The value of environmental goods to individuals often depends on spatial features such as distance. The most common approach of accounting for distance decay is to model utility as some function of distance. It has been suggested to instead model the value as a function of the quantity of an environmental good within a certain distance. We develop three novel quantity-within-distance models that may be more suited for evaluating quantity changes in an environmental good. We argue that these models could capture spatial patterns better than distance-based models when i) secondary benefits are a relevant source of welfare, ii) the environmental change is spatially scattered, iii) the distribution of the endowment, i.e. the present availability of the environmental good, matters. Using data from choice experiments on the extension of green space and trees in two urban areas, we compare required assumptions, model fit, and size and precision of aggregated welfare estimates. Our results indicate limited differences in model fit. However, the quantity-within-distance models consistently produce aggregate welfare estimates roughly half of common distance decay models and have narrower confidence intervals. While it is not possible to infer which is more accurate, the large differences can have considerable policy implications.
{"title":"Does quantity matter for distance decay? Evidence from two choice experiments on urban green","authors":"Malte Welling , Jette Bredahl Jacobsen , Søren Bøye Olsen , Thomas Lundhede","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101472","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101472","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The value of environmental goods to individuals often depends on spatial features such as distance. The most common approach of accounting for distance decay is to model utility as some function of distance. It has been suggested to instead model the value as a function of the quantity of an environmental good within a certain distance. We develop three novel quantity-within-distance models that may be more suited for evaluating quantity changes in an environmental good. We argue that these models could capture spatial patterns better than distance-based models when i) secondary benefits are a relevant source of welfare, ii) the environmental change is spatially scattered, iii) the distribution of the endowment, i.e. the present availability of the environmental good, matters. Using data from choice experiments on the extension of green space and trees in two urban areas, we compare required assumptions, model fit, and size and precision of aggregated welfare estimates. Our results indicate limited differences in model fit. However, the quantity-within-distance models consistently produce aggregate welfare estimates roughly half of common distance decay models and have narrower confidence intervals. While it is not possible to infer which is more accurate, the large differences can have considerable policy implications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101472"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01Epub Date: 2024-12-18DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101474
Haowei Yu , Guanglai Zhang , Ning Zhang
The Key Cities for Air Pollution Control (KCAPC) program is one of China’s earliest and most important target-based environmental policies, launched in 2002 to address the country’s severe air pollution issue. However, the effectiveness of the program is still largely unknown. This paper examines the impact of the KCAPC program on sulfur dioxide (SO) emissions, with an emphasis on the role of bureaucratic incentives. We find that the program reduced SO emissions by 12.19%–13.84% at the city level and by 11.22%–13.50% at the firm level. We also find that local governments shut down highly polluting firms, promoted greener production and enhanced environmental regulation in order to meet environmental targets set by the program. However, we find that the KCAPC program was only effective in cities where the mayor has a promotion incentive and is not incentivized to collude with polluting firms. Our findings point to the importance of bureaucratic incentives in governing the effectiveness of environmental regulations in localities.
{"title":"The role of bureaucratic incentives in the effectiveness of environmental regulations: Evidence from China","authors":"Haowei Yu , Guanglai Zhang , Ning Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101474","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101474","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Key Cities for Air Pollution Control (KCAPC) program is one of China’s earliest and most important target-based environmental policies, launched in 2002 to address the country’s severe air pollution issue. However, the effectiveness of the program is still largely unknown. This paper examines the impact of the KCAPC program on sulfur dioxide (SO<span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msub></math></span>) emissions, with an emphasis on the role of bureaucratic incentives. We find that the program reduced SO<span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msub></math></span> emissions by 12.19%–13.84% at the city level and by 11.22%–13.50% at the firm level. We also find that local governments shut down highly polluting firms, promoted greener production and enhanced environmental regulation in order to meet environmental targets set by the program. However, we find that the KCAPC program was only effective in cities where the mayor has a promotion incentive and is not incentivized to collude with polluting firms. Our findings point to the importance of bureaucratic incentives in governing the effectiveness of environmental regulations in localities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101474"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143135967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01Epub Date: 2024-12-12DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101473
Marvin Gleue, Theresa Luigs, Andreas Ziegler
Previous studies on leading by example have shown how an actor contributing to a public good first can increase the contribution of following actors in social dilemma situations. This paper empirically examines how leading by example of non-state actors, which are key to the transition to a low-carbon society, affects individual climate protection. Specifically, we consider the causal effect of providing information about the past climate protection activities of two non-state actors on donations for climate protection through an incentivized donation scheme. Based on data from a survey of 671 students, we conducted a framed field experiment using different information treatments about climate protection activities of the university and city of residence of the participants. Although our treatments successfully influence beliefs about the climate protection activities of both non-state actors, these beliefs do not significantly increase the individual contributions to climate protection in either treatment group. The analysis of heterogeneity in treatment effects reveals that informing students about climate protection activities of the city significantly increases climate protection activities among individuals with low prior beliefs about the role of cities in climate protection. In contrast, no such heterogeneity is observed for the university. Finally, individual identification with a non-state actor and environmental attitudes do not significantly moderate the treatment effects. These results contrast somewhat with previous studies on the effectiveness of leading by example measures and suggest that a broader understanding of the leader-follower relationship is needed for non-state actors to effectively promote individual climate protection.
{"title":"The relevance of non-state climate protection activities as motivation for individual climate protection: Results from a framed field experiment","authors":"Marvin Gleue, Theresa Luigs, Andreas Ziegler","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101473","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101473","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Previous studies on leading by example have shown how an actor contributing to a public good first can increase the contribution of following actors in social dilemma situations. This paper empirically examines how leading by example of non-state actors, which are key to the transition to a low-carbon society, affects individual climate protection. Specifically, we consider the causal effect of providing information about the past climate protection activities of two non-state actors on donations for climate protection through an incentivized donation scheme. Based on data from a survey of 671 students, we conducted a framed field experiment using different information treatments about climate protection activities of the university and city of residence of the participants. Although our treatments successfully influence beliefs about the climate protection activities of both non-state actors, these beliefs do not significantly increase the individual contributions to climate protection in either treatment group. The analysis of heterogeneity in treatment effects reveals that informing students about climate protection activities of the city significantly increases climate protection activities among individuals with low prior beliefs about the role of cities in climate protection. In contrast, no such heterogeneity is observed for the university. Finally, individual identification with a non-state actor and environmental attitudes do not significantly moderate the treatment effects. These results contrast somewhat with previous studies on the effectiveness of leading by example measures and suggest that a broader understanding of the leader-follower relationship is needed for non-state actors to effectively promote individual climate protection.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101473"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01Epub Date: 2024-12-27DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101475
Francisco Cabo, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Laís Ramos
This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between an environmental regulator and a polluting firm in a stock pollution Stackelberg game, where the regulator acts as the leader and the firm as the follower. The firm must determine the emissions required for production and pay a tax based on its reported emissions. The regulator chooses this tax on emissions to induce more environmentally respectful behavior of the firm. Evasion, defined as the gap between real and reported emissions can be discouraged using a fine. A central assumption in our analysis is that the regulator has incomplete information regarding the firm’s objective function. The regulator does not know, but conjectures, how afraid the firm is of the fine for fraud. Based on this conjecture, the regulator estimates the firm’s best-response functions and determines the tax. We compare the results when the regulator is accurate or misguided. Interestingly we find that when the regulator overestimates the firm’s fear of the fine for fraud, social welfare can be greater than when he accurately estimates it.
{"title":"Environmental regulation and tax evasion when the regulator has incomplete information","authors":"Francisco Cabo, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Laís Ramos","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101475","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101475","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between an environmental regulator and a polluting firm in a stock pollution Stackelberg game, where the regulator acts as the leader and the firm as the follower. The firm must determine the emissions required for production and pay a tax based on its reported emissions. The regulator chooses this tax on emissions to induce more environmentally respectful behavior of the firm. Evasion, defined as the gap between real and reported emissions can be discouraged using a fine. A central assumption in our analysis is that the regulator has incomplete information regarding the firm’s objective function. The regulator does not know, but conjectures, how afraid the firm is of the fine for fraud. Based on this conjecture, the regulator estimates the firm’s best-response functions and determines the tax. We compare the results when the regulator is accurate or misguided. Interestingly we find that when the regulator overestimates the firm’s fear of the fine for fraud, social welfare can be greater than when he accurately estimates it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101475"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01Epub Date: 2024-11-13DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101464
Robert Fonner, Leif Anderson
This article develops a demand model of recreational steelhead fishing to estimate how changes in catch rates and the percentage of catch of wild (vs. hatchery) origin influence angler welfare. Demand models of recreational fishing often rely on discrete choice experiments that are centered on the overall average attribute levels experienced within a fishery. In contrast, many recreational fisheries are characterized by heterogeneous anglers facing heterogeneous consideration sets and attribute levels experienced at given sites. Within the context of the steelhead fishery of Washington State, USA, we conducted a discrete choice experiment that closely mirrored the actual levels of catch rates experienced and locations used by individuals. The experiment varied catch rates and the percentage of steelhead that were of wild (vs. hatchery) origin. Estimated mean willingness-to-pay for a change in catch rates was an order of magnitude larger than mean willingness-to-pay for proportional changes in the percent of steelhead catch that was wild, indicating that catch rates were the primary determinant of behavior. The effects of both attributes depended on the catch- and location-specific baselines experienced by anglers.
{"title":"Accounting for baseline individual and site characteristics when estimating recreational demand for specialized activities","authors":"Robert Fonner, Leif Anderson","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article develops a demand model of recreational steelhead fishing to estimate how changes in catch rates and the percentage of catch of wild (vs. hatchery) origin influence angler welfare. Demand models of recreational fishing often rely on discrete choice experiments that are centered on the overall average attribute levels experienced within a fishery. In contrast, many recreational fisheries are characterized by heterogeneous anglers facing heterogeneous consideration sets and attribute levels experienced at given sites. Within the context of the steelhead fishery of Washington State, USA, we conducted a discrete choice experiment that closely mirrored the actual levels of catch rates experienced and locations used by individuals. The experiment varied catch rates and the percentage of steelhead that were of wild (vs. hatchery) origin. Estimated mean willingness-to-pay for a change in catch rates was an order of magnitude larger than mean willingness-to-pay for proportional changes in the percent of steelhead catch that was wild, indicating that catch rates were the primary determinant of behavior. The effects of both attributes depended on the catch- and location-specific baselines experienced by anglers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101464"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142757292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01Epub Date: 2024-11-22DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101465
Jorge Holzer , Geret DePiper , Elizabeth N. Brooks
Heuristic learning from personal experience is hard-wired in humans, but overreliance on experiential samples may lead to biased beliefs when such samples are not representative of the population. Prominent examples include skepticism towards climate change and an increasingly vocal anti-vaccine movement. In turn, biased beliefs may lead to stakeholder conflict when different parties hold competing views of reality and financial stakes are high. In this paper we focus on the commercial fishing industry. We develop a theoretical model to study harvesters’ incentives to challenge the science that informs management when the claims of official science are at odds with their personal experience. In the empirical application, the case of the Georges Bank cod fishery, we estimate the distribution of extra profits industry would expect to earn if their view of science were incorporated into policy. Our findings show strong incentives to lobby for lax regulations even when harvesters hold relatively low confidence in their own beliefs. An impatient industry would have strong incentives to challenge the official science. While the stock would eventually collapse in this scenario, leading to welfare losses, the crash of the cod population would take time. The industry’s overreliance on first-hand observations will ultimately undermine its own interests. This paper highlights the importance of effectively communicating and translating the technical aspects of science to the relevant audiences, particularly those directly impacted by its use in policy.
{"title":"Observability and stakeholder conflict in resources management","authors":"Jorge Holzer , Geret DePiper , Elizabeth N. Brooks","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101465","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101465","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Heuristic learning from personal experience is hard-wired in humans, but overreliance on experiential samples may lead to biased beliefs when such samples are not representative of the population. Prominent examples include skepticism towards climate change and an increasingly vocal anti-vaccine movement. In turn, biased beliefs may lead to stakeholder conflict when different parties hold competing views of reality and financial stakes are high. In this paper we focus on the commercial fishing industry. We develop a theoretical model to study harvesters’ incentives to challenge the science that informs management when the claims of official science are at odds with their personal experience. In the empirical application, the case of the Georges Bank cod fishery, we estimate the distribution of extra profits industry would expect to earn if their view of science were incorporated into policy. Our findings show strong incentives to lobby for lax regulations even when harvesters hold relatively low confidence in their own beliefs. An impatient industry would have strong incentives to challenge the official science. While the stock would eventually collapse in this scenario, leading to welfare losses, the crash of the cod population would take time. The industry’s overreliance on first-hand observations will ultimately undermine its own interests. This paper highlights the importance of effectively communicating and translating the technical aspects of science to the relevant audiences, particularly those directly impacted by its use in policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101465"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142747008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01Epub Date: 2025-01-03DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101476
Michael Pahle , Simon Quemin , Sebastian Osorio , Claudia Günther , Robert Pietzcker
The 2023 reform of the EU emissions trading system (ETS) has brought to the forefront the issue of allowance market functioning in the long run. With the emissions cap set to go down to zero by around 2040, the next decade can be said to mark the ‘ETS endgame’. That is, when allowance supply approaches zero, the market is bound to undergo fundamental changes. Yet the understanding and modeling of terminal market dynamics with ever-increasing allowance scarcity is limited. We analyze possible changes in market conditions and behaviors, and discuss associated challenges in two steps. First, we use the numerical model LIMES-EU to illuminate the market dynamics instigated by the reform, i.e. key changes in allowance price formation, supply adjustment and abatement by sector. Second, we use our numerical results as a backdrop to identify potential frictions (financial, informational, distributional) that may arise or become exacerbated as the endgame unfolds. Besides shedding light on whether the ETS is fit for climate neutrality, these frictions further delineate avenues for future research to improve the understanding and modeling of emissions trading in the long run.
{"title":"The emerging endgame: The EU ETS on the road towards climate neutrality","authors":"Michael Pahle , Simon Quemin , Sebastian Osorio , Claudia Günther , Robert Pietzcker","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101476","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101476","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The 2023 reform of the EU emissions trading system (ETS) has brought to the forefront the issue of allowance market functioning in the long run. With the emissions cap set to go down to zero by around 2040, the next decade can be said to mark the ‘ETS endgame’. That is, when allowance supply approaches zero, the market is bound to undergo fundamental changes. Yet the understanding and modeling of terminal market dynamics with ever-increasing allowance scarcity is limited. We analyze possible changes in market conditions and behaviors, and discuss associated challenges in two steps. First, we use the numerical model LIMES-EU to illuminate the market dynamics instigated by the reform, i.e. key changes in allowance price formation, supply adjustment and abatement by sector. Second, we use our numerical results as a backdrop to identify potential frictions (financial, informational, distributional) that may arise or become exacerbated as the endgame unfolds. Besides shedding light on whether the ETS is fit for climate neutrality, these frictions further delineate avenues for future research to improve the understanding and modeling of emissions trading in the long run.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"81 ","pages":"Article 101476"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01Epub Date: 2024-11-09DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101463
Jose D. Lopez-Rivas
This paper reports the direct and spillover effects of a norm-based informational campaign on residential water usage. I follow a two-stage randomized saturation design to produce and measure interference within utilities. A percentage of households within utilities is targeted to receive periodic reports comparing their usage to neighbors' average, while the rest are left untreated to measure spillover effects. I find targeted and spillover households reduced their water usage compared to the control group, with average reductions of 8.2 % and 5.6 %, respectively. I also find that the campaign’s effects depend on the number of targeted households within a utility, the feedback frequency, baseline water usage, and the proximity to other directly treated households. The findings shed light on the efficacy of leveraging social influence and norms to foster environmentally responsible behaviors.
{"title":"Spreading the word! Effects of a randomized normative informational campaign on residential water conservation","authors":"Jose D. Lopez-Rivas","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101463","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101463","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper reports the direct and spillover effects of a norm-based informational campaign on residential water usage. I follow a two-stage randomized saturation design to produce and measure interference within utilities. A percentage of households within utilities is targeted to receive periodic reports comparing their usage to neighbors' average, while the rest are left untreated to measure spillover effects. I find targeted and spillover households reduced their water usage compared to the control group, with average reductions of 8.2 % and 5.6 %, respectively. I also find that the campaign’s effects depend on the number of targeted households within a utility, the feedback frequency, baseline water usage, and the proximity to other directly treated households. The findings shed light on the efficacy of leveraging social influence and norms to foster environmentally responsible behaviors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101463"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142656335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01Epub Date: 2024-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101461
Eric Nævdal
The literature on how price changes affect optimally managed fisheries is mostly concerned with how fish stocks and harvest rates are affected in steady state. There is little published on how prices affect optimal harvest rates at stock levels outside of steady state. Here we show the effect of an unanticipated and permanent price increase. It is shown that in a model of a pure schooling fishery, if the stock is below the steady state, it is optimal to harvest less if the price goes up and vice versa. It is also shown that in a model with stock dependent harvest costs, the optimal response to a price increase is to reduce the harvest rate for low stock levels even if the optimal harvest rate increases close to the steady state. Empirical relevance is demonstrated by illustrating the theoretical results in an estimated model.
{"title":"Optimal fisheries management and the response to price changes","authors":"Eric Nævdal","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101461","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101461","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The literature on how price changes affect optimally managed fisheries is mostly concerned with how fish stocks and harvest rates are affected in steady state. There is little published on how prices affect optimal harvest rates at stock levels outside of steady state. Here we show the effect of an unanticipated and permanent price increase. It is shown that in a model of a pure schooling fishery, if the stock is below the steady state, it is optimal to harvest less if the price goes up and vice versa. It is also shown that in a model with stock dependent harvest costs, the optimal response to a price increase is to reduce the harvest rate for low stock levels even if the optimal harvest rate increases close to the steady state. Empirical relevance is demonstrated by illustrating the theoretical results in an estimated model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101461"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092876552400037X/pdfft?md5=7b2e10df89e97e975890da9ba05cc774&pid=1-s2.0-S092876552400037X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142270840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01Epub Date: 2024-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101462
Pedro Naso
I study the drivers of a reduction in the discretionary power of environmental inspectors and the impact that such reduction has on firms’ perceptions. I examine the transition from the Air Pollution Protection Act of 1965 to the Air Quality Act of 2005 (AQA), a change from full to partial delegation of regulation in South Africa. By constructing a principal–agent model, I propose a theoretical explanation for why a society would restrict environmental inspectors’ discretionary power. I then use my theoretical model to discuss the air quality regulation transition in South Africa. I suggest that the transition might have occurred because of increases in inspectors’ rent-seeking motivation and capacity of appropriating rents after the end of Apartheid. Using microdata, I run difference-in-differences models in a two-period panel with 191 South African firms to show that the implementation of the AQA decreases affected firms’ perceived corruption, but does not change perceptions on obtaining licences and on the functioning of courts. My work indicates that national governments in developing countries should consider the characteristics of the agents who are implementing regulation, and the system they are embedded in, when designing environmental regulation.
{"title":"Delegation of environmental regulation and perceived corruption in South Africa","authors":"Pedro Naso","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101462","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101462","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study the drivers of a reduction in the discretionary power of environmental inspectors and the impact that such reduction has on firms’ perceptions. I examine the transition from the Air Pollution Protection Act of 1965 to the Air Quality Act of 2005 (AQA), a change from full to partial delegation of regulation in South Africa. By constructing a principal–agent model, I propose a theoretical explanation for why a society would restrict environmental inspectors’ discretionary power. I then use my theoretical model to discuss the air quality regulation transition in South Africa. I suggest that the transition might have occurred because of increases in inspectors’ rent-seeking motivation and capacity of appropriating rents after the end of Apartheid. Using microdata, I run difference-in-differences models in a two-period panel with 191 South African firms to show that the implementation of the AQA decreases affected firms’ perceived corruption, but does not change perceptions on obtaining licences and on the functioning of courts. My work indicates that national governments in developing countries should consider the characteristics of the agents who are implementing regulation, and the system they are embedded in, when designing environmental regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101462"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142434184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}