Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-07-05DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101514
Oliwia Kurtyka, Rania Mabrouk
The extent to which innovation is good news for environment depends not only on the research and development incentives but also on adoption stimulus. We analyze firm’s choice of abatement technology in vertical chains. A downstream polluting monopoly can sign a contract with an upstream supplier of mature end-of-pipe equipment or develop an in-house clean technology. We show that contracting plays a crucial role in the efficiency of environmental regulation in spurring adoption. We find that polluter’s innovation may be undertaken only to increase bargaining power and a share of industry profits he manages to capture. Consequently, polluter’s and regulator’s interests are not always aligned. The role of regulator as a technology forcing authority is partially confirmed in regions of under-investment. However, the regulator may not be able to trigger innovation and/or adoption if clean technology increases marginal costs too much. On the other hand, regulator may become laxer and oppose innovation in case of over-investment. All these results rely upon the creation of total profits from the integrated vertical structure and the partitioning rule.
{"title":"Does adoption always follow innovation?","authors":"Oliwia Kurtyka, Rania Mabrouk","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101514","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101514","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The extent to which innovation is good news for environment depends not only on the research and development incentives but also on adoption stimulus. We analyze firm’s choice of abatement technology in vertical chains. A downstream polluting monopoly can sign a contract with an upstream supplier of mature end-of-pipe equipment or develop an in-house clean technology. We show that contracting plays a crucial role in the efficiency of environmental regulation in spurring adoption. We find that polluter’s innovation may be undertaken only to increase bargaining power and a share of industry profits he manages to capture. Consequently, polluter’s and regulator’s interests are not always aligned. The role of regulator as a technology forcing authority is partially confirmed in regions of under-investment. However, the regulator may not be able to trigger innovation and/or adoption if clean technology increases marginal costs too much. On the other hand, regulator may become laxer and oppose innovation in case of over-investment. All these results rely upon the creation of total profits from the integrated vertical structure and the partitioning rule.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101514"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144631088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-05-28DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101511
En-Ze Wang , Jiangchuan Xu
The environmental outcomes of voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) remain a controversial issue, especially in developing countries. We advance this subject by examining the impact of the ISO14001 Environmental Management System on firm-level energy intensity in China. The paper applies a difference-in-differences approach combined with propensity score matching to a unique panel dataset including all manufacturing firms obtaining ISO14001 certification during the period of 2008–2016. The results indicate that although VEP increases both energy consumption and output, the impact on output is significantly greater, leading to a reduction in energy intensity. This reduction is primarily achieved through capital upgrades and innovation rather than foreign trade. Furthermore, VEP exhibits spillover effects at the supply chain level, primarily benefiting upstream firms through mercantile credit rather than downstream firms. Finally, firms continue to benefit from VEP even after exiting this program, as their energy intensity does not increase.
{"title":"Something for nothing? The effect of voluntary environmental program on energy intensity","authors":"En-Ze Wang , Jiangchuan Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101511","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101511","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The environmental outcomes of voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) remain a controversial issue, especially in developing countries. We advance this subject by examining the impact of the ISO14001 Environmental Management System on firm-level energy intensity in China. The paper applies a difference-in-differences approach combined with propensity score matching to a unique panel dataset including all manufacturing firms obtaining ISO14001 certification during the period of 2008–2016. The results indicate that although VEP increases both energy consumption and output, the impact on output is significantly greater, leading to a reduction in energy intensity. This reduction is primarily achieved through capital upgrades and innovation rather than foreign trade. Furthermore, VEP exhibits spillover effects at the supply chain level, primarily benefiting upstream firms through mercantile credit rather than downstream firms. Finally, firms continue to benefit from VEP even after exiting this program, as their energy intensity does not increase.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101511"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144184906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-05-17DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101499
Davide Bazzana, Nicola Comincioli, Camilla Gusperti, Demis Legrenzi, Massimiliano Carlo Pietro Rizzati, Sergio Vergalli
Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (CCUS) is a pivotal technology for achieving ambitious climate targets. Despite its prominent inclusion in energy mix projections, its current deployment falls short of the required level and future uncertainties pose obstacles to its optimal diffusion. This study addresses two primary issues for the widespread adoption of CCUS. Firstly, it investigates how investments in CCUS technology either compete with or complement other green Research and Development (R&D) activity. Secondly, it explores how the heterogeneity among different economies and the peculiarities of CCUS technology itself might lead to alternative configurations compared to the current trajectory. To address these issues, this study introduces CCUS into a regional Integrated Assessment Model incorporating endogenous green R&D and heterogeneous cost functions over the 21st century. The findings reveals that undervaluing R&D costs may crowd out CCUS investments. Additionally, CCUS capital distribution by the end of the century requires substantial investments from regions with currently low deployment, such as China and lower-income countries. However, as Europe and other high income countries lose centrality in the global economy, they may become less willing to finance CCUS expansion, raising concerns about technology transfer and cost-sharing. The findings underscore the need for policies that reduce technological uncertainties and enhance international cooperation to ensure CCUS contributes effectively to emission reduction targets.
{"title":"Gotta Catch ’Em All: CCUS With endogenous technical change","authors":"Davide Bazzana, Nicola Comincioli, Camilla Gusperti, Demis Legrenzi, Massimiliano Carlo Pietro Rizzati, Sergio Vergalli","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101499","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101499","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (CCUS) is a pivotal technology for achieving ambitious climate targets. Despite its prominent inclusion in energy mix projections, its current deployment falls short of the required level and future uncertainties pose obstacles to its optimal diffusion. This study addresses two primary issues for the widespread adoption of CCUS. Firstly, it investigates how investments in CCUS technology either compete with or complement other green Research and Development (R&D) activity. Secondly, it explores how the heterogeneity among different economies and the peculiarities of CCUS technology itself might lead to alternative configurations compared to the current trajectory. To address these issues, this study introduces CCUS into a regional Integrated Assessment Model incorporating endogenous green R&D and heterogeneous cost functions over the 21st century. The findings reveals that undervaluing R&D costs may crowd out CCUS investments. Additionally, CCUS capital distribution by the end of the century requires substantial investments from regions with currently low deployment, such as China and lower-income countries. However, as Europe and other high income countries lose centrality in the global economy, they may become less willing to finance CCUS expansion, raising concerns about technology transfer and cost-sharing. The findings underscore the need for policies that reduce technological uncertainties and enhance international cooperation to ensure CCUS contributes effectively to emission reduction targets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101499"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144116950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-07-18DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101510
Benjamin Ouvrard , Arnaud Reynaud , Stéphane Cezera , Alban Thomas , Dishant Jojit James , Murudaiah Shivamurthy
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to analyze the preferences of Indian farmers (Karnataka state) regarding surface water sharing. To elicit impartial social preferences, we implement a dictator game behind the veil of ignorance in which a limited quantity of water has to be allocated between two farmers which differ in terms of location (upstream versus downstream) and water productivity. We first show that subjects express preferences for allocating less water to the downstream farmer. Next, we demonstrate that a majority of subjects’ decisions are consistent with efficient, egalitarian in payoff or egalitarian in quantity behaviors. Last, more efficient water allocation behaviors can be induced by modifying subjects’ choice architecture. For instance, a loss framing is shown to induce subjects to share more efficiently the water resource, but only when the most productive farmer is located downstream.
{"title":"Water sharing and equity-efficiency trade-offs: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India","authors":"Benjamin Ouvrard , Arnaud Reynaud , Stéphane Cezera , Alban Thomas , Dishant Jojit James , Murudaiah Shivamurthy","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101510","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101510","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to analyze the preferences of Indian farmers (Karnataka state) regarding surface water sharing. To elicit impartial social preferences, we implement a dictator game behind the veil of ignorance in which a limited quantity of water has to be allocated between two farmers which differ in terms of location (upstream versus downstream) and water productivity. We first show that subjects express preferences for allocating less water to the downstream farmer. Next, we demonstrate that a majority of subjects’ decisions are consistent with efficient, egalitarian in payoff or egalitarian in quantity behaviors. Last, more efficient water allocation behaviors can be induced by modifying subjects’ choice architecture. For instance, a loss framing is shown to induce subjects to share more efficiently the water resource, but only when the most productive farmer is located downstream.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101510"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144653944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-06-03DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101512
Martin Drechsler
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated the potential of coordination incentives like the agglomeration bonus for the establishment of species habitat networks in agricultural landscapes. Less well understood is the social process behind this coordination, and how it affects the performance of the instrument. In the present paper this issue is addressed by simulating the coalition formation between several landowners in a stylized but structurally realistic landscape. Rather than assuming perfectly informed rational decision makers, the landowners are modeled as learning agents. A variety of learning strategies is considered. While these affect the coalition structure they have comparatively little influence on the land-use dynamics and the scheme expenditure, suggesting that knowledge about the details of the coordination process may be less relevant for predicting the performance of an agglomeration bonus. Instead, the performance is shown to mainly depend on the economic settings, such as the spatial correlation of the conservation costs, the spatial distribution of the landowners’ properties, and the presence or absence of side payments between the landowners – where the present results largely confirm the results of previous studies. A weak relationship is observed, though, between the average size of the coalitions on the one hand and the ecological scheme performance and scheme expenditure on the other. Confirming previous studies, budget-effectiveness gains of the agglomeration bonus are limited.
{"title":"Learning coalition formation under an agglomeration bonus: Impacts on coalition structure and scheme performance","authors":"Martin Drechsler","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101512","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101512","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated the potential of coordination incentives like the agglomeration bonus for the establishment of species habitat networks in agricultural landscapes. Less well understood is the social process behind this coordination, and how it affects the performance of the instrument. In the present paper this issue is addressed by simulating the coalition formation between several landowners in a stylized but structurally realistic landscape. Rather than assuming perfectly informed rational decision makers, the landowners are modeled as learning agents. A variety of learning strategies is considered. While these affect the coalition structure they have comparatively little influence on the land-use dynamics and the scheme expenditure, suggesting that knowledge about the details of the coordination process may be less relevant for predicting the performance of an agglomeration bonus. Instead, the performance is shown to mainly depend on the economic settings, such as the spatial correlation of the conservation costs, the spatial distribution of the landowners’ properties, and the presence or absence of side payments between the landowners – where the present results largely confirm the results of previous studies. A weak relationship is observed, though, between the average size of the coalitions on the one hand and the ecological scheme performance and scheme expenditure on the other. Confirming previous studies, budget-effectiveness gains of the agglomeration bonus are limited.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101512"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144243287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-07-29DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101515
Max Harleman , Pramod Manohar , Elaine L. Hill
Oil and gas lease negotiations provide mineral owners with the opportunity to negotiate for both compensation and clauses that may protect their health and the enjoyment of their properties. We use optical character recognition to assemble the most comprehensive dataset to date on royalty rates and clauses in nearly 60,000 leases signed in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale. We leverage our data to produce three descriptive findings. First, we find a positive relationship between royalty rates and the prevalence of protective clauses. Second, we find that as development of the shale play progressed over time, royalty rates rose and leases became more likely to contain several protective clauses. Third, we find that royalty rates and the presence of protective clauses bear a weak relationship with the geologic productivity of nearby wells, explained by few firms competing in geographically segregated leasing markets. Some leases simultaneously containing higher royalty rates and more protective clauses suggests that there is a bargaining surplus in leasing markets, though our results do not identify the mechanism through which the surplus is allocated. The allocation appears not to depend on the productivity of the mineral estate, and may instead reflect mineral owners’ differing preferences, negotiating skills, legal resources, and access to information. By documenting 43 clauses found in shale leases and their prevalence — more than double the number identified in past research — we provide critical information that can help mineral owners overcome information asymmetries and increase transparency and equity in leasing markets.
{"title":"Negotiations of oil and gas auxiliary lease clauses: Evidence from Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale","authors":"Max Harleman , Pramod Manohar , Elaine L. Hill","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101515","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101515","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Oil and gas lease negotiations provide mineral owners with the opportunity to negotiate for both compensation and clauses that may protect their health and the enjoyment of their properties. We use optical character recognition to assemble the most comprehensive dataset to date on royalty rates and clauses in nearly 60,000 leases signed in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale. We leverage our data to produce three descriptive findings. First, we find a positive relationship between royalty rates and the prevalence of protective clauses. Second, we find that as development of the shale play progressed over time, royalty rates rose and leases became more likely to contain several protective clauses. Third, we find that royalty rates and the presence of protective clauses bear a weak relationship with the geologic productivity of nearby wells, explained by few firms competing in geographically segregated leasing markets. Some leases simultaneously containing higher royalty rates and more protective clauses suggests that there is a bargaining surplus in leasing markets, though our results do not identify the mechanism through which the surplus is allocated. The allocation appears not to depend on the productivity of the mineral estate, and may instead reflect mineral owners’ differing preferences, negotiating skills, legal resources, and access to information. By documenting 43 clauses found in shale leases and their prevalence — more than double the number identified in past research — we provide critical information that can help mineral owners overcome information asymmetries and increase transparency and equity in leasing markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101515"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144767239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Due to their ability to mitigate price risks, Contracts for Difference (CfDs) gained popularity amidst high electricity prices during the energy crisis in 2022. Depending on their specific design, CfDs are known to affect investment and dispatch decisions in electricity markets. We evaluate these effects in a fully decarbonised, sector-coupled European electricity market in terms of their impact on the power system and from an investor’s and consumer perspective. We consider four different types of governmental CfDs awarded to wind onshore power plants in a competitive auction for the contracts’ underlying strike price. On the one hand, the CfD types differ in terms of the allowed direction and unit (energy vs. capacity) of payments with consequences for dispatch decisions. On the other hand, they apply different reference prices with implications for investment decisions as reflected by optimally derived strike prices. Implementing the CfDs in an energy system optimisation model, we find that these differences affect curtailment, electrolyser load and market prices in fully decarbonised electricity markets. From a consumer’s perspective, our results show that system costs are lowest for types of CfDs that foster investments in more system-friendly power plants. For investors, in turn, these types of CfDs incur the highest discrepancy of ex ante expected and ex post realised CfD payments, such that they do not necessarily suffice to recover their costs. We conclude that this could be addressed by an adequate risk premium on the strike price, which should be subject to future research.
{"title":"Does the difference make a difference? Evaluating Contracts for Difference design in a fully decarbonised European electricity market","authors":"Silke Johanndeiter , Niina Helistö , Valentin Bertsch","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101495","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101495","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Due to their ability to mitigate price risks, Contracts for Difference (CfDs) gained popularity amidst high electricity prices during the energy crisis in 2022. Depending on their specific design, CfDs are known to affect investment and dispatch decisions in electricity markets. We evaluate these effects in a fully decarbonised, sector-coupled European electricity market in terms of their impact on the power system and from an investor’s and consumer perspective. We consider four different types of governmental CfDs awarded to wind onshore power plants in a competitive auction for the contracts’ underlying strike price. On the one hand, the CfD types differ in terms of the allowed direction and unit (energy vs. capacity) of payments with consequences for dispatch decisions. On the other hand, they apply different reference prices with implications for investment decisions as reflected by optimally derived strike prices. Implementing the CfDs in an energy system optimisation model, we find that these differences affect curtailment, electrolyser load and market prices in fully decarbonised electricity markets. From a consumer’s perspective, our results show that system costs are lowest for types of CfDs that foster investments in more system-friendly power plants. For investors, in turn, these types of CfDs incur the highest discrepancy of ex ante expected and ex post realised CfD payments, such that they do not necessarily suffice to recover their costs. We conclude that this could be addressed by an adequate risk premium on the strike price, which should be subject to future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101495"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143895682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-06-18DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101513
Maryam Feyzollahi, Nima Rafizadeh
This study quantifies the impact of residential electricity prices on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, addressing a critical gap in climate policy analysis. Using panel data from 48 contiguous U.S. states (1990–2017), we develop a novel decomposition framework for the residential electricity price elasticity of GHG emissions (REPE-GHG) and employ two-step GMM estimation to address price endogeneity and dynamic consumption adjustments. Our results reveal a short-run residential electricity price elasticity of GHG emissions of −0.6% and a long-run elasticity of −5.2%. We find substantial regional heterogeneity, with elasticities in the Midwest and South significantly exceeding those in the Northeast. Moreover, the REPE-GHG exhibits a marked downward trend over time, accelerating post-2005. These findings suggest that uniform national pricing policies may be suboptimal and that price-based interventions become less effective as energy systems evolve.
{"title":"The price-emissions nexus in U.S. residential electricity markets","authors":"Maryam Feyzollahi, Nima Rafizadeh","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101513","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101513","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study quantifies the impact of residential electricity prices on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, addressing a critical gap in climate policy analysis. Using panel data from 48 contiguous U.S. states (1990–2017), we develop a novel decomposition framework for the residential electricity price elasticity of GHG emissions (REPE-GHG) and employ two-step GMM estimation to address price endogeneity and dynamic consumption adjustments. Our results reveal a short-run residential electricity price elasticity of GHG emissions of −0.6% and a long-run elasticity of −5.2%. We find substantial regional heterogeneity, with elasticities in the Midwest and South significantly exceeding those in the Northeast. Moreover, the REPE-GHG exhibits a marked downward trend over time, accelerating post-2005. These findings suggest that uniform national pricing policies may be suboptimal and that price-based interventions become less effective as energy systems evolve.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"83 ","pages":"Article 101513"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144366211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01Epub Date: 2025-01-27DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101481
Jean-Pierre Amigues , Gilles Lafforgue
We develop a dynamic model of energy use that relies on three primary sources: a ‘dirty’ fossil resource, a ‘clean’ fossil resource equipped with a specific abatement device, and a carbon-free renewable energy source. The total amount of carbon emissions is limited by a given carbon budget. Expenditures on adaptation measures can expand this budget by increasing society’s tolerance to the effects of climate change. Therefore, we make the carbon budget endogenous and dependent on the adaptation effort. Within this framework, we study the trade-offs between mitigation (achieved through energy substitutions and abatement) and adaptation to relax the climate constraint imposed by the carbon budget. We find that, without any abatement option, adaptation measures are only taken once carbon concentrations reach a minimum tolerance level for society. On the other hand, when abatement is possible, the economy should start implementing it as soon as it begins adapting. Over time, both abatement and adaptation efforts will increase until the economy reaches a point where it prefers to fully abate carbon emissions rather than investing further in adaptation. We refer to this point as the maximum adaptation frontier.
{"title":"Optimal adaptation policies under a carbon budget constraint","authors":"Jean-Pierre Amigues , Gilles Lafforgue","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101481","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101481","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a dynamic model of energy use that relies on three primary sources: a ‘dirty’ fossil resource, a ‘clean’ fossil resource equipped with a specific abatement device, and a carbon-free renewable energy source. The total amount of carbon emissions is limited by a given carbon budget. Expenditures on adaptation measures can expand this budget by increasing society’s tolerance to the effects of climate change. Therefore, we make the carbon budget endogenous and dependent on the adaptation effort. Within this framework, we study the trade-offs between mitigation (achieved through energy substitutions and abatement) and adaptation to relax the climate constraint imposed by the carbon budget. We find that, without any abatement option, adaptation measures are only taken once carbon concentrations reach a minimum tolerance level for society. On the other hand, when abatement is possible, the economy should start implementing it as soon as it begins adapting. Over time, both abatement and adaptation efforts will increase until the economy reaches a point where it prefers to fully abate carbon emissions rather than investing further in adaptation. We refer to this point as the maximum adaptation frontier.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 101481"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143176019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01Epub Date: 2025-02-10DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101492
Maria Börjesson , Stef Proost
The EU aims to achieve climate neutrality for trucks. This paper compares the user cost of diesel trucks, battery electric trucks, and trucks that rely on overhead lines in a decision context where the developments of battery costs and overhead line investment and maintenance costs are uncertain. The user costs contain the truck capital cost and the energy costs, the possible vehicle-to-grid benefits, driver costs, and other distance costs. User costs are compared for different distance profiles and optimized battery sizes. The possible user cost developments serve as input to an analysis of investment decisions in electric motorways (e-roads). The economics of e-roads is analyzed for two representations of the EU TEN-T network. In the first analysis, average EU truck flow (veh/h) and truck trip characteristics are used. In the second representation, we consider domestic and international truck transport between two neighbouring countries with strongly diverging average traffic flows and shares of international truck trips on their TEN-T network. This allows for the analysis of the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions of the two countries. The installation of e-roads appears to be a robust investment decision for the motorways of large countries that have dense truck traffic but not for less dense countries. Cooperation between countries may increase total benefits due to economies of scale.
{"title":"Costs and benefits of e-roads versus battery trucks: Uncertainty and coordination","authors":"Maria Börjesson , Stef Proost","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101492","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101492","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The EU aims to achieve climate neutrality for trucks. This paper compares the user cost of diesel trucks, battery electric trucks, and trucks that rely on overhead lines in a decision context where the developments of battery costs and overhead line investment and maintenance costs are uncertain. The user costs contain the truck capital cost and the energy costs, the possible vehicle-to-grid benefits, driver costs, and other distance costs. User costs are compared for different distance profiles and optimized battery sizes. The possible user cost developments serve as input to an analysis of investment decisions in electric motorways (e-roads). The economics of e-roads is analyzed for two representations of the EU TEN-T network. In the first analysis, average EU truck flow (veh/h) and truck trip characteristics are used. In the second representation, we consider domestic and international truck transport between two neighbouring countries with strongly diverging average traffic flows and shares of international truck trips on their TEN-T network. This allows for the analysis of the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions of the two countries. The installation of e-roads appears to be a robust investment decision for the motorways of large countries that have dense truck traffic but not for less dense countries. Cooperation between countries may increase total benefits due to economies of scale.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 101492"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143422004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}