Journal of Financial Stability最新文献

This paper explores the impact of political connections on zombie business in the presence of massive economic stimulus. Although a stimulus plan may substantially ease financial constraints for a politically connected firm, it distorts the firm’s decision regarding market exit. Exploiting China’s 2008 stimulus package as a semi natural experiment, we show that a firm with political connections is more likely to become a zombie following such stimulus measures. Further analysis indicates that the zombification impact of the stimulus plan is more pronounced for the firms operating in the key industries targeted by the stimulus package.

In this study, we estimate a Bayesian global vector autoregressive model to uncover the effects of financial stress on output growth, inflation, and interest rates, accounting for several advanced and emerging economies for a period spanning from February 2008 until May 2022. We construct a financial stress index applicable to all countries, tracking periods of financial instability in the economies, and employ shadow short rates as a proxy measure of unconventional monetary policy. This study provides strong evidence that financial stress shocks are transmitted abroad as financial stress increases in all the countries in the sample. Our results also show that financial stress innovation generates important domestic and cross-border output, inflation, and interest rate spillovers for several countries. Additionally, we identify the active role of the financial and bank credit channels in the transmission of shocks across financial systems, while macroprudential policy can intercept the propagation of the shock. Our results carry policy implications for monetary and regulatory authorities.

We study the impact of higher capital buffers on bank lending and risk-taking behaviour, at different time horizons following the initial policy decision. Employing a regression discontinuity design and confidential centralised supervisory data for euro area banks from 2014 to 2017, our research uniquely explores the effects of the EU policy on other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) through a quasi-randomised experiment, exploiting the induced policy change and discontinuity of the O-SII identification process. Our findings show that the introduction of the O-SII buffers resulted in a short-term reduction in credit supply to households and financial sector, followed by a medium-term shift towards less risky borrowers, particularly in the household sector. We find a temporary cut in loan growth post-capital hikes, succeeded by a rebound in the medium-term. Our results substantiate the hypothesis that higher capital buffers can positively discipline banks by reducing risk-taking in the medium-term. At the same time, evidence suggests a limited adverse impact on the real economy, characterised by a temporary reduction in credit supply restricted to instances of macroprudential policy tightening.

This paper compares three methods for assessing the contagion of risk among ten Globally Significant International Banks, known as GSIBs, listed on the New York Stock Exchange with daily and weekly data sets from 2007 to 2020, based on Machine Learning and Network Analysis. In particular we identify the banks which are the largest net sources or transmitters of risk, and net receptors of risk. We also examine the response of regulatory actions, in the form of fines and BIS Bin Classification for capital adequacy.

Under alternative risk measures, of Range Volatility (RV) of share prices, Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia, and Conditional Value at Risk ($\Delta$CoVar), there is a stronger and significant connection between Contagion and the BIS Bin classifications relative to the connections between Contagion and banking fines, either in the amount or frequency of the fines. These results show that BIS bin classifications respond positively to underlying signals of increased contagion in the form of Range Volatility (RV) and $\Delta$CoVar measures but not to CDS risk premia.

Using a recent global sample, this paper estimates the effect of cryptocurrency usage on tax revenue collections. We hypothesize that greater cryptocurrency use undermines tax collections, and this result generally holds across overall tax collections, VAT revenues, and GST revenues. The other contribution lies in dissecting the direct and indirect channels of cryptocurrency use on tax collections. Results show that greater cryptocurrency usage reduces tax collections. Furthermore, larger government sizes increase tax collections, while the COVID-19 pandemic undermined tax collections. Finally, significant differences were found in the direct and indirect effects. The main results withstand a number of robustness checks.

Using Facebook’s social network data for the US counties, we examine whether social connectedness reduces the informational disadvantage in lending to small businesses at a distance. We find that for a given distance, there is a pecking order of lending. Banks first lend to more socially connected counties, and later, banks expand credit to socially less connected areas. The probability of loan charge-off decreases in social connectedness and more so for the loans originated by small banks. In the cross-section, the positive effect of social connectedness on loan performance is higher for the loans originated by out of state banks. These findings suggest that loan officers get valuable information through their social networks.

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for endogenous compensation and leverage can explain the conflicting findings of the empirical literature. We uncover a new channel of complementarity between effort and leverage that induces a correlation sign opposite to what current theoretical models predict. Second, we study the dynamics of leverage and compensation design after a credit stimulus. We derive a set of new empirical predictions. For outward-shifts in credit supply, variable compensation is increasing in leverage growth. Moreover, variable compensation increases after the credit stimulus, especially for firms with low idiosyncratic risk.

Credit contractions are costly, but policymakers have limited tools to counter them. In this paper, we examine the efficacy of public credit guarantees as antidotes to a credit crunch by studying the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). We find that the program averted a historic credit crunch at a time when banks were unlikely to meet firm credit needs by risking their own capital. Our evaluation incorporates selection effects emanating from banks’ participation decision on both the extensive and intensive margins. Risk-aversion, rather than profitability, motivated bank participation in the program. Indeed, even as the program boosted loan growth among participants, it attenuated profitability.

This paper empirically analyses whether post-global financial crisis regulatory reforms have created appropriate incentives to voluntarily centrally clear over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts. We use confidential European trade repository data on single-name sovereign credit default swap (CDS) transactions and show that both seller and buyer manage counterparty exposures and capital costs, strategically choosing to clear when the counterparty is riskier. The clearing incentives seem particularly responsive to seller credit risk, which is in line with the notion that counterparty credit risk (CCR) is asymmetric in CDS contracts. The riskiness of the underlying reference entity also impacts the decision to clear as it affects both CCR capital charges for OTC contracts and central counterparty clearing house (CCP) margins for cleared contracts. Lastly, we find evidence that when a transaction helps netting positions with the CCP and hence lower margins, the likelihood of clearing is higher.

We add to the literature on the economic outcomes of government debt and argue that government debt increases crash risk via two channels: (i) hoarding bad news and (ii) tax avoidance. Based on a large international sample, our results indicate that stock crash risk is positively associated with government debt. Our conclusions are robust when we treat endogeneity issues, and our tests confirm the validity of bad news hoarding and tax avoidance as channels through which government debt influences stock price crash risk.