Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2270423
Rico Isaacs
In divided-executive patronal systems, legislatures have been sites of resistance to the centralization of power in a single patronal pyramid. Kyrgyzstan is an anomaly among divided-executive patronal systems when between 2010 to 2020, the Kyrgyz parliament was neither a site of opposition nor did it demonstrate legislative agency vis-à-vis the executive. Instead, following another uprising in 2020, a unified single patronal pyramid was re-established. Adopting an approach rooted in the semiotics of meaning making and drawing on a dataset of interviews with parliamentary deputies and a range of documentary sources, this article complements existing institutional approaches to explaining weak legislative agency by revealing a series of dialogical relationships between deputy meaning making and broader institutional and cultural constraints which shaped the Kyrgyz’s parliament’s overall quality and strength. These relationships pertain to legislative initiative, the protection of private interests and representation, with the interplay between the ascribed meaning and its constitution within broader institutional and cultural context contributing to the diminishment of legislative agency vis-à-vis the presidency. Kyrgyzstan illustrates the value of meaning making as an approach to understanding legislative-executive relations in non-democratic contexts, and its impact in conjunction with cultural and institutional constraints in shaping legislative agency.
{"title":"Explaining the failure of legislative agency in patronal divided executives: deputy meaning making and its impact on legislative quality in Kyrgyzstan 2010–2020","authors":"Rico Isaacs","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2270423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2270423","url":null,"abstract":"In divided-executive patronal systems, legislatures have been sites of resistance to the centralization of power in a single patronal pyramid. Kyrgyzstan is an anomaly among divided-executive patronal systems when between 2010 to 2020, the Kyrgyz parliament was neither a site of opposition nor did it demonstrate legislative agency vis-à-vis the executive. Instead, following another uprising in 2020, a unified single patronal pyramid was re-established. Adopting an approach rooted in the semiotics of meaning making and drawing on a dataset of interviews with parliamentary deputies and a range of documentary sources, this article complements existing institutional approaches to explaining weak legislative agency by revealing a series of dialogical relationships between deputy meaning making and broader institutional and cultural constraints which shaped the Kyrgyz’s parliament’s overall quality and strength. These relationships pertain to legislative initiative, the protection of private interests and representation, with the interplay between the ascribed meaning and its constitution within broader institutional and cultural context contributing to the diminishment of legislative agency vis-à-vis the presidency. Kyrgyzstan illustrates the value of meaning making as an approach to understanding legislative-executive relations in non-democratic contexts, and its impact in conjunction with cultural and institutional constraints in shaping legislative agency.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2268536
Leonie Reicheneder, Michael Neureiter
ABSTRACTDemocracy aid has been a major foreign policy instrument over the past 30 years. However, it is not clear whether such aid has any meaningful effect on democratic development in recipient countries, as previous studies have yielded somewhat contradictory results. We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of democracy aid by arguing that recipient countries’ history of conflict constitutes an important moderator in the relationship between democracy aid and democratic development. Specifically, we develop a theoretical framework which examines the effects of two different types of democracy aid – top-down and bottom-up assistance – on democratic development in post-conflict recipient countries. Analysing data on 147 recipients over a period of 19 years (2002–2020), we find that while neither type has a significant general effect on democracy levels in recipient countries, bottom-up democracy assistance does have a positive and significant effect in post-conflict contexts, which suggests that post-conflict periods pose an opportunity for domestic pro-democracy actors and their international supporters to nudge their countries towards democratic development. These findings have implications for the literatures on democracy aid and conflict as well as policymakers interested in fostering democratic development abroad.KEYWORDS: Democracy aiddemocracy assistancedemocracy promotioncivil warintrastate conflictpost-conflict societies AcknowledgementsThis article is partly based on the master’s thesis of the first author. Special thanks go to Berthold Rittberger for his support and supervision in the planning and conceptualization of this master’s thesis. We are also grateful to the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Boese et al., Autocratization Changing Nature? 12.2 Nowack and Leininger, “Protecting Democracy from Abroad”; European Commission, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument.3 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20; Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7.4 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”5 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.6 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil.”7 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”8 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.9 Strand and Hegre, Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020; Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 1.10 OECD, “States of Fragility 2020.”11 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”12 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance; Collins, “Can
摘要民主援助是近30年来美国外交政策的重要手段。然而，目前尚不清楚这种援助是否对受援国的民主发展有任何有意义的影响，因为以前的研究得出的结果有些矛盾。我们认为，受援国的冲突历史是民主援助与民主发展之间关系的重要调节因素，从而为有关民主援助有效性的新兴文献做出了贡献。具体而言，我们开发了一个理论框架，该框架检查了两种不同类型的民主援助-自上而下和自下而上的援助-对冲突后受援国民主发展的影响。通过对147个受援国19年间(2002-2020年)的数据进行分析，我们发现，虽然这两种援助类型对受援国的民主水平都没有显著的总体影响，但自下而上的民主援助确实在冲突后环境中产生了积极而显著的影响，这表明冲突后时期为国内亲民主行动者及其国际支持者提供了推动其国家走向民主发展的机会。这些发现对民主援助和冲突的文献以及对促进国外民主发展感兴趣的政策制定者具有启示意义。关键词:民主援助、民主援助、民主促进、内战、国内冲突、冲突后社会特别感谢Berthold Rittberger在本硕士论文的规划和构思过程中给予的支持和指导。我们也感谢编辑和三位匿名审稿人提供的有益意见和建议。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Boese et al.，独裁化改变自然?12.2诺瓦克和莱宁格:《保护民主不受外来侵害》;欧洲委员会，邻里、发展和国际合作文书，3 de Zeeuw和Kumar，“对冲突后社会的民主援助”，20;霍纳特，《跨大西洋民主援助》，7.4波辛，《支持前苏联的民主》;格什曼和艾伦，《对民主援助的攻击》;格林和马西斯，《通过援助实现民主化?》5迪特里希和赖特:《对外援助分配策略》;Finkel等，美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2014. Bermeo，“援助不是石油。”7康奈尔，“政权类型对民主援助对民主的影响有影响吗?”8 Finkel et al.，美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2014。Strand and Hegre，武装冲突趋势，1946-2020;Strand等人，武装冲突的趋势，1946-2018,1.10 OECD，“脆弱性国家2020”。11 de Zeeuw和Kumar，《对冲突后社会的民主援助》。布什:《民主援助的驯服》;《美国能实现经济自由吗?》13 Kopstein，《跨大西洋对民主促进的分歧》。14 Carothers，《民主援助:政治Vs.发展?》15 zulueta - f<s:1> lscher，“脆弱国家”中的民主支持有效性”，30.16 Cornell，“政权类型是否影响民主援助对民主的影响?”;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson，“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2003”;Finkel等，美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2014.17 Hornat，《跨大西洋民主援助》，7;de Zeeuw和Kumar，“对冲突后社会的民主援助”，20.18 Carothers，“民主援助:政治Vs.发展?”19 von Borzyskowski，《抵制民主援助》20迪特里希和赖特，《外援分配策略》，218.21 l<s:1>赫曼，麦克曼和范哈姆，《民主援助有效性》，6.22海德，《选举监督和国际规范扩散》，358.23同上。24格林和马西斯，《稳定第一，发展第二，民主第三》;哈利普:《西方民主观念与跨大西洋民主促进分歧》，第65-76页;《跨大西洋在促进民主方面的分歧》。25迪特里希和赖特，“外援分配策略”，220;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson，“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2003，”405;民主能帮助改善民主吗?“780;哈利普:《西方民主观念与跨大西洋民主促进分歧》，第70期;Schimmelfennig和Sedelmeier，“条件治理”。26 Carothers，“民主援助:战略问题”，113;Carothers，《援助海外民主》，166-67页;Savun和Tirone，“民主援助如何影响国内冲突?”“236;《西方民主观念与跨大西洋民主促进分歧》，第69页。 27迪特里希和赖特，“对外援助分配策略”，220;Savun和Tirone，“民主援助如何影响国内冲突?”234.28迪特里希和赖特，“对外援助分配策略”，220;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson，“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2003”;萨维奇，《民主援助的有效性》，842;民主能帮助改善民主吗?780.29 de Zeeuw和Kumar，“对冲突后社会的民主援助”，10-13;Savun和Tirone，“民主援助如何影响国内冲突?”236.30 de Zeeuw和Kumar，“对冲突后社会的民主援助”，10-13.31 Dietrich和Wright，“外援分配策略”，220;萨维奇，“民主援助的有效性”，847.32 Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson，“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2003”;萨维奇，《民主援助的有效性》33 Finkel et al.，美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2014;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson，“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2003”;格林和马西斯，《通过援助实现民主化?》“164;萨维奇，“民主援助的有效性”，841.34博辛，“支持前苏联的民主”;格什曼和艾伦，《对民主援助的攻击》;格林和马西斯，《通过援助实现民主化?》35迪特里希和赖特，《对外援助分配策略》;Finkel, Pérez-Liñán和Seligson，“美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2003”;Finkel et al.，美国对外援助对民主建设的影响，1990-2014;Gibson, Hoffman和Jablonski，《技术援助在非洲转型中的作用》;Kalyvitis和Vlachaki， <民主援助和接受者的民主化>。36 zulueta - f<s:1> lscher，“脆弱国家”的民主支持有效性”。37 Gibson等人，《发展援助的政治经济学》;Knack和Rahman，“受援国的捐助者分裂和官僚质量”。38 .斯奈德，《美国民主援助与威权国家》。39贝尔梅奥，《援助不是石油》;邓宁，《调节援助的效果》。斯奈德，《美国民主援助与威权国家》。41康奈尔，“政权类型对民主援助对民主的影响重要吗?”42 Savage，《民主援助的有效性》43布什，《民主援助的驯服》。44芬克尔等人，《美国对外援助对民主建设的影响:第三阶段活动报告》。45在本研究中，我们将“国内战争”和“内战”等同使用。46 de Zeeuw和Kumar，“对冲突后社会的民主援助”，2.47 UCDP, UCDP定义。Riese, Röhner和z<e:1> rcher，“冲突后民主化的外部战略”;关于民主化决定因素的概述，见Pérez-Liñán，“民主”，91-95.49。Paris和Sisk，国家建设的困境，36;zulueta - f<s
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Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2268007
Guillermo Kreiman
ABSTRACTWhat is the relation between coups d’etat and civil wars? While a wide set of studies have traced the determinants of internal armed conflicts and coup attempts, the interplay between these contentious processes remains unexplored. Building on different strands of research, this article seeks to explain why, and under what conditions, some regimes experience coup attempts in the midst of civil wars while others do not. Concretely, I posit that coup attempts during internal armed conflicts are more likely to occur when two conditions converge: when insurgents reach a medium-level of strength in situations of intra-elite competition. Key military forces, elite outsiders and coalition insiders interpret this situation as a unique opportunity for changes in the distribution of power and potentially coalesce through the formation of alternative regime coalitions. This argument is tested with a novel dataset on 90 Latin American revolutionary socialist insurgencies active since 1950 and a qualitative case study of the dynamics leading to the 1976 coup d’etat in Argentina, with results supporting the theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to a more detailed understanding of the relation between coups and civil wars, opening the way for further studies on this burgeoning area of research.KEYWORDS: Civil warscoupsinsurgencyelitesLatin America AcknowledgementsI am grateful to Stathis Kalyvas, Andrea Ruggeri, Luis de la Calle, Benoit Siberdt, Luis Schenoni, Joaquín Artés, Klaudia Wegschaider, Raquel Chantó, Sandra León, Inés Pina, members of the T.E. Lawrence Program on the Study of Conflict, and participants in the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, the Conflict and Change Workshop at UCL, the Council for European Studies Annual Conference and the Carlos III Juan March Institute Conference for their feedback. I also thank the editor of Democratization and two anonymous reviewers.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes.”2 Roessler, Ethnic Politics.3 Wood, Forging Democracy from Below.4 Johnson and Thyne, “Squeaky Wheels.”5 Casper and Tyson, “Popular Protest and Elite Coordination.”6 Slater, Ordering Power.7 Paine, “The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma.”8 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.9 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic origins.10 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 15.11 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 7.12 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 51. The concept of selectorate is defined as “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government´s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government´s leadership” (Ibid., 42).13 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 6.14 The concept of ruling coalition reflects the agree
摘要政变与内战的关系是什么?虽然一系列广泛的研究追踪了国内武装冲突和政变企图的决定因素，但这些有争议的过程之间的相互作用仍未得到探索。基于不同的研究线索，本文试图解释为什么以及在什么条件下，一些政权在内战中经历了政变企图，而另一些政权则没有。具体地说，我认为当两个条件汇合时，内部武装冲突中的政变企图更有可能发生:当叛乱分子在精英内部竞争的情况下达到中等水平时。关键的军事力量、外部精英和联盟内部人士将这种情况解读为改变权力分配的独特机会，并有可能通过形成替代政权联盟而联合起来。这一论点通过一个新颖的数据集进行了检验，该数据集包含了自1950年以来活跃的90个拉丁美洲革命社会主义叛乱，并对导致1976年阿根廷政变的动态进行了定性案例研究，结果支持了理论预期。这些发现有助于更详细地了解政变与内战之间的关系，为这一新兴研究领域的进一步研究开辟了道路。关键词:致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢欧洲研究委员会年会和卡洛斯三世胡安马奇研究所会议的反馈意见。我还要感谢民主化杂志的编辑和两位匿名审稿人。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1:Bell and Sudduth，《原因与结果》。2罗斯勒，《民族政治》，3伍德，《自下而上锻造民主》，4约翰逊和泰恩，《吱吱作响的车轮》。5卡斯珀和泰森，大众抗议和精英协调。6 .斯莱特，《权力秩序》。7 .潘恩，《独裁者的权力分享困境》。8 de Mesquita et al.，《政治生存的逻辑》，《民主与再分配》;阿塞莫格鲁和罗宾逊，《经济起源》10阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊，《经济起源》，15.11 de Mesquita等人，《政治生存的逻辑》，7.12 de Mesquita等人，《政治生存的逻辑》，51。选择群体的概念被定义为“一群人，他们的禀赋包括选择政府领导的制度所要求的品质或特征，并且是获得政府领导发放的私人福利所必需的”(同上，42)执政联盟的概念反映了现任者和行动者之间的协议，这些协议赋予了它政治权力，即获胜的联盟组成获胜联盟的核心角色是联盟内部人士和关键的军事参与者阿尔伯图斯，专制和再分配，33.17 Heger和Salehyan，“无情的统治者”，387.18 Kim和Sudduth，“政治制度和政变”，7.19 Staniland，“叛乱网络”，5.20参见Pérez-Liñán和Polga-Hecimovich，“解释军事政变”。21 Higley和Gunther，精英与民主巩固，10-13.22 Slater，秩序权力。23 Powell，“尝试的决定因素”。24 Higley和Gunther，精英与民主巩固，13.25未来的研究应该深入研究获胜联盟规模对这种关系的影响。见附录中的表A30。26 Higley和Gunther，精英和民主巩固，11.27 Singh，夺取权力。28 Bell和Sudduth，“原因和结果”，1435-7.29 de Mesquita等人，政治生存的逻辑，8.30虽然叛乱力量肯定是一个线性变量，但我区分了三种理想类别。参见Cunningham, Gleditsch和Salehyan的《非国家行为体》。31刘易斯:《叛乱是如何开始的》，32斯沃利克:《威权统治的政治》，33斯沃利克:《威权统治的政治》，125-9.34德拉·门塔:《社会运动与政治暴力》，35伍德:《叛乱的集体行动》，36罗斯勒:《民族政治》;Coup-Proofing Sudduth。”《卡斯珀和泰森》，大众抗议和精英协调。38刘易斯:《叛乱是如何开始的》;39阿尔乔纳:《反叛政治》;40列文托格鲁和梅特涅:《生来软弱，成长为强者》。有两种机制可以解释精英趋同:对存在的颠覆力量的工具性利用;以及对革命成功的恐惧Powell，“尝试的决定因素”，1019.43 Bell和Sudduth，“原因和结果”，1436.44 Nilsson，“将弱点转化为力量”;克莱顿，《相对反抗力量》。45伍德，《自下而上锻造民主》。 46列文托格鲁和梅特涅，《生来软弱，成长为强者》。“47另一种机制可能是，政变策划者面临叛乱分子和其他力量发动反政变的可信威胁其中，关于政变的系统和平中心数据集(马歇尔和马歇尔，Coup d’acimtat Events)，来自Lehoucq和pacimrez的拉丁美洲政变数据库Liñán(“打破政变陷阱”)或全球政变实例数据集(鲍威尔和Thyne，“全球政变实例”)。50Powell和thne，“政变的全球实例”，252.51这与先前研究中发现的内战期间政变的百分比相似55 Wood:《从底层锻造民主》。56 Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan:《需要两个人》。57克莱顿，《相对反抗力量》。58列文托格鲁和梅特涅，《生来软弱，成长为坚强》。59 Holtermann，《相对能力》。60克莱曼2023.61克莱顿，“相对实力”，611.62贝尔和Sudduth，“原因和结果”，1442.63麦迪逊项目数据库。64费伦和拉丁，“种族，叛乱。”65同上，66 Higley和Gunther:《精英与民主巩固》;Leventoglu & Metternich，《生来软弱，成长为坚强》;潘恩，《独裁者的权力分享困境》。68 Bell and Sudduth， <原因与结果>。69 Stanley，保护费国家。70 Romero, Breve history contemporánea de la Argentina.71 Gudat, la insurrección anhelada.72数据来自Banks cnt Dataset.73 Gläßel、González和Scharpf的《颠覆磨坊的谷物》。鲍威尔:《尝试的决定因素》;约翰逊和泰恩，《吱吱作响的车轮》。“75附录表A29显示了对非战争时期政变决定因素的分析Stanley，《保护费国家》，148-9.77 Higley和Gunther，《精英与民主巩固》，10-11.78这是对官僚-威权主义理论的补充，详细说明了大众部门激活的威胁程度如何以及在什么条件下可能导致官僚-威权主义国家的实施(O ' Donnell，“反思”)79其他活跃的反叛力量不是短命的就是被这些集团吸收了Moyano，阿根廷迷失的巡逻队，90.81阿根廷反共产主义联盟，82 de Riz, 54.83这种两极分化对平民的偏好有直接的影响韦尔比斯基和波霍斯拉夫斯基，《经济共犯》85这也包括演员，如教会86 APEGE " Declaración de la APEGE ";引用于Wermus, 231.87 Schorr，“工业经济力量”，237-9.88 Lewis，游击队和将军，124.89同上，124.90 Franco, unenemigo para la nación, 144.91 Muleiro, 1976: El golpe civil, 21.92 Romero, Breve
{"title":"Common enemies? Coups, insurgent strength and intra-elite competition: evidence from Latin America","authors":"Guillermo Kreiman","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2268007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2268007","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWhat is the relation between coups d’etat and civil wars? While a wide set of studies have traced the determinants of internal armed conflicts and coup attempts, the interplay between these contentious processes remains unexplored. Building on different strands of research, this article seeks to explain why, and under what conditions, some regimes experience coup attempts in the midst of civil wars while others do not. Concretely, I posit that coup attempts during internal armed conflicts are more likely to occur when two conditions converge: when insurgents reach a medium-level of strength in situations of intra-elite competition. Key military forces, elite outsiders and coalition insiders interpret this situation as a unique opportunity for changes in the distribution of power and potentially coalesce through the formation of alternative regime coalitions. This argument is tested with a novel dataset on 90 Latin American revolutionary socialist insurgencies active since 1950 and a qualitative case study of the dynamics leading to the 1976 coup d’etat in Argentina, with results supporting the theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to a more detailed understanding of the relation between coups and civil wars, opening the way for further studies on this burgeoning area of research.KEYWORDS: Civil warscoupsinsurgencyelitesLatin America AcknowledgementsI am grateful to Stathis Kalyvas, Andrea Ruggeri, Luis de la Calle, Benoit Siberdt, Luis Schenoni, Joaquín Artés, Klaudia Wegschaider, Raquel Chantó, Sandra León, Inés Pina, members of the T.E. Lawrence Program on the Study of Conflict, and participants in the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, the Conflict and Change Workshop at UCL, the Council for European Studies Annual Conference and the Carlos III Juan March Institute Conference for their feedback. I also thank the editor of Democratization and two anonymous reviewers.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes.”2 Roessler, Ethnic Politics.3 Wood, Forging Democracy from Below.4 Johnson and Thyne, “Squeaky Wheels.”5 Casper and Tyson, “Popular Protest and Elite Coordination.”6 Slater, Ordering Power.7 Paine, “The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma.”8 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.9 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic origins.10 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 15.11 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 7.12 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 51. The concept of selectorate is defined as “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government´s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government´s leadership” (Ibid., 42).13 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 6.14 The concept of ruling coalition reflects the agree","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-20DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2267448
Marcus Michaelsen, Kris Ruijgrok
Authoritarian regimes frequently reach across borders to repress against exiled dissidents. Existing scholarship has investigated the methods and effects of transnational repression. Yet, we lack knowledge of the role that the political context of a host country and its relations to the origin country of diasporas play in incidents of transnational repression. Addressing this gap, we use a Freedom House dataset on physical acts of transnational repression (2014–2020) to study how the regime type of the host country and the regional ties between the host and origin country influence the likelihood and type of transnational repression incidents. Conducting a logistic regression analysis with yearly directed dyads, we find that to target exiles in autocratic host states perpetrators primarily rely on the cooperation of authorities, whereas in democratic host states they resort more often to direct attacks. We also show that authoritarian cooperation on transnational repression is regionally clustered: it often occurs when home and host state are situated within the same authoritarian neighbourhood, and partly also when they are members in the same regional organization. Our article reveals some of the host state conditions and relational dynamics that shape the decisions and strategies of transnational repression perpetrators.
{"title":"Autocracy's long reach: explaining host country influences on transnational repression","authors":"Marcus Michaelsen, Kris Ruijgrok","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2267448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2267448","url":null,"abstract":"Authoritarian regimes frequently reach across borders to repress against exiled dissidents. Existing scholarship has investigated the methods and effects of transnational repression. Yet, we lack knowledge of the role that the political context of a host country and its relations to the origin country of diasporas play in incidents of transnational repression. Addressing this gap, we use a Freedom House dataset on physical acts of transnational repression (2014–2020) to study how the regime type of the host country and the regional ties between the host and origin country influence the likelihood and type of transnational repression incidents. Conducting a logistic regression analysis with yearly directed dyads, we find that to target exiles in autocratic host states perpetrators primarily rely on the cooperation of authorities, whereas in democratic host states they resort more often to direct attacks. We also show that authoritarian cooperation on transnational repression is regionally clustered: it often occurs when home and host state are situated within the same authoritarian neighbourhood, and partly also when they are members in the same regional organization. Our article reveals some of the host state conditions and relational dynamics that shape the decisions and strategies of transnational repression perpetrators.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135616770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2264196
Guido Panzano
ABSTRACTDo mutually reinforcing cleavages harm democracy? Evidence from specific cases suggests that autocratization can be related to the predicament of ethnic groups, if ethnicity is politicized and involves resource distribution. However, we know little about whether this is a cause of autocratization more broadly. The article demonstrates that, with increasing inequalities between ethnic groups, a country experiences a decline in its level of democracy and higher propensity to start autocratizing. The analysis thus advances previous contributions, focusing on individual inequalities and power-sharing institutions as explanations of democratization or democratic quality, in two ways. First, isolating autocratization as downturns in democracy levels and the onsets of related timespans (autocratization episodes), and comparing the impact of (economic, political, and social) types of inequalities between ethnic groups. Second, adopting a global sample of (democratic and non-democratic) countries since 1981, with an original data collection integrating expert surveys with survey data. Quantitative evidence confirms most expectations, particularly on economic inequalities between ethnic groups, and – although less precisely – economic, political and social dimensions combined. The findings have important implications for political regime and ethnic studies, showing that preventing the mutual reinforcement of sociocultural and economic cleavages is key to stabilize democracy.KEYWORDS: Autocratizationethnicityinequalitydemocracyethnic groups AcknowledgmentsI thank Luca Tomini, Jean-Benoît Pilet and Daniel Bochsler, for their precious feedback on the paper. I also thank the participants of the 2022 ECPR General Conference panel “Authoritarianism”, 2022 SISP Conference panel “Regime convergence” and 2022 AuPSA Political Science Day panel “Democratization and Autocratization” for their useful comments. Moreover, I am grateful to Lasse Egendal Leipziger, Christian Houle, Frances Stewart and Nils-Christian Bormann, who shared manuscripts, replication data and ideas that helped me progress this research. Other readers of previous versions of the paper and my research project that I kindly thank are Felix Wiebrecht, Andreas Juon, Andrea Vaccaro, Andrea Cassani, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Seda Gürkan, Matthijs Bogaards, Gianni Del Panta and Licia Cianetti. Finally, I wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their excellent suggestions and generous support.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Boese et al., “State of the World 2021”; Wiebrecht et al., “State of the World 2022.”2 Houle, “Ethnic Inequality”; and Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities.”3 Bochsler and Juon, “Power-Sharing”; Juon and Bochsler, “The Two Faces.”4 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook V11.”5 Vogt et al., “Integrating Data.”6 Baldwin and Huber, “Economic versus Cultural Differences”; Houle, “Ethnic Inequality.”7 Leipziger, “Measuring Ethnic In
瑞格利菲尔德，《美国种族不平等》。" 35 Woo-Mora， "揭秘宇宙种族。36 gengnay和dzihiic，《解读权威密码》;Vachudova,“Ethnopopulism”;Kapidžić and stojarov<e:1>，《非自由主义政治》。37 Widmalm，《劳特利奇独裁手册》。38 Maizland，《缅甸动乱的历史》。”39 Yusupova，“俄罗斯的恐惧政治是如何运作的?40 Onwuzuruigbo，“研究尼日利亚的种族冲突”;世界银行集团，《克服南非的贫困和不平等》;Benjaminsen和Ba，《为什么马里的牧民加入圣战组织?》《埃塞俄比亚的革命民主》。41斯图尔特:《横向不平等与冲突》。钱德拉将种族定义为:“一个类别的子集，其中基于血统的属性是成员资格所必需的”(钱德拉，“什么是种族党?“154)。在对分裂的定义中，克里西提到了它的“结构基础，相关群体的政治价值，以及他们的政治表达”(克里西，“转型”，165)。这篇文章集中在结构基础上测量两个随机个体属于不同群体的概率:Alesina等人，“分数化”。44 Bochsler等人，《交换》;马夸特和埃雷拉:“种族作为一个变量”;参见哈泽尔和霍迪，《可能性的艺术》。45 Contra Gerring, Hoffman, and Zarecki，《多种效应》。46蒂利:《民主》;47钱德拉:《少数民族政党为何成功》;《政党制度与选民结盟》，《横向不平等》。49 Houle，“种族不平等”;斯图尔特，《横向不平等》。50 Stewart, Brown, and Mancini，《监测与测量》，11.51 Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch，《水平不平等》。52 Baldwin and Huber， <经济与文化差异>。53库恩和魏德曼，《我们不平等地战斗》。54霍洛维茨:《冲突中的族群》;《从投票到暴力》。这篇论文肯定，对民主来说，问题不在于种族本身，而在于种族不平等种族不平等。56 Leipziger，《衡量种族不平等》[57] Lijphart，《民主的模式》;[58]Cederman, Hug, and wucherpfenen，《分享权力，确保和平?》;Bochsler and Juon，《权力分享》;Juon和Bochsler的《双面人》(Two Faces);哈泽尔和霍迪，《可能性的艺术》;鲍曼，“民族权力分享。洛伊齐德斯:《多数民族主义的政治》;Schedler，“一个模棱两可的工具”。60 Waldner and Lust，不受欢迎的变化。61 Stewart, Brown, and Mancini，“监测与测量”，11.62 Merkel et al.， Defekte democrat .63 Coppedge et al.，“V-Dem Codebook V11”。64 Maerz et al.，《框架》。65 Coppedge等人，《V-Dem Codebook V11》。66 .电子数据交换不包括与不平等或族裔群体有关的指标:因此，在解释变量和结果之间不存在循环的危险[68] Alesina, Michalopoulos, Papaioannou，“种族不平等”;参见Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann，《三角测量水平不等式》。69 Baldwin and Huber，“经济与文化差异”;Houle， <种族不平等>。Juon在“包容，承认”中也采用了类似的方法来研究对政府的满意度和对种族歧视的感知WVS: https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp(最后一次访问:2023年3月)CSES: https://cses.org/data-download/cses-integrated-module-dataset-imd/(最后一次访问:2023年3月)Latinobarometro: https://www.latinobarometro.org(最后一次访问:2023年3月)74 . LAPOP实验室的美国晴雨表:www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop(最后一次访问:2023年3月)Afrobarometer: https://www.afrobarometer.org(最后一次访问:2023年3月)亚洲晴雨表:https://www.asianbarometer.org/(最后一次访问:2023年3月)Vogt等人，“整合数据。77对于撒哈拉以南的非洲，我使用了由<s:1> ller- crepon、Pengl和Bormann女士开发的R软件包，比较了种族群体列表，”链接非洲种族数据(Leda)。“非洲晴雨表”不包含关于被调查者收入的指标。根据Houle(“种族不平等”)，我根据受访者对一项或多项资产的所有权创建了一个变量，例如自行车，汽车，电话等(范围从0到最大资产数量)。79Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch， <横向不平等>80 Juon，《被忽视的少数民族》另一个国家级来源，“世界各州的权力分享”数据集(Strøm等人，“包容、分散和约束”)，在其种族群体列表上缺乏编码标准Cederman和Girardin， <超越分馏>“83 .紧急方案评估的分类可能与政治特征有关，而与社会特征无关。然而，我们的政治不平等指标考虑的是正式制度，而社会不平等指标指的是非正式做法。朱恩(《被忽视的少数民族》)证明了这两者并不一定相关出处同上,177年。 Cederman和Girardin比较了由两个群体(占人口30%的a组和占人口70%的B组)组成的国家的分数化指数的结果，无论排除多数还是少数，分数化指数都是相同的，而nstar指标的变化范围从0.072到0.843，如果掌权的群体是多数，则为0.843。诚然，衡量种族群体之间的社会不平等仍然是试探性的。更适当的指标应考虑到根据居住地或身份归属分配给族裔群体的具体服务(如学校或医院)。然而，对于大n分析，这种度量不存在。我用EPR指标来代替它，该指标基于非正式实践，可以根据种族指示不同的服务分配。进一步的研究应该改进这种测量方法“民族极化”。“86表A.3报告了主要自变量之间的相互关系(可忽略或无关紧要)继Houle之后，“种族不平等”;以及Cederman, Weidmann和Gleditsch，“横向不平等”，用于分析民族群体层面和使用国家年度数据进行民主化研究的最常见方法CPSD数据集仅包含2016年之前的观察结果，并且是针对有正式宪法的国家随着第一个指标从0调整到1.90，关于社会不平等的模型和总体指数不包括已经在社会不平等指标中计算的群体规模变量种族不平等。92它们达到显著性的标准误差聚集在组水平。然而，这可能会有忽视同一国家各种族群体的空间自相关性的危险Bochsler and Juon，《权力分享》;还有朱恩和博赫斯勒的《双面人》。94参见l<s:1>赫曼和林德伯格，《第三波独裁浪潮》，探讨独裁如何
{"title":"Do mutually reinforcing cleavages harm democracy? Inequalities between ethnic groups and autocratization","authors":"Guido Panzano","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2264196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2264196","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTDo mutually reinforcing cleavages harm democracy? Evidence from specific cases suggests that autocratization can be related to the predicament of ethnic groups, if ethnicity is politicized and involves resource distribution. However, we know little about whether this is a cause of autocratization more broadly. The article demonstrates that, with increasing inequalities between ethnic groups, a country experiences a decline in its level of democracy and higher propensity to start autocratizing. The analysis thus advances previous contributions, focusing on individual inequalities and power-sharing institutions as explanations of democratization or democratic quality, in two ways. First, isolating autocratization as downturns in democracy levels and the onsets of related timespans (autocratization episodes), and comparing the impact of (economic, political, and social) types of inequalities between ethnic groups. Second, adopting a global sample of (democratic and non-democratic) countries since 1981, with an original data collection integrating expert surveys with survey data. Quantitative evidence confirms most expectations, particularly on economic inequalities between ethnic groups, and – although less precisely – economic, political and social dimensions combined. The findings have important implications for political regime and ethnic studies, showing that preventing the mutual reinforcement of sociocultural and economic cleavages is key to stabilize democracy.KEYWORDS: Autocratizationethnicityinequalitydemocracyethnic groups AcknowledgmentsI thank Luca Tomini, Jean-Benoît Pilet and Daniel Bochsler, for their precious feedback on the paper. I also thank the participants of the 2022 ECPR General Conference panel “Authoritarianism”, 2022 SISP Conference panel “Regime convergence” and 2022 AuPSA Political Science Day panel “Democratization and Autocratization” for their useful comments. Moreover, I am grateful to Lasse Egendal Leipziger, Christian Houle, Frances Stewart and Nils-Christian Bormann, who shared manuscripts, replication data and ideas that helped me progress this research. Other readers of previous versions of the paper and my research project that I kindly thank are Felix Wiebrecht, Andreas Juon, Andrea Vaccaro, Andrea Cassani, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Seda Gürkan, Matthijs Bogaards, Gianni Del Panta and Licia Cianetti. Finally, I wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their excellent suggestions and generous support.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Boese et al., “State of the World 2021”; Wiebrecht et al., “State of the World 2022.”2 Houle, “Ethnic Inequality”; and Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities.”3 Bochsler and Juon, “Power-Sharing”; Juon and Bochsler, “The Two Faces.”4 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook V11.”5 Vogt et al., “Integrating Data.”6 Baldwin and Huber, “Economic versus Cultural Differences”; Houle, “Ethnic Inequality.”7 Leipziger, “Measuring Ethnic In","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135779729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2267453
Nemanja Stankov
ABSTRACTUnderstanding clientelist practices is one of the core issues to unravel to ensure the proper functioning of electoral institutions. This article focuses on the decision of patrons/brokers on who to target, introducing a new norm into the picture – authoritarianism. Building on the theories of norm-based compliance, I argued that authoritarian individuals should be more frequently targeted, as they should be more likely to comply with brokers demands without external monitoring. I posit that this is true because authoritarian individuals should be more willing to submit to the will and demands of authorities (brokers), and because they are likely to evaluate clientelism as morally acceptable and a legitimate electoral strategy. Furthermore, the rate of authoritarian targeting should be higher in institutional settings that limit the overall reach of clientelism. Utilizing Afrobarometer (2011-2013) data for 34 countries, through multilevel regression modelling I show that authoritarian individuals do have a higher chance of being targeted with the strength of this association increasing as the district magnitude rises. This article opens a new avenue of research that introduces individual level authoritarianism into the literature on clientelist targeting and complements the norm-based compliance approach with a focus on a new and potentially influential norm.KEYWORDS: ClientelismtargetingauthoritarianismAfricadistrict magnitude Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Political linkages.”2 Stokes, “A formal model of machine politics.”3 Stokes et al., Brokers, voters, and clientelism.4 Lawson and Green, “Making clientelism work.”5 Carlin and Moseley, “Good democrats, bad targets” and Carlin and Moseley, “When Clientelism Backfires.”6 Robinson and Verdier, “The political economy.”7 Dal Bó, “Bribing voters.”8 Lawson and Green, “Making clientelism work.”9 see Van de Walle, “Meet the new boss.”10 Cohrs et al., “Effects of right-wing” and Crowson, “Authoritarianism, perceived threat.”11 Arlin, “Right-wing authoritarianism.”12 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture in Lawson and Greene, “Making clientelism work.”13 Chang and Golden, “Electoral systems.”14 Pellicer and Wegner, “Electoral rules.”15 see Mares, From open secrets, for XIX century German elections.16 Hicken, “Clientelism”17 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Political linkages.”18 Yildirim and Kitschelt, “Analytical perspectives” and Berenschot and Aspinall, “How clientelism varies.”19 Stokes et al., Brokers, voters, and clientelism.20 Note that this conceptualization of clientelism implicitly excludes negative clientelist strategies, such as threats, the withdrawal of benefits and ultimately violence. While I recognize that these can also constitute clientelist exchanges, this paper will focus only on those strategies that “promise” some sort of directly transferable benefits for future electoral support.
摘要了解裙带主义行为是保障选举制度正常运行的核心问题之一。本文关注的是赞助人/经纪人对目标对象的决定，并引入了一种新的规范——威权主义。在基于规范的服从理论的基础上，我认为专制个人应该更频繁地成为目标，因为他们应该更有可能在没有外部监控的情况下服从经纪人的要求。我认为这是正确的，因为专制的个人应该更愿意服从当局(经纪人)的意志和要求，因为他们可能会认为庇护主义在道德上是可以接受的，是一种合法的选举策略。此外，在限制庇护主义总体影响范围的制度环境中，针对威权主义的比例应该更高。利用Afrobarometer(2011-2013) 34个国家的数据，通过多层次回归模型，我表明专制个人确实有更高的机会成为目标，随着地区规模的增加，这种关联的强度也在增加。本文开辟了一条新的研究途径，将个人层面的威权主义引入到针对客户的文献中，并通过关注一种新的、具有潜在影响力的规范来补充基于规范的合规方法。关键词:客户主义;针对威权主义;非洲;地区规模披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Kitschelt和Wilkinson，“公民-政治联系”。2 Stokes，机器政治的正式模型。3 Stokes et al.，经纪人、选民和客户主义劳森和格林，《让裙带关系发挥作用》。5卡林和莫斯利，“好的民主党人，坏的目标”和卡林和莫斯利，“当庇护主义适得其反。”6罗宾逊和维迪尔，《政治经济学》。“7 Dal Bó”，贿赂选民。劳森和格林，《让裙带关系发挥作用》9 .见Van de Walle，见新老板。10 Cohrs等人，“右翼的影响”和Crowson，“威权主义，感知威胁。”11 Arlin，右翼威权主义。12 Almond and Verba，《Lawson and Greene的公民文化》，《让裙带关系发挥作用》。13 Chang and Golden，《选举制度》14 Pellicer和Wegner，《选举规则》。15见马雷斯，从公开的秘密，为十九世纪的德国选举17 Kitschelt和Wilkinson，《公民与政治的联系》。18 Yildirim and Kitschelt，《分析视角》，Berenschot and Aspinall，《裙带关系如何变化》。[19] Stokes et al.，经纪人、选民和客户主义请注意，这种对庇护主义的概念化隐含地排除了消极的庇护主义策略，如威胁、撤回利益和最终的暴力。虽然我认识到这些也可以构成客户交换，但本文将只关注那些“承诺”为未来的选举支持提供某种直接转让利益的战略马和杨，购买，征用。22 Stokes，《机器政治的正式模型》，Stokes等人，《经纪人、选民和庇护主义》。23见马雷斯和杨，“购买，征用”的广泛评论卡尔沃和穆里略，《谁来交付?》25 gass - morse et al.，《各种各样的clientelism》。《26匹马与幼马》，购买，征用。27 Stokes，《机器政治的正式模型》，Stokes等人著，《经纪人、选民和clientelism》，Calvo和Murillo著，《谁交付?》28卡尔沃和穆里略，《谁来交付?》斯托克斯，《机器政治的正式模型》和斯托克斯等人，《经纪人、选民和clientism》Gonzales-Ocantos等人，"贿选。30布拉顿《贿选》31基切尔特和阿尔塔米拉诺《拉丁美洲的裙带主义》32 Kitschelt and Wilkinson， <公民-政治联系>。33劳森和格林，《让裙带关系发挥作用》。《34克拉蒙》，作为信息的选举讲义。35同上36 Vicente and Wantchekon， "裙带关系和贿选。"37 Kramon，“作为信息的选举讲义”，456.38 Muno，“概念化和衡量庇护主义”。39劳森和格林，《让裙带关系发挥作用》40 Kitschelt和Wilkinson，《公民与政治的联系》。41劳森和格林，“使裙带关系发挥作用”，Chang，“行为模型”，Finan和Schechter，“投票购买和互惠”。费南和谢斯特街42号，贿选和互惠。43，同上，44劳森和格林，《使裙带关系有效》。45 Hicken, Clientelism。拉瓦尼拉等人，“经纪人、社会网络、互惠。”48 Finan和Schester，“投票购买和互惠”。49 Duarte等人，“利用信息中介投票”。50 Vilchez et al.，“一个系统框架。”51劳森和格林，让裙带关系发挥作用。《52狐狸》，艰难的过渡。53卡林和莫斯利，《当庇护主义适得其反》"卡林街和莫斯利街54号，"好的民主党人，坏的目标。55 Gonzales-Ocantos et al.，贿选。“56 Altemeyer”，另一个“专制人格”。" 57同上，52.58同上，48。
{"title":"Offer money, they will accept: linkages between authoritarian tendencies and clientelist targeting in Africa","authors":"Nemanja Stankov","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2267453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2267453","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTUnderstanding clientelist practices is one of the core issues to unravel to ensure the proper functioning of electoral institutions. This article focuses on the decision of patrons/brokers on who to target, introducing a new norm into the picture – authoritarianism. Building on the theories of norm-based compliance, I argued that authoritarian individuals should be more frequently targeted, as they should be more likely to comply with brokers demands without external monitoring. I posit that this is true because authoritarian individuals should be more willing to submit to the will and demands of authorities (brokers), and because they are likely to evaluate clientelism as morally acceptable and a legitimate electoral strategy. Furthermore, the rate of authoritarian targeting should be higher in institutional settings that limit the overall reach of clientelism. Utilizing Afrobarometer (2011-2013) data for 34 countries, through multilevel regression modelling I show that authoritarian individuals do have a higher chance of being targeted with the strength of this association increasing as the district magnitude rises. This article opens a new avenue of research that introduces individual level authoritarianism into the literature on clientelist targeting and complements the norm-based compliance approach with a focus on a new and potentially influential norm.KEYWORDS: ClientelismtargetingauthoritarianismAfricadistrict magnitude Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Political linkages.”2 Stokes, “A formal model of machine politics.”3 Stokes et al., Brokers, voters, and clientelism.4 Lawson and Green, “Making clientelism work.”5 Carlin and Moseley, “Good democrats, bad targets” and Carlin and Moseley, “When Clientelism Backfires.”6 Robinson and Verdier, “The political economy.”7 Dal Bó, “Bribing voters.”8 Lawson and Green, “Making clientelism work.”9 see Van de Walle, “Meet the new boss.”10 Cohrs et al., “Effects of right-wing” and Crowson, “Authoritarianism, perceived threat.”11 Arlin, “Right-wing authoritarianism.”12 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture in Lawson and Greene, “Making clientelism work.”13 Chang and Golden, “Electoral systems.”14 Pellicer and Wegner, “Electoral rules.”15 see Mares, From open secrets, for XIX century German elections.16 Hicken, “Clientelism”17 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Political linkages.”18 Yildirim and Kitschelt, “Analytical perspectives” and Berenschot and Aspinall, “How clientelism varies.”19 Stokes et al., Brokers, voters, and clientelism.20 Note that this conceptualization of clientelism implicitly excludes negative clientelist strategies, such as threats, the withdrawal of benefits and ultimately violence. While I recognize that these can also constitute clientelist exchanges, this paper will focus only on those strategies that “promise” some sort of directly transferable benefits for future electoral support.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-15DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2258809
Leeann H. Youn, Haruka Nagao, William Hatungimana, Rigao Liu
ABSTRACTSocial media presents a contradictory relationship with democracy. Once, it was regarded as a tool for democracy, providing alternative sources of information and coordinating social movements for democratization. Later it also became a tool for authoritarian regimes to control information and spread propaganda to stay in power. This mixed perception suggests that both democratic and authoritarian forces can use social media to influence public opinion. This presents a puzzle to the relationship between social media use and democratic understanding. Does social media promote or erode understanding of democracy? This study argues that the effect of social media use on understanding of democracy depends on higher education. The relationship also differs between democracies and non-democracies. Using the newest wave of the World Values Survey (wave 7, 2017–2020), this study analyses the influence of social media use on understanding of democracy in non-democracies and democracies. The findings suggest that social media use positively affects understanding of democracy in democratic countries. However, the democratic effect of social media is nullified in non-democracy unless it interacts with higher education. The findings offer implications for the relationship between social media, higher education, and understanding of democracy.KEYWORDS: Understanding of democracysocial mediahigher educationregime typepublic opinion Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Chapman et al., “Under the Veil of Democracy”; Cinar and Bulbul, “Varieties of Democratic Understanding”; Gerber and Chapman, “Familiarity Breeds Contempt?”2 Chang et al., “Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia”; Kirsch and Welzel, “Democracy Misunderstood”; Shin, “Popular Understanding of Democracy.”3 Kirsch and Welzel, “Democracy Misunderstood”; Yeung, “Overestimation of Democracy in Nondemocracies.”4 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.5 Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.”6 Inglehart, “Modernization, Postmodernization and Changing Perceptions of Risk.”7 Canache, “Citizens’ Conceptualizations of Democracy”; Chapman et al., “Under the Veil of Democracy”; Cho, “To Know Democracy Is to Love It”; Gerber and Chapman, “Familiarity Breeds Contempt?”8 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Inglehart, “Modernization, Postmodernization and Changing Perceptions of Risk”; Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.”9 Lu and Chu, Understandings of Democracy.10 Zagrebina, “Concepts of Democracy in Democratic and Nondemocratic Countries.”11 Ceka and Magalhães, “Do the Rich and the Poor Have Different Conceptions of Democracy?”12 Allcott and Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News”; Behrouzian et al., “Resisting Censorship”; Dal and Nisbet, “Walking Through Firewalls”; Lessenski, “Resilience to ‘Post-Truth’.”13 Bodó et al., “Interested in Diversity”; Borgesius et al., “Should We Worry about Filter Bubbles?”14 Haerpfer et al., “World Values Sur
社交媒体与民主呈现出一种矛盾的关系。曾经，它被视为民主的工具，提供其他信息来源和协调民主化的社会运动。后来，它也成为专制政权控制信息和传播宣传以保持权力的工具。这种复杂的看法表明，民主和威权力量都可以利用社交媒体影响公众舆论。这给社交媒体的使用和民主理解之间的关系带来了困惑。社交媒体是促进还是侵蚀对民主的理解?这项研究认为，社交媒体使用对理解民主的影响取决于高等教育。民主国家和非民主国家之间的关系也有所不同。利用最新一波的世界价值观调查(2017-2020年第7波)，本研究分析了社交媒体的使用对非民主国家和民主国家对民主的理解的影响。研究结果表明，在民主国家，社交媒体的使用会对人们对民主的理解产生积极影响。然而，除非与高等教育互动，否则社交媒体的民主效应在非民主中是无效的。这些发现为社交媒体、高等教育和对民主的理解之间的关系提供了启示。关键词:对民主的理解;社交媒体;高等教育制度;舆论披露声明;注1参见Chapman et al.，“Under the Veil of Democracy”;西纳尔和布尔:《民主理解的多样性》;Gerber和Chapman，“熟悉滋生轻蔑?2张等，《亚洲的威权怀旧》;Kirsch和Welzel:《被误解的民主》;申，《大众对民主主义的理解》3 Kirsch和Welzel，《被误解的民主》;《非民主国家对民主的高估》。4 Almond and Verba，《公民文化》。5 Lipset，《民主的一些社会必要条件》。6 Inglehart，《现代化、后现代与风险观念的变化》。7卡纳奇:《公民对民主的概念化》;Chapman et al.，《在民主的面纱之下》;“了解民主主义就是热爱民主主义”;Gerber和Chapman，“熟悉滋生轻蔑?8《公民文化》，阿尔蒙德和维尔巴;Inglehart:《现代化、后现代与风险观念的变化》;利普塞特，《民主的一些社会条件》9 Lu and Chu，《对民主的理解》。10 Zagrebina，《民主与非民主国家的民主概念》。11 Ceka and magalh<e:1>，《富人和穷人对民主有不同的概念吗?》12 Allcott and Gentzkow，“社交媒体与假新闻”;Behrouzian et al.，“抵制审查”;Dal和Nisbet，《穿越防火墙》;lesenski， <对“后真相”的适应能力>。13 Bodó等人，“对多样性感兴趣”;Borgesius等人，“我们应该担心过滤气泡吗?”14 Haerpfer等人，《世界价值观调查:第七轮-国家汇总数据》。15例如，Guriev和Treisman，“信息独裁者。”16达尔:《多元民主的困境》;17道尔顿、辛和朱:《理解民主》;卢、楚:《民主的理解》《民主的意义》18道尔顿，辛，和你，<理解民主。19 Quaranta，《民主的意义》20卢、楚:《对民主的理解》;21 Kirsch、Welzel:《被误解的民主》;申，《大众对民主主义的理解》22 Shin，《大众对民主的理解》。23 Kirsch和Welzel， <被误解的民主>。24萨格勒比纳，“民主与非民主国家的民主概念”。25杨，《非民主国家对民主的高估》。26同上，27 Shin，“对民主的普遍理解”，斜体添加Chapman et al.，《在民主的面纱之下》;“了解民主主义就是热爱民主主义。”29 Canache， <公民对民主的概念化>。30 Gerber and Chapman，“熟悉滋生轻蔑?”31 Cinar and Bulbul， <民主理解的多样性>。《公民文化》，阿尔蒙德和韦尔巴著;Inglehart:《现代化、后现代与风险观念的变化》;利普塞特，《民主的一些社会条件》33 Almond and Verba，《公民文化》。34 Lipset，《民主的一些社会必要条件》。35 Inglehart，《现代化、后现代与风险观念的变化》。36 Canache:《公民对民主的概念化》;Chapman et al.，《在民主的面纱之下》;“了解民主主义就是热爱民主主义”;Gerber和Chapman，“熟悉滋生轻蔑?37 Ceka and magalh<e:1>，《富人和穷人有不同的民主观念吗?》38同上39 Cho，“全球公民对民主的了解程度如何?”;Kirsch和Welzel， <被误解的民主>40 Cho，“全球公民对民主的了解程度如何?”41同上，42 Cho，“互联网与民主公民”。 ，《世界价值观调查:第七轮-国家汇总数据》。113 Kirsch和Welzel:《被误解的民主》;申，《大众对民主主义的理解》114普热沃斯基:《民主的极简主义概念:辩护》;《非自由民主的兴起》。115 Haerpfer等人，《世界价值观调查:第七轮-国家汇总数据》。这些描述性统计数据的一个有趣发现是，非民主国家对自由民主的平均理解高于民主国家。尽管我们的研究并不旨在找出这种有趣差异的原因，但人们可能会怀疑，非民主国家对公民权利的保护相对薄弱，使得公民比民主国家的公民更批判性地认识到其重要性。特别是，在我们的研究中被归类为非民主的竞争性专制政权中，有选举的公民可能已经意识到，没有保护公民权利的程序性民主并不能给他们带来民主的真正好处Haerpfer等人，《世界价值观调查:第七轮-国家汇总数据》。119 Wike等人，《全球范围内，对代议制和直接民主的广泛支持》。杨，《非民主国家对民主的高估》。121 Coppedge et al.，《V-Dem Dataset V9》。122 Coppedge et al.《V-Dem Codebook V9》，186.123 Cantoni et al.《课程与意识形态》;Testa“教育和宣传”;Voigtländer和Voth，“纳粹在德国的灌输和反犹太主义信仰。124杨，《对非民主国家民主的高估》。黄125，《宣传作为信号》。126 Haerpfer等人，《世界价值观调查:第七轮-国家汇总数据》。127同上。128同上。129杨，“对非民主国家民主的高估”;宣传作为信号。130道尔顿、辛恩和乔:《理解民主》;卢、楚:《民主的理解》《民主的意义》131 Kirsch和Welzel:《被误解的民主》;《非民主国家对民主的高估》。132 Kirsch和Welzel:《被误解的民主》;申，《对民主主义的大众理解》leeann H. Youn是马里兰大学全球校区世界语言与文化专业的兼职助理教授。她的研究兴趣包括比较政治学(民主化、政党、竞选和选举)、公共政策(政策制定和实施)以及亚洲政治。永尾晴香(Haruka Nagao)是俄克拉荷马州立大学政治科学系助理教授。她/他们的研究重点是中国政治、健康政治、性别与政治。William Hatungimana是俄克拉荷马州立大学的客座助理教授。他的专业是比较政治和国际关系。主要研究方向为移民与移民政治、中国政治、非洲政治。刘日高，美国堪萨斯大学政治学系比较政治与国际关系专业博士研究生。他也是堪萨斯大学贸易战实验室的研究生研究员。他的研究领域涉及中国的民意
{"title":"Where do social media and education meet? A closer look at understanding of democracy","authors":"Leeann H. Youn, Haruka Nagao, William Hatungimana, Rigao Liu","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2258809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2258809","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTSocial media presents a contradictory relationship with democracy. Once, it was regarded as a tool for democracy, providing alternative sources of information and coordinating social movements for democratization. Later it also became a tool for authoritarian regimes to control information and spread propaganda to stay in power. This mixed perception suggests that both democratic and authoritarian forces can use social media to influence public opinion. This presents a puzzle to the relationship between social media use and democratic understanding. Does social media promote or erode understanding of democracy? This study argues that the effect of social media use on understanding of democracy depends on higher education. The relationship also differs between democracies and non-democracies. Using the newest wave of the World Values Survey (wave 7, 2017–2020), this study analyses the influence of social media use on understanding of democracy in non-democracies and democracies. The findings suggest that social media use positively affects understanding of democracy in democratic countries. However, the democratic effect of social media is nullified in non-democracy unless it interacts with higher education. The findings offer implications for the relationship between social media, higher education, and understanding of democracy.KEYWORDS: Understanding of democracysocial mediahigher educationregime typepublic opinion Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Chapman et al., “Under the Veil of Democracy”; Cinar and Bulbul, “Varieties of Democratic Understanding”; Gerber and Chapman, “Familiarity Breeds Contempt?”2 Chang et al., “Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia”; Kirsch and Welzel, “Democracy Misunderstood”; Shin, “Popular Understanding of Democracy.”3 Kirsch and Welzel, “Democracy Misunderstood”; Yeung, “Overestimation of Democracy in Nondemocracies.”4 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.5 Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.”6 Inglehart, “Modernization, Postmodernization and Changing Perceptions of Risk.”7 Canache, “Citizens’ Conceptualizations of Democracy”; Chapman et al., “Under the Veil of Democracy”; Cho, “To Know Democracy Is to Love It”; Gerber and Chapman, “Familiarity Breeds Contempt?”8 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Inglehart, “Modernization, Postmodernization and Changing Perceptions of Risk”; Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.”9 Lu and Chu, Understandings of Democracy.10 Zagrebina, “Concepts of Democracy in Democratic and Nondemocratic Countries.”11 Ceka and Magalhães, “Do the Rich and the Poor Have Different Conceptions of Democracy?”12 Allcott and Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News”; Behrouzian et al., “Resisting Censorship”; Dal and Nisbet, “Walking Through Firewalls”; Lessenski, “Resilience to ‘Post-Truth’.”13 Bodó et al., “Interested in Diversity”; Borgesius et al., “Should We Worry about Filter Bubbles?”14 Haerpfer et al., “World Values Sur","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136185612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-15DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2266805
Nur Fajriani S, Satrio Alpen Pradanna, Hendri Irawan
"Expertise, policy-making and democracy." Democratization, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 AcknowledgmentThe authors would like to extend their gratitude to the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education (Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan) for sponsoring their studies.
“专业知识、政策制定和民主。”民主化，印刷前(印刷前)，第1-2页致谢作者要感谢印度尼西亚教育捐赠基金(Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan)赞助他们的研究。
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Pub Date : 2023-10-10DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2258341
Jacek Lewkowicz, Rafał Woźniak, Anna Lewczuk, Mateusz Marcol
ABSTRACTAlthough compliance with constitutions is undoubtedly one of the most essential topics in the current public debate, there are still a lot of questions about its determinants that have to be addressed. What is the impact of the populistic and anti-pluralistic character of ruling political parties on constitutional compliance of the government and does it depend on how long such parties have been in power? In our study, based on data for 147 countries during the period between 1990 and 2019, we aim to investigate the relationships between populism, anti-pluralism, and constitutional compliance, with a special focus on the years of the populist or anti-pluralistic ruling parties in office. In a series of panel regressions, we find that the longer anti-pluralists remain in power, the worse the effect they may have on constitutional compliance of the government. These results suggest that the respect for a constitution shown by government representatives is dependent on the nature of the party from which they originate and that anti-pluralism entrenched in the political scene for many years can be a real peril.KEYWORDS: constitutional economicspopulismanti-pluralismilliberalisminstitutional economics AcknowledgementsWe are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for the comments on our manuscript. We also give thanks to Christian Bjørnskov, Niclas Berggren, Jan Fałkowski, Jerg Gutmann, Bernd Hayo, Jarosław Kantorowicz, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, and Stefan Voigt for the feedback. The support of the Foundation for Polish Science (FNP) is gratefully acknowledged.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism”; Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”2 North, “Institutions, Transaction Costs”; Trebilcock and Leng, “The Role of Formal Contract Law”; Lewkowicz and Lewczuk, “Civil Society and Compliance with Constitutions.”3 Voigt, “Mind the Gap”; Metelska-Szaniawska, Economic Effects of Post Socialist Constitutions; Chilton and Versteeg, “Rights Without Resources”; Bjoernskov and Mchangama, “Do Social Rights Affect Social Outcomes?”; Gutmann and Voigt, “Judicial Independence in the EU.”4 Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, “Economic Development”; Gavison, “What Belongs in a Constitution?”; Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions.5 Voigt, “Mind the Gap”; Alesina, Troiano, and Cassidy, “Old and Young Politicians”; Dal Bó et al., “Who Becomes a Politician?”6 Voigt, “Mind the Gap.”7 Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”8 Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism.9 Ibid.10 Tushnet and Bugaric, Power to the People.11 Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism”; Bonikowski et al., “Populism and Nationalism.”12 Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism”; Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”13 Gutmann and Rode, Are Populists Constitutionalists?14 Ibid.15 Celico, Rode, and Carreño
摘要虽然宪法的遵守无疑是当前公共辩论中最重要的话题之一，但关于其决定因素仍有许多问题需要解决。执政政党的民粹主义和反多元主义特征对政府的合宪性有何影响?是否与执政时间有关?在我们的研究中，基于1990年至2019年147个国家的数据，我们旨在调查民粹主义、反多元主义和宪法遵从之间的关系，并特别关注民粹主义或反多元政党执政的年份。在一系列的面板回归中，我们发现反多元主义者掌权的时间越长，他们对政府合宪性的影响就越严重。这些结果表明，政府代表对宪法的尊重取决于他们所来自的政党的性质，而在政治舞台上根深蒂固的反多元主义可能是一个真正的危险。关键词:宪法经济学民粹主义多元主义自由主义制度经济学感谢两位匿名审稿人对我们手稿的评论。我们还要感谢Christian Bjørnskov, Niclas Berggren, Jan Fałkowski, Jerg Gutmann, Bernd Hayo, Jarosław Kantorowicz, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska和Stefan Voigt的反馈。感谢波兰科学基金会(FNP)的支持。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Urbinati，“民粹主义的政治理论”;Guriev和Papaioannou，《民粹主义的政治经济学》2 North，“制度，交易成本”;Trebilcock and Leng:《形式合同法的作用》;Lewkowicz and Lewczuk，《公民社会与宪法遵从》。3 Voigt，“Mind the Gap”;Metelska-Szaniawska:后社会主义宪法的经济效应Chilton和Versteeg:《没有资源的权利》;Bjoernskov和Mchangama:“社会权利影响社会结果吗?”Gutmann和Voigt， <欧盟的司法独立>。4 Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard，《经济发展》;加维森，《什么属于宪法?》埃尔金斯、金斯伯格和梅尔顿，《国家宪法的持久性》。5 Voigt，“注意差距”;Alesina, Troiano和Cassidy，《年老和年轻的政治家》;Dal Bó等人，“谁会成为政治家?”6 . Voigt，“注意缝隙。”7 Guriev和Papaioannou，《民粹主义的政治经济学》。8穆德和卡尔瓦瑟:《民粹主义》。9同上。10图什涅特和布加里克:《权力归于人民》。11古里耶夫和帕帕约安诺:《民粹主义的政治经济学》;博尼科夫斯基等人，《民粹主义与民族主义》。12 Urbinati，《民粹主义的政治理论》;Guriev和Papaioannou，《民粹主义的政治经济学》13古特曼和罗德:《民粹主义者是立宪主义者吗?》14同上15 Celico, Rode和Carreño，“每个人在某种程度上都是民粹主义者。[16]“V-Dem、V-Party与比较宪法遵从性数据库”。阿斯拉尼迪斯:《民粹主义是一种意识形态吗?》《论民粹主义的政治理论》。19霍金斯，Chávez是民粹主义者吗?20 Mudde and Kaltwasser，民粹主义。21 Scheppele，民粹主义者的机会主义。22 Guriev and Papaioannou，《民粹主义的政治经济学》。23诺里斯和英格哈特:《文化反弹》;24马德里:《民族民粹主义的兴起》;Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin， <民粹主义的政治理论>。[25]《民粹主义的宏观经济学》;[26]同上。28格斯特，雷尼，迈耶，<激进右翼的根源>。29诺伊和罗兰，《身份政治与民粹主义》。30参见Algan等人，“欧洲信任危机”;[31]古里耶夫、帕帕约安努，《民粹主义的政治经济学》。32朱利亚诺和瓦齐亚格，《谁投票给特朗普?》33 Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou和Exadaktylos，《危机中的希腊》34帕洛宁:《政治两极分化与民粹主义》;《民粹主义与法治》。35保加利亚，民粹主义，自由民主。36古特曼和罗德:《民粹主义者是立宪主义者吗?》37同上。38根据图什涅特和保加利亚的定义，权力归人民;或者保加利亚语，“民粹主义会好吗?”39 l<s:1>赫曼，梅兹霍斯基和林德伯格，《言出必行》。40参见帕帕斯的《幽灵萦绕欧洲》;莱尔·赫曼、梅兹霍斯基和林德伯格，《言出必行》;里德尔，《民粹主义及其潜力》41保加利亚，“民粹主义会好吗?”42 Norris和Inglehart，《文化反弹》43 Bugaric，《民粹主义会好吗?》44约翰逊，《为民主民粹主义辩护》。45谢佩尔，《民粹主义者的机会主义》。46 l<s:1>赫曼、梅兹霍斯基和林德伯格，《言出必行》。47莱西，《民粹主义与法治》。48米勒:《什么是民粹主义?》“人民反对宪法”。
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