{"title":"Notes from the Editor","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/pam.70081","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70081","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145717873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/pam.70073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.70073","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145619272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xingguo Wang, Pourya Valizadeh, Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr., Henry L. Bryant, Bart L. Fischer
The broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE) policy allows states to bypass federal gross income and asset tests for supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP) eligibility. Policymakers often propose limiting BBCE's scope or eliminating it altogether. Yet, our understanding of BBCE's impact on SNAP participation has relied solely on static two-way fixed effects (TWFE) estimators, which have been criticized for assuming no treatment effect heterogeneity across states and over time. In this study, using a heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences estimator, we provide new estimates of BBCE's impact that are more than twice as large as those derived from the static TWFE models. Importantly, our event-study analysis shows that BBCE's effect has increased uniformly over time across state groups defined by their adoption timing, explaining the smaller effects estimated by the static TWFE model. In addition, we find that although BBCE extended eligibility to higher-income households, most of its impact on participation occurred among households already eligible under federal gross income limits. Our counterfactual simulations further show that between 2000 and 2016, extending eligibility to higher-income households accounted for approximately 11.5% of the increase in participation and 3.8% of the rise in program spending resulting from BBCE, with the remainder driven by already income-eligible households.
{"title":"Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility Policy and SNAP Participation","authors":"Xingguo Wang, Pourya Valizadeh, Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr., Henry L. Bryant, Bart L. Fischer","doi":"10.1002/pam.70063","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70063","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE) policy allows states to bypass federal gross income and asset tests for supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP) eligibility. Policymakers often propose limiting BBCE's scope or eliminating it altogether. Yet, our understanding of BBCE's impact on SNAP participation has relied solely on static two-way fixed effects (TWFE) estimators, which have been criticized for assuming no treatment effect heterogeneity across states and over time. In this study, using a heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences estimator, we provide new estimates of BBCE's impact that are more than twice as large as those derived from the static TWFE models. Importantly, our event-study analysis shows that BBCE's effect has increased uniformly over time across state groups defined by their adoption timing, explaining the smaller effects estimated by the static TWFE model. In addition, we find that although BBCE extended eligibility to higher-income households, most of its impact on participation occurred among households already eligible under federal gross income limits. Our counterfactual simulations further show that between 2000 and 2016, extending eligibility to higher-income households accounted for approximately 11.5% of the increase in participation and 3.8% of the rise in program spending resulting from BBCE, with the remainder driven by already income-eligible households.</p>","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pam.70063","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145485713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Low-income housing is often of substandard quality. Health care payers like Medicaid and Medicare are piloting reimbursement for housing quality improvement with the rationale of reducing expenses from acute care use, but little is known about whether housing quality interventions can alter health utilization. I evaluate a large-scale policy mandating remediation of NYC's worst buildings in a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of housing improvements on health utilization. I do not find evidence of impacts on any metric of short-run acute care use or health expenditures, even among vulnerable subgroups. Exploratory longer-run event studies show some evidence of moderate (10%–15%) reductions in emergency department visits 3–4 years later but no evidence of impacts on expenditures. The policy succeeded at reducing housing violation rates in treated buildings by half. Yet, this only corresponded to a move from the 98th percentile to the 96th percentile of all buildings, underscoring the dire conditions tenants continue to live in—and suggesting one potential explanation for muted findings on health care use. The theory that housing quality interventions can directly translate to reductions in health use and spending may not be borne out empirically, particularly if interventions cannot completely address substandard conditions.
{"title":"Housing Quality Improvement and Health Care Utilization: A Regression Discontinuity Study","authors":"Kacie L. Dragan","doi":"10.1002/pam.70074","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70074","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Low-income housing is often of substandard quality. Health care payers like Medicaid and Medicare are piloting reimbursement for housing quality improvement with the rationale of reducing expenses from acute care use, but little is known about whether housing quality interventions can alter health utilization. I evaluate a large-scale policy mandating remediation of NYC's worst buildings in a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of housing improvements on health utilization. I do not find evidence of impacts on any metric of short-run acute care use or health expenditures, even among vulnerable subgroups. Exploratory longer-run event studies show some evidence of moderate (10%–15%) reductions in emergency department visits 3–4 years later but no evidence of impacts on expenditures. The policy succeeded at reducing housing violation rates in treated buildings by half. Yet, this only corresponded to a move from the 98th percentile to the 96th percentile of all buildings, underscoring the dire conditions tenants continue to live in—and suggesting one potential explanation for muted findings on health care use. The theory that housing quality interventions can directly translate to reductions in health use and spending may not be borne out empirically, particularly if interventions cannot completely address substandard conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pam.70074","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145485714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Evaluating the comparative performance of U.S. federal agencies is difficult, particularly since both tasks and missions vary so dramatically. In addition, forces beyond an agency's control (e.g., COVID, an economic downturn, etc.) can determine outcomes even when agencies are performing at a high level. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to measuring organizational performance, something conceptually distinct from, but correlated with, both organizational inputs and outcomes. This measurement approach focuses on how well the internal machinery of agencies is functioning. We analyze a vast trove of subjective and objective performance information and aggregate it using a Bayesian structural equation measurement (BSEM) model. We isolate organizational performance from inputs and outcomes through careful model specification, information from the BSEM models, and model identification through a careful evaluation of different models and diagnostics. Our analysis yields 2479 organizational performance estimates for 135 U.S. federal departments and agencies spanning 19 years between 2002 and 2024. We explore the validity of these estimates by comparing them with other measures of similar or related concepts. We conclude by discussing the implications of our measurement approach and its usefulness for evaluating organizational performance in diverse and changing contexts.
{"title":"Obtaining Comparable Measures of Organizational Performance: An Application to U.S. Federal Agencies, 2002–2024","authors":"George A. Krause, David E. Lewis","doi":"10.1002/pam.70064","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70064","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Evaluating the comparative performance of U.S. federal agencies is difficult, particularly since both tasks and missions vary so dramatically. In addition, forces beyond an agency's control (e.g., COVID, an economic downturn, etc.) can determine outcomes even when agencies are performing at a high level. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to measuring organizational performance, something conceptually distinct from, but correlated with, both organizational inputs and outcomes. This measurement approach focuses on how well the internal machinery of agencies is functioning. We analyze a vast trove of subjective and objective performance information and aggregate it using a Bayesian structural equation measurement (BSEM) model. We isolate organizational performance from inputs and outcomes through careful model specification, information from the BSEM models, and model identification through a careful evaluation of different models and diagnostics. Our analysis yields 2479 organizational performance estimates for 135 U.S. federal departments and agencies spanning 19 years between 2002 and 2024. We explore the validity of these estimates by comparing them with other measures of similar or related concepts. We conclude by discussing the implications of our measurement approach and its usefulness for evaluating organizational performance in diverse and changing contexts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pam.70064","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145472947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A number of large companies deploy facilities—factories, warehouses, shopping malls—that employ thousands of people directly and indirectly. Local governments have been enticing these companies with various financial incentives. But how much economic growth do these facilities promote, if any? We study this question using Amazon distribution facilities as the case in point. We show evidence of a positive effect of opening Amazon's distribution facilities on counties' economic outcomes. We focus on midsized counties in which Amazon opened facilities in the years 2014–2017 because we have good controls for these counties. We find a selection effect where Amazon locates its facilities, and we address this issue. Our preferred methodology is Callaway–Sant'Anna difference-in-differences combined with matching. After Amazon's entry, in our preferred specification, we find that the employment-to-population ratio in the treated county increased by 0.0087 (+1.46% at the mean), the poverty rate decreased by 0.36 percentage points (−2.69%), and the median household income increased by $1413 (+2.33%). We present evidence to argue that our findings can likely be interpreted as causal and plausible.
{"title":"The Impact of Amazon Facilities on Local Economies","authors":"Vikram Pathania, Serguei Netessine","doi":"10.1002/pam.70065","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70065","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A number of large companies deploy facilities—factories, warehouses, shopping malls—that employ thousands of people directly and indirectly. Local governments have been enticing these companies with various financial incentives. But how much economic growth do these facilities promote, if any? We study this question using Amazon distribution facilities as the case in point. We show evidence of a positive effect of opening Amazon's distribution facilities on counties' economic outcomes. We focus on midsized counties in which Amazon opened facilities in the years 2014–2017 because we have good controls for these counties. We find a selection effect where Amazon locates its facilities, and we address this issue. Our preferred methodology is Callaway–Sant'Anna difference-in-differences combined with matching. After Amazon's entry, in our preferred specification, we find that the employment-to-population ratio in the treated county increased by 0.0087 (+1.46% at the mean), the poverty rate decreased by 0.36 percentage points (−2.69%), and the median household income increased by $1413 (+2.33%). We present evidence to argue that our findings can likely be interpreted as causal and plausible.</p>","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pam.70065","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145472944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Goldring, Brian A. Jacob, Daniel Kreisman, Michael David Ricks
In 2015, Michigan increased its Career and Technical Education (CTE) funding and changed its funding formula to reimburse programs based on student progression through program curricula. Although this change nearly doubled program completion rates, student enrollment and persistence were unaffected; instead, administrators accelerated student progress by reorganizing course curricula around notches in the new funding formula. As a result of response heterogeneity, 30% of the funding increase was transferred away from high-poverty districts to more affluent ones, underscoring how supply-side responses to loopholes shape the incidence of public services.
{"title":"Loopholes and the Incidence of Public Services: Evidence From Funding Career and Technical Education","authors":"Thomas Goldring, Brian A. Jacob, Daniel Kreisman, Michael David Ricks","doi":"10.1002/pam.70062","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70062","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 2015, Michigan increased its Career and Technical Education (CTE) funding and changed its funding formula to reimburse programs based on student progression through program curricula. Although this change nearly doubled program completion rates, student enrollment and persistence were unaffected; instead, administrators accelerated student progress by reorganizing course curricula around notches in the new funding formula. As a result of response heterogeneity, 30% of the funding increase was transferred away from high-poverty districts to more affluent ones, underscoring how supply-side responses to loopholes shape the incidence of public services.</p>","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pam.70062","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145472943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Private school choice is having a moment. After a slow start, voucher and Education Savings Account (ESA) programs experienced explosive growth in their numbers, geographic scope, and enrollments recently. Vermont and Maine established the first voucher programs in rural areas that lacked public schools in 1869 and 1873, respectively. They were the only private school choice initiatives in the United States until Wisconsin established the first modern voucher program in Milwaukee in 1990 (Witte and Wolf <span>2017</span>). Ohio followed in 1995 with the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program. Arizona launched the first tax-credit-funded scholarship (voucher) program statewide in 1997 and followed with the first ESA program in 2011. By 2025, 35 states, plus DC and Puerto Rico, operated 70 tuition voucher or ESA programs serving over 1.2 million students.1</p><p>Until 2022, eligibility for private school choice programs was targeted to students disadvantaged by disability, geography, or family income in all states. That year, Arizona expanded eligibility for its pioneering ESA initiative to every K–12 student in the Grand Canyon state. In the three short years since Arizona launched the first universal private school choice program, 16 other states have followed suit, including Idaho, Indiana, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming in 2025 alone.</p><p>On July 4, 2025, President Trump signed the <i>One Big Beautiful Bill Act</i>, which includes a national voucher-type program that states can opt into beginning January 1, 2027. Private school choice programs initially were few, exclusively in the tuition voucher mold, and narrowly targeted. Now, choice programs are common throughout the country, often take the more flexible form of ESAs, and are either building toward or have reached universal eligibility.</p><p>Is universal private school choice good policy? I think so. Levin (<span>2001</span>, 9) argues that private school choice programs should be evaluated based on their effects on four key dimensions: expanding consumer choice, improving the productive efficiency of K–12 education, promoting equity, and advancing social cohesion. Here, I apply Levin's evaluative framework to the existing research on school choice. Although robust evidence on the effects of U.S. universal private school choice programs is just now emerging, we can draw inferences from studies of universal choice programs in other developed countries, evaluations of targeted U.S. programs, and descriptive data from new universal initiatives in the United States. These inferences are provisional, given the inherent uncertainty regarding how such policies will evolve.</p><p>Universal voucher and ESA programs expand consumer choice by allowing more parents to access the schools they prefer for their children. According to Morning Consult's recent polling, 36% of parents of school-age children would prefer a private school placement for their child, and 14% would like t
私立学校的选择正在经历一段时间。在缓慢的开始之后,代金券和教育储蓄账户(ESA)项目在数量、地理范围和入学人数上都经历了爆炸式的增长。佛蒙特州和缅因州分别于1869年和1873年在缺乏公立学校的农村地区建立了第一批代金券计划。这是美国唯一的私立学校选择计划,直到1990年威斯康星州在密尔沃基建立了第一个现代代金券计划(Witte and Wolf 2017)。随后,俄亥俄州在1995年推出了克利夫兰奖学金和辅导计划。亚利桑那州于1997年在全州范围内推出了第一个税收抵免奖学金(代金券)项目,随后在2011年推出了第一个欧空局项目。到2025年,35个州,加上华盛顿特区和波多黎各,运营了70个学费代金券或ESA项目,为120多万名学生提供服务。直到2022年,私立学校选择项目的资格是针对所有州因残疾、地理位置或家庭收入而处于不利地位的学生的。那一年,亚利桑那州将其开创性的ESA计划的资格扩大到大峡谷州的每个K-12学生。自亚利桑那州推出首个普及私立学校选择计划以来的短短三年里,其他16个州也纷纷效仿,其中包括爱达荷州、印第安纳州、新罕布什尔州、田纳西州、德克萨斯州和怀俄明州,仅在2025年这一年。2025年7月4日,特朗普总统签署了《一个大美丽法案》,其中包括一个全国性的代金券类型的项目,各州可以从2027年1月1日开始选择加入。私立学校的选择项目最初很少,完全是学费代金券模式,而且目标范围很窄。现在,选择性课程在全国范围内很普遍,通常采用更灵活的ESAs形式,并且要么朝着普遍资格的方向发展,要么已经达到普遍资格。全民私立学校选择是好政策吗?我想是的。Levin(2001,9)认为,私立学校选择计划应该基于其对四个关键维度的影响来评估:扩大消费者选择,提高K-12教育的生产效率,促进公平,促进社会凝聚力。在这里,我将莱文的评估框架应用于现有的择校研究。尽管关于美国普及私立学校选择计划的影响的有力证据刚刚出现,但我们可以从其他发达国家的普及选择计划的研究、对美国目标计划的评估以及美国新普及计划的描述性数据中得出推论。鉴于这些政策将如何演变的内在不确定性,这些推论是暂时的。通用代金券和ESA计划允许更多的家长为他们的孩子进入他们喜欢的学校,从而扩大了消费者的选择。根据Morning Consult最近的民意调查,36%的学龄儿童家长希望让他们的孩子上私立学校,14%的家长希望让他们在家上学(EdChoice 2025a)。在同样具有代表性的家长样本中,目前只有9%的学生就读于私立学校,只有5%的学生在家接受教育。因此,36%的家长报告说,他们无法为孩子提供他们喜欢的学校选择。在拥有大量择校计划的州,家长的入学决定更符合他们的学校偏好。在2023-2024年,也就是佛罗里达州每个学生都有资格获得私立或在家上学代金券或ESA的第一年,643,022名学生在佛罗里达州私立或在家上学,占阳光之州学龄人口的18.3% (Gibbons 2025)。瑞典在1993年建立了一个普遍的私立学校选择系统,当时新生的私立学校部门招收的学生不到瑞典学生的2%。2022年,瑞典20%的中学生进入私立学校就读(世界银行集团2024年数据)。最后,荷兰在1917年建立了普遍的私立学校选择制度。到2008年,超过70%的荷兰小学生和超过80%的荷兰中学生就读于公立私立学校(Patrinos 2011,57)。参加选择性课程的家长往往对孩子的学校更满意。在对19项关于美国选择项目对家长对学校满意度影响的研究的系统回顾中,Rhinesmith(2019, 114)得出结论:“无论学生是通过抽签进入他们选择的项目,还是自己选择进入他们选择的私立学校……提供教育选择会导致更高水平的家长满意度。”审查中的一项实验研究借鉴了国会最初授权的华盛顿特区教育券计划评估的数据。Kisida和Wolf(2015, 274)报告称,使用平均学校成绩或多项目满意度量表,学券计划对家长满意度的总体积极影响范围为0.34至0.53标准差(SD)。 如果学生在基线上表现较差,在初中或高中,或者从没有失败的公立学校转到这个项目,家长满意度的影响就会更高。孩子的成就影响越大,父母的满意度影响越大,反之亦然。学校代金券和ESA计划在多大程度上提高了K-12教育的生产效率,这是一个激烈的争论。这个问题是多方面的,涉及三个主要考虑因素:(1)选择项目对学生成绩和成就的参与者影响,(2)选择对受影响公立学校表现的竞争影响,以及(3)财政影响。通用代金券和ESA计划能促进公平吗?和什么相比?在出现任何现代私立学校选择计划之前,K-12教育是非常不公平的。能否进入高质量的公立或私立学校在很大程度上取决于家庭财富(Wolf 2005)。有学龄儿童的家庭每月支付数千美元的抵押贷款溢价,住在被划分为高绩效公立学校的住宅区(Barrow 2002)。正如前密尔沃基公立学校负责人霍华德·富勒经常说的那样,“在美国,学校选择很普遍,除非你很穷。”比起缺乏选择,普遍代金券和教育储蓄计划会创造一个更公平的竞争环境吗?全民选择计划在向普遍性迈进的过程中促进了公平。在2022年普及之前,亚利桑那州的ESA项目针对的是低收入学生、印第安人、残疾学生、D级或f级公立学校的学生、严重残疾学生、现役军人的子女和急救人员的子女。在2021-2022学年,12127名弱势学生享有“先行者”的优势。他们比条件好的学生更早进入自己喜欢的学校。大多数通用的ESA项目都采用了类似的资格限制,在阿肯色州的ESA项目中,超过48%的一年级和超过36%的二年级参与者有残疾(Daniels et al. 2025, 9)。通用的ESA项目对残疾学生很有吸引力,因为它们为他们提供了适合他们独特需求的定制教育,而不是公立学校部门主导特殊教育的臭名昭著的程序主义(Wolf and Hassel 2001)。越来越多的弱势学生将有机会通过普及计划选择学校,随着这些计划的扩大,他们将首当其冲。通用代金券和ESA计划通过减少与公立学校住宿分配相关的强制性,以自愿行为取而代之,从而促进了社会凝聚力。美国公立学校制度之父霍勒斯·曼(n.d.)明确指出:“我们从事神圣的教育事业的人有权把所有的父母看作是我们事业的人质。”这可不是社会礼让的愿景!在美国公立学校的整个历史中,强制隔离一直是典型的(Glenn 1988)。从1890年到20世纪60年代,南方的公立学校系统对学生实行严格的种族隔离(Foreman 2005),而北方城市通过将非洲裔美国家庭划分到特定的社区,将他们的孩子集中在种族统一的学校,在公立学校实现了事实上的种族隔离(DeRoche 2020)。实现公立学校内部的凝聚力也是一个挑战,因为政治斗争已经在公立学校的课程、图书馆的书籍、性、种族、宗教、爱国主义和其他有争议的话题上肆虐。相比之下,许多欧洲国家通过建立普遍的私立学校选择制度,实现了高度的社会凝聚力。在比利时、丹麦、瑞典和荷兰,父母可以选择孩子就读的公立或私立学校。公立学校和私立学校从国家获得同等的每名学生资助。Berner(2016)将欧洲的私立学校选择制度描述为“教育多元化”,这种制度也在加拿大和澳大利亚的大部分地区运作。荷兰于1917年将其普遍的择校政策写入宪
{"title":"Universal School Vouchers and Education Savings Accounts Are Good Policies","authors":"Patrick J. Wolf","doi":"10.1002/pam.70070","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70070","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Private school choice is having a moment. After a slow start, voucher and Education Savings Account (ESA) programs experienced explosive growth in their numbers, geographic scope, and enrollments recently. Vermont and Maine established the first voucher programs in rural areas that lacked public schools in 1869 and 1873, respectively. They were the only private school choice initiatives in the United States until Wisconsin established the first modern voucher program in Milwaukee in 1990 (Witte and Wolf <span>2017</span>). Ohio followed in 1995 with the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program. Arizona launched the first tax-credit-funded scholarship (voucher) program statewide in 1997 and followed with the first ESA program in 2011. By 2025, 35 states, plus DC and Puerto Rico, operated 70 tuition voucher or ESA programs serving over 1.2 million students.1</p><p>Until 2022, eligibility for private school choice programs was targeted to students disadvantaged by disability, geography, or family income in all states. That year, Arizona expanded eligibility for its pioneering ESA initiative to every K–12 student in the Grand Canyon state. In the three short years since Arizona launched the first universal private school choice program, 16 other states have followed suit, including Idaho, Indiana, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming in 2025 alone.</p><p>On July 4, 2025, President Trump signed the <i>One Big Beautiful Bill Act</i>, which includes a national voucher-type program that states can opt into beginning January 1, 2027. Private school choice programs initially were few, exclusively in the tuition voucher mold, and narrowly targeted. Now, choice programs are common throughout the country, often take the more flexible form of ESAs, and are either building toward or have reached universal eligibility.</p><p>Is universal private school choice good policy? I think so. Levin (<span>2001</span>, 9) argues that private school choice programs should be evaluated based on their effects on four key dimensions: expanding consumer choice, improving the productive efficiency of K–12 education, promoting equity, and advancing social cohesion. Here, I apply Levin's evaluative framework to the existing research on school choice. Although robust evidence on the effects of U.S. universal private school choice programs is just now emerging, we can draw inferences from studies of universal choice programs in other developed countries, evaluations of targeted U.S. programs, and descriptive data from new universal initiatives in the United States. These inferences are provisional, given the inherent uncertainty regarding how such policies will evolve.</p><p>Universal voucher and ESA programs expand consumer choice by allowing more parents to access the schools they prefer for their children. According to Morning Consult's recent polling, 36% of parents of school-age children would prefer a private school placement for their child, and 14% would like t","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pam.70070","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Douglas Harris has written a cogent essay arguing that universal voucher and ESA programs are undesirable because public charter schools are better. While I disagree with Harris on several key points, I begin by emphasizing our areas of agreement.</p><p>We agree that public charter schools have a strong record of improving academic outcomes, especially for disadvantaged students. We agree that accountability tests sometimes fail to align with the curriculum taught to students, complicating comparisons between groups across time and school sectors. We agree that the ability of private schools to teach religion gives them an advantage relative to secular public schools. We agree that “public accountability is about more than just test scores. It is about ensuring that schools instill common language, values like tolerance, and belief in democracy” (Harris <span>2025</span>). We agree that expanding private school choice programs in the form of vouchers and ESAs increases freedom, axiomatically.</p><p>We agree that Levin's four-criterion evaluation scheme is useful for assessing the desirability of expanding private school choice. We tend to disagree on the evidence that is most relevant to the application of Levin's criteria, and how to characterize and interpret that evidence.</p><p>Harris claims that statewide voucher programs in Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and Ohio provide the best evidence regarding the likely effects of universal private school choice programs. Florida certainly is highly relevant, as it serves over half a million choice students, recently converted its voucher programs to ESAs, and is a model for many states, given its 28 years of experience publicly funding private schooling. The experiences of Indiana and Ohio are less instructive than those of Florida, since the Hoosier and Buckeye states are two of only three states with universal school voucher programs, the other being North Carolina. A total of 14 states combine universal eligibility with the more flexible ESA policy model, with Arizona the earliest adopter of that now popular approach.</p><p>The least relevant program for forecasting the future effects of universal ESAs is the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP). The LSP was a highly regulated school voucher program limited to low-income students. It was repealed and replaced with the Louisiana GATOR universal ESA program in 2025. The LSP taught policymakers how not to design and implement a private school choice program (Wolf <span>2019</span>). They have taken those lessons to heart, rendering the disappointing participant effects from my team's evaluation of the LSP the least informative findings for predicting the outcomes of current and future private school choice programs.</p><p>Since no private school choice program designed like the universal ESAs proliferating across the country has been rigorously evaluated, I draw the evidence for my assessment from all the voucher and ESA evaluations, via meta-analyse
道格拉斯·哈里斯(Douglas Harris)写了一篇令人信服的文章,认为普遍的代金券和ESA计划是不可取的,因为公立特许学校更好。虽然我在几个关键点上与哈里斯意见不一致,但我首先强调一下我们的共识领域。我们同意,公立特许学校在提高学业成绩方面有着良好的记录,尤其是对弱势学生而言。我们同意,问责制测试有时与教授给学生的课程不一致,使不同时间和学校部门的群体之间的比较复杂化。我们同意,私立学校教授宗教的能力使它们相对于世俗公立学校具有优势。我们一致认为,“公共问责制不仅仅关乎考试成绩。它是关于确保学校灌输共同语言、宽容等价值观和民主信仰”(哈里斯2025)。我们一致认为,以教育券和教育储蓄计划的形式扩大私立学校的选择项目可以增加自由,这是不言自明的。我们同意莱文的四标准评估方案对于评估扩大私立学校选择的可取性是有用的。对于与莱文标准的应用最相关的证据,以及如何描述和解释这些证据,我们往往存在分歧。哈里斯声称,佛罗里达州、印第安纳州、路易斯安那州和俄亥俄州的全州教育券计划为普及私立学校选择计划可能产生的影响提供了最好的证据。佛罗里达州当然是高度相关的,因为它为50多万优等学生提供服务,最近将其代金券计划转变为教育储蓄计划,鉴于其28年的公共资助私立学校的经验,它是许多州的榜样。印第安纳州和俄亥俄州的经验不如佛罗里达州那么有教育意义,因为只有三个州实行了普及教育券计划,印第安纳州和七叶树州是其中两个,另一个是北卡罗来纳州。共有14个州将普遍资格与更灵活的ESA政策模式结合起来,亚利桑那州是最早采用这种现在流行的方法的州。预测通用esa未来影响的最不相关的计划是路易斯安那奖学金计划(LSP)。LSP是一个严格监管的学校券计划,仅限于低收入家庭的学生。该计划于2025年被废除,并被路易斯安那州GATOR通用ESA计划所取代。LSP教会了政策制定者如何不设计和实施私立学校选择计划(Wolf 2019)。他们把这些教训牢记于心,使我的团队对LSP的评估中令人失望的参与者效应成为预测当前和未来私立学校选择项目结果的最不具信息性的发现。由于没有一个私立学校选择项目像全国范围内普及的全民教育辅助教育项目那样被严格评估过,我通过荟萃分析和系统回顾,从所有代金券和教育辅助教育项目的评估中提取证据,特别关注亚利桑那州、阿肯色州和佛罗里达州的示范项目,这些项目最能反映当前的政策。我不同意哈里斯关于评估私立学校选择项目的正确反事实。当哈里斯说:“今天的辩论实际上是关于我们是否应该继续扩大公立学校的选择,还是扩大宗教和其他私立学校的选择”时,他制造了一个错误的二分法。著名评论家认为我们不应该扩大任何一种类型的选择(拉维奇2013),我们应该扩大公共而不是私人形式(奥斯本2017),我们应该扩大私人而不是公共形式(金斯伯里和格林2025),或者我们应该扩大所有形式的学校选择(DeAngelis 2024)。这场政策辩论是关于是否扩大私立学校的选择。正如哈里斯所说,私立学校和家庭教育的“主要替代方案”不是公立特许学校。特许学校只招收了所有K-12学生的8%。代金券和ESAs的主要替代方案是社区公立学校(NPS),它招收了所有K-12学生的78%。当随机抽奖来奖励私立学校券时,大多数失去这些彩票的学生随后进入NPS,而不是特许学校,即使在像哥伦比亚特区这样拥有大型特许学校的城市也是如此(Wolf et al. 2007)。没有证据表明普遍的私立学校选择计划会威胁到公立特许学校。在大流行之前的几年里,特许学校入学人数的增长停滞不前,但随着私立学校选择计划的启动和扩大,特许学校也在不断扩大。私立学校的选择似乎促进了特许学校的增长,因为所有形式的学校选择同时增长。我同意哈里斯的观点,公立特许学校对许多家长来说是一个有吸引力的学校选择。 然而,特许学校并不是私立学校的完美替代品,因为一些家长希望他们的孩子在宗教环境中学习,而公立特许学校被禁止教授宗教或将宗教活动纳入上学日。历史并不支持哈里斯关于“世俗教学”和“不歧视”是美国“长期存在的学校传统”的说法。在美国及其前身美国殖民地公立学校存在的前325年里,公立学校教授基督教的新教版本。世俗教学是相对近期的一种突破,打破了美国最高法院1962年禁止在公立学校进行宗教教学和强制读圣经的长期传统。可悲的是,歧视也是美国公立学校的一个长期传统,最臭名昭著的是在南方的种族歧视,但更普遍的是在全国各地,直到今天。哈里斯认为,美国的K12教育不需要“彻底改变”。大量证据表明并非如此。自大流行以来,学生们几乎失去了整整一个年级的学习水平,弱势学生的损失更大,而且几乎没有反弹的迹象。现在的慢性缺勤率是covid前的两倍多。三分之一的学生在学校感到不安全(美国疾病控制与预防中心,2024年)。美国的学生人均教育支出仅次于卢森堡(OECD 2024)。然而,在最近的国际数学和科学测试中,美国学生的成绩在12到22之间,我们的优等生和低等生之间的差距相对较大(美国教育部2024年)。一次重大的航向调整似乎是合理的。哈里斯说:“虽然这方面的证据有限,但有理由担心代金券会降低我们的社会凝聚力”(哈里斯2025)。学校券补贴私立学校。关于公立和私立学校在宽容、政治参与、政治知识和技能以及学生和校友的社区参与方面的差异,有深入的实证文献。该研究基地的调查结果有利于私立学校。即使我们只关注因果研究,私立学校在培养宽容、积极、知情和参与的公民方面至少与公立学校一样有效。几十年来,在许多国家,私立学校推动了公共教育的发展。如果有更多的学生在公共资金的支持下上私立学校,我认为没有理由认为这种情况会改变,尤其是因为家长们报告说,培养孩子的公民价值观是他们把孩子送到私立学校的一个重要原因。不管你喜不喜欢,如果你附近的社区还没有普及代金券或esa,那么它们很快就会到来。在过去的三年里,拥有普遍资格享受私立学校选择补贴的州从0个猛增到17个。政策制定者将继续推行全民择校计划,因为这些计划受到选民的欢迎。随着这些项目的不断发展和推广,我们将获得更多的证据来证明它们的效果,关于它们的收益和成本的辩论将继续下去。
{"title":"Private School Choice Programs Should and Will Continue to Expand","authors":"Patrick J. Wolf","doi":"10.1002/pam.70068","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70068","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Douglas Harris has written a cogent essay arguing that universal voucher and ESA programs are undesirable because public charter schools are better. While I disagree with Harris on several key points, I begin by emphasizing our areas of agreement.</p><p>We agree that public charter schools have a strong record of improving academic outcomes, especially for disadvantaged students. We agree that accountability tests sometimes fail to align with the curriculum taught to students, complicating comparisons between groups across time and school sectors. We agree that the ability of private schools to teach religion gives them an advantage relative to secular public schools. We agree that “public accountability is about more than just test scores. It is about ensuring that schools instill common language, values like tolerance, and belief in democracy” (Harris <span>2025</span>). We agree that expanding private school choice programs in the form of vouchers and ESAs increases freedom, axiomatically.</p><p>We agree that Levin's four-criterion evaluation scheme is useful for assessing the desirability of expanding private school choice. We tend to disagree on the evidence that is most relevant to the application of Levin's criteria, and how to characterize and interpret that evidence.</p><p>Harris claims that statewide voucher programs in Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and Ohio provide the best evidence regarding the likely effects of universal private school choice programs. Florida certainly is highly relevant, as it serves over half a million choice students, recently converted its voucher programs to ESAs, and is a model for many states, given its 28 years of experience publicly funding private schooling. The experiences of Indiana and Ohio are less instructive than those of Florida, since the Hoosier and Buckeye states are two of only three states with universal school voucher programs, the other being North Carolina. A total of 14 states combine universal eligibility with the more flexible ESA policy model, with Arizona the earliest adopter of that now popular approach.</p><p>The least relevant program for forecasting the future effects of universal ESAs is the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP). The LSP was a highly regulated school voucher program limited to low-income students. It was repealed and replaced with the Louisiana GATOR universal ESA program in 2025. The LSP taught policymakers how not to design and implement a private school choice program (Wolf <span>2019</span>). They have taken those lessons to heart, rendering the disappointing participant effects from my team's evaluation of the LSP the least informative findings for predicting the outcomes of current and future private school choice programs.</p><p>Since no private school choice program designed like the universal ESAs proliferating across the country has been rigorously evaluated, I draw the evidence for my assessment from all the voucher and ESA evaluations, via meta-analyse","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pam.70068","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How will universal school vouchers and Education Savings Accounts (ESAs) change American schooling?","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/pam.70067","DOIUrl":"10.1002/pam.70067","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48105,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Analysis and Management","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}