{"title":"The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism, by Theron Pummer","authors":"Daniel Muñoz","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"267 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill Get access Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xii + 365. Raphael Woolf Raphael Woolf King’s College London, UK raphael.g.woolf@kcl.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad044, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044 Published: 19 September 2023
期刊文章《学习自然生活:斯多葛伦理学及其现代意义》，克里斯托弗·吉尔著。牛津:牛津大学出版社，2022。Pp. xii + 365拉斐尔·伍尔夫拉斐尔·伍尔夫伦敦国王学院，英国raphael.g.woolf@kcl.ac.uk搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者思想，fzad044, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044出版日期:2023年9月19日
{"title":"Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill","authors":"Raphael Woolf","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill Get access Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xii + 365. Raphael Woolf Raphael Woolf King’s College London, UK raphael.g.woolf@kcl.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad044, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044 Published: 19 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article explores the connection between Boolean-valued class models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary entity. According to this view, the set-theoretic universe can be in many different states. These states are structurally like Boolean-valued models, and they contain sets conceived of as variable or arbitrary objects.
{"title":"Boolean-Valued Sets as Arbitrary Objects","authors":"Leon Horsten","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the connection between Boolean-valued class models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary entity. According to this view, the set-theoretic universe can be in many different states. These states are structurally like Boolean-valued models, and they contain sets conceived of as variable or arbitrary objects.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135257680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life, by Jonathan Lear","authors":"R Jay Wallace","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Our decision-theoretic states are not luminous. We are imperfectly reliable at identifying our own credences, utilities and available acts, and thus can never be more than imperfectly reliable at identifying the prescriptions of decision theory. The lack of luminosity affords decision theory a remarkable opportunity — to issue guidance on the basis of epistemically inaccessible facts. We show how a decision theory can guarantee action in accordance with contingent truths about which an agent is arbitrarily uncertain. It may seem that such advantages would require dubiously adverting to externalist facts that go beyond the internalism of traditional decision theory, but this is not so. Using only the standard repertoire of decision-theoretic tools, we show how to modify existing decision theories to take advantage of this opportunity. These improved decision theories require agents to maximize conditional expected utility — expected utility conditional upon an agent’s actual decision situation. We call such modified decision theories ‘self-confident’. These self-confident decision theories have a distinct advantage over standard decision theories: their prescriptions are better.
{"title":"Decision Theory without Luminosity","authors":"Yoaav Isaacs, Benjamin A Levinstein","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Our decision-theoretic states are not luminous. We are imperfectly reliable at identifying our own credences, utilities and available acts, and thus can never be more than imperfectly reliable at identifying the prescriptions of decision theory. The lack of luminosity affords decision theory a remarkable opportunity — to issue guidance on the basis of epistemically inaccessible facts. We show how a decision theory can guarantee action in accordance with contingent truths about which an agent is arbitrarily uncertain. It may seem that such advantages would require dubiously adverting to externalist facts that go beyond the internalism of traditional decision theory, but this is not so. Using only the standard repertoire of decision-theoretic tools, we show how to modify existing decision theories to take advantage of this opportunity. These improved decision theories require agents to maximize conditional expected utility — expected utility conditional upon an agent’s actual decision situation. We call such modified decision theories ‘self-confident’. These self-confident decision theories have a distinct advantage over standard decision theories: their prescriptions are better.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136298515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frege on Language, Logic & Psychology, by Eva Picardi","authors":"Mark Textor","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136361726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hsueh M. Qu has recently argued that Hume’s famed ‘Separability Principle’ from the Treatise entangles him in a contradiction. Qu offers a modified principle as a solution but also argues that the mature Hume would not have needed to avail himself of it, given that Hume’s arguments in the first Enquiry do not depend on this principle in any form. To the contrary, I show that arguments in the first Enquiry depend on this principle, but I agree with Qu that Qu’s solution to Hume’s quandary frees him of the contradiction. Next, I compare Qu’s solution to Hume’s original position. By analysing the divergent forms of 'Hume’s Dictum’ that follow from them, I show that Qu’s solution and Hume’s original position have significantly different consequences in a range of domains, including Hume’s modality. Generally, Qu’s solution fits better with Hume’s other commitments—even though Hume often fails to recognize it—thereby increasing its plausibility.
{"title":"Hume’s Separability Principle, his Dictum, and their Implications","authors":"G. Clay","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Hsueh M. Qu has recently argued that Hume’s famed ‘Separability Principle’ from the Treatise entangles him in a contradiction. Qu offers a modified principle as a solution but also argues that the mature Hume would not have needed to avail himself of it, given that Hume’s arguments in the first Enquiry do not depend on this principle in any form. To the contrary, I show that arguments in the first Enquiry depend on this principle, but I agree with Qu that Qu’s solution to Hume’s quandary frees him of the contradiction. Next, I compare Qu’s solution to Hume’s original position. By analysing the divergent forms of 'Hume’s Dictum’ that follow from them, I show that Qu’s solution and Hume’s original position have significantly different consequences in a range of domains, including Hume’s modality. Generally, Qu’s solution fits better with Hume’s other commitments—even though Hume often fails to recognize it—thereby increasing its plausibility.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46807733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love, Berislav Marušić","authors":"Kyla Ebels-Duggan","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44154649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang Get access Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. vii + 282. Sharon Crasnow Sharon Crasnow Norco College, United States of America sharon.crasnow@norcocollege.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad038, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad038 Published: 01 September 2023
{"title":"Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang","authors":"Sharon Crasnow","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad038","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang Get access Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. vii + 282. Sharon Crasnow Sharon Crasnow Norco College, United States of America sharon.crasnow@norcocollege.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad038, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad038 Published: 01 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136353964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester Get access In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019. Pp. xxii + 402. Alan Thomas Alan Thomas University of York, United Kingdom ap.thomas@york.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad030, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030 Published: 23 August 2023
《在正义的阴影下:战后自由主义与政治哲学的重塑》，作者:Katrina Forrester普林斯顿，新泽西州:普林斯顿大学出版社，2019。第22页+ 402页。Alan Thomas英国约克大学Alan Thomas ap.thomas@york.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195搜索作者的其他作品:Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad030, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030发布日期:2023年8月23日
{"title":"<i>In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy</i>, by Katrina Forrester","authors":"Alan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester Get access In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019. Pp. xxii + 402. Alan Thomas Alan Thomas University of York, United Kingdom ap.thomas@york.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad030, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030 Published: 23 August 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"06 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135571241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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