Journal of Financial Stability最新文献

We provide a joint non-parametric test to gather insights on the boundaries of applicability of Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) models. We find that a non-trivial class of models cannot price the U.S. stock market equally weighted portfolio, implying non-monotonic SDFs, especially over the last 50/60 years in (recessionary) periods characterized by higher market volatility. Stocks responsible for this rejection mostly belong to the smallest NYSE market cap decile, are characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, and typically cannot be priced via SDF models where the aggregate level of risk aversion is bigger then 9 or 10. Excluding these stocks increases the ability to explain the cross-section of returns without impairing the ability to span the mean–variance frontier.

Strategic alliances are voluntary corporate arrangements for mutual benefit. Although alliances are common as an alternative to M&As, they require cooperation between alliance partners who continue to operate as independent companies. Thus, relational risk—the probability and consequences of unsatisfactory cooperation or opportunistic behavior—is inherent in alliances and a major determinant of alliance success. In this paper, we examine and find that alliance announcement CARs are higher for companies sharing the same auditor with their alliance partner. Further, our findings suggest that the shared auditor effect is stronger for alliances where potential relational risk between alliance partners is greater. Our findings hold when we use “withdrawn” (i.e., the withdrawal of an announced alliance before its start date) as an alternative, albeit inverse, measure of alliance success. Collectively, we provide novel evidence which suggests that auditors add shareholder value by playing a matchmaking role in alliance formation, building inter-company trust and mitigating relational risk by facilitating the sharing of non-financial information between potential alliance partners among their audit clients.

We present evidence that firms with greater asset redeployability are more likely to engage in green innovation activities, as measured by corporate green patents and citations. This finding supports the notion of funding flexibility and withstands numerous robustness and endogeneity tests. The relationship is particularly pronounced for firms facing high climate change uncertainty, as well as those in high-polluting industries. Moreover, we find further evidence that the pursuit of green innovation is associated with improved firm value over the long term. These insights shed light on how asset redeployability correlates with both innovation outcomes and firm performance within the context of green finance for sustainable development.

Every financial crisis raises questions about how the banking market structure affects the real economy. Although low bank concentration may reduce markups and foster riskier behavior, concentrated banking systems appear more resilient to financial shocks. We use a nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to compare the transmissions of shocks under different competition and concentration configurations. The results reveal that oligopolistic competition amplifies the effects of the shocks relative to monopolistic competition. The transmission mechanism works through the markups, which are amplified when banking concentration is increased. The desirable banking market structure is determined according to financial stability and social welfare objectives. Moreover, we find that depending on policymakers’ preferences, a banking concentration of five to eight banks balances social welfare and bank stability objectives in the United States.

We examine the determinants of investor flows into, and the potential market fragility imposed by, U.S. municipal bond mutual funds. We find that funds have a linear flow-performance relationship that is consistent with effective liquidity management strategies. Funds use liquid holdings to partially offset net redemptions, but trade municipal bonds in proportion to flows. Funds increase their liquid holdings after flow volatility increases. The fact that funds use a vertical slice approach as a primary strategy is not surprising because they maintain small amounts of liquid securities. Our evidence is consistent with investors not being concerned with municipal bond mutual funds promoting run-risk.

We develop a dynamic framework to study banks’ incentives to take excessive risk in an emerging economy, where bank default probability and excess bank risk-taking are modeled endogenously. We calibrate it for the 1998 Peruvian economy. We find that the infinite-period feature amplifies banks’ incentives to take excessive risk. When we simulate the sudden stop that hit Peru in 1998, the model accurately predicts the substantial short-term rise in the non-performing loans ratio through the rise of the bank default probability.

Financial institutions, especially in Europe, hold a disproportionate amount of domestic sovereign debt. We examine the extent to which this home bias leads to capital misallocation in a real business cycle model with imperfect information and fiscal stress. We assume banks can hold sovereign debt according to a zero-risk weight policy and contrast this scenario to one in which banks weight the sovereign debt according to default probabilities. Banks are assumed to miscalculate the probability of a disaster state due to moral hazard and imperfect monitoring. This distortion pushes the economy away from the first-best allocation. We show that the zero risk weight policy exacerbates these distortions while a non-zero risk-weight improves allocations. The welfare costs associated with zero-risk weight policies are large. Households are willing to give up 3.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation, whereas in the economy with non-zero risk-weights households are willing to give up only 1.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation.

This paper provides evidence that central banks’ purchase programmes of corporate bonds in the aftermath of market stress foster risk-taking by bond funds. Using the COVID-19 shock as a laboratory, we show that funds more exposed to pandemic-related asset purchase programmes took on more credit and liquidity risks than less exposed ones during 2020, generating higher returns and attracting more inflows. More exposed funds increased their risk-taking buying assets not eligible for central banks’ interventions, particularly when they under-performed their peers or held less liquid assets. These results suggest that asset purchase programmes affected risk-taking by reducing liquidation costs and, thus, lowering the risk of run by fund investors. We discuss the implications for the transmission of policy interventions during periods of market stress and the regulation of the investment fund sector.

This empirical study investigates whether a strong bank culture may help strengthen, weaken, or have no effect on the relationship between regulatory capital and liquidity creation. Using a machine learning approach and banks’ 10-K reports, we first measure the corporate culture of selected bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United State (U.S.) over the period between 1995 and 2019. We find that bank culture does affect the link between regulatory capital and liquidity creation. In particular, while we find that regulatory capital has a negative impact on bank liquidity creation, a strong culture in a bank weakens this negative association. We also find that an increase in asset-side liquidity creation is the main channel through which bank culture exerts its moderating role. Finally, our results are largely driven by smaller banks, banks with a more traditional funding structure and more profitable banks. The results of this study suggest that regulators should consider bank culture as being a crucial element in the monitoring approach when designing bank regulation and supervision.

In this paper, we investigate the real effects of special taxation on banks. We provide evidence that the introduction of a new fiscal levy on banks significantly impairs their performance and has an adverse impact on the real economy through the lending channel. Using micro-level data on lending relationships, we identify the credit supply shock related with a bank tax controlling for loan demand factors. We compute a firm-specific measure of firm exposure to burdened credit institutions. We find a negative impact of the tax shock on investment and output. Our results are important from a policy perspective as they shed light on the economic consequences of double taxation on banks.