Organizational research has revealed considerable variation in immigrant–native pay inequalities across workplace contexts. However, less is known about how broader labor market institutions intersect in the local dynamics of wage setting between employees of immigrant and native backgrounds. We argue that union density and higher shares of employees in licensed occupations in workplaces constrain organizational opportunity structures for unequal pay according to immigrant backgrounds. Our analysis of longitudinal linked employer–employee administrative data for the Norwegian labor market shows that the wage gap between immigrants and natives decreases with increasing workplace unionization, but almost exclusively for immigrants who are union members. Next, licensure raises pay at the individual and workplace levels, although any reduction in immigrant–native pay gaps is contingent on immigrants’ access to licensed jobs. Our findings support the claim that institutional regulation in the workplace reduces the organizational scope of unequal pay based on immigrant status.
{"title":"Unionization, licensure and workplace variation in pay inequality between immigrants and natives","authors":"Ida Drange, Håvard Helland, Are Skeie Hermansen","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad075","url":null,"abstract":"Organizational research has revealed considerable variation in immigrant–native pay inequalities across workplace contexts. However, less is known about how broader labor market institutions intersect in the local dynamics of wage setting between employees of immigrant and native backgrounds. We argue that union density and higher shares of employees in licensed occupations in workplaces constrain organizational opportunity structures for unequal pay according to immigrant backgrounds. Our analysis of longitudinal linked employer–employee administrative data for the Norwegian labor market shows that the wage gap between immigrants and natives decreases with increasing workplace unionization, but almost exclusively for immigrants who are union members. Next, licensure raises pay at the individual and workplace levels, although any reduction in immigrant–native pay gaps is contingent on immigrants’ access to licensed jobs. Our findings support the claim that institutional regulation in the workplace reduces the organizational scope of unequal pay based on immigrant status.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139645824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers’ preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.
{"title":"Sectors versus borders: interest group cleavages and struggles over corporate governance in the age of asset management","authors":"Dustin Voss","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad072","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers’ preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139443887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The replacement of cash by cashless alternatives carries huge potential to aggravate social inequality. Governments struggle to manage these dynamics since they must keep a delicate balance between the formation of strong players and the provision of inclusive payment options. Studying the political economy behind the payment industry is crucial to understanding how digitalization has transformed payments. To this aim, we look at the history of the payment industry in two cases: the USA and the euro area. In the USA, the cashless revolution gave rise to an oligopoly of two extremely successful credit card companies, which, however, resulted in a banking system that does not serve the needs of at least one-fifth of the population. In the euro area, the population has access to affordable financial services; however, neither the private nor the public sector has been able to provide the infrastructure to integrate European payments.
{"title":"Small money, large profits: how the cashless revolution aggravates social inequality","authors":"Barbara Brandl, David Hengsbach, Guadalupe Moreno","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad071","url":null,"abstract":"The replacement of cash by cashless alternatives carries huge potential to aggravate social inequality. Governments struggle to manage these dynamics since they must keep a delicate balance between the formation of strong players and the provision of inclusive payment options. Studying the political economy behind the payment industry is crucial to understanding how digitalization has transformed payments. To this aim, we look at the history of the payment industry in two cases: the USA and the euro area. In the USA, the cashless revolution gave rise to an oligopoly of two extremely successful credit card companies, which, however, resulted in a banking system that does not serve the needs of at least one-fifth of the population. In the euro area, the population has access to affordable financial services; however, neither the private nor the public sector has been able to provide the infrastructure to integrate European payments.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Utilizing the geographical polarization of American politics, we examine how state politics shape the implementation of downsizing. Combining power resources theory and the political-embeddedness approach in organizational studies, we propose that labor power resources at the state level, namely Democratic control of state government and state-level union membership, limit firms’ ability to implement drastic job cuts within the state. Based on data on the 697 largest, publicly traded US firms between 1981 and 2005, combined with their establishment-level employment data from EEO-1 reports, our analysis shows that post-downsizing reductions in employment were less severe in states with a worker-friendly political environment. But the limited effectiveness of labor’s power resources in right-to-work states and the American South suggests that there is considerable regional variation. Our findings provide strong evidence of the political embeddedness of firms, by demonstrating the growing salience of political considerations in corporate decision-making.
{"title":"Power resources of labor and the state politics of downsizing","authors":"Jiwook Jung, Tom VanHeuvelen","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad064","url":null,"abstract":"Utilizing the geographical polarization of American politics, we examine how state politics shape the implementation of downsizing. Combining power resources theory and the political-embeddedness approach in organizational studies, we propose that labor power resources at the state level, namely Democratic control of state government and state-level union membership, limit firms’ ability to implement drastic job cuts within the state. Based on data on the 697 largest, publicly traded US firms between 1981 and 2005, combined with their establishment-level employment data from EEO-1 reports, our analysis shows that post-downsizing reductions in employment were less severe in states with a worker-friendly political environment. But the limited effectiveness of labor’s power resources in right-to-work states and the American South suggests that there is considerable regional variation. Our findings provide strong evidence of the political embeddedness of firms, by demonstrating the growing salience of political considerations in corporate decision-making.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138507473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study addresses a critical gap in our understanding of how the employer and workplace context influences the working career of older employees. Leveraging linked employer–employee data, this study examines the impact of workplace retention practices on an early labour market exit for employees aged fifty-five to sixty-four in Denmark. The findings reveal that, for those eligible for early retirement, work environment adaptation, re-employment of retired employees, and positive views of older employees’ productivity significantly contribute to avoiding early retirement. However, these workplace retention practices do not influence unemployment, emphasizing their effectiveness in postponing early retirement rather than mitigating job loss. Moreover, the analysis shows that employees with managerial roles and high skill levels benefit more from workplace retention practices in terms of avoiding both early retirement and unemployment. This finding highlights the employer’s key role in shaping inequalities in an ageing workforce by selectively providing opportunities to extend working lives.
{"title":"Managing an ageing workforce: workplace retention practices and early labour market exit","authors":"Jeevitha Yogachandiran Qvist","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad063","url":null,"abstract":"This study addresses a critical gap in our understanding of how the employer and workplace context influences the working career of older employees. Leveraging linked employer–employee data, this study examines the impact of workplace retention practices on an early labour market exit for employees aged fifty-five to sixty-four in Denmark. The findings reveal that, for those eligible for early retirement, work environment adaptation, re-employment of retired employees, and positive views of older employees’ productivity significantly contribute to avoiding early retirement. However, these workplace retention practices do not influence unemployment, emphasizing their effectiveness in postponing early retirement rather than mitigating job loss. Moreover, the analysis shows that employees with managerial roles and high skill levels benefit more from workplace retention practices in terms of avoiding both early retirement and unemployment. This finding highlights the employer’s key role in shaping inequalities in an ageing workforce by selectively providing opportunities to extend working lives.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138507476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article contributes to debates on business power, noisy politics, and right-wing populism. The populist right weakens strategies of quiet politics, which many suggest has led to a steep decline of business power. I challenge this view and argue that a combination of innovative strategies and ample financial resources allow business associations to exercise power in this environment. Drawing on new empirical evidence, the article makes three central contributions. First, I suggest that the failure of Remain business advocacy in the 2016 Brexit referendum resulted from the constraints of administrative legislation (the PPERA), weaknesses in campaigning strategies, and the CBI leadership’s decision to not register as a campaign organization. Second, while my regression analysis provides some support for Culpepper’s quiet politics argument, the Swiss business federation Economiesuisse has won 90% of the referendum campaigns it has led, including many referendums with high issue salience against right-wing populists. Third, Economiesuisse shows that business strategies of ‘loud voice’ can be successful. With money and innovative public-facing campaigning strategies, business organizations can win in noisy environments and against right-wing populists.
{"title":"Business power, right-wing populism, and noisy politics: lessons from Brexit and Swiss referendums","authors":"Daniel Kinderman","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad061","url":null,"abstract":"This article contributes to debates on business power, noisy politics, and right-wing populism. The populist right weakens strategies of quiet politics, which many suggest has led to a steep decline of business power. I challenge this view and argue that a combination of innovative strategies and ample financial resources allow business associations to exercise power in this environment. Drawing on new empirical evidence, the article makes three central contributions. First, I suggest that the failure of Remain business advocacy in the 2016 Brexit referendum resulted from the constraints of administrative legislation (the PPERA), weaknesses in campaigning strategies, and the CBI leadership’s decision to not register as a campaign organization. Second, while my regression analysis provides some support for Culpepper’s quiet politics argument, the Swiss business federation Economiesuisse has won 90% of the referendum campaigns it has led, including many referendums with high issue salience against right-wing populists. Third, Economiesuisse shows that business strategies of ‘loud voice’ can be successful. With money and innovative public-facing campaigning strategies, business organizations can win in noisy environments and against right-wing populists.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134956717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract How does a technocratic entity, such as a central bank, craft a key policy intervention when faced with limits to established frameworks of governance? This article explores the Bank of England’s turn to unconventional policy in 2009 drawing on a set of eighteen in-depth interviews with former members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Executive team, and staff economists, and a corpus of documents. Adopting Goffman’s ‘framing analysis’, it argues that the limits to established governance led to the temporary replacement of the New Keynesian frame with a Monetarist frame, as a result of expert struggles, with consequential outcomes on the policy intervention. As the backstage dissensus spilled over onto the frontstage, manifesting as limits to knowledge, the Bank’s ‘expert authority’ was threatened. The Bank engaged in ‘manufactured consensus’—a backstage compromise between competing frames forged into a frontstage consensus via a hybrid frame—which proved to be a fragile strategy. By throwing light on the backstage–frontstage relations of technocratic organizations, I claim that an intervention may be shaped both by internal processes as well as by the ways in which the organization seeks to handle the external demands to which those very same internal processes may give rise.
{"title":"Economics as intervention: Expert struggles over quantitative easing at the Bank of England","authors":"Dylan Cassar","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad060","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does a technocratic entity, such as a central bank, craft a key policy intervention when faced with limits to established frameworks of governance? This article explores the Bank of England’s turn to unconventional policy in 2009 drawing on a set of eighteen in-depth interviews with former members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Executive team, and staff economists, and a corpus of documents. Adopting Goffman’s ‘framing analysis’, it argues that the limits to established governance led to the temporary replacement of the New Keynesian frame with a Monetarist frame, as a result of expert struggles, with consequential outcomes on the policy intervention. As the backstage dissensus spilled over onto the frontstage, manifesting as limits to knowledge, the Bank’s ‘expert authority’ was threatened. The Bank engaged in ‘manufactured consensus’—a backstage compromise between competing frames forged into a frontstage consensus via a hybrid frame—which proved to be a fragile strategy. By throwing light on the backstage–frontstage relations of technocratic organizations, I claim that an intervention may be shaped both by internal processes as well as by the ways in which the organization seeks to handle the external demands to which those very same internal processes may give rise.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135293044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract After the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union (EU) introduced a New Economic Governance (NEG) regime, which enabled much more coercive interventions of EU executives in social policy areas hitherto shielded from them. This study assesses the policy orientation of their NEG prescriptions in healthcare for Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Romania from 2009 to 2019 and the potential for countervailing actions of labour movements. Acknowledging organized labour’s contribution to the making of decommodified healthcare systems after 1945, we ask if the NEG prescriptions were informed by an overarching healthcare commodification script, as this is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for transnational counter-movements. Our analysis reveals that the country-specific NEG prescriptions of the European Commission and the Council followed an overarching commodification script, which especially targeted the countries that lagged behind in health service commodification. NEG thus represents a case of reversed differentiated integration, which provided both opportunities and challenges to transnational counter-movements.
{"title":"Pursuing an overarching commodification script through country-specific interventions? The EU’s New Economic Governance prescriptions in healthcare (2009–2019)","authors":"Sabina Stan, Roland Erne","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union (EU) introduced a New Economic Governance (NEG) regime, which enabled much more coercive interventions of EU executives in social policy areas hitherto shielded from them. This study assesses the policy orientation of their NEG prescriptions in healthcare for Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Romania from 2009 to 2019 and the potential for countervailing actions of labour movements. Acknowledging organized labour’s contribution to the making of decommodified healthcare systems after 1945, we ask if the NEG prescriptions were informed by an overarching healthcare commodification script, as this is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for transnational counter-movements. Our analysis reveals that the country-specific NEG prescriptions of the European Commission and the Council followed an overarching commodification script, which especially targeted the countries that lagged behind in health service commodification. NEG thus represents a case of reversed differentiated integration, which provided both opportunities and challenges to transnational counter-movements.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines the undergraduate major as a closure mechanism in occupations among college graduates, using the American Community Surveys. We measure the college major density of occupations, termed “major specialization”, finding that greater major specialization of an occupation is associated with higher earnings, over and above previously identified closure devices (licensure, unionization, and vertical educational credentialing), and college selectivity. We conclude that major specialization operates as a powerful earnings-boosting closure device within higher-educated labor markets. Additional analyses regarding premiums from individuals matching their own college major with their occupation’s typical major indicate comparatively small earnings payoffs. Hence, deviating from one’s occupation’s usual credential does not generate a substantial earnings penalty. Furthermore, payoffs from major-occupation matching have a ceiling: there is no further payoff above the average match level. These findings demonstrate how occupational closure theory helps explain the substantial earnings advantages of certain college majors in the labor force.
{"title":"Closure and matching payoffs from college majors","authors":"Dirk Witteveen, Paul Attewell","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad059","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the undergraduate major as a closure mechanism in occupations among college graduates, using the American Community Surveys. We measure the college major density of occupations, termed “major specialization”, finding that greater major specialization of an occupation is associated with higher earnings, over and above previously identified closure devices (licensure, unionization, and vertical educational credentialing), and college selectivity. We conclude that major specialization operates as a powerful earnings-boosting closure device within higher-educated labor markets. Additional analyses regarding premiums from individuals matching their own college major with their occupation’s typical major indicate comparatively small earnings payoffs. Hence, deviating from one’s occupation’s usual credential does not generate a substantial earnings penalty. Furthermore, payoffs from major-occupation matching have a ceiling: there is no further payoff above the average match level. These findings demonstrate how occupational closure theory helps explain the substantial earnings advantages of certain college majors in the labor force.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135266409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The comparative capitalisms literature has developed an increasingly dynamic approach to conceptualizing capitalism variety, and has suggested mechanisms to explain shifts in institutional practices under the surface of formal stability of the institutional context. Less is known, however, about how new entrepreneurial firms engage with institutions to develop organizational arrangements needed to support their innovation activities. Such engagement with institutions can represent sources of heterogeneity within and across national institutional contexts, with incremental changes in practices resulting, in some instances, in major transformations in institutions over time. We draw on a study of fifty-three independent mobile games firms in the USA and Japan and the structures and processes used by these firms to develop innovative activities in their institutional context. Our research advances our understanding of organizational diversity and institutional change in two ways. First, our study identifies two new ‘variants’ of how entrepreneurial firms organize their innovation activities in their institutional context—digital creatives and digital engineers. Second, we characterize the mechanisms through which entrepreneurial firms engage and respond to institutions that support the establishment of these variants—defecting, intensifying, and positioning vis-à-vis large firms.
{"title":"Digital creatives and digital engineers: entrepreneurial firms, institutional context, and the organization of innovation","authors":"Marcela Miozzo, Cornelia Storz, Steven Casper","doi":"10.1093/ser/mwad057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwad057","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The comparative capitalisms literature has developed an increasingly dynamic approach to conceptualizing capitalism variety, and has suggested mechanisms to explain shifts in institutional practices under the surface of formal stability of the institutional context. Less is known, however, about how new entrepreneurial firms engage with institutions to develop organizational arrangements needed to support their innovation activities. Such engagement with institutions can represent sources of heterogeneity within and across national institutional contexts, with incremental changes in practices resulting, in some instances, in major transformations in institutions over time. We draw on a study of fifty-three independent mobile games firms in the USA and Japan and the structures and processes used by these firms to develop innovative activities in their institutional context. Our research advances our understanding of organizational diversity and institutional change in two ways. First, our study identifies two new ‘variants’ of how entrepreneurial firms organize their innovation activities in their institutional context—digital creatives and digital engineers. Second, we characterize the mechanisms through which entrepreneurial firms engage and respond to institutions that support the establishment of these variants—defecting, intensifying, and positioning vis-à-vis large firms.","PeriodicalId":47947,"journal":{"name":"Socio-Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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