Abstract How does a technocratic entity, such as a central bank, craft a key policy intervention when faced with limits to established frameworks of governance? This article explores the Bank of England’s turn to unconventional policy in 2009 drawing on a set of eighteen in-depth interviews with former members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Executive team, and staff economists, and a corpus of documents. Adopting Goffman’s ‘framing analysis’, it argues that the limits to established governance led to the temporary replacement of the New Keynesian frame with a Monetarist frame, as a result of expert struggles, with consequential outcomes on the policy intervention. As the backstage dissensus spilled over onto the frontstage, manifesting as limits to knowledge, the Bank’s ‘expert authority’ was threatened. The Bank engaged in ‘manufactured consensus’—a backstage compromise between competing frames forged into a frontstage consensus via a hybrid frame—which proved to be a fragile strategy. By throwing light on the backstage–frontstage relations of technocratic organizations, I claim that an intervention may be shaped both by internal processes as well as by the ways in which the organization seeks to handle the external demands to which those very same internal processes may give rise.
{"title":"Economics as intervention: Expert struggles over quantitative easing at the Bank of England","authors":"Dylan Cassar","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad060","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does a technocratic entity, such as a central bank, craft a key policy intervention when faced with limits to established frameworks of governance? This article explores the Bank of England’s turn to unconventional policy in 2009 drawing on a set of eighteen in-depth interviews with former members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Executive team, and staff economists, and a corpus of documents. Adopting Goffman’s ‘framing analysis’, it argues that the limits to established governance led to the temporary replacement of the New Keynesian frame with a Monetarist frame, as a result of expert struggles, with consequential outcomes on the policy intervention. As the backstage dissensus spilled over onto the frontstage, manifesting as limits to knowledge, the Bank’s ‘expert authority’ was threatened. The Bank engaged in ‘manufactured consensus’—a backstage compromise between competing frames forged into a frontstage consensus via a hybrid frame—which proved to be a fragile strategy. By throwing light on the backstage–frontstage relations of technocratic organizations, I claim that an intervention may be shaped both by internal processes as well as by the ways in which the organization seeks to handle the external demands to which those very same internal processes may give rise.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":" 31","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135293044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract After the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union (EU) introduced a New Economic Governance (NEG) regime, which enabled much more coercive interventions of EU executives in social policy areas hitherto shielded from them. This study assesses the policy orientation of their NEG prescriptions in healthcare for Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Romania from 2009 to 2019 and the potential for countervailing actions of labour movements. Acknowledging organized labour’s contribution to the making of decommodified healthcare systems after 1945, we ask if the NEG prescriptions were informed by an overarching healthcare commodification script, as this is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for transnational counter-movements. Our analysis reveals that the country-specific NEG prescriptions of the European Commission and the Council followed an overarching commodification script, which especially targeted the countries that lagged behind in health service commodification. NEG thus represents a case of reversed differentiated integration, which provided both opportunities and challenges to transnational counter-movements.
{"title":"Pursuing an overarching commodification script through country-specific interventions? The EU’s New Economic Governance prescriptions in healthcare (2009–2019)","authors":"Sabina Stan, Roland Erne","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union (EU) introduced a New Economic Governance (NEG) regime, which enabled much more coercive interventions of EU executives in social policy areas hitherto shielded from them. This study assesses the policy orientation of their NEG prescriptions in healthcare for Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Romania from 2009 to 2019 and the potential for countervailing actions of labour movements. Acknowledging organized labour’s contribution to the making of decommodified healthcare systems after 1945, we ask if the NEG prescriptions were informed by an overarching healthcare commodification script, as this is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for transnational counter-movements. Our analysis reveals that the country-specific NEG prescriptions of the European Commission and the Council followed an overarching commodification script, which especially targeted the countries that lagged behind in health service commodification. NEG thus represents a case of reversed differentiated integration, which provided both opportunities and challenges to transnational counter-movements.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"29 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines the undergraduate major as a closure mechanism in occupations among college graduates, using the American Community Surveys. We measure the college major density of occupations, termed “major specialization”, finding that greater major specialization of an occupation is associated with higher earnings, over and above previously identified closure devices (licensure, unionization, and vertical educational credentialing), and college selectivity. We conclude that major specialization operates as a powerful earnings-boosting closure device within higher-educated labor markets. Additional analyses regarding premiums from individuals matching their own college major with their occupation’s typical major indicate comparatively small earnings payoffs. Hence, deviating from one’s occupation’s usual credential does not generate a substantial earnings penalty. Furthermore, payoffs from major-occupation matching have a ceiling: there is no further payoff above the average match level. These findings demonstrate how occupational closure theory helps explain the substantial earnings advantages of certain college majors in the labor force.
{"title":"Closure and matching payoffs from college majors","authors":"Dirk Witteveen, Paul Attewell","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad059","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the undergraduate major as a closure mechanism in occupations among college graduates, using the American Community Surveys. We measure the college major density of occupations, termed “major specialization”, finding that greater major specialization of an occupation is associated with higher earnings, over and above previously identified closure devices (licensure, unionization, and vertical educational credentialing), and college selectivity. We conclude that major specialization operates as a powerful earnings-boosting closure device within higher-educated labor markets. Additional analyses regarding premiums from individuals matching their own college major with their occupation’s typical major indicate comparatively small earnings payoffs. Hence, deviating from one’s occupation’s usual credential does not generate a substantial earnings penalty. Furthermore, payoffs from major-occupation matching have a ceiling: there is no further payoff above the average match level. These findings demonstrate how occupational closure theory helps explain the substantial earnings advantages of certain college majors in the labor force.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135266409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The comparative capitalisms literature has developed an increasingly dynamic approach to conceptualizing capitalism variety, and has suggested mechanisms to explain shifts in institutional practices under the surface of formal stability of the institutional context. Less is known, however, about how new entrepreneurial firms engage with institutions to develop organizational arrangements needed to support their innovation activities. Such engagement with institutions can represent sources of heterogeneity within and across national institutional contexts, with incremental changes in practices resulting, in some instances, in major transformations in institutions over time. We draw on a study of fifty-three independent mobile games firms in the USA and Japan and the structures and processes used by these firms to develop innovative activities in their institutional context. Our research advances our understanding of organizational diversity and institutional change in two ways. First, our study identifies two new ‘variants’ of how entrepreneurial firms organize their innovation activities in their institutional context—digital creatives and digital engineers. Second, we characterize the mechanisms through which entrepreneurial firms engage and respond to institutions that support the establishment of these variants—defecting, intensifying, and positioning vis-à-vis large firms.
{"title":"Digital creatives and digital engineers: entrepreneurial firms, institutional context, and the organization of innovation","authors":"Marcela Miozzo, Cornelia Storz, Steven Casper","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad057","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The comparative capitalisms literature has developed an increasingly dynamic approach to conceptualizing capitalism variety, and has suggested mechanisms to explain shifts in institutional practices under the surface of formal stability of the institutional context. Less is known, however, about how new entrepreneurial firms engage with institutions to develop organizational arrangements needed to support their innovation activities. Such engagement with institutions can represent sources of heterogeneity within and across national institutional contexts, with incremental changes in practices resulting, in some instances, in major transformations in institutions over time. We draw on a study of fifty-three independent mobile games firms in the USA and Japan and the structures and processes used by these firms to develop innovative activities in their institutional context. Our research advances our understanding of organizational diversity and institutional change in two ways. First, our study identifies two new ‘variants’ of how entrepreneurial firms organize their innovation activities in their institutional context—digital creatives and digital engineers. Second, we characterize the mechanisms through which entrepreneurial firms engage and respond to institutions that support the establishment of these variants—defecting, intensifying, and positioning vis-à-vis large firms.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We examine how government venture capital (GVC)—a specific type of political connection—affected initial public offering (IPO) valuation. Contrary to the well-recognized benefits of political connections in channeling access to financial resources in China, our analysis of 959 IPOs between 2008 and 2014 suggests that GVC backing lowers IPO valuation. This baseline effect is moderated by other sources of political connection (e.g. government ownership, state sector experience of top management team members, private sector partner status, and institutional environments). We argue that it is the negative signaling mechanism revolving around political connections that accounts for this observable pattern. This research enriches the signaling theory by uncovering signal emergence and analyzing the interactions between several signaling sources of political connection. Specifically, it contributes to a better understanding of political connections by specifying an undesirable consequence of state-led financialization, which has timely practical relevance as China’s capital market is steering toward a rule-based system.
{"title":"Revolving around political connections: the negative effect of government venture capital backing on IPO valuation","authors":"Tan Li, Jar-Der Luo, Enying Zheng","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad056","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine how government venture capital (GVC)—a specific type of political connection—affected initial public offering (IPO) valuation. Contrary to the well-recognized benefits of political connections in channeling access to financial resources in China, our analysis of 959 IPOs between 2008 and 2014 suggests that GVC backing lowers IPO valuation. This baseline effect is moderated by other sources of political connection (e.g. government ownership, state sector experience of top management team members, private sector partner status, and institutional environments). We argue that it is the negative signaling mechanism revolving around political connections that accounts for this observable pattern. This research enriches the signaling theory by uncovering signal emergence and analyzing the interactions between several signaling sources of political connection. Specifically, it contributes to a better understanding of political connections by specifying an undesirable consequence of state-led financialization, which has timely practical relevance as China’s capital market is steering toward a rule-based system.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135803786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Platform cooperatives that are owned and governed by gig workers themselves have been proposed as a silver bullet to improve these workers’ influence on organizational decision-making. However, they remain relatively rare compared with dominant investor-owned platforms. Traditionally, worker cooperatives strive for alternative organizing based on the ideal of workplace democracy but are often faced with unequal participation by members in decision-making processes. To test for participation inequalities, this study used survey data (n = 418) from a network of four platform worker cooperatives in Italy. The results show that members with lower affective commitment towards their cooperative and less social capital among other members are less likely to participate, but that there is no effect of cooperative size and human capital.
{"title":"Silicon law of oligarchy: patterns of member participation in the decision-making of platform cooperatives","authors":"Damion J Bunders","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad058","url":null,"abstract":"Platform cooperatives that are owned and governed by gig workers themselves have been proposed as a silver bullet to improve these workers’ influence on organizational decision-making. However, they remain relatively rare compared with dominant investor-owned platforms. Traditionally, worker cooperatives strive for alternative organizing based on the ideal of workplace democracy but are often faced with unequal participation by members in decision-making processes. To test for participation inequalities, this study used survey data (n = 418) from a network of four platform worker cooperatives in Italy. The results show that members with lower affective commitment towards their cooperative and less social capital among other members are less likely to participate, but that there is no effect of cooperative size and human capital.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135198251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Income comparisons imply that individuals care not only about the absolute value of their income but also about its relative value. Such comparisons likely have significant societal consequences while also challenging standard neoclassical economic theory. I argue that a better understanding of income comparisons requires a more systematic, theoretical engagement with three problems: (1) the problem of reference group selection, (2) the problem of orientation, and (3) the problem of functional form. Income comparisons are commonly attributed to interdependent preferences, in particular to envy. I propose an alternative theoretical approach in which comparisons are a rational means for individuals to improve upon imperfect information about their current earning potential. I test the empirical implications of both approaches for reference group selection, orientation, and functional form using individual-level data from the Netherlands. The evidence suggests that imperfect information drives comparisons, but interdependent preferences also play a role.
{"title":"Looking up and down and round and round: a theoretical–empirical, individual-level analysis of income comparisons","authors":"Alex Lehr","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Income comparisons imply that individuals care not only about the absolute value of their income but also about its relative value. Such comparisons likely have significant societal consequences while also challenging standard neoclassical economic theory. I argue that a better understanding of income comparisons requires a more systematic, theoretical engagement with three problems: (1) the problem of reference group selection, (2) the problem of orientation, and (3) the problem of functional form. Income comparisons are commonly attributed to interdependent preferences, in particular to envy. I propose an alternative theoretical approach in which comparisons are a rational means for individuals to improve upon imperfect information about their current earning potential. I test the empirical implications of both approaches for reference group selection, orientation, and functional form using individual-level data from the Netherlands. The evidence suggests that imperfect information drives comparisons, but interdependent preferences also play a role.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135549269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of the gender pay gap is generated within workplaces, making it paramount to understand which workplace policies effectively address gaps. Our article asks when policies limit gender pay gaps across employee tenure to identify potential temporal weak points. We analyze a representative panel of 10,000 establishments with over 850,000 employees using the 2005–19 waves of German-linked employer–employee data (LIAB). Two key findings emerge. First, a temporal perspective on workplace policies reveals that no policy under study—formalization, identity-based career programs, and child care assistance—reduces gender pay gaps at hire. Instead, policies only address additional disparities that accumulate after hire. Second, only identity-based career programs narrow gender disparities for all women. In contrast, seemingly gender-neutral formalization is insufficient, while providing employer-sponsored child care has mixed effects depending on employees’ education. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for organizational policy and future research.
{"title":"Off to a slow start: which workplace policies can limit gender pay gaps across firm tenure?","authors":"Anne-Kathrin Kronberg, Anna Gerlach","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad055","url":null,"abstract":"Much of the gender pay gap is generated within workplaces, making it paramount to understand which workplace policies effectively address gaps. Our article asks when policies limit gender pay gaps across employee tenure to identify potential temporal weak points. We analyze a representative panel of 10,000 establishments with over 850,000 employees using the 2005–19 waves of German-linked employer–employee data (LIAB). Two key findings emerge. First, a temporal perspective on workplace policies reveals that no policy under study—formalization, identity-based career programs, and child care assistance—reduces gender pay gaps at hire. Instead, policies only address additional disparities that accumulate after hire. Second, only identity-based career programs narrow gender disparities for all women. In contrast, seemingly gender-neutral formalization is insufficient, while providing employer-sponsored child care has mixed effects depending on employees’ education. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for organizational policy and future research.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135739886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores two questions. What generates the political division over climate change policy in the United States? How is the division over climate change policy related to the broader polarization of contemporary American politics? I argue that the geographies of America’s dual economy—the knowledge economy and the carbon economy—and exposure to the climate crisis intersect to generate a new axis of conflict, which I call the carbon–climate cleavage. This cleavage produces political division over climate change and provides materialist elements that accompany the sociocultural factors that shape contemporary polarization. I demonstrate the existence of the cleavage and its impact using data on economic geography, political attitudes on climate change policy, and support for Trump in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The empirical analysis indicates that carbon economy communities oppose climate change policy and support Trump, while knowledge economy residents support climate change policy and oppose Trump.
{"title":"The dual economy, climate change, and the polarization of American politics","authors":"Thomas Oatley","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad052","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores two questions. What generates the political division over climate change policy in the United States? How is the division over climate change policy related to the broader polarization of contemporary American politics? I argue that the geographies of America’s dual economy—the knowledge economy and the carbon economy—and exposure to the climate crisis intersect to generate a new axis of conflict, which I call the carbon–climate cleavage. This cleavage produces political division over climate change and provides materialist elements that accompany the sociocultural factors that shape contemporary polarization. I demonstrate the existence of the cleavage and its impact using data on economic geography, political attitudes on climate change policy, and support for Trump in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The empirical analysis indicates that carbon economy communities oppose climate change policy and support Trump, while knowledge economy residents support climate change policy and oppose Trump.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135739889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do firms take excessive risks that result in failure? Moral hazard theorists argue that the answer lies in the risk-boosting effects of the government safety net, which insulates firms from market discipline. We revisit this conventional wisdom by examining how exposure to government protection has contributed to recent trends in bank risk-taking in the USA. Drawing from insights from economic sociology, we highlight an additional way that exposure to government protection can shape organizational behavior: by reducing resource-based profitability pressures that can spur risky behavior. Using panel data analysis of risky US bank behavior between 1994 and 2015, we find that bank exposure to government protection was more often associated with less risk-taking than more of it. This pattern contradicts the predictions of moral hazard theory but aligns with the predictions of our own institutional-resource theory. We discuss implications for economic sociology and financial economics.
{"title":"Rethinking moral hazard: government protection and bank risk-taking","authors":"Kim Pernell, Jiwook Jung","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad050","url":null,"abstract":"Why do firms take excessive risks that result in failure? Moral hazard theorists argue that the answer lies in the risk-boosting effects of the government safety net, which insulates firms from market discipline. We revisit this conventional wisdom by examining how exposure to government protection has contributed to recent trends in bank risk-taking in the USA. Drawing from insights from economic sociology, we highlight an additional way that exposure to government protection can shape organizational behavior: by reducing resource-based profitability pressures that can spur risky behavior. Using panel data analysis of risky US bank behavior between 1994 and 2015, we find that bank exposure to government protection was more often associated with less risk-taking than more of it. This pattern contradicts the predictions of moral hazard theory but aligns with the predictions of our own institutional-resource theory. We discuss implications for economic sociology and financial economics.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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