Pub Date : 2025-08-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101450
Daniel Neukirchen , Gerrit Köchling , Peter N. Posch
We exploit exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolios to show that managers engage in significantly more stakeholder-related misconduct when institutional investors are distracted. Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that managerial career concerns and risk-taking equity incentives strongly moderate this relationship, suggesting that managers weigh the potential benefits and risks before engaging in misconduct during these periods. Finally, we provide evidence that the results are more pronounced when especially those institutional investors who are likely to be motivated monitors of the managers become distracted.
{"title":"Institutional distraction and illegal business practices: The role of career concerns and wealth incentives","authors":"Daniel Neukirchen , Gerrit Köchling , Peter N. Posch","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101450","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101450","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We exploit exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolios to show that managers engage in significantly more stakeholder-related misconduct when institutional investors are distracted. Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that managerial career concerns and risk-taking equity incentives strongly moderate this relationship, suggesting that managers weigh the potential benefits and risks before engaging in misconduct during these periods. Finally, we provide evidence that the results are more pronounced when especially those institutional investors who are likely to be motivated monitors of the managers become distracted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101450"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101451
Grzegorz Hałaj, Ruben Hipp
We evaluate the impact of contagion and common exposures on banks’ capital using a structural regression framework derived from the balance sheet identity and inspired by the structural VAR literature. Contagion arises through bilateral exposures, fire sales, rollover risk, and market-based sentiment, while common exposures reflect overlapping portfolio holdings. We estimate the model using granular regulatory balance sheet and interbank exposure data for the Canadian banking sector. Our results yield three key insights. First, contagion driven by bilateral contractual exposures remains relatively stable over time until the onset of quantitative easing. In contrast, non-contractual contagion channels are less stable and move with market conditions. Second, we observe an increase in common exposure risk along with a decrease in contagion risk, following unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy measures in the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, we demonstrate how our framework complements traditional bank stress-testing approaches that focus on individual institutions by analysing second-round effects. In a policy application, we simulate targeted bailouts and show that their effectiveness in stabilizing the system is related to the interconnectedness of the rescued institution.
{"title":"Decomposing systemic risk: The roles of contagion and common exposures","authors":"Grzegorz Hałaj, Ruben Hipp","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101451","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101451","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We evaluate the impact of contagion and common exposures on banks’ capital using a structural regression framework derived from the balance sheet identity and inspired by the structural VAR literature. Contagion arises through bilateral exposures, fire sales, rollover risk, and market-based sentiment, while common exposures reflect overlapping portfolio holdings. We estimate the model using granular regulatory balance sheet and interbank exposure data for the Canadian banking sector. Our results yield three key insights. First, contagion driven by bilateral contractual exposures remains relatively stable over time until the onset of quantitative easing. In contrast, non-contractual contagion channels are less stable and move with market conditions. Second, we observe an increase in common exposure risk along with a decrease in contagion risk, following unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy measures in the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, we demonstrate how our framework complements traditional bank stress-testing approaches that focus on individual institutions by analysing second-round effects. In a policy application, we simulate targeted bailouts and show that their effectiveness in stabilizing the system is related to the interconnectedness of the rescued institution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101451"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144860300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-14DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101453
Jon Danielsson , Andreas Uthemann
The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) poses new and poorly understood threats to financial stability. We use a game-theoretic model to analyse the stability impact of AI, finding that it amplifies existing financial system vulnerabilities — leverage, liquidity stress and opacity — through superior information processing, common data, speed and strategic complementarities. The consequence is crises become faster and more severe, where the likelihood of a crisis is directly affected by how effectively the authorities engage with AI. In response, we propose that the financial authorities develop their own AI systems and expertise, establish direct AI-to-AI communication, implement automated crisis facilities and monitor AI use.
{"title":"Artificial intelligence and financial crises","authors":"Jon Danielsson , Andreas Uthemann","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101453","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101453","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) poses new and poorly understood threats to financial stability. We use a game-theoretic model to analyse the stability impact of AI, finding that it amplifies existing financial system vulnerabilities — leverage, liquidity stress and opacity — through superior information processing, common data, speed and strategic complementarities. The consequence is crises become faster and more severe, where the likelihood of a crisis is directly affected by how effectively the authorities engage with AI. In response, we propose that the financial authorities develop their own AI systems and expertise, establish direct AI-to-AI communication, implement automated crisis facilities and monitor AI use.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101453"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144878801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-11DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101452
Evangelos Salachas , Georgios P. Kouretas , Nikiforos T. Laopodis
Using VAR and Local Projections models, enhanced with macroeconomic factors and monetary policy shocks, we investigate the underlying mechanisms through which the Fed’s and ECB’s react to bank reactions of geopolitical risks between January 1994 and March 2024. Our findings reveal that central banks react to geopolitical risk events by tightening monetary policy to fend off potential inflationary pressures. However, the effect is often temporary, as policymakers typically adopt accommodative measures during economic expansions and shift to tighter policies during contractions. Analyzing reactions based on central bank presidents' tenures, we find that while earlier responses were limited, in recent years, both central banks have reacted more strongly and immediately, reflecting their growing concern over geopolitical risks. Furthermore, we document that the Fed adopted a more accommodative stance in response to bilateral geopolitical risk shocks between the US and China, driven by changes in capital flows and trade activities. In contrast, the ECB’s responses were more consistently contractionary, particularly in periods of heightened inflation concerns or when geopolitical tensions threatened price stability within the euro area.
{"title":"Understanding central bank responses to geopolitical risks: Evidence from the Fed and ECB","authors":"Evangelos Salachas , Georgios P. Kouretas , Nikiforos T. Laopodis","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using VAR and Local Projections models, enhanced with macroeconomic factors and monetary policy shocks, we investigate the underlying mechanisms through which the Fed’s and ECB’s react to bank reactions of geopolitical risks between January 1994 and March 2024. Our findings reveal that central banks react to geopolitical risk events by tightening monetary policy to fend off potential inflationary pressures. However, the effect is often temporary, as policymakers typically adopt accommodative measures during economic expansions and shift to tighter policies during contractions. Analyzing reactions based on central bank presidents' tenures, we find that while earlier responses were limited, in recent years, both central banks have reacted more strongly and immediately, reflecting their growing concern over geopolitical risks. Furthermore, we document that the Fed adopted a more accommodative stance in response to bilateral geopolitical risk shocks between the US and China, driven by changes in capital flows and trade activities. In contrast, the ECB’s responses were more consistently contractionary, particularly in periods of heightened inflation concerns or when geopolitical tensions threatened price stability within the euro area.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101452"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144852347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101454
Stefan Jacewitz , Jonathan Pogach , Haluk Unal , Chengjun Wu
The regulatory dialectic describes the dynamic process of banks and regulators continuously acting and reacting to one another. We provide empirical evidence of the regulatory dialectic in the prime institutional money market fund (PI-MMF) industry. Regulations on commercial deposits fueled growth in bank-sponsored PI-MMFs as a form of shadow banking in a relatively less regulated market. Re-regulation following the 2008 financial crisis halted this rapid growth, and the industry shifted from PI-MMFs to government institutional MMFs. We conjecture that this dialectical process will continue, and the decline of the PI-MMF may engender a shift toward structurally similar products, like stablecoins.
{"title":"The regulatory dialectic in bank-sponsored money market funds","authors":"Stefan Jacewitz , Jonathan Pogach , Haluk Unal , Chengjun Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101454","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101454","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The regulatory dialectic describes the dynamic process of banks and regulators continuously acting and reacting to one another. We provide empirical evidence of the regulatory dialectic in the prime institutional money market fund (PI-MMF) industry. Regulations on commercial deposits fueled growth in bank-sponsored PI-MMFs as a form of shadow banking in a relatively less regulated market. Re-regulation following the 2008 financial crisis halted this rapid growth, and the industry shifted from PI-MMFs to government institutional MMFs. We conjecture that this dialectical process will continue, and the decline of the PI-MMF may engender a shift toward structurally similar products, like stablecoins.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101454"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144886740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101437
Julio Dávila , Elizaveta Lukmanova
We show the possibility of negative nominal interest rates in a general equilibrium model with financial intermediation. We establish that the decentralization of the planner’s steady state requires a zero nominal lending rate on bank loans to firms, as well as a negative nominal lending rate on central bank loans to banks. We also find that implementing the planner’s steady state requires firms to be bound by collateral requirements that limit their leverage. The key driver of the results is the very defining characteristic of banking, namely banks’ ability to create money by opening deposit accounts that borrowers can withdraw from, and that are unbacked by household deposits. Our results can be used to rationalize the ultra-low rates policy implemented by major central banks in the second half of the 2010’s and early 2020’s.
{"title":"Negative nominal rates","authors":"Julio Dávila , Elizaveta Lukmanova","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101437","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101437","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We show the possibility of negative nominal interest rates in a general equilibrium model with financial intermediation. We establish that the decentralization of the planner’s steady state requires a zero nominal lending rate on bank loans to firms, as well as a negative nominal lending rate on central bank loans to banks. We also find that implementing the planner’s steady state requires firms to be bound by collateral requirements that limit their leverage. The key driver of the results is the very defining characteristic of banking, namely banks’ ability to create money by opening deposit accounts that borrowers can withdraw from, and that are unbacked by household deposits. Our results can be used to rationalize the ultra-low rates policy implemented by major central banks in the second half of the 2010’s and early 2020’s.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101437"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144702832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101439
Paulo Júlio , José R. Maria , Sílvia Santos
We employ a structural model endowed with a banking system in which assets of different qualities, occasionally binding credit restrictions, and regulatory requirements coexist, to analyze the effectiveness of various macroprudential policies that cope with the level of due loans in the economy. We analyze how policy designs influencing impairment recognition by banks affect output and welfare, both in the steady state and across business cycles driven by financial risk. The cost of managing due loans, credit constraints, dividend strategies, and the cure rate, are key components of the driveshaft propelling policies to outcomes. Our findings suggest that “less is more,” i.e. policies emphasizing greater leniency in impairment recognition outperform stricter approaches, when management costs are sufficiently low, especially when combined with high cure rates that enhance the benefits of delaying recognition. However, reducing penalties for banks that violate regulatory requirements proves largely ineffective and exacerbates incentives for non-compliance. The presence of binding credit constraints enhances the effectiveness of lenient impairment policies when management costs are low and diminishes it otherwise.
{"title":"Risk shocks, due loans, and policy options: When less is more!","authors":"Paulo Júlio , José R. Maria , Sílvia Santos","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101439","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We employ a structural model endowed with a banking system in which assets of different qualities, occasionally binding credit restrictions, and regulatory requirements coexist, to analyze the effectiveness of various macroprudential policies that cope with the level of due loans in the economy. We analyze how policy designs influencing impairment recognition by banks affect output and welfare, both in the steady state and across business cycles driven by financial risk. The cost of managing due loans, credit constraints, dividend strategies, and the cure rate, are key components of the driveshaft propelling policies to outcomes. Our findings suggest that “less is more,” <em>i.e.</em> policies emphasizing greater leniency in impairment recognition outperform stricter approaches, when management costs are sufficiently low, especially when combined with high cure rates that enhance the benefits of delaying recognition. However, reducing penalties for banks that violate regulatory requirements proves largely ineffective and exacerbates incentives for non-compliance. The presence of binding credit constraints enhances the effectiveness of lenient impairment policies when management costs are low and diminishes it otherwise.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101439"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144702823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101438
Pauline Gandré , Margarita Rubio
Macroprudential policy is traditionally characterized by countercyclical rules that respond to credit variables. In this paper, we augment these rules with additional indicators, including the credit spread. First, we empirically assess the relevance of the credit spread by showing its correlation with credit booms. Then, we incorporate this variable into a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions. Using the model, we evaluate the extent to which macroprudential measures that also respond to credit spreads can improve welfare, focusing on both a capital requirement ratio (CRR) rule and a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) rule. We find that credit spreads are particularly useful for credit supply-based measures, while borrower-based measures benefit more from an additional response to house prices. Overall, the augmented rules enhance welfare by reducing output volatility, although this comes at the cost of increased inflation volatility. Finally, we show that the welfare gains from responding to credit spreads are robust to the monetary policy stance in the case of the CRR, while for the LTV rule, they depend on the degree of monetary policy responsiveness to inflation.
{"title":"Designing credit-spread driven macroprudential rules","authors":"Pauline Gandré , Margarita Rubio","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101438","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101438","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Macroprudential policy is traditionally characterized by countercyclical rules that respond to credit variables. In this paper, we augment these rules with additional indicators, including the credit spread. First, we empirically assess the relevance of the credit spread by showing its correlation with credit booms. Then, we incorporate this variable into a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions. Using the model, we evaluate the extent to which macroprudential measures that also respond to credit spreads can improve welfare, focusing on both a capital requirement ratio (CRR) rule and a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) rule. We find that credit spreads are particularly useful for credit supply-based measures, while borrower-based measures benefit more from an additional response to house prices. Overall, the augmented rules enhance welfare by reducing output volatility, although this comes at the cost of increased inflation volatility. Finally, we show that the welfare gains from responding to credit spreads are robust to the monetary policy stance in the case of the CRR, while for the LTV rule, they depend on the degree of monetary policy responsiveness to inflation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101438"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-14DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101436
M. Koetter , P. Marek , A. Mavropoulos
We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect on the growth rates of regional house prices and outstanding mortgage loans by all local German banks. The results show that a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces regional house prices by 3%–4%. Furthermore, IV-regressions yield that a 1 percentage point drop in regional house prices induced by a RETT increase leads to a 0.3% decline in regional mortgage lending, particularly among low-capitalized banks in rural regions.
{"title":"Real estate transaction taxes and credit supply","authors":"M. Koetter , P. Marek , A. Mavropoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101436","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101436","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect on the growth rates of regional house prices and outstanding mortgage loans by all local German banks. The results show that a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces regional house prices by 3%–4%. Furthermore, IV-regressions yield that a 1 percentage point drop in regional house prices induced by a RETT increase leads to a 0.3% decline in regional mortgage lending, particularly among low-capitalized banks in rural regions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101436"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101433
Kyongjun Kwak , Camilo Granados
To rationalize the increased use of capital flows regulations in recent times, we study the capacity of capital flow management measures (CFMs) to insulate an economy from external shocks. We examine the extent to which CFMs mitigate the effects of US monetary shocks and whether measuring this mitigation at the net or gross level of flows matters. Our analysis is carried out for a panel of emerging market economies and for different disaggregations of the flows. Our results indicate that the level of aggregation matters for evaluating the effects of CFMs, and that analyses with excessively aggregated flows or with only net measures may lead to biases in assessing the insulation features of the CFMs. Furthermore, CFMs have insulation properties that mitigate capital repatriations; however, these are mostly related to risky portfolio and banking flows.
{"title":"Dissecting capital flows: Do capital controls shield against foreign shocks?","authors":"Kyongjun Kwak , Camilo Granados","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101433","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101433","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To rationalize the increased use of capital flows regulations in recent times, we study the capacity of capital flow management measures (CFMs) to insulate an economy from external shocks. We examine the extent to which CFMs mitigate the effects of US monetary shocks and whether measuring this mitigation at the net or gross level of flows matters. Our analysis is carried out for a panel of emerging market economies and for different disaggregations of the flows. Our results indicate that the level of aggregation matters for evaluating the effects of CFMs, and that analyses with excessively aggregated flows or with only net measures may lead to biases in assessing the insulation features of the CFMs. Furthermore, CFMs have insulation properties that mitigate capital repatriations; however, these are mostly related to risky portfolio and banking flows.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"79 ","pages":"Article 101433"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144596816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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