena provoke various questions. Do partisans or conspiracy theorists really believe what they are saying? Given the systematic inconsistency of their choices, in what sense do consumers prefer the items they purchase? More generally, how "flat" is the mind-do we come to decision-making and choice with pre-existing preferences, attitudes, and beliefs, or are our explanations for our behavior mere post-hoc narratives? Here, we argue that several apparently disparate difficulties are rooted in a failure to separate psychologically different types of preferences, attitudes, and beliefs. We distinguish between underlying, inferred, and expressed preferences. These preferences may be expressed in different coordinate spaces and hence support different types of explanatory generalizations. Choices that appear inconsistent according to one type of preference can appear consistent according to another, and whether we can say that a person "really" prefers something depends on which type of preference we mean. We extend the tripartite classification to the case of attitudes and beliefs, and suggest that attributions of attitudes and beliefs may also be ambiguous. We conclude that not all of the mental states and representations that govern our behavior are context-dependent and constructed, although many are.

This is an introduction to the special issue of Topics in Cognitive Science, honoring Nick Chater's award of the 2023 David E. Rumelhart Prize for Contributions to the Theoretical Foundations of Human Cognition. It provides a condensed overview of his contributions to cognitive science within which the articles to this special issue are situated, finishing off with two short personal recollections by the Editors.

How do teachers' gestures influence students' learning? This article reviews research investigating the role of gestures in communication, focusing on teachers' communication with their students, primarily in mathematics and science instruction. We first briefly consider gesture's role in communication more generally as a backdrop for considering teaching as a special context for communication. We then describe teachers' spontaneous gesturing in teaching contexts, and we consider how teachers' spontaneous gestures might influence students' learning. We then consider experimental studies that provide causal support for the effects of teachers' gestures on students' learning. We conclude by discussing future directions and implications for educational practice.

Studies of the evolution of language rely heavily on comparisons to nonhuman primates, particularly the gestural communication of nonhuman apes. Differences between human and ape gestures are largely ones of degree rather than kind. For example, while human gestures are more flexible, ape gestures are not inflexible. In this piece, I closely consider two features of the gestural communication of apes and humans that might display differences in kind: iconicity and temporal alignment. Iconicity has long played a privileged role in theories of gestural language origins, the proposal being that it provided a steppingstone into language through a stage of pantomime. However, iconicity is not as easy as it seems. Evidence from co-speech gestures of hearing children and from homesign suggests that iconic reference is both cognitively complex and slow to develop in humans. There is no conclusive evidence that nonhuman apes understand or produce iconic gestures; some gestures may appear iconic to human observers but the apes themselves may not understand the similarity between form and meaning. Far from providing an easy pathway into the emergence of symbolic communication, iconicity relies on sophisticated capacities for analogy and abstraction, ones often lacking in apes and young children. Temporal alignment between gesture and vocalization is another area that may show sharp contrasts between adult humans and apes, though data here is sparser. I discuss the tight synchronization of gesture and speech that emerges over the first year of life in human children and contrast it with gesture and vocalization in apes, which typically are described as overlapping but not simultaneous. Human ancestors probably communicated in ways similar to other apes, but the dual emergence of the ability to use iconic reference and the alignment of hand and mouth may have set our ancestors down a unique evolutionary road toward language.

How we judge the similarity between stimuli in the world is connected ultimately to how we represent them. Because of this, decisions about how we model similarity, either in terms of human behavior or patterns of neural activity, can provide key insights into how representations are structured and organized. Despite this, psychology and cognitive neuroscience continue to be dominated by a narrow range of similarity models, particularly those that characterize similarity as distance within "cognitive space." Despite the appeal of such models, their topological nature places fundamental constraints on their ability to capture relationships between objects and events in the world. To probe this, we created a stimulus set in which the predicted similarity relationships (based on an alternative model of similarity) could not be simply embedded within Euclidean space. This approach revealed that the spatial model distorts these predictions, and the perceived similarities of human observers. These findings indicate that cognitive spaces-that underlie much recent work probing both visual and conceptual representations in cognitive neuroscience-are limited in fundamental ways that restrict their theoretical and practical utility.

Mushrooms are a ubiquitous and essential component in our biological environment and have been of interest to humans around the globe for millennia. Knowledge about mushrooms represents a prime example of cumulative culture, one of the key processes in human evolution. Based on a review of available research, we argue that the cognitive mechanisms of cultural transmission impact this knowledge in a twofold manner. First and foremost, they secure the accumulation of (folk-)mycological knowledge, with the principal objective to capture reliable information on edibility and means for safe distinction. However, they also shape attitudes toward mushrooms, practices involved in foraging and consumption, and appraisals of edibility in distinct ways, with even regression and eventual loss of knowledge as one possible outcome. In using the domain of mushrooms as an example for expounding this dual role that culture plays during knowledge transmission, our paper contributes to theoretical debates around the cognitive and cultural mechanisms involved in human evolution.