Journal of Policy Analysis and Management最新文献

IT modernization reforms seek to improve administrative performance by improving the delivery of program benefits. Performance benefits manifest in a reduction in agency-induced administrative errors, and a reduction in performance gaps between high and low complexity task caseloads. These claims are evaluated by assessing the impact of IT modernization reforms instituted by state unemployment insurance payment (UIP) agencies from 2002 to 2022. The evidence reveals that these reforms have discernible, unconditional dynamic effects, lowering overall program error rates by 20.95% over 60 months, as well as reducing both absolute and relative reduction in benefit overpayment error rates relating to program efficiency. IT reforms close the performance gap for overall program error rates between high and low task complexity caseloads involving individuals seeking different occupations. This evidence corroborates existing claims that technological-based administration is inherently non-neutral since program efficiency gains are emphasized relative to program accessibility gains.

Since 1990, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) has been the primary benchmark for tracking the progress of state education reform. The focus on math and reading achievement is motivated by the cross-sectional relationship between test scores and adult outcomes, such as earnings and college completion. But do changes in NAEP scores predict changes in long-term economic and social outcomes for future earners—or do they reflect other factors unrelated to earnings such as teaching to the test? We investigate by linking long-term outcomes by year and state of birth to NAEP scores. We find that more recent birth cohorts in states with large increases in NAEP math achievement enjoyed higher incomes, improved educational attainment, and declines in teen motherhood, incarceration, and arrest rates compared to those in states with smaller increases. In fact, the relationship between changes in NAEP achievement and cohort earnings is about two thirds the size of the cross-sectional relationship observed in prior research: a 6% to 8% rise in earnings per standard deviation rise in 8th grade math. The results are not sensitive to controls for student demographics, labor market conditions, or measures of children's health (such as low birthweight).

If voters do not like federal tax policy, they can elect new representatives. At the local level, though, voters can directly deny the tax increases their elected officials propose. All but three states have a limit on either the taxing or spending abilities of local governments and, most commonly, state laws require that increases in local taxes receive a public referendum before they are enacted (Mullins, 2010). In the November 2020 election, voters nationwide decided on the fate of $52.7 billion of proposed funding, down from $70 billion 4 years prior (Pierog, 2020).

Requirements that budgeting questions be put to a vote reduce the level of spending (Feld & Matsusaka, 2003; Funk & Gathmann, 2011). However, the rules that govern these votes vary in myriad ways. States differ in the types of taxes or spending the rules cover: Some only allow proposals for capital spending, while others also include current expenditure spending. States also often limit the total amount of tax revenue or the tax rate governments can propose, and vary in whether they adjust for inflation, for changes in population, or for growth in the property tax base. Certain election rules limit the timing of when governments can put proposals on the ballot, since local governments may use this timing flexibility strategically (Anzia, 2011; Kogan et al., 2018; Meredith, 2009). States also differ in the vote share required to approve the proposals, with many proposals requiring more than a simple majority. There is little empirical research, however, documenting how these differences in voting requirements may affect government budgets, local spending, and the provision of public goods and services. This is a significant gap in the literature given the millions of dollars in funding at stake in each local referendum and the billions at stake nationwide.

In this paper, we study a proposition in California that weakened the constraints on some local governments by lowering the vote share required to approve capital funding for schools and community colleges. We use a difference-in-differences design around this policy change and data for over 4,000 local elections across the state over 2 decades. We estimate the effects of this policy change on the proposals made by affected districts, their outcomes at the ballot box, and on the eventual funding outcomes.

We develop a theoretical model of the interaction between a school board and voters, building on the literature in local political economy (Barseghyan & Coate, 2014; Coate & Ma, 2017; Romer & Rosenthal, 1982). In our model, the school board makes a tax proposal that the voter can accept or reject. Thus, the school board has “agenda-setting” power to extract policies closer to its preferences than those of the voter. However, uncertainty in how residents will vo