{"title":"<i>Knowing Science</i>, by Alexander Bird","authors":"Jonathan Birch","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad048","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"168 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135779010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins Get access Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. viii + 200. Saba Bazargan-Forward Saba Bazargan-Forward University of California, San Diego, USA sbazargan@ucsd.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-5684 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad061, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061 Published: 19 October 2023
《作为违法者的组织:从本体论到道德》，作者:斯蒂芬妮·柯林斯牛津:牛津大学出版社，2023。Pp. viii + 200。Saba Bazargan-Forward Saba Bazargan-Forward美国加州大学圣地亚哥分校sbazargan@ucsd.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-5684搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者思维，fzad061, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061发布日期:2023年10月19日
{"title":"<i>Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality</i>, by Stephanie Collins","authors":"Saba Bazargan-Forward","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins Get access Organizations as Wrongdoers: From Ontology to Morality, by Stephanie Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. viii + 200. Saba Bazargan-Forward Saba Bazargan-Forward University of California, San Diego, USA sbazargan@ucsd.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4156-5684 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad061, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad061 Published: 19 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135730443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The search for extraterrestrial life centres on the search for ‘biosignatures’. Yet there is little agreement within the scientific community with respect to what exactly it is for something to be a biosignature. Existing accounts are presented and criticised. An alternative is provided that resolves problems with existing accounts by distinguishing clearly between types and tokens.
{"title":"New Work on Biosignatures","authors":"Christopher Cowie","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The search for extraterrestrial life centres on the search for ‘biosignatures’. Yet there is little agreement within the scientific community with respect to what exactly it is for something to be a biosignature. Existing accounts are presented and criticised. An alternative is provided that resolves problems with existing accounts by distinguishing clearly between types and tokens.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135967691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"This is a correction to: Poppy Mankowitz, Not Half True, <i>Mind</i>, Volume 132, Issue 525, January 2023, Pages 84–112, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac016","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad053","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135252273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism.
{"title":"Suárez’s Argument against Real Universals","authors":"Han Thomas Adriaenssen","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134943602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty Get access Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxi + 264. Stephen Houlgate Stephen Houlgate University of Warwick, United Kingdom Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052 Published: 06 October 2023
《黑格尔的逻辑和形而上学》，雅各布·麦克纳尔蒂著。剑桥:剑桥大学出版社，2023。第21页+ 264页Stephen Houlgate，英国华威大学，Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk搜索作者的其他作品:Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052发布日期:2023年10月6日
{"title":"Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty","authors":"Stephen Houlgate","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty Get access Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxi + 264. Stephen Houlgate Stephen Houlgate University of Warwick, United Kingdom Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052 Published: 06 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135345867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract People sometimes use speech to interfere with other people’s speech, as in the case of a heckler sabotaging a lecture with constant interjections. Some people claim that such interference infringes upon free speech. Against this view, we argue that where competing speakers in a public forum both have an interest in speaking, free speech principles should not automatically give priority to the ‘official’ speaker. Given the ideals underlying free speech, heckling speech sometimes deserves priority. But what can we say, then, about situations in which heckling clearly seems to infringe upon people’s civil liberties, in a way that intuitively justifies intervention? In such cases, we argue, heckling infringes upon people’s associative freedom. We present and defend an ethical framework for the institutional management of ‘Speech Fights’, geared around this insight.
{"title":"Heckling, Free Speech, and Freedom of Association","authors":"Emily McTernan, Robert Mark Simpson","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People sometimes use speech to interfere with other people’s speech, as in the case of a heckler sabotaging a lecture with constant interjections. Some people claim that such interference infringes upon free speech. Against this view, we argue that where competing speakers in a public forum both have an interest in speaking, free speech principles should not automatically give priority to the ‘official’ speaker. Given the ideals underlying free speech, heckling speech sometimes deserves priority. But what can we say, then, about situations in which heckling clearly seems to infringe upon people’s civil liberties, in a way that intuitively justifies intervention? In such cases, we argue, heckling infringes upon people’s associative freedom. We present and defend an ethical framework for the institutional management of ‘Speech Fights’, geared around this insight.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135483028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen Get access The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen (eds.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. xxx + 281. Richard Pettigrew Richard Pettigrew University of Bristol, UK richard.pettigrew@bristol.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad047, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047 Published: 27 September 2023
{"title":"The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen","authors":"Richard Pettigrew","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen Get access The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen (eds.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. xxx + 281. Richard Pettigrew Richard Pettigrew University of Bristol, UK richard.pettigrew@bristol.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad047, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047 Published: 27 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135477836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism, by Theron Pummer","authors":"Daniel Muñoz","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"267 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：