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Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic, by Robert Trueman 属性与命题:高阶逻辑的形而上学》,罗伯特-特鲁曼著
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad056
Nicholas K Jones
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引用次数: 0
Reason and Inquiry: The Erotetic Theory, by Philipp Koralus 理性与探索:情欲理论》,作者 Philipp Koralus
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-24 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad062
Daniel Hoek
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引用次数: 0
Fichte’s Moral Philosophy, by Owen Ware 费希特的道德哲学》,欧文-瓦尔著
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-24 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad066
S. Hoeltzel
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引用次数: 0
Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision? 不可测量倾向于不精确吗?
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad041
Cian Dorr
In a recent paper, Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek, and John Hawthorne argue for the rational permissibility of ’credal imprecision’ by appealing to certain propositions associated with non-measurable spatial regions: for example, the proposition that the pointer of a spinner will come to rest within a certain non-measurable set of points on its circumference. This paper rebuts their argument by showing that its premises lead to implausible consequences in cases where one is trying to learn, by making multiple observations, whether a certain outcome is associated with a non-measurable region or a measurable one.
在最近的一篇论文中,Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek和John Hawthorne通过与不可测量的空间区域相关的某些命题来论证“信用不精确”的理性允许性:例如,旋转器的指针将停在其周长上某个不可测量的点集合内的命题。本文反驳了他们的论点,表明其前提导致难以置信的结果,当一个人试图学习的情况下,通过多次观察,一个特定的结果是否与一个不可测量的区域或可测量的区域相关联。
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引用次数: 0
Infelicitous Conditionals and KK 错误条件句和KK
IF 1.8 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-11 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad046
John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs
Kevin Dorst (2019) uses the ‘manifest unassertability’ of conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know p, then p’ as a new motivation for the KK thesis. In this paper we show that his argumentation is misguided. Plausible heuristics offer a compelling and nuanced explanation of the relevant infelicity data. Meanwhile, Dorst relies on tools that, quite independently of KK, turn out to be rather poor predictors of the infelicity of indicative conditionals.
Kevin Dorst(2019)使用“如果我不知道p,那么p”形式的条件的“明显不可断言性”作为KK论文的新动机。在本文中,我们证明他的论证是错误的。似是而非的启发式提供了一个令人信服和细致入微的解释相关的不可信数据。与此同时,Dorst所依赖的工具完全独立于KK,结果证明它们在指示性条件句的错误性预测上相当糟糕。
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引用次数: 0
Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto 《思想主题:知识、信仰、想象的逻辑》,弗朗西斯科·贝尔托著
1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad051
Igor Douven
Journal Article Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto Get access Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 229. Igor Douven Igor Douven IHPST / CNRS / Panthéon–Sorbonne University, France igor.douven@univ-paris1.fr Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad051, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad051 Published: 09 November 2023
期刊文章《思想主题:知识、信仰、想象的逻辑》,作者:弗朗西斯科·贝托。牛津,英国:牛津大学出版社,2022。第xi + 229页Igor Douven IHPST / CNRS / panth -索邦大学,法国igor.douven@univ-paris1.fr搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者思想,fzad051, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad051发布日期:2023年11月9日
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引用次数: 0
The Adoption Problem and the Epistemology of Logic 采用问题与逻辑认识论
1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad009
Romina Birman
Abstract After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles.
在将采纳问题(AP)作为不能采纳某些基本逻辑原则的主张引入之后,我将这一概念描述为两个阶段的过程,包括:(1)接受基本逻辑原则,以及(2)根据第一阶段根据该原则进行推理的实践的发展。详细考虑了主体不按照普遍实例化进行推理的情况。我认为,AP对逻辑的认识论具有深刻而广泛的影响,远远超出了克里普克的最初目标,即普特南提出的逻辑的经验修正及其背景奎因认识论。特别地,AP质疑基本逻辑原则是否能在我们的推理实践中发挥基本作用,将我们的注意力吸引到基本推理的性质以及在对逻辑原则的认识论证明问题采取立场之前需要对它们有一个更清晰的概念。
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引用次数: 0
Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic 克里普克,奎因,“采纳问题”与逻辑的经验概念
1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad011
Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright
Abstract Recently, there has been a significant upsurge of interest in what has come to be known as the 'Adoption Problem', first developed by Saul Kripke in 1974. The problem purports to raise a difficulty for Quine’s anti-exceptionalist conception of logic. In what follows, we first offer a statement of the problem and argue that, so understood, it depends upon natural but resistible assumptions. We then use that discussion as a springboard for developing a different adoption problem, arguing that, for a significant class of basic logical principles, there is indeed a difficulty in seeing how they might be ‘freely adopted,’ thereby vindicating something close to the spirit of Kripke’s original claim. This first part of our argument will enforce a significant qualification of Quine’s claim that basic logical principles can be empirically confirmed. In the concluding sections of the paper, we turn to the question, specifically, of the empirical revisability of logic, arguing that when proper attention is paid to the role of reasoning in theory revision, it does indeed emerge that anti-exceptionalism, in full generality, is untenable.
最近,人们对索尔·克里普克(Saul Kripke)于1974年首次提出的“收养问题”(Adoption Problem)产生了浓厚的兴趣。这个问题意在为奎因的反例外论逻辑概念提出一个难题。在接下来的文章中,我们首先对这个问题提出一个陈述,并论证说,这样理解的话,它取决于自然的但不可抗拒的假设。然后,我们将这一讨论作为发展另一个采用问题的跳板,认为对于一类重要的基本逻辑原则,确实很难看到它们如何可能被“自由采用”,从而证明一些接近Kripke最初主张的精神。我们论证的第一部分将加强奎因关于基本逻辑原则可以被经验证实的主张的重要资格。在论文的最后部分,我们将转向逻辑的经验可修正性的问题,认为当适当关注推理在理论修正中的作用时,它确实出现了反例外论,总的来说,是站不住脚的。
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引用次数: 0
The Question of Logic 逻辑问题
1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad008
Saul A Kripke
Abstract Under the influence of Quine’s famous manifesto, many philosophers have thought that logical theories are scientific theories that can be ‘adopted’ and tested as scientific theories. Here we argue that this idea is untenable. We discuss it with special reference to Putnam’s proposal to ‘adopt’ a particular non-classical logic to solve the foundational problems of quantum mechanics in his famous paper ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ (1968), which we argue was not really coherent.
在蒯因著名宣言的影响下,许多哲学家认为逻辑理论是科学理论,可以作为科学理论来“采用”和检验。在这里,我们认为这种观点是站不住脚的。我们将特别参考帕特南在其著名论文《逻辑是经验的吗?》中提出的“采用”一种特殊的非经典逻辑来解决量子力学的基本问题的建议。(1968),我们认为它并不真正连贯。
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引用次数: 1
Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro 《柏拉图的形而上学》中的形式与结构,作者:A. Marmodoro
1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad059
Dimitri El Murr
Journal Article Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro Get access Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp vii + 223. Dimitri El Murr Dimitri El Murr Department of Philosophy, École normale supérieure - PSL, France dimitri.el.murr@ens.psl.eu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad059, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059 Published: 04 November 2023
《柏拉图形而上学中的形式与结构》,作者:A. Marmodoro纽约:牛津大学出版社,2021。Pp vii + 223。Dimitri El Murr Dimitri El Murr哲学系,École normale supsamrieure - PSL,法国dimitri.el.murr@ens.psl.eu搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者心智,fzad059, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059出版日期:2023年11月4日
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引用次数: 0
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