Journal Article Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit, by Sally Sedgwick Get access Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit, by Sally Sedgwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. ix + 194. Andreja Novakovic Andreja Novakovic University of California, Berkeley, USA andreja@berkeley.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad060, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad060 Published: 19 October 2023
《黑格尔思想与精神中的时间与历史》，莎莉·塞奇威克著。牛津:牛津大学出版社，2023。Pp. ix + 194安德烈亚·诺瓦科维奇安德烈亚·诺瓦科维奇加州大学伯克利分校，美国andreja@berkeley.edu搜索作者的其他作品:Oxford Academic谷歌Scholar Mind, fzad060, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad060出版日期:2023年10月19日
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There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are (in one or another sense) ultimate. I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary objects as a case study, I show that the arguments that animate these debates bear directly on the question of which objects there are and cannot plausibly be recast as arguments about what’s ultimate. I then address the objection that, because they are easily answerable, questions about what there is cannot be a proper subject of ontological debate.
{"title":"Why Care About What There Is?","authors":"Daniel Z Korman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad058","url":null,"abstract":"There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are (in one or another sense) ultimate. I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary objects as a case study, I show that the arguments that animate these debates bear directly on the question of which objects there are and cannot plausibly be recast as arguments about what’s ultimate. I then address the objection that, because they are easily answerable, questions about what there is cannot be a proper subject of ontological debate.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"1 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71435274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement, by James R. Shaw Get access Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement, by James R. Shaw. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. x + 319. José L Zalabardo José L Zalabardo University College London, UK j.zalabardo@ucl.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1247-3548 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad057, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad057 Published: 19 October 2023
期刊文章《维特根斯坦论规则》。《正当性、语法和协议》，作者:詹姆斯·r·肖《辩护、语法和协议》，作者:詹姆斯·r·肖。纽约:牛津大学出版社，2023。Pp. x + 319。jos L Zalabardo英国伦敦大学学院jos L Zalabardo j.zalabardo@ucl.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1247-3548搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者思维，fzad057, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad057出版日期:2023年10月19日
{"title":"<i>Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement</i>, by James R. Shaw","authors":"José L Zalabardo","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad057","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement, by James R. Shaw Get access Wittgenstein on Rules. Justification, Grammar, and Agreement, by James R. Shaw. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. x + 319. José L Zalabardo José L Zalabardo University College London, UK j.zalabardo@ucl.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1247-3548 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad057, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad057 Published: 19 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135729775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"<i>Knowing Science</i>, by Alexander Bird","authors":"Jonathan Birch","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad048","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"168 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135779010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins Get access Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. viii + 200. Saba Bazargan-Forward Saba Bazargan-Forward University of California, San Diego, USA sbazargan@ucsd.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-5684 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad061, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061 Published: 19 October 2023
《作为违法者的组织:从本体论到道德》，作者:斯蒂芬妮·柯林斯牛津:牛津大学出版社，2023。Pp. viii + 200。Saba Bazargan-Forward Saba Bazargan-Forward美国加州大学圣地亚哥分校sbazargan@ucsd.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-5684搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者思维，fzad061, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061发布日期:2023年10月19日
{"title":"<i>Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality</i>, by Stephanie Collins","authors":"Saba Bazargan-Forward","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins Get access Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. viii + 200. Saba Bazargan-Forward Saba Bazargan-Forward University of California, San Diego, USA sbazargan@ucsd.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-5684 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad061, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061 Published: 19 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135730443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The search for extraterrestrial life centres on the search for ‘biosignatures’. Yet there is little agreement within the scientific community with respect to what exactly it is for something to be a biosignature. Existing accounts are presented and criticised. An alternative is provided that resolves problems with existing accounts by distinguishing clearly between types and tokens.
{"title":"New Work on Biosignatures","authors":"Christopher Cowie","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The search for extraterrestrial life centres on the search for ‘biosignatures’. Yet there is little agreement within the scientific community with respect to what exactly it is for something to be a biosignature. Existing accounts are presented and criticised. An alternative is provided that resolves problems with existing accounts by distinguishing clearly between types and tokens.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135967691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"This is a correction to: Poppy Mankowitz, Not Half True, <i>Mind</i>, Volume 132, Issue 525, January 2023, Pages 84–112, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac016","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad053","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135252273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism.
{"title":"Suárez’s Argument against Real Universals","authors":"Han Thomas Adriaenssen","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134943602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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