Development and Change最新文献

Anti-extractivist critique still positions Indigenous people as protagonists of counter-modern political sentiment, whether as opponents of modernity's processes of productive rationalization and economic integration, or as embodying ontologies that reject modernity's conceptual separation of humanity from natural resources. Indigenous anti-extractivism is thus said to represent a rupture of modern politics in that it exceeds politics as we know it. Yet the calculus of modern politics remains central to Indigenous responses to resource extraction, even in social contexts where non-modern ontological suppositions are widely adhered to. This is illustrated through an ethnography of Indigenous mining in the southern Ecuadorean Amazon and national-level electoral data showing the sweeping support of Indigenous people for former leftist President Rafael Correa's ‘neo-extractivist’ programme. This persistent modernity of Indigenous resource politics exposes the fallacy of projecting counter-modern sentiments onto Indigenous peoples.

OPHI and UNDP, Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2022: Unpacking Deprivation Bundles to Reduce Multidimensional Poverty. Oxford and New York: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative and United Nations Development Programme, 2022. 39 pp. https://ophi.org.uk/global-mpi-report-2022/

Few questions are more fraught, or more consequential, than the number of people in the world who are poor, and whether that number is rising or falling. There is no shortage of high-profile liberal ideologues who, in recent years, have been happy to claim that global capitalism has managed to drive down the global poverty rate from some 90 per cent at the turn of the 19th century to around 10–15 per cent today. This claim was made perhaps most (in)famously in recent years by Steven Pinker in his 2018 bestselling book Enlightenment Now. Pinker's data and claims about poverty draw heavily on economist Martin Ravallion's work,1 although he notably brushes aside the latter's caveats and methodological caution in favour of burnishing a teleological narrative of inexorable rationalization, enlightenment and progress.

Such claims echo a longer history of optimistic readings of the capacity of neoliberal capitalism to counter poverty2 and are overwhelmingly based on income-threshold measures of extreme poverty that Ravallion and colleagues originally helped to develop and popularize in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Ravallion et al., 1991). This approach to measuring poverty has long been contested (see Wade, 2004). For instance, based on other measures of poverty such as estimates of real wages and data on height and mortality rates, Dylan Sullivan and Jason Hickel (2023) have recently argued that the rise of capitalism has in fact worsened extreme poverty globally.

Such divergent assessments of the level and trajectory of global poverty are possible in part because measuring poverty is slippery business. Analysts must deal with patchy data, alongside thorny methodological and measurement problems, which are ultimately grafted on top of foundationally contested normative and political questions about what exactly poverty entails (see Fischer, 2018). Whether income thresholds are an adequate or meaningful way of understanding and counting poverty, especially on a world–historical scale, is first and foremost a normative question, even though it often masquerades as a technical problem.

Poverty measures are no less contested at lower levels of aggregation, however. They are invariably both objects of political contention and tools of statecraft. Katharina Lenner, for instance, shows how the contested construction of poverty measures in Jordan simultaneously renders poverty intelligible to the state while also ‘obscur[ing] worsening socio-economic situations, and deflect[ing] responsibility for the situation away from government offices’ (Lenner, 202

The debt crises looming in developing countries are being exacerbated by changing debt composition. Declining net foreign exchange earnings have worsened their predicament. As concessional development finance declined, many governments turned to riskier forms of borrowing from international capital markets. Concerted interest rate hikes are supposed to stem inflation; however, given that prices have mainly risen due to supply chain disruptions caused by war, sanctions and pandemic, interest rate increases are likely to trigger more debt crises, much worse than before. Current discourses, for example about China's ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, distract from urgently needed international and national measures to avert the looming debt crises.

Local financial institutions can play a crucial role in reducing income inequalities at the within-country level by promoting inclusive economic growth and development across time and space. This is against a backdrop of increasing financial and economic fragility, to which emerging economies have also been exposed over more recent decades and years. This article adds emerging economy evidence from Brazil to an empirical literature on the income inequality implications of cooperative financial institutions. Panel-data estimations for 2004‒19 reveal that Brazilian credit cooperatives have gone beyond commercial banks in supporting communities that have traditionally been underserved financially. Additionally, the article provides new evidence and insights on credit cooperatives’ resilience in the context of a relatively recent but severe economic crisis in Brazil. The results indicate that credit cooperatives have helped fill gaps in finance and economic opportunity that tend to arise in an emerging economy setting. Furthermore, the contribution of credit cooperatives in filling these gaps is found to be more significant at lower levels of development. These findings add theoretical and, importantly, empirical support to the relationship channel of financial inclusion, which is in line with the optimistic perspective in this debate.

The COVID-19 pandemic motivated calls for the field of development studies to be recast. This article analyses two prominent, future-gazing ‘pandemic papers’ to illustrate salient features of the ascendant trend towards a new ‘global development’ paradigm. By unpacking and interpreting major lines of reasoning put forward by two agenda-setting articles, this contribution appraises how these texts make the case for the future of development studies. Through this analysis, the article questions the core arguments that seek to shift the contours of the discipline, and thus the study of development generally. In making their call to adopt a universalist or global development framework that includes a focus on Europe and North America, the authors of the ‘pandemic papers’ overlook the Southern origins of and justifications for the North‒South framework they seek to overturn. The present article acknowledges the importance of and supports returning to and advancing — rather than jettisoning — the intellectual lineage anchored in non-Truman understandings of development, including as a popular project of Southern emancipation from colonial, imperial and structural subordination. Rather than de-centring the global North‒South framework, it suggests that the analytically more useful way forward is for development studies to (re)centre the global South and use global South theories and lenses to better understand the world economy and the majority world.

The notion of green growth emphasizes environmental and climate policies that make economic activities more sustainable while contributing to higher growth. In developing countries, the ability of such policies to help solve the most pressing economic challenges is essential for green growth to be a viable concept. Notably, current account deficits, foreign exchange shortage and external debt accumulation are serious obstacles to economic development. The analysis in this article therefore approaches green growth from a new perspective. With a focus on energy, the article estimates the impact of the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy on the balance-of-payments constrained growth of energy-importing developing and emerging economies. It assumes that their current economic structure otherwise remains the same. Since renewable energy production is more efficient than fossil fuel combustion and reduces import dependence, the energy transition increases the annual balance-of-payments constrained growth rate of the selected countries by up to 2.5 percentage points on average in a scenario from the present until 2050. This means that policies in favour of renewable energy allow those countries to grow faster without accumulating foreign debt or even triggering currency crises. Consequently, staying with the current fossil fuel-based energy system implies missing a significant potential for growth and development.

This article examines whether the transitional government in the wake of the December 2018 Sudanese revolution succeeded in realigning social policy with public demands. The article focuses on the evolution of cash transfer programmes from the 2012 cash programme under the Ingaz regime to the transitional government's programme 2021. While the recent programme was popularly viewed as a ‘World Bank programme’, its originators were in fact Sudanese professionals. Similarly, the Ingaz regime experimented with cash transfers before seeking out World Bank technical support. In this sense, cash transfers cannot be seen as an external imposition, as domestic actors have favoured them across different regimes. Yet, their appeal may still reflect the ‘choicelessness’ that Thandika Mkandawire associated with structural adjustment, as in both cases cash transfers were introduced as part of broader economic reform. Sudan's case is distinct in the sense that its domestic policy makers did not begrudgingly accept cash transfers but were enthusiastic instigators of them. The article traces the origins of this enthusiasm within Sudan's recent political history and explores the way in which alignment with international mainstream policy making locks Sudan into a bind. The country urgently needs to reverse the fragmentation of social policy along geographic and racial lines, yet these programmes do little to overcome such regional and racial inequalities. Thus, even after a popular revolution displaced the prevailing political settlement and called for radical change, policy makers remain misaligned to public demands.

While much attention has been paid to the ways in which the private sector is now embedded within the field of development, one group of actors — for-profit development consultancies and contractors, or service providers — has received relatively little attention. This article analyses the growing role of for-profit consultancies and contractors in British aid delivery, which has been driven by two key trends: first, the outsourcing of managerial, audit and knowledge-management functions as part of efforts to bring private sector approaches and skills into public spending on aid; and second, the reconfiguration of aid spending towards markets and the private sector, and away from locally embedded, state-focused aid programming. The authors argue that both trends were launched under New Labour in the early 2000s, and super-charged under successive Conservative governments. The resulting entanglement means that the policies and practices of the UK government's aid agencies, and the interests and forms of for-profit service providers, are increasingly mutually constitutive. Amongst other implications, this shift acts to displace traditional forms of contestation and accountability of aid delivery.

Forest frontiers are important areas for sustainable development as they combine the need to halt deforestation with the challenges of rural poverty. In the region of San Martín, Peru, the ‘Production, Protection and Inclusion’ model combines narratives of conservation, economic development and social inclusion in what can be defined as a ‘sustainable development frontier’. This article asks how such sustainable development frontiers change social, economic and ecological outcomes in the localities where they are found. The authors examine the reality of sustainable cocoa production linked to conservation and development goals, as promoted by government bodies, international agencies, cooperatives and chocolate brands in Peru, and show how, paradoxically, sustainability goals intensify production and attract smallholders into forest frontier areas. In doing so, the boom in demand for sustainable commodities has inadvertently created conditions encouraging further colonization of forested areas leading to a continuing rise in deforestation, ecological degradation and economic instability. Narratives of sustainable development can thus reinforce commodity intensification, as they obscure alternative approaches and reproduce traditional frontier dynamics.