{"title":"Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains, by Ernest Sosa","authors":"Errol Lord","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48518401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract As most philosophers recognize, the body’s central role in touch differs from the role it plays in the other sense modalities. Any account of touch must then explain the pivotal nature of the body’s involvement in touch. Unlike most accounts of touch, this paper argues that the body’s centrality in touch is not phenomenological or experiential: the body is not felt in any special way in tactile experiences. Building on Aristotle’s account in De Anima, I argue that the body is central in touch because it is the medium of tactile perception. Touch depends on the body as vision and audition depend on air or any medium that can transmit light or sound waves. I show that it is precisely because the body must be transparent in order to transmit tangible properties that it cannot be perceived or experienced in tactile perception. Although this account conflicts with the widespread view that tactile perception is mediated by bodily sensations, I maintain that it explains how the structure and constitution of the human body contribute directly to what we feel in tactile experiences and that it provides a better understanding of the relation between the sense of touch and our bodily feelings.
{"title":"Touch and Bodily Transparency","authors":"Vivian Mizrahi","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As most philosophers recognize, the body’s central role in touch differs from the role it plays in the other sense modalities. Any account of touch must then explain the pivotal nature of the body’s involvement in touch. Unlike most accounts of touch, this paper argues that the body’s centrality in touch is not phenomenological or experiential: the body is not felt in any special way in tactile experiences. Building on Aristotle’s account in De Anima, I argue that the body is central in touch because it is the medium of tactile perception. Touch depends on the body as vision and audition depend on air or any medium that can transmit light or sound waves. I show that it is precisely because the body must be transparent in order to transmit tangible properties that it cannot be perceived or experienced in tactile perception. Although this account conflicts with the widespread view that tactile perception is mediated by bodily sensations, I maintain that it explains how the structure and constitution of the human body contribute directly to what we feel in tactile experiences and that it provides a better understanding of the relation between the sense of touch and our bodily feelings.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135647903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, by David Papineau","authors":"Farid Masrour","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46392985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
kk states that knowing entails knowing that one knows, and K¬K states that not knowing entails knowing that one does not know. In light of the arguments against kk and K¬K, one might consider modally qualified variants of those principles. According to weak kk, knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. And according to weak K¬K, not knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one does not know. This paper shows that weak kk and weak K¬K are much stronger than they initially appear. Jointly, they entail kk and K¬K. And they are susceptible to variants of the standard arguments against kk and K¬K. This has interesting implications for the debate on positive introspection and for deeper issues concerning the structure and limits of knowability.
{"title":"KK, Knowledge, Knowability","authors":"Weng Kin San","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 kk states that knowing entails knowing that one knows, and K¬K states that not knowing entails knowing that one does not know. In light of the arguments against kk and K¬K, one might consider modally qualified variants of those principles. According to weak kk, knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. And according to weak K¬K, not knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one does not know. This paper shows that weak kk and weak K¬K are much stronger than they initially appear. Jointly, they entail kk and K¬K. And they are susceptible to variants of the standard arguments against kk and K¬K. This has interesting implications for the debate on positive introspection and for deeper issues concerning the structure and limits of knowability.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43243913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a relation does not even require possibly being something.
{"title":"Being Somehow Without (Possibly) Being Something","authors":"Peter Fritz","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac052","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a relation does not even require possibly being something.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48409944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first programme in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which this limitation can be overcome. Building on the best arguments in finite domains, I present two accuracy arguments for probabilism that are perfectly general—they apply to credence functions with arbitrary domains. I then discuss how the arguments’ premisses can be challenged. We will see that it is particularly difficult to characterize admissible accuracy measures in infinite domains.
{"title":"Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains","authors":"Michael Nielsen","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac053","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first programme in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which this limitation can be overcome. Building on the best arguments in finite domains, I present two accuracy arguments for probabilism that are perfectly general—they apply to credence functions with arbitrary domains. I then discuss how the arguments’ premisses can be challenged. We will see that it is particularly difficult to characterize admissible accuracy measures in infinite domains.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44569093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Meaning, Truth, and the Limits of Analysis: Ten Studies, by David Wiggins","authors":"C. Misak","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac037","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48941862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, by Bernard Reginster","authors":"Andrew Huddleston","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41544914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Everyone will find something interesting in this book, and many will find something or other that they completely disagree with. William Demopoulos was no fan of ‘isms’, and he was no builder of systems. As a result, this book — written during Demopoulos’s decade-long battle with terminal illness — does not provide a sustained defence of realism, antirealism, pragmatism, or whatever-ism. Similarly, one would be hard pressed to identify some key motive behind Demopoulos’s work, such as, for example, the naturalism that served as the polestar for the work of Quine and Lewis. Nonetheless, Demopoulos spent his entire career developing well-informed stances on most of the issues that occupy philosophers of science (especially philosophers of physics), and his considered opinions are unique, and sometimes in stark opposition to those of other philosophers in the field. So this book will, or at least should, provoke many new discussions and debates. In keeping with Demopoulos’s style, I will not attempt to put his diverse ideas into a simple nutshell. But I will take a few of the points he makes in this book, and explain why they are so interesting, important, and worthy of our attention.
{"title":"On Theories: Logical Empiricism and the Methodology of Modern Physics, by William Demopoulos","authors":"Hans Halvorson","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac065","url":null,"abstract":"Everyone will find something interesting in this book, and many will find something or other that they completely disagree with. William Demopoulos was no fan of ‘isms’, and he was no builder of systems. As a result, this book — written during Demopoulos’s decade-long battle with terminal illness — does not provide a sustained defence of realism, antirealism, pragmatism, or whatever-ism. Similarly, one would be hard pressed to identify some key motive behind Demopoulos’s work, such as, for example, the naturalism that served as the polestar for the work of Quine and Lewis. Nonetheless, Demopoulos spent his entire career developing well-informed stances on most of the issues that occupy philosophers of science (especially philosophers of physics), and his considered opinions are unique, and sometimes in stark opposition to those of other philosophers in the field. So this book will, or at least should, provoke many new discussions and debates. In keeping with Demopoulos’s style, I will not attempt to put his diverse ideas into a simple nutshell. But I will take a few of the points he makes in this book, and explain why they are so interesting, important, and worthy of our attention.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135245359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The term ‘epistemic trespassing’ has recently been coined to denote a person’s judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number of distinctions, I argue that while intra-scientific trespassing testimony may seriously hamper scientific collaboration, it does not invariably do so and may even be beneficial to it.
{"title":"Trespassing Testimony in Scientific Collaboration","authors":"Mikkel Gerken","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac072","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The term ‘epistemic trespassing’ has recently been coined to denote a person’s judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number of distinctions, I argue that while intra-scientific trespassing testimony may seriously hamper scientific collaboration, it does not invariably do so and may even be beneficial to it.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41876912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：