Kevin Dorst (2019) uses the ‘manifest unassertability’ of conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know p, then p’ as a new motivation for the KK thesis. In this paper we show that his argumentation is misguided. Plausible heuristics offer a compelling and nuanced explanation of the relevant infelicity data. Meanwhile, Dorst relies on tools that, quite independently of KK, turn out to be rather poor predictors of the infelicity of indicative conditionals.
Kevin Dorst(2019)使用“如果我不知道p，那么p”形式的条件的“明显不可断言性”作为KK论文的新动机。在本文中，我们证明他的论证是错误的。似是而非的启发式提供了一个令人信服和细致入微的解释相关的不可信数据。与此同时，Dorst所依赖的工具完全独立于KK，结果证明它们在指示性条件句的错误性预测上相当糟糕。
{"title":"Infelicitous Conditionals and KK","authors":"John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad046","url":null,"abstract":"Kevin Dorst (2019) uses the ‘manifest unassertability’ of conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know p, then p’ as a new motivation for the KK thesis. In this paper we show that his argumentation is misguided. Plausible heuristics offer a compelling and nuanced explanation of the relevant infelicity data. Meanwhile, Dorst relies on tools that, quite independently of KK, turn out to be rather poor predictors of the infelicity of indicative conditionals.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"14 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"110423312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto Get access Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 229. Igor Douven Igor Douven IHPST / CNRS / Panthéon–Sorbonne University, France igor.douven@univ-paris1.fr Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad051, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad051 Published: 09 November 2023
{"title":"Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto","authors":"Igor Douven","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad051","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto Get access Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 229. Igor Douven Igor Douven IHPST / CNRS / Panthéon–Sorbonne University, France igor.douven@univ-paris1.fr Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad051, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad051 Published: 09 November 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" 22","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135291657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles.
{"title":"The Adoption Problem and the Epistemology of Logic","authors":"Romina Birman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"15 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135430056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Recently, there has been a significant upsurge of interest in what has come to be known as the 'Adoption Problem', first developed by Saul Kripke in 1974. The problem purports to raise a difficulty for Quine’s anti-exceptionalist conception of logic. In what follows, we first offer a statement of the problem and argue that, so understood, it depends upon natural but resistible assumptions. We then use that discussion as a springboard for developing a different adoption problem, arguing that, for a significant class of basic logical principles, there is indeed a difficulty in seeing how they might be ‘freely adopted,’ thereby vindicating something close to the spirit of Kripke’s original claim. This first part of our argument will enforce a significant qualification of Quine’s claim that basic logical principles can be empirically confirmed. In the concluding sections of the paper, we turn to the question, specifically, of the empirical revisability of logic, arguing that when proper attention is paid to the role of reasoning in theory revision, it does indeed emerge that anti-exceptionalism, in full generality, is untenable.
{"title":"Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic","authors":"Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, there has been a significant upsurge of interest in what has come to be known as the 'Adoption Problem', first developed by Saul Kripke in 1974. The problem purports to raise a difficulty for Quine’s anti-exceptionalist conception of logic. In what follows, we first offer a statement of the problem and argue that, so understood, it depends upon natural but resistible assumptions. We then use that discussion as a springboard for developing a different adoption problem, arguing that, for a significant class of basic logical principles, there is indeed a difficulty in seeing how they might be ‘freely adopted,’ thereby vindicating something close to the spirit of Kripke’s original claim. This first part of our argument will enforce a significant qualification of Quine’s claim that basic logical principles can be empirically confirmed. In the concluding sections of the paper, we turn to the question, specifically, of the empirical revisability of logic, arguing that when proper attention is paid to the role of reasoning in theory revision, it does indeed emerge that anti-exceptionalism, in full generality, is untenable.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"15 s2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135430057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Under the influence of Quine’s famous manifesto, many philosophers have thought that logical theories are scientific theories that can be ‘adopted’ and tested as scientific theories. Here we argue that this idea is untenable. We discuss it with special reference to Putnam’s proposal to ‘adopt’ a particular non-classical logic to solve the foundational problems of quantum mechanics in his famous paper ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ (1968), which we argue was not really coherent.
{"title":"The Question of Logic","authors":"Saul A Kripke","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Under the influence of Quine’s famous manifesto, many philosophers have thought that logical theories are scientific theories that can be ‘adopted’ and tested as scientific theories. Here we argue that this idea is untenable. We discuss it with special reference to Putnam’s proposal to ‘adopt’ a particular non-classical logic to solve the foundational problems of quantum mechanics in his famous paper ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ (1968), which we argue was not really coherent.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" 24","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135292808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro Get access Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp vii + 223. Dimitri El Murr Dimitri El Murr Department of Philosophy, École normale supérieure - PSL, France dimitri.el.murr@ens.psl.eu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad059, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059 Published: 04 November 2023
《柏拉图形而上学中的形式与结构》，作者:A. Marmodoro纽约:牛津大学出版社，2021。Pp vii + 223。Dimitri El Murr Dimitri El Murr哲学系，École normale supsamrieure - PSL，法国dimitri.el.murr@ens.psl.eu搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者心智，fzad059, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059出版日期:2023年11月4日
{"title":"Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro","authors":"Dimitri El Murr","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro Get access Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp vii + 223. Dimitri El Murr Dimitri El Murr Department of Philosophy, École normale supérieure - PSL, France dimitri.el.murr@ens.psl.eu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad059, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059 Published: 04 November 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"54 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135775851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Stanley Cavell’s account of aesthetic judgment has two components. The first is a feeling: the judge has to see, hear, or ‘dig’ something in the object being judged; there has to be an ‘emotion’ that the judge feels and expresses. The second is the ‘discipline of accounting for [the judgment]’, a readiness to argue for one’s aesthetic judgment in the face of disagreement. The discipline of accounting for one’s aesthetic judgments involves what Nick Riggle has called a norm of convergence: the judge aims to get one’s audience to taste, see, or hear what the judge tastes or sees or hears in the object being judged. Because of the unmistakable difficulty in reaching agreement in aesthetic judgment, Riggle has denied that aesthetic judgment requires a convergence norm and has proposed instead that it requires ‘a kind of harmony of individuality’ (which Riggle calls ‘vibing’). We argue that Cavell offers a version of the convergence norm that is distinct from those that Riggle criticizes, namely Kant’s demand for agreement and Andy Egan’s presupposition of similarity in dispositions in ‘non-defective’ aesthetic conversations. Cavell’s version of the convergence norm is ‘the hope of agreement’. One can hope that one’s audience will agree with one’s aesthetic judgments even when one isn’t in a position to demand agreement or to presuppose similarity in the dispositions that would make agreement more likely. Cavell’s distinct convergence norm avoids Riggle’s criticisms and contributes to a richer account of what’s going on when we disagree about aesthetic matters.
{"title":"The Hope of Agreement: Against Vibing Accounts of Aesthetic Judgment","authors":"Nat Hansen, Zed Adams","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Stanley Cavell’s account of aesthetic judgment has two components. The first is a feeling: the judge has to see, hear, or ‘dig’ something in the object being judged; there has to be an ‘emotion’ that the judge feels and expresses. The second is the ‘discipline of accounting for [the judgment]’, a readiness to argue for one’s aesthetic judgment in the face of disagreement. The discipline of accounting for one’s aesthetic judgments involves what Nick Riggle has called a norm of convergence: the judge aims to get one’s audience to taste, see, or hear what the judge tastes or sees or hears in the object being judged. Because of the unmistakable difficulty in reaching agreement in aesthetic judgment, Riggle has denied that aesthetic judgment requires a convergence norm and has proposed instead that it requires ‘a kind of harmony of individuality’ (which Riggle calls ‘vibing’). We argue that Cavell offers a version of the convergence norm that is distinct from those that Riggle criticizes, namely Kant’s demand for agreement and Andy Egan’s presupposition of similarity in dispositions in ‘non-defective’ aesthetic conversations. Cavell’s version of the convergence norm is ‘the hope of agreement’. One can hope that one’s audience will agree with one’s aesthetic judgments even when one isn’t in a position to demand agreement or to presuppose similarity in the dispositions that would make agreement more likely. Cavell’s distinct convergence norm avoids Riggle’s criticisms and contributes to a richer account of what’s going on when we disagree about aesthetic matters.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135975679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit, by Sally Sedgwick Get access Time and History in Hegelian Thought and Spirit, by Sally Sedgwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. ix + 194. Andreja Novakovic Andreja Novakovic University of California, Berkeley, USA andreja@berkeley.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad060, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad060 Published: 19 October 2023
《黑格尔思想与精神中的时间与历史》，莎莉·塞奇威克著。牛津:牛津大学出版社，2023。Pp. ix + 194安德烈亚·诺瓦科维奇安德烈亚·诺瓦科维奇加州大学伯克利分校，美国andreja@berkeley.edu搜索作者的其他作品:Oxford Academic谷歌Scholar Mind, fzad060, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad060出版日期:2023年10月19日
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There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are (in one or another sense) ultimate. I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary objects as a case study, I show that the arguments that animate these debates bear directly on the question of which objects there are and cannot plausibly be recast as arguments about what’s ultimate. I then address the objection that, because they are easily answerable, questions about what there is cannot be a proper subject of ontological debate.
{"title":"Why Care About What There Is?","authors":"Daniel Z Korman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad058","url":null,"abstract":"There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are (in one or another sense) ultimate. I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary objects as a case study, I show that the arguments that animate these debates bear directly on the question of which objects there are and cannot plausibly be recast as arguments about what’s ultimate. I then address the objection that, because they are easily answerable, questions about what there is cannot be a proper subject of ontological debate.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"1 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71435274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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