In this paper, I argue against recent modifications of the Knowledge Condition on intentional action that weaken the condition. My contention is that the condition is best understood in the context of Anscombe’s Intention and, when so understood, can be maintained in its strongest form.
{"title":"The Knowledge Condition on Intentional Action in Its Proper Home","authors":"Laura Tomlinson Makin","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad045","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue against recent modifications of the Knowledge Condition on intentional action that weaken the condition. My contention is that the condition is best understood in the context of Anscombe’s Intention and, when so understood, can be maintained in its strongest form.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139407818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Tangle of Science: Reliability Beyond Method, Rigour, and Objectivity, by Nancy Cartwright, Jeremy Hardie, Eleonora Montuschi, Matthew Soleiman, Ann C. Thresher","authors":"Anna Alexandrova","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad067","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"6 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139443561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering.
{"title":"Conceptual Engineering: For What Matters","authors":"Sebastian Köhler, Herman Veluwenkamp","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad064","url":null,"abstract":"Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139400601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Boolean-Valued Sets as Arbitrary Objects","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad072","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139138117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
José Benardete developed a famous paradox involving a beginningless set of items each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. The Grim Reaper version of this paradox has recently been employed in favour of various finitist metaphysical theses, ranging from temporal finitism to causal finitism to the discrete nature of time. Here, I examine a new challenge to these finitist arguments—namely, the challenge of implying that the future cannot be endless. In particular, I develop future-oriented Benardete paradoxes and examine their epistemic symmetry with past-oriented paradoxes.
{"title":"The End is Near: Grim Reapers and Endless Futures","authors":"Joseph C Schmid","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad065","url":null,"abstract":"José Benardete developed a famous paradox involving a beginningless set of items each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. The Grim Reaper version of this paradox has recently been employed in favour of various finitist metaphysical theses, ranging from temporal finitism to causal finitism to the discrete nature of time. Here, I examine a new challenge to these finitist arguments—namely, the challenge of implying that the future cannot be endless. In particular, I develop future-oriented Benardete paradoxes and examine their epistemic symmetry with past-oriented paradoxes.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139050899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic, by Robert Trueman","authors":"Nicholas K Jones","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad056","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139213899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reason and Inquiry: The Erotetic Theory, by Philipp Koralus","authors":"Daniel Hoek","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad062","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"112 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139242307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fichte’s Moral Philosophy, by Owen Ware","authors":"S. Hoeltzel","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139238659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a recent paper, Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek, and John Hawthorne argue for the rational permissibility of ’credal imprecision’ by appealing to certain propositions associated with non-measurable spatial regions: for example, the proposition that the pointer of a spinner will come to rest within a certain non-measurable set of points on its circumference. This paper rebuts their argument by showing that its premises lead to implausible consequences in cases where one is trying to learn, by making multiple observations, whether a certain outcome is associated with a non-measurable region or a measurable one.
在最近的一篇论文中，Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek和John Hawthorne通过与不可测量的空间区域相关的某些命题来论证“信用不精确”的理性允许性:例如，旋转器的指针将停在其周长上某个不可测量的点集合内的命题。本文反驳了他们的论点，表明其前提导致难以置信的结果，当一个人试图学习的情况下，通过多次观察，一个特定的结果是否与一个不可测量的区域或可测量的区域相关联。
{"title":"Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?","authors":"Cian Dorr","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad041","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent paper, Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek, and John Hawthorne argue for the rational permissibility of ’credal imprecision’ by appealing to certain propositions associated with non-measurable spatial regions: for example, the proposition that the pointer of a spinner will come to rest within a certain non-measurable set of points on its circumference. This paper rebuts their argument by showing that its premises lead to implausible consequences in cases where one is trying to learn, by making multiple observations, whether a certain outcome is associated with a non-measurable region or a measurable one.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"72 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"110423272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：