Pub Date : 2023-11-07DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2259808
Leila Demarest
"Good governance in Nigeria: rethinking accountability and transparency in the twenty-first century." Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2
“尼日利亚的善治:重新思考21世纪的问责制和透明度。”《民主化》，印刷前，第1-2页
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Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2275705
Jody Metcalfe
"The Plot to Save South Africa: The Week Mandela Averted Civil War and Forged a New Nation." Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2
《拯救南非的阴谋:曼德拉避免内战、建立新国家的一周》《民主化》，印刷前，第1-2页
{"title":"The Plot to Save South Africa: The Week Mandela Averted Civil War and Forged a New NationThe Plot to Save South Africa: The Week Mandela Averted Civil War and Forged a New Nation by Justice Malala, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2023, 335 pp., $28.99, ISBN 987-1-9821-4973-4","authors":"Jody Metcalfe","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2275705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2275705","url":null,"abstract":"\"The Plot to Save South Africa: The Week Mandela Averted Civil War and Forged a New Nation.\" Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135680077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2273874
Elizabeth Carlson, Kristin McKie
ABSTRACTPast research on the relationship between democracy and poverty in Africa has produced surprisingly mixed findings. We argue that one source of variation is in the measures of democracy and poverty used by prior studies, which capture different concepts and contain different amounts of error. Using measures that map closely onto theory and which are directly comparable across countries, we show that electoral democracy is robustly correlated with small-but-significant reductions in lived poverty over time. We provide additional quantitative and case study evidence that accountability encourages governments to take swift action on poverty. Finally, we show that our results are sensitive to measurement choices, helping to explain null results in prior literature. Altogether our results suggest that empowering the poor in Africa will ultimately lead to meaningful reductions in poverty.KEYWORDS: Africapovertydemocracyaccountabilityanti-poverty programmesAfrobarometer Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Harding and Stasavage, “What Democracy Does.”2 Carlson, “The Relevance of Relative Distribution.”3 Keefer, “Clientelism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.”4 Arriola, “Capital and Opposition in Africa.”5 We intentionally omit a large number of studies that use at their dependent variable either public goods provision or objective proxies of poverty such as night lights. Most of these studies come to the conclusion that democracy reduces poverty. We exclude them primarily because our discussion of survey-based measures does not speak to them or their validity.6 Lake and Baum, “The Invisible Hand of Democracy.”7 Zweigel and Navia, “Democracy, Dictatorship and Infant Mortality.”8 Ross, “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?”9 Garcia, “Democracy is Good for the Poor.”10 Rosenberg, “Political Economy of Infant Mortality.”11 Tebaldi and Mohan, “Institiutions and Poverty.”12 Djeneba, “The Quest for Pro-poor and Inclusive Growth.”13 Saha, “Legislative Democracy, Economic Growth and Multidimensional Poverty.”14 Khodaverian, “The African Tragedy.”15 Ramos, Flores, and Ross, “Where has Democracy Helped the Poor?”16 Wullert and Williamson, “Democracy, Hybrid Regimes, and Infant Mortality.”17 Such as Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival or Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin, “Why Democracies Excel.”18 Dahl, Polyarchy.19 Vaccaro, “Comparing Measures of Democracy”; Casper and Tufis, “Correlation versus Interchangeability.”20 Beegle et al., “Methods of Household Consumption Measurement.”21 Kudamatsu, “Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality.”22 For Round 5, which we use as a control for Round 6, we generate this measure ourselves by averaging the five component measures. In Rounds 6–8, this calculation is already done and reported with the rest of the data.23 We lag democracy one year to ensure any changes in democracy occurred before poverty was measured.24 These va
41 .如果研究对象试图获得援助或避税，他们可能会向政府报告更高的贫困水平(Carlson和Fidalgo，“当零钱包效应是人工制品时”)人数统计数据是二进制的，因此使用logit进行分析是合适的。为了便于解释，我们继续使用回归，并使结果与表2.42 Dörfell和Freytag的“民主化的贫困效应”中的结果直接比较;《民主有利于穷人吗?》43 Brown and Hunter，《民主与社会支出》;莱克和鲍姆，《民主看不见的手》;斯塔萨维奇，《民主与教育支出》，第44页EFW给小政府更高的分数。我们把衡量标准颠倒过来，这样越大的政府得分就越高有关这些民主侵蚀的深入讨论，请参阅hirshelburns的《贝宁的棉花之王》和Kohnert和Preuss的《贝宁的隐秘的民主毁灭》。第8轮调查于2020年11月至12月在贝宁进行，在2019冠状病毒病大流行的第一年下降。因此，大流行病期间的经济挑战很可能是本调查期间贝宁报告的生活贫困增加的部分原因。然而，贝宁对新冠肺炎的限制措施采取了比其他许多国家“温和”得多的态度，从未在全国范围内实施全面封锁。相反，政府仅在3月30日至5月11日期间，在受影响地区周围实施了“卫生警戒线”，允许其中的人口自由流动。此外，虽然该国关闭了酒吧和俱乐部，但超市，特别是餐馆仍然营业。(见Osseni，“贝宁应对Covid-19”)。因此，我们预计贝宁对生计(以及贫困)的影响将低于其他采取更严格的Covid-19限制措施的撒哈拉以南国家。然而，贝宁在第7轮(2016/7)和第8轮(2020/1)期间的生活贫困增长率在两轮包括的国家中排名第六，上升了0.28点，而32个国家的平均增长率为0.13点。(见马特斯和帕特尔，生活贫困复苏，7)49 Paul等人，《预算挑战》，2.50贝宁共和国总统，《政府行动计划》，2016-2021年摘要，25.51 Noret和Yedji，《贝宁的新自由主义和冷漠》，52同上，53同上，54 Sackey，“加纳的飞跃计划”。55 Handa等人，《LEAPImpact Evaluation》;Palermo等人，加纳LEAP 1000项目。56 Merttens，乌干达社会援助赠款赋权。57 Dietrich等人，“人力资本回报现金转移。”58 Abdulai，重新思考精英阶层对社会保护的承诺，20.59同上，30.60同上，31.61 Mugisha和Kitamirike，“二十年的增长”，87.62 Vokes和Wilkins，“政党，赞助或胁迫，”589。伊丽莎白·卡尔森伊丽莎白·卡尔森是NDSU政治学和公共政策助理教授，也是希拉和罗伯特·查利全球创新与增长研究所的教员学者。她的研究重点是政治行为和非洲发展的政治经济学。她的作品曾发表在《世界政治》、《比较政治研究》、《发展研究杂志》、《政治学研究与方法》等刊物上。她拥有加州大学洛杉矶分校的博士学位。克里斯汀·麦基(Kristin McKie)是圣劳伦斯大学政府和非洲研究副教授。在此之前，她是耶鲁大学民主项目的博士后，也是圣母大学凯洛格研究所的研究员。她的研究兴趣包括总统任期限制的政治、政治制度以及撒哈拉以南非洲地区的法治发展。她拥有康奈尔大学的博士学位。
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Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2277874
Sophie Sunderland
"Parties, political finance, and governance in Africa: extracting money and shaping states in Benin and Ghana." Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2
“非洲的政党、政治融资和治理:榨取资金并塑造贝宁和加纳的国家。”《民主化》，印刷前，第1-2页
{"title":"Parties, political finance, and governance in Africa: extracting money and shaping states in Benin and Ghana <b>Parties, political finance, and governance in Africa: extracting money and shaping states in Benin and Ghana</b> , by Rachel Sigman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2023, 310 pp., index, $110(paperback), ISBN 978-1-009-26283-5","authors":"Sophie Sunderland","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2277874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2277874","url":null,"abstract":"\"Parties, political finance, and governance in Africa: extracting money and shaping states in Benin and Ghana.\" Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135683880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2272381
Muhammad Asad Latif
"Routledge handbook of EU-Middle East relations." Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2
"劳特利奇欧盟-中东关系手册"《民主化》，印刷前，第1-2页
{"title":"Routledge handbook of EU-Middle East relations <b>Routledge handbook of EU-Middle East relations</b> , edited by Dimitris Bouris, Daniela Huber and Michelle Pace, New York, Routledge Taylor and Francis Publishing Group2021, 508+vi pp. Paperback£34.39, Hardback£164.00, eBook£34.39, ISBN: 9781032132167","authors":"Muhammad Asad Latif","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2272381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2272381","url":null,"abstract":"\"Routledge handbook of EU-Middle East relations.\" Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135684030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2262939
Woojeong Jang
Studies of noncooperative transitions find that domestic balances of power shaped postcommunist regime trajectories in favor of the powerful. Then, what determined the balance of power during a transition? Drawing on relational-network analysis in IR, I argue that the configuration of international ties determined the relative strength of democrats and Soviet-era elites. States with diversified ties between the US and the Soviet Union - that occupy a brokerage position- were more likely to democratize. Their ties with the US funneled material and non-material assistance into democrats in postcommunist states. However, states deeply integrated into the Soviet order resisted democratization to a greater extent. Their extensive ties to the Soviet order resulted in stronger Sovietization and Soviet legacies impeding democratization. The interplay of states' ties with the US and the Soviet Union, as a function of brokerage and integration, shaped the domestic balance of power, conditioning postcommunist political changes. Empirical analysis using medium-N analysis and case studies on the former Soviet Union republics lends support to the argument. The finding contributes to the literature on international determinants of regime changes by highlighting how underlying global power structures frame the domestic balance of power.
{"title":"The contestation of international ties and regime transitions: evidence from the former Soviet republics","authors":"Woojeong Jang","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2262939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2262939","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of noncooperative transitions find that domestic balances of power shaped postcommunist regime trajectories in favor of the powerful. Then, what determined the balance of power during a transition? Drawing on relational-network analysis in IR, I argue that the configuration of international ties determined the relative strength of democrats and Soviet-era elites. States with diversified ties between the US and the Soviet Union - that occupy a brokerage position- were more likely to democratize. Their ties with the US funneled material and non-material assistance into democrats in postcommunist states. However, states deeply integrated into the Soviet order resisted democratization to a greater extent. Their extensive ties to the Soviet order resulted in stronger Sovietization and Soviet legacies impeding democratization. The interplay of states' ties with the US and the Soviet Union, as a function of brokerage and integration, shaped the domestic balance of power, conditioning postcommunist political changes. Empirical analysis using medium-N analysis and case studies on the former Soviet Union republics lends support to the argument. The finding contributes to the literature on international determinants of regime changes by highlighting how underlying global power structures frame the domestic balance of power.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135869028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2268019
Daria Kuznetsova, Caroline Tolbert
The past three decades have witnessed a rapid global uptake of digital media. Does an increase in internet access lead to more anti-government protests globally, in both democracies and non-democracies? Has the role of the internet changed over time from benefiting the opposition to benefiting the regime? We use time-series cross-national data and negative binomial regressions to model protest data in 151 countries from 1990 to 2020. By leveraging change in the development of digital information globally, the results show that increases in internet penetration and mobile cellular subscription rates increase the number of anti-government protests in non-democracies in the period from 1990 to 2010, but not among a subsample of democracies. After 2010, increases in internet penetration rates did not affect the number of protests in either democracies or non-democracies. The use of cellular internet continues to have a small positive effect on protest frequency after 2010. We also test the government's internet censorship efforts as a mechanism for decreasing information access and diminishing mobilization. Results suggest authoritarian regimes modified their strategies over time, more effectively using information and communications technologies (ICTs) to quell anti-government protests using digital repression and information control consistent with the theory of informational autocracy.
{"title":"Modelling temporal dynamics: does internet use fuel anti-government protests?","authors":"Daria Kuznetsova, Caroline Tolbert","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2268019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2268019","url":null,"abstract":"The past three decades have witnessed a rapid global uptake of digital media. Does an increase in internet access lead to more anti-government protests globally, in both democracies and non-democracies? Has the role of the internet changed over time from benefiting the opposition to benefiting the regime? We use time-series cross-national data and negative binomial regressions to model protest data in 151 countries from 1990 to 2020. By leveraging change in the development of digital information globally, the results show that increases in internet penetration and mobile cellular subscription rates increase the number of anti-government protests in non-democracies in the period from 1990 to 2010, but not among a subsample of democracies. After 2010, increases in internet penetration rates did not affect the number of protests in either democracies or non-democracies. The use of cellular internet continues to have a small positive effect on protest frequency after 2010. We also test the government's internet censorship efforts as a mechanism for decreasing information access and diminishing mobilization. Results suggest authoritarian regimes modified their strategies over time, more effectively using information and communications technologies (ICTs) to quell anti-government protests using digital repression and information control consistent with the theory of informational autocracy.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135819670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2271842
Huang-Ting Yan
ABSTRACTThis study examines why regime survival rates vary across young democracies. The literature offers competing claims regarding the effect of the mode of transition on the duration of post-transitional democracy. This study reconciles these claims by proposing three modes of democratic transitions – military dominance (MD), popular sanction (PS), and consensual power transfer (CPT) – arguing that CPT leads the subsequent democracies to last longer than MD and PS. MD fails to incorporate the military into democratic systems, making it more likely for the ensuing democracies to suffer a coup, whereas PS enables regime insiders to change democratic rules without hindrance or outsiders to gain power through an organized armed conflict. CPT shapes a strong electoral performance by authoritarian successor parties, which provide checks and balances in post-authoritarian politics, thus decreasing the likelihood of collapse. This study verifies these hypotheses using data on nascent democracies between 1945 and 2022.KEYWORDS: authoritarian successor partiesdemocratic survivaldemocratic transitionsmilitarypower transfer AcknowledgementsI am grateful all the comments I have received on previous versions of this article. Particular thanks go to Dr. Sebastian Ziaja (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences), Dr. Alexander Baturo (School of Law and Government, Dublin City University), Prof. Carl Henrik Knutsen (Department of Political Science, University of Oslo), and to all the participants at the 9th European Political Science Association (EPSA) Annual General Conference.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available from the author on reasonable request.Notes1 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 6.2 Albertus and Menaldo, Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins; Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats; Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of Transition”; McFaul, “The Fourth Wave”; Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy; Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition”; Stepan, “Paths Toward Redemocratization”; Stradiotto and Guo, “Transitional Modes of Democratization.”3 Albertus and Menaldo, Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins; Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats; Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of Transition”; McFaul, “The Fourth Wave”; Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy; Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition”; Stepan, “Paths Toward Redemocratization”; Stradiotto and Guo, “Transitional Modes of Democratization.”4 Marinov and Goemans, “Coups and Democracy”; Thyne and Powell, “Coup D'état.”5 Derpanopoulos et al., “Are Coups Good for Democracy?”6 Maeda, “Two Modes of Democratic Breakdown”; Tomini and Wagemann, “Varieties of Contemporary Democratic Breakdown.”7 Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past; Grzymala-Busse, “Authoritarian Determinants”; Ishiyama and Quinn, “African Phoenix”; Langst
摘要本研究探讨了为什么年轻民主国家的政权存活率各不相同。关于过渡模式对过渡后民主持续时间的影响，文献提供了相互竞争的主张。本研究通过提出三种民主过渡模式——军事主导(MD)、民众制裁(PS)和共识权力转移(CPT)来调和这些说法，认为CPT导致随后的民主国家比MD和PS持续更长时间。MD未能将军队纳入民主制度，使得随后的民主国家更有可能遭受政变。而PS则使政权内部人士不受阻碍地改变民主规则，或使外部人士通过有组织的武装冲突获得权力。CPT塑造了威权主义继任者政党在选举中的强势表现，为后威权主义政治提供了制衡，从而降低了崩溃的可能性。本研究使用1945年至2022年间新兴民主国家的数据验证了这些假设。关键词:威权继承者政党民主生存民主过渡军事权力转移感谢我收到的所有关于本文以前版本的评论。特别感谢Sebastian Ziaja博士(GESIS -莱布尼茨社会科学研究所)、Alexander Baturo博士(都柏林城市大学法律与政府学院)、Carl Henrik Knutsen教授(奥斯陆大学政治科学系)以及第九届欧洲政治科学协会(EPSA)年度大会的所有与会者。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。数据可用性声明当前研究中使用和/或分析的数据集可根据作者的合理要求提供。注1:奥唐奈和施米特:《威权统治的转型》;6.2阿尔伯图斯和梅纳尔多:《威权主义与精英的起源》;哈格德和考夫曼:《独裁者和民主党人》;Karl and Schmitter:《转型模式》;麦克福尔，《第四次浪潮》;Mainwaring，向民主过渡;蒙克和莱夫:《过渡模式》;斯捷潘，《走向民主化的道路》;史特拉迪奥托和郭:“民主化的过渡模式”。3阿尔伯塔斯和梅纳尔多，威权主义和精英起源;哈格德和考夫曼:《独裁者和民主党人》;Karl and Schmitter:《转型模式》;麦克福尔，《第四次浪潮》;Mainwaring，向民主过渡;蒙克和莱夫:《过渡模式》;斯捷潘，《走向民主化的道路》;史特拉迪奥托和郭:“民主化的过渡模式”。4马里诺夫和戈曼斯，《政变与民主》;泰恩和鲍威尔，"政变的时候。5 Derpanopoulos等人，“政变对民主有益吗?”6前田:《民主崩溃的两种模式》;Tomini和Wagemann， <当代民主崩溃的多样性>7 Grzymala-Busse，《救赎共产主义的过去》;Grzymala-Busse，《威权决定因素》;石山和奎恩，“非洲凤凰”;兰斯顿:民主化与威权政党的生存洛克斯顿和曼沃宁:独裁统治后的生活;《共产党的继承者》。8 .米勒，《不要称之为回归》;《通往持久民主之路》。“9 Mainwaring，向民主过渡;斯捷潘，《走向民主化的道路》10步，走向民主化之路。11 Mainwaring，向民主过渡，26.12 Markovitz，“宪法，联邦党人文集”，45.13林茨和斯捷潘，民主过渡的问题，4.14卡尔和施米特，“过渡模式”，275.15蒙克和莱夫，“过渡模式”。16 Stradiotto and Guo，“民主化的过渡模式”，13.17 Stradiotto and Guo，“民主化的过渡模式”。18麦克福尔，《第四波》。19 Stradiotto和Guo，“民主化的过渡模式”，14.20 Munck和Leff，“过渡模式”，358.21 Albertus和Menaldo，威权主义和精英起源，124.22 Haggard和Kaufman，独裁者和民主主义者，181-8.23见上文注释2麦克福尔，《第四次浪潮》，223页;蒙克和莱夫，《过渡模式》，359;Stradiotto and Guo，“民主化的过渡模式”，14.25 Levitsky and Way，竞争威权主义，7.26 Maeda，“民主崩溃的两种模式”。27 Kailitz，“重新审视政治制度分类”，48.28 thne和Powell，“政变的文氏”，1966.29 Marinov和Goemans，“政变与民主”，803.30 Chambers，“泰国的军事“阴影”。31 Pongsudhirak，“政变后的泰国”，146.32 McCargo，“2014年的泰国”，350.33 Baker，“2014年的泰国政变”，390.34 Bazenguissa-Ganga，“政治暴力的蔓延”，39-41.35 Ward和Gleditsch，“为和平而民主化”，53.36 Wheeler，“1975年的巴基斯坦”，113.37 Branch和Cheeseman，“民主化，顺序和国家失败”，18.38 Puig，“FSLN的适应”，89-92.39 popp - eleches，“四季派对”。40费雷拉，几内亚比绍，47-9。
{"title":"Born with a silver spoon? Modes of transitions and democratic survival","authors":"Huang-Ting Yan","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2271842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2271842","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis study examines why regime survival rates vary across young democracies. The literature offers competing claims regarding the effect of the mode of transition on the duration of post-transitional democracy. This study reconciles these claims by proposing three modes of democratic transitions – military dominance (MD), popular sanction (PS), and consensual power transfer (CPT) – arguing that CPT leads the subsequent democracies to last longer than MD and PS. MD fails to incorporate the military into democratic systems, making it more likely for the ensuing democracies to suffer a coup, whereas PS enables regime insiders to change democratic rules without hindrance or outsiders to gain power through an organized armed conflict. CPT shapes a strong electoral performance by authoritarian successor parties, which provide checks and balances in post-authoritarian politics, thus decreasing the likelihood of collapse. This study verifies these hypotheses using data on nascent democracies between 1945 and 2022.KEYWORDS: authoritarian successor partiesdemocratic survivaldemocratic transitionsmilitarypower transfer AcknowledgementsI am grateful all the comments I have received on previous versions of this article. Particular thanks go to Dr. Sebastian Ziaja (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences), Dr. Alexander Baturo (School of Law and Government, Dublin City University), Prof. Carl Henrik Knutsen (Department of Political Science, University of Oslo), and to all the participants at the 9th European Political Science Association (EPSA) Annual General Conference.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available from the author on reasonable request.Notes1 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 6.2 Albertus and Menaldo, Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins; Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats; Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of Transition”; McFaul, “The Fourth Wave”; Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy; Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition”; Stepan, “Paths Toward Redemocratization”; Stradiotto and Guo, “Transitional Modes of Democratization.”3 Albertus and Menaldo, Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins; Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats; Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of Transition”; McFaul, “The Fourth Wave”; Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy; Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition”; Stepan, “Paths Toward Redemocratization”; Stradiotto and Guo, “Transitional Modes of Democratization.”4 Marinov and Goemans, “Coups and Democracy”; Thyne and Powell, “Coup D'état.”5 Derpanopoulos et al., “Are Coups Good for Democracy?”6 Maeda, “Two Modes of Democratic Breakdown”; Tomini and Wagemann, “Varieties of Contemporary Democratic Breakdown.”7 Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past; Grzymala-Busse, “Authoritarian Determinants”; Ishiyama and Quinn, “African Phoenix”; Langst","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135221850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2258803
Hendrik Schopmans, İrem Tuncer Ebetürk
{"title":"Techno-authoritarian imaginaries and the politics of resistance against facial recognition technology in the US and European Union*","authors":"Hendrik Schopmans, İrem Tuncer Ebetürk","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2258803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2258803","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-25DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2260762
Pelin Ayan Musil
{"title":"How opposition parties unite in competitive authoritarian regimes: the role of an intermediary party","authors":"Pelin Ayan Musil","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2260762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2260762","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135217398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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