{"title":"Sustainability Policies and Practices for Corporate Governance in Latin America","authors":"","doi":"10.1787/76df2285-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/76df2285-en","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91388779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.
Research Findings/Insights
In a hand-collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside-promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.
Theoretical/Academic Implications
Our study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
Our evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.
{"title":"An axe to grind: Family outsiders and firms doing good","authors":"Fuxiu Jiang, Ping Jiang, Xiaojia Zheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12509","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12509","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In a hand-collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside-promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"921-944"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45742289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12498","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12498","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"253-257"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42219200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CGIR Review Issue 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12499","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"249"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50146405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CGIR Paper Development Workshop","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12512","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12512","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"250"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46582657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CGIR Special Issues","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12511","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"251-252"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50127317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<div> <section> <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3> <p>Studies on business groups, a collection of legally separate firms operating in unrelated industries under common control, tend to compare the behavior of firms affiliated with business groups and firms that are independent companies. Unfortunately, this ignores the diversity among business groups based on their controlling owner. Hence, in this conceptual article, we study how the types of controlling owners impact the diversification and internationalization of business groups.</p> </section> <section> <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3> <p>Building on agency theory, we separate business groups into five types based on their ultimate controlling owners (state, labor, family, mutual, and bank) and identify their nonfinancial objectives. We argue that their nonfinancial objectives result in diverging levels of diversification and internationalization of business groups across owner types. Specifically, we propose that state-owned and bank-owned business groups have a relatively high level of diversification, labor-owned and mutual-owned business groups have a relatively moderate level, and family-owned business groups have a relatively low level. We also argue that state-owned and labor-owned business groups have a relatively low level of internationalization, family-owned business groups have a relatively moderate level, and mutual-owned and bank-owned business groups have a relatively high level. We add depth to these ideas by proposing that pro-market reforms alter owners' ability to achieve their nonfinancial objectives, leading to diverging changes in business groups' diversification and internationalization across owner types. Specifically, we propose that following pro-market reforms, state-owned and bank-owned business groups experience a large decrease in their level of diversification, labor-owned and mutual-owned business groups see a moderate decrease, and family-owned business groups have a small decrease. We also argue that pro-market reforms lead state-owned and labor-owned business groups to have a small increase in their level of internationalization, family-owned a moderate increase, and mutual-owned and bank-owned to experience a large increase.</p> </section> <section> <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3> <p>To the business groups literature, we highlight the importance of controlling owners and their nonfinancial objectives as the drivers of business group diversification and internationalization, complementing the usual focus on market imperfections. To agency theory, we highlight the diversity of owners' nonfinancial objectives and explain how these affect strategy, complementing the traditional focus on differences in objectiv
{"title":"Owners' nonfinancial objectives and the diversification and internationalization of business groups","authors":"Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Asli M. Colpan","doi":"10.1111/corg.12507","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12507","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Studies on business groups, a collection of legally separate firms operating in unrelated industries under common control, tend to compare the behavior of firms affiliated with business groups and firms that are independent companies. Unfortunately, this ignores the diversity among business groups based on their controlling owner. Hence, in this conceptual article, we study how the types of controlling owners impact the diversification and internationalization of business groups.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Building on agency theory, we separate business groups into five types based on their ultimate controlling owners (state, labor, family, mutual, and bank) and identify their nonfinancial objectives. We argue that their nonfinancial objectives result in diverging levels of diversification and internationalization of business groups across owner types. Specifically, we propose that state-owned and bank-owned business groups have a relatively high level of diversification, labor-owned and mutual-owned business groups have a relatively moderate level, and family-owned business groups have a relatively low level. We also argue that state-owned and labor-owned business groups have a relatively low level of internationalization, family-owned business groups have a relatively moderate level, and mutual-owned and bank-owned business groups have a relatively high level. We add depth to these ideas by proposing that pro-market reforms alter owners' ability to achieve their nonfinancial objectives, leading to diverging changes in business groups' diversification and internationalization across owner types. Specifically, we propose that following pro-market reforms, state-owned and bank-owned business groups experience a large decrease in their level of diversification, labor-owned and mutual-owned business groups see a moderate decrease, and family-owned business groups have a small decrease. We also argue that pro-market reforms lead state-owned and labor-owned business groups to have a small increase in their level of internationalization, family-owned a moderate increase, and mutual-owned and bank-owned to experience a large increase.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>To the business groups literature, we highlight the importance of controlling owners and their nonfinancial objectives as the drivers of business group diversification and internationalization, complementing the usual focus on market imperfections. To agency theory, we highlight the diversity of owners' nonfinancial objectives and explain how these affect strategy, complementing the traditional focus on differences in objectiv","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"869-891"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45184092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-981-99-2707-4
Shital Jhunjhunwala
{"title":"Corporate Governance: Creating Value for Stakeholders","authors":"Shital Jhunjhunwala","doi":"10.1007/978-981-99-2707-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2707-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89325472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Relying on enhanced market power and improved information environment associated with institutional cross-ownership, this paper examines the relation between institutional cross-ownership and trade credit in China.
Research Findings/Insights
Listed firms with cross-ownership can obtain more trade credit. The main conclusion is robust when we consider endogeneity problems, alternative measures of institutional cross-ownership, and the effect of a financial crisis. Further, we perform several tests to examine the influencing mechanisms, confirming that the positive relation between institutional cross-ownership and trade credit is more pronounced for listed firms in more competitive industries, or with poorer information environment. Further analysis also finds that the positive effect of institutional cross-ownership on trade credit is more prominent for listed firms with fewer bank loans.
Theoretical/Academic Implications
This paper emphasizes information sharing and cooperation among listed firms with institutional cross-ownership and argues that the information improvement effect is a relatively more important mechanism in affecting listed firms' decisions.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
China's market-oriented reform is in progress and shows some weaknesses in corporate governance and investor protection. The research focusing on institutional cross-ownership can provide useful suggestions for policy makers on how to improve corporate governance and construct efficient capital markets.
{"title":"Institutional cross-ownership and trade credit: Evidence from China","authors":"Huan Liu, Canran Hou","doi":"10.1111/corg.12505","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12505","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Relying on enhanced market power and improved information environment associated with institutional cross-ownership, this paper examines the relation between institutional cross-ownership and trade credit in China.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Listed firms with cross-ownership can obtain more trade credit. The main conclusion is robust when we consider endogeneity problems, alternative measures of institutional cross-ownership, and the effect of a financial crisis. Further, we perform several tests to examine the influencing mechanisms, confirming that the positive relation between institutional cross-ownership and trade credit is more pronounced for listed firms in more competitive industries, or with poorer information environment. Further analysis also finds that the positive effect of institutional cross-ownership on trade credit is more prominent for listed firms with fewer bank loans.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper emphasizes information sharing and cooperation among listed firms with institutional cross-ownership and argues that the information improvement effect is a relatively more important mechanism in affecting listed firms' decisions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>China's market-oriented reform is in progress and shows some weaknesses in corporate governance and investor protection. The research focusing on institutional cross-ownership can provide useful suggestions for policy makers on how to improve corporate governance and construct efficient capital markets.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"845-868"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41598375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aaron Afzali, Minna Martikainen, Lars Oxelheim, Trond Randøy
Research Question/Issue
Motivated by the agency theory and the findings of linguistic studies, we analyze the association between the internationalization of a firm's audit committee and its corporate governance.
Research Findings/Insights
Based on data from 2159 publicly traded European firms from 15 countries for the period 2000–2018, we find that firms with foreign directors on their audit committees are associated with lower financial reporting quality. The association is mitigated by stronger country-level investor protection and a higher similarity among intra-committee languages. We further find that foreign directors on the audit committee are related to stock prices being less informative about future earnings.
Theoretical/Academic Implication
In this study, we argue that language differences create communication difficulties that weaken social integration between foreign directors and the other parties involved in overseeing financial reporting, thus hampering their ability to monitor effectively.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
The results indicate that foreign directors on a corporate board increase its independence. However, appointing foreign directors to the firm's audit committee may compromise the board's monitoring function.
{"title":"On the role of internationalization of firm-level corporate governance: The case of audit committees","authors":"Aaron Afzali, Minna Martikainen, Lars Oxelheim, Trond Randøy","doi":"10.1111/corg.12503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12503","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Motivated by the agency theory and the findings of linguistic studies, we analyze the association between the internationalization of a firm's audit committee and its corporate governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on data from 2159 publicly traded European firms from 15 countries for the period 2000–2018, we find that firms with foreign directors on their audit committees are associated with lower financial reporting quality. The association is mitigated by stronger country-level investor protection and a higher similarity among intra-committee languages. We further find that foreign directors on the audit committee are related to stock prices being less informative about future earnings.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implication</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this study, we argue that language differences create communication difficulties that weaken social integration between foreign directors and the other parties involved in overseeing financial reporting, thus hampering their ability to monitor effectively.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The results indicate that foreign directors on a corporate board increase its independence. However, appointing foreign directors to the firm's audit committee may compromise the board's monitoring function.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 5","pages":"737-758"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12503","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号