Digitalization of the global economy is occurring apace and has spurred a new wave of trade negotiations, as governments and technology firms vie to establish international rules and standards for the digital era. This article examines the ways that trade policy-makers are responding to artificial intelligence (AI), arguably the most disruptive of the new digital technologies. In a digitalized global economy, trade rules have implications for AI innovation, uptake, and governance, yet existing trade rules have significant shortcomings and need updating in order to assist with effective AI governance. Updating is happening but, so far, the changes focus on promoting AI and disproportionately reflect the interests of large technology firms, the major innovators and owners of AI. New digital trade rules include stringent intellectual property protections for source code and algorithms, and strong commitments to enable the free flow of data across borders. However, much less progress has been made in addressing cross-border risks and harms associated with AI, in areas such as competition policy; ethical, transparent, and accountable use of AI; personal data protection; and protections against the exploitative use of algorithms in consumer and labour markets.
{"title":"Digital disruption: artificial intelligence and international trade policy","authors":"Emily Jones","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac049","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Digitalization of the global economy is occurring apace and has spurred a new wave of trade negotiations, as governments and technology firms vie to establish international rules and standards for the digital era. This article examines the ways that trade policy-makers are responding to artificial intelligence (AI), arguably the most disruptive of the new digital technologies. In a digitalized global economy, trade rules have implications for AI innovation, uptake, and governance, yet existing trade rules have significant shortcomings and need updating in order to assist with effective AI governance. Updating is happening but, so far, the changes focus on promoting AI and disproportionately reflect the interests of large technology firms, the major innovators and owners of AI. New digital trade rules include stringent intellectual property protections for source code and algorithms, and strong commitments to enable the free flow of data across borders. However, much less progress has been made in addressing cross-border risks and harms associated with AI, in areas such as competition policy; ethical, transparent, and accountable use of AI; personal data protection; and protections against the exploitative use of algorithms in consumer and labour markets.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48895364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2019, Shinzo Abe, then Prime Minister of Japan, stated that if the world wanted to achieve the benefits of the data-driven economy, members of the World Trade Organization should find a common approach to combining ‘data free flow with trust’. However, he never explained what these rules should look like and how nations might find an internationally accepted approach to such rules. In this paper, I argue that trade policy-makers must pay closer attention to users’ concerns if they truly want to achieve ‘data free flow with trust’. I begin with an examination of what the most recent digital trade/ecommerce agreements say about trust and discuss whether they actually meet user concerns. Next, I turn to three different examples of online problems that users have expressed concerns about, namely internet shutdowns/censorship, disinformation, and ransomware, describing how these may yield both trade distortions and less trust online. I argue that policy-makers should address these issues if they believe trade agreements should build trust in cross-border data flows. Moreover, I argue how policy-makers respond to user concerns is as important as what they include in trade agreements. Finally, I note that trade negotiators will need to rethink how they involve the broad public in digital trade policy-making, while recognizing that trade policy agreements may not be the best place to address these problems.
{"title":"Building trust in digital trade will require a rethink of trade policy-making","authors":"S. Aaronson","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac046","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In 2019, Shinzo Abe, then Prime Minister of Japan, stated that if the world wanted to achieve the benefits of the data-driven economy, members of the World Trade Organization should find a common approach to combining ‘data free flow with trust’. However, he never explained what these rules should look like and how nations might find an internationally accepted approach to such rules. In this paper, I argue that trade policy-makers must pay closer attention to users’ concerns if they truly want to achieve ‘data free flow with trust’. I begin with an examination of what the most recent digital trade/ecommerce agreements say about trust and discuss whether they actually meet user concerns. Next, I turn to three different examples of online problems that users have expressed concerns about, namely internet shutdowns/censorship, disinformation, and ransomware, describing how these may yield both trade distortions and less trust online. I argue that policy-makers should address these issues if they believe trade agreements should build trust in cross-border data flows. Moreover, I argue how policy-makers respond to user concerns is as important as what they include in trade agreements. Finally, I note that trade negotiators will need to rethink how they involve the broad public in digital trade policy-making, while recognizing that trade policy agreements may not be the best place to address these problems.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42101891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory cooperation is indispensable for increasing the quality of carbon-related product regulations and standards (CPRS), reducing trade tensions over them, facilitating their alignment, and, eventually, promoting the convergence of different national emission reduction levels towards a universal carbon price. In this article, we explore how trade and trade-related arrangements and institutions can be used to intensify regulatory cooperation on CPRS. We focus on the following questions: when, where, and how does regulatory cooperation on CPRS take place within the international trading system, and what are the ways to strengthen regulatory cooperation on CPRS? While admitting the key role of market forces and the large market factor in the alignment of carbon standards, we argue that this de facto trade-driven alignment requires a steering from state-to-state regulatory cooperation, as well as cooperation of government agencies with private certification schemes in helping producers, especially from developing countries, to comply. Moreover, the potential for more systematic collaboration between the multilateral institutions for climate change and trade should be explored. This could include the establishment of a joint UNFCCC–WTO forum for the exchange of policy-relevant technical and scientific information on key issues surrounding CPRS and consolidation of the relevant database.
{"title":"Trading in the era of carbon standards: how can trade, standard setting, and climate regimes cooperate?","authors":"Aik Hoe Lim, Kateryna Holzer","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Regulatory cooperation is indispensable for increasing the quality of carbon-related product regulations and standards (CPRS), reducing trade tensions over them, facilitating their alignment, and, eventually, promoting the convergence of different national emission reduction levels towards a universal carbon price. In this article, we explore how trade and trade-related arrangements and institutions can be used to intensify regulatory cooperation on CPRS. We focus on the following questions: when, where, and how does regulatory cooperation on CPRS take place within the international trading system, and what are the ways to strengthen regulatory cooperation on CPRS? While admitting the key role of market forces and the large market factor in the alignment of carbon standards, we argue that this de facto trade-driven alignment requires a steering from state-to-state regulatory cooperation, as well as cooperation of government agencies with private certification schemes in helping producers, especially from developing countries, to comply. Moreover, the potential for more systematic collaboration between the multilateral institutions for climate change and trade should be explored. This could include the establishment of a joint UNFCCC–WTO forum for the exchange of policy-relevant technical and scientific information on key issues surrounding CPRS and consolidation of the relevant database.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43567150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Susan Athey, Juan Camilo Castillo, Esha Chaudhuri, Michael Kremer, Alexandre Simoes Gomes, Christopher M Snyder
We review economic arguments for using public policy to accelerate vaccine supply during a pandemic. Rapidly vaccinating a large share of the global population helps avoid economic, mortality, and social losses, which in the case of Covid-19 mounted into trillions of dollars. However, pharmaceutical firms are unlikely to have private incentives to invest in vaccine capacity at the socially optimal scale and speed. The socially optimal level of public spending may cause some sticker shock but—as epitomized by the tagline ‘spending billions to save trillions’—is eclipsed by the benefits and can be restrained with the help of careful policy design and advance preparations. Capacity is so valuable during a pandemic that fractional dosing and other measures to stretch available capacity should be explored.
{"title":"Expanding capacity for vaccines against Covid-19 and future pandemics: a review of economic issues","authors":"Susan Athey, Juan Camilo Castillo, Esha Chaudhuri, Michael Kremer, Alexandre Simoes Gomes, Christopher M Snyder","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac037","url":null,"abstract":"We review economic arguments for using public policy to accelerate vaccine supply during a pandemic. Rapidly vaccinating a large share of the global population helps avoid economic, mortality, and social losses, which in the case of Covid-19 mounted into trillions of dollars. However, pharmaceutical firms are unlikely to have private incentives to invest in vaccine capacity at the socially optimal scale and speed. The socially optimal level of public spending may cause some sticker shock but—as epitomized by the tagline ‘spending billions to save trillions’—is eclipsed by the benefits and can be restrained with the help of careful policy design and advance preparations. Capacity is so valuable during a pandemic that fractional dosing and other measures to stretch available capacity should be explored.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides an overview of approaches to the allocation of scarce vaccine doses during a pandemic. Price and non-price methods are outlined to determine whom to prioritize. It is argued that depending on viral and vaccine properties, it may be superior to use epidemiological criteria than health risk criteria for prioritization. The paper concludes by noting that the key trade-offs between health risk and epidemiological properties have received too little study to systematically inform allocation during a public health emergency. Moreover, the evaluation criteria for vaccines themselves need to be adjusted to take potential short-term scarcity into account.
{"title":"Optimal allocation of vaccines in a pandemic","authors":"Joshua S Gans","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac027","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an overview of approaches to the allocation of scarce vaccine doses during a pandemic. Price and non-price methods are outlined to determine whom to prioritize. It is argued that depending on viral and vaccine properties, it may be superior to use epidemiological criteria than health risk criteria for prioritization. The paper concludes by noting that the key trade-offs between health risk and epidemiological properties have received too little study to systematically inform allocation during a public health emergency. Moreover, the evaluation criteria for vaccines themselves need to be adjusted to take potential short-term scarcity into account.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A lack of timely financing for purchases of vaccines and other health products impeded the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on analysis of contract signature and delivery dates in Covid-19 vaccine advance purchase agreements, this paper finds that 60–75 per cent of the delay in vaccine deliveries to low- and middle-income countries is attributable to their signing purchase agreements later than high-income countries, which placed them further behind in the delivery line. A pandemic Advance Commitment Facility with access to a credit line on day-zero of the next pandemic could allow low- and middle-income countries to secure orders earlier, ensuring a much faster and equitable global response than during Covid-19. The paper outlines four options for a financier to absorb some or all of the risk associated with the credit line and discusses how the credit would complement other proposals to strengthen the financing architecture for pandemic preparedness, prevention, and response.
{"title":"Financing vaccine equity: funding for day-zero of the next pandemic","authors":"Ruchir Agarwal, Tristan Reed","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac032","url":null,"abstract":"A lack of timely financing for purchases of vaccines and other health products impeded the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on analysis of contract signature and delivery dates in Covid-19 vaccine advance purchase agreements, this paper finds that 60–75 per cent of the delay in vaccine deliveries to low- and middle-income countries is attributable to their signing purchase agreements later than high-income countries, which placed them further behind in the delivery line. A pandemic Advance Commitment Facility with access to a credit line on day-zero of the next pandemic could allow low- and middle-income countries to secure orders earlier, ensuring a much faster and equitable global response than during Covid-19. The paper outlines four options for a financier to absorb some or all of the risk associated with the credit line and discusses how the credit would complement other proposals to strengthen the financing architecture for pandemic preparedness, prevention, and response.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How effective were investments in pandemic preparation? We use a comprehensive and detailed measure of pandemic preparedness, the Global Health Security (GHS) Index produced by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHU), to measure which investments in pandemic preparedness reduced infections, deaths, excess deaths, or otherwise ameliorated or shortened the pandemic. We also look at whether values or attitudinal factors such as individualism, willingness to sacrifice, or trust in government—which might be considered a form of cultural pandemic preparedness—influenced the course of the pandemic. Our primary finding is that almost no form of pandemic preparedness helped to ameliorate or shorten the pandemic. Compared to other countries, the United States did not perform poorly because of cultural values such as individualism, collectivism, selfishness, or lack of trust. General state capacity, as opposed to specific pandemic investments, is one of the few factors which appears to improve pandemic performance. Understanding the most effective forms of pandemic preparedness can help guide future investments. Our results may also suggest that either we aren’t measuring what is important or that pandemic preparedness is a global public good.
{"title":"Is it possible to prepare for a pandemic?","authors":"Robert Tucker Omberg, A. Tabarrok","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac035","url":null,"abstract":"How effective were investments in pandemic preparation? We use a comprehensive and detailed measure of pandemic preparedness, the Global Health Security (GHS) Index produced by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHU), to measure which investments in pandemic preparedness reduced infections, deaths, excess deaths, or otherwise ameliorated or shortened the pandemic. We also look at whether values or attitudinal factors such as individualism, willingness to sacrifice, or trust in government—which might be considered a form of cultural pandemic preparedness—influenced the course of the pandemic. Our primary finding is that almost no form of pandemic preparedness helped to ameliorate or shorten the pandemic. Compared to other countries, the United States did not perform poorly because of cultural values such as individualism, collectivism, selfishness, or lack of trust. General state capacity, as opposed to specific pandemic investments, is one of the few factors which appears to improve pandemic performance. Understanding the most effective forms of pandemic preparedness can help guide future investments. Our results may also suggest that either we aren’t measuring what is important or that pandemic preparedness is a global public good.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48897660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Athey, Juan-Camilo Castillo, E. Chaudhuri, Michael Kremer, Alexandre Simoes Gomes, Christopher M. Snyder
We review economic arguments for using public policy to accelerate vaccine supply during a pandemic. Rapidly vaccinating a large share of the global population helps avoid economic, mortality, and social losses, which in the case of Covid-19 mounted into trillions of dollars. However, pharmaceutical firms are unlikely to have private incentives to invest in vaccine capacity at the socially optimal scale and speed. The socially optimal level of public spending may cause some sticker shock but—as epitomized by the tagline ‘spending billions to save trillions’—is eclipsed by the benefits and can be restrained with the help of careful policy design and advance preparations. Capacity is so valuable during a pandemic that fractional dosing and other measures to stretch available capacity should be explored.
{"title":"Expanding Capacity for Vaccines Against Covid-19 and Future Pandemics: A Review of Economic Issues","authors":"S. Athey, Juan-Camilo Castillo, E. Chaudhuri, Michael Kremer, Alexandre Simoes Gomes, Christopher M. Snyder","doi":"10.3386/w30192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w30192","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We review economic arguments for using public policy to accelerate vaccine supply during a pandemic. Rapidly vaccinating a large share of the global population helps avoid economic, mortality, and social losses, which in the case of Covid-19 mounted into trillions of dollars. However, pharmaceutical firms are unlikely to have private incentives to invest in vaccine capacity at the socially optimal scale and speed. The socially optimal level of public spending may cause some sticker shock but—as epitomized by the tagline ‘spending billions to save trillions’—is eclipsed by the benefits and can be restrained with the help of careful policy design and advance preparations. Capacity is so valuable during a pandemic that fractional dosing and other measures to stretch available capacity should be explored.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42165683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How should government and business solve big problems? In bold leaps or in many smaller moves? We show that bespoke, one-off projects are prone to poorer outcomes than projects built on a repeatable platform. Repeatable projects are cheaper, faster, and scale at lower risk of failure. We compare evidence from 203 space missions at NASA and SpaceX, on cost, speed-to-market, schedule, and scalability. We find that SpaceX’s platform strategy was 10X cheaper and 2X faster than NASA’s bespoke strategy. Moreover, SpaceX’s platform strategy was financially less risky, virtually eliminating cost overruns. Finally, we show that achieving platform repeatability is a strategically diligent process involving experimental learning sequences. Sectors of the economy where governments find it difficult to control spending or timeframes or to realize planned benefits – e.g., health, education, climate, defence – are ripe for a platform rethink.
{"title":"Correction to: How to solve big problems: bespoke versus platform strategies","authors":"A. Ansar, B. Flyvbjerg","doi":"10.1093/oxrep/grac030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac030","url":null,"abstract":"How should government and business solve big problems? In bold leaps or in many smaller moves? We show that bespoke, one-off projects are prone to poorer outcomes than projects built on a repeatable platform. Repeatable projects are cheaper, faster, and scale at lower risk of failure. We compare evidence from 203 space missions at NASA and SpaceX, on cost, speed-to-market, schedule, and scalability. We find that SpaceX’s platform strategy was 10X cheaper and 2X faster than NASA’s bespoke strategy. Moreover, SpaceX’s platform strategy was financially less risky, virtually eliminating cost overruns. Finally, we show that achieving platform repeatability is a strategically diligent process involving experimental learning sequences. Sectors of the economy where governments find it difficult to control spending or timeframes or to realize planned benefits – e.g., health, education, climate, defence – are ripe for a platform rethink.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48731731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Parag A. Pathak, G. Persad, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver
Reserve systems are a tool to allocate scarce resources when stakeholders do not have a single objective. This paper introduces some basic concepts about reserve systems for pandemic medical resource allocation. At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, we proposed that reserve systems can help practitioners arrive at compromises between competing stakeholders. More than a dozen states and local jurisdictions adopted reserve systems in initial phases of vaccine distribution. We highlight several design issues arising in some of these implementations. We also offer suggestions about ways practitioners can take advantage of the flexibility offered by reserve systems.
{"title":"Reserve System Design for Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in a Pandemic: Some Perspectives from the Field","authors":"Parag A. Pathak, G. Persad, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver","doi":"10.3386/w30064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w30064","url":null,"abstract":"Reserve systems are a tool to allocate scarce resources when stakeholders do not have a single objective. This paper introduces some basic concepts about reserve systems for pandemic medical resource allocation. At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, we proposed that reserve systems can help practitioners arrive at compromises between competing stakeholders. More than a dozen states and local jurisdictions adopted reserve systems in initial phases of vaccine distribution. We highlight several design issues arising in some of these implementations. We also offer suggestions about ways practitioners can take advantage of the flexibility offered by reserve systems.","PeriodicalId":48024,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Review of Economic Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42668979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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