Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献

英文中文

Stock market response to the statement on the purpose of a corporation: A vindication of stakeholder theory 股票市场对公司宗旨声明的反应:利益相关者理论的证明

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12508

Mina Glambosky, Surendranath Rakesh Jory, Thanh Ngo

Research Question/Issue

On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable (2019) released a statement signed by 181 chief executive officers (CEOs) of well-known US corporations, in which they pledged “a fundamental commitment” to “deliver value to all” stakeholders. This study examines the stock market reaction to this new statement on the purpose of a corporation.

Research Findings/Insights

Based on a sample of 163 publicly listed companies that signed the pledge, the results show that investors react positively to a firm's pledge in the days surrounding the statement release. The consensus among stock market investors was robust, characterized by the low volatility in the share price post-announcement date. The decision by these companies, though intended to maximize the wealth of all stakeholders, rather than shareholders alone, carries an opportunity cost. Specifically, a post-announcement decline in share buybacks by pledge firms relative to control firms is observed, though investors embracing stakeholder theory appear undeterred by the reduction in distributions.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

This study provides empirical support that, in the evolving business environment, companies must emphasize issues that concern customers, employees, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the government. Failure to prioritize these issues may engender public backlash, especially in the age of social media. However, the attention to stakeholders is compatible with the focus on shareholder performance. Performance suffers when customers leave, workers feel dissatisfied, NGOs call for boycotts, and governments levy fines. Corporations seeking to increase shareholder wealth will need to fully embrace stakeholder concerns.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study shows that adopting a stakeholder perspective unlocked value that would not have been achieved had the focus remained on shareholder primacy. The excess values may derive from greater customer loyalty, improved employee motivation, better supplier relations, supportive financiers, maximizing revenue, minimizing costs, and/or yielding higher profits. Shareholders anticipate greater long-term value from companies emphasizing employees, communities, supply chain, financiers, and shareholders.

2019年8月19日，商业圆桌会议(2019)发布了一份由181名美国知名企业首席执行官签署的声明，承诺“为所有利益相关者创造价值”。本研究考察了股票市场对公司目的这一新声明的反应。研究结果/见解基于163家签署了承诺的上市公司的样本，结果显示，投资者在声明发布的几天内对公司的承诺反应积极。股市投资者的共识是强劲的，其特点是公告发布后股价波动较小。尽管这些公司的决策是为了使所有利益相关者的财富最大化，而不仅仅是股东的财富最大化，但这是有机会成本的。具体而言，我们观察到质押公司的股票回购在公告发布后相对于控股公司有所下降，尽管信奉利益相关者理论的投资者似乎并未被分配减少所吓倒。本研究提供了实证支持，在不断变化的商业环境中，公司必须重视与客户、员工、非政府组织(ngo)和政府有关的问题。如果不能优先考虑这些问题，可能会引起公众的强烈反对，尤其是在社交媒体时代。然而，对利益相关者的关注与对股东绩效的关注是相容的。当顾客离开、员工感到不满、非政府组织呼吁抵制、政府征收罚款时，业绩就会受到影响。寻求增加股东财富的公司需要充分考虑利益相关者的担忧。从业者/政策启示本研究表明，采用利益相关者视角释放的价值，如果焦点仍然是股东至上，就无法实现。超额价值可能来自于更大的客户忠诚度、更好的员工激励、更好的供应商关系、支持性融资、最大化收入、最小化成本和/或产生更高的利润。股东期望从重视员工、社区、供应链、金融家和股东的公司获得更大的长期价值。

{"title":"Stock market response to the statement on the purpose of a corporation: A vindication of stakeholder theory","authors":"Mina Glambosky, Surendranath Rakesh Jory, Thanh Ngo","doi":"10.1111/corg.12508","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12508","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable (2019) released a statement signed by 181 chief executive officers (CEOs) of well-known US corporations, in which they pledged “a fundamental commitment” to “deliver value to all” stakeholders. This study examines the stock market reaction to this new statement on the purpose of a corporation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on a sample of 163 publicly listed companies that signed the pledge, the results show that investors react positively to a firm's pledge in the days surrounding the statement release. The consensus among stock market investors was robust, characterized by the low volatility in the share price post-announcement date. The decision by these companies, though intended to maximize the wealth of all stakeholders, rather than shareholders alone, carries an opportunity cost. Specifically, a post-announcement decline in share buybacks by pledge firms relative to control firms is observed, though investors embracing stakeholder theory appear undeterred by the reduction in distributions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study provides empirical support that, in the evolving business environment, companies must emphasize issues that concern customers, employees, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the government. Failure to prioritize these issues may engender public backlash, especially in the age of social media. However, the attention to stakeholders is compatible with the focus on shareholder performance. Performance suffers when customers leave, workers feel dissatisfied, NGOs call for boycotts, and governments levy fines. Corporations seeking to increase shareholder wealth will need to fully embrace stakeholder concerns.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study shows that adopting a stakeholder perspective unlocked value that would not have been achieved had the focus remained on shareholder primacy. The excess values may derive from greater customer loyalty, improved employee motivation, better supplier relations, supportive financiers, maximizing revenue, minimizing costs, and/or yielding higher profits. Shareholders anticipate greater long-term value from companies emphasizing employees, communities, supply chain, financiers, and shareholders.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"892-920"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12508","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46834313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Unification of power and responsibilities for state-owned enterprises: A quasi-natural experiment 国有企业权责统一：一个准自然实验

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12514

Ning Hu, Shilei Yu, Yanan Cao, Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo, Yu Wang

Research Question/Issue

Based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory, this paper uses the establishment of local State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions (SASACs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate whether and how SASACs improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Research Findings/Insights

(1) After the establishment of SASACs, and compared to those not supervised by the SASACs (i.e., the control group), SOEs governed by local SASACs (i.e., the treatment group) have experienced a significant increase in decentralization and empowerment from the government, proxied by corporate pyramid levels. We also find increased pay-performance sensitivity for SOE managers and higher productivity measured by total factor productivity (TFP). (2) SASACs adopt different strategies to manage SOEs in monopolistic and competitive industries. (3) The above effect of the SASACs is more pronounced in SOEs supervised by high-quality governments that effectively protect property rights, enforce fair contracts, apply laws and regulations to everyone, and sufficiently refrain from expropriation.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Using a quasi-natural experiment, this paper expands the existing literature on SOE reform from the perspective of incentive reform at the regulatory level based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

(1) Privatization is not necessarily the only optimal solution for SOE reform. We show that the unification of power and responsibilities can be very effective and is perhaps less costly and more practical than privatization. Thus, our study provides an encouraging solution for SOE reform for other countries. (2) Countries experiencing SOE reform should also work on strengthening their government quality in order to fully maximize the benefit of the reform.

本文基于产权理论和授权理论，以地方国资委的设立为准自然实验，考察国资委是否以及如何提高国有企业的效率。(1)国资委成立后，与不受国资委监管的国有企业(即对照组)相比，由地方国资委管理的国有企业(即处理组)的政府放权和授权程度显著提高，以企业金字塔层级为代表。我们还发现，国有企业管理者的薪酬绩效敏感性增加，全要素生产率(TFP)衡量的生产率也更高。(2)国资委对垄断行业和竞争性行业国有企业的管理策略不同。(3)国资委的上述作用在国有企业中更为明显，这些国有企业由高质量的政府监管，政府有效保护产权，执行公平合同，法律法规适用于每个人，并充分避免征收。本文运用准自然实验，以产权理论和授权理论为基础，从监管层面的激励改革视角，对已有的国有企业改革文献进行了拓展。(1)私有化不一定是国有企业改革的唯一最佳解决方案。我们表明，权力和责任的统一可以非常有效，也许比私有化成本更低，更实际。因此，我们的研究为其他国家的国有企业改革提供了一个令人鼓舞的解决方案。(2)进行国有企业改革的国家还应努力提高政府质量，以充分发挥改革效益的最大化。

{"title":"Unification of power and responsibilities for state-owned enterprises: A quasi-natural experiment","authors":"Ning Hu, Shilei Yu, Yanan Cao, Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo, Yu Wang","doi":"10.1111/corg.12514","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12514","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory, this paper uses the establishment of local State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions (SASACs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate whether and how SASACs improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>(1) After the establishment of SASACs, and compared to those not supervised by the SASACs (i.e., the control group), SOEs governed by local SASACs (i.e., the treatment group) have experienced a significant increase in decentralization and empowerment from the government, proxied by corporate pyramid levels. We also find increased pay-performance sensitivity for SOE managers and higher productivity measured by total factor productivity (TFP). (2) SASACs adopt different strategies to manage SOEs in monopolistic and competitive industries. (3) The above effect of the SASACs is more pronounced in SOEs supervised by high-quality governments that effectively protect property rights, enforce fair contracts, apply laws and regulations to everyone, and sufficiently refrain from expropriation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using a quasi-natural experiment, this paper expands the existing literature on SOE reform from the perspective of incentive reform at the regulatory level based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>(1) Privatization is not necessarily the only optimal solution for SOE reform. We show that the unification of power and responsibilities can be very effective and is perhaps less costly and more practical than privatization. Thus, our study provides an encouraging solution for SOE reform for other countries. (2) Countries experiencing SOE reform should also work on strengthening their government quality in order to fully maximize the benefit of the reform.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"971-993"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43062298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

How boards manage the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness: Illuminating the four board conflict climates 董事会如何处理认知冲突和凝聚力之间的紧张关系：照亮四种董事会冲突氛围

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12516

Marilieke Engbers, Svetlana N. Khapova

Research Question/Issue

Although both cognitive conflict and cohesiveness are quintessential for a supervisory board to fulfill its monitoring and advisory role, cognitive conflict may equally create tension that negatively affects board cohesiveness and performance. How boards manage this tension between conflict and cohesiveness is the key concern of this paper.

Research Findings/Insights

Analysis of the multicase data from 17 Dutch two-tier supervisory boards reveals that how boards manage the tension between conflict and cohesiveness depends on three attributes: (a) board cohesiveness, (b) the board's conflict norms formation and (c) the board's dominant conflict management style. These attributes shape volatile board conflict climates. Four conflict climates are identified: (a) compliance climate, (b) pseudocohesive climate, (c) conflict climate, and (d) agree-to-disagree climate.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our study makes three contributions. First, it suggests that boards avoid conflict but are nonetheless often not cohesive. Second, it reveals that boards have conflict management styles that include action patterns distinct from those reported in the extant literature since these patterns emerged from exploring what board members think and feel but do not openly say. Third, we develop new insights into how boards implicitly and continuously form conflict norms and propose that boards require explicit, conscious, and shared conflict norms to enact productive conflict management action patterns.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

A conceptual model is proposed that facilitates reflection of board decision-making and effectiveness and that maps out actions the boards can take to address the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness.

研究问题/议题虽然认知冲突和凝聚力都是监事会履行其监督和咨询职责的必要条件，但认知冲突同样会造成紧张关系，从而对董事会的凝聚力和绩效产生负面影响。董事会如何处理这种冲突与凝聚力之间的矛盾，是本文关注的重点。研究结果/见解对 17 个荷兰两级监事会的多案例数据进行分析后发现，董事会如何管理冲突与凝聚力之间的紧张关系取决于三个属性：（a）董事会的凝聚力；（b）董事会冲突规范的形成；（c）董事会主导的冲突管理风格。这些属性决定了动荡的董事会冲突氛围。确定了四种冲突氛围：(a) 服从氛围，(b) 伪凝聚氛围，(c) 冲突氛围，以及 (d) 同意-反对氛围。理论/学术意义我们的研究有三方面的贡献。首先，它表明董事会可以避免冲突，但往往缺乏凝聚力。其次，它揭示了董事会的冲突管理方式，其中包括与现有文献报道不同的行动模式，因为这些模式是通过探究董事会成员的所思所感而产生的，但并没有公开说出来。第三，我们对董事会如何潜移默化地持续形成冲突规范有了新的认识，并提出董事会需要明确、有意识和共享的冲突规范来制定富有成效的冲突管理行动模式。实践者/政策启示我们提出了一个概念模型，该模型有助于反思董事会的决策和有效性，并描绘出董事会可以采取的行动，以解决认知冲突和凝聚力之间的矛盾。

{"title":"How boards manage the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness: Illuminating the four board conflict climates","authors":"Marilieke Engbers, Svetlana N. Khapova","doi":"10.1111/corg.12516","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12516","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Although both cognitive conflict and cohesiveness are quintessential for a supervisory board to fulfill its monitoring and advisory role, cognitive conflict may equally create tension that negatively affects board cohesiveness and performance. How boards manage this tension between conflict and cohesiveness is the key concern of this paper.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Analysis of the multicase data from 17 Dutch two-tier supervisory boards reveals that how boards manage the tension between conflict and cohesiveness depends on three attributes: (a) board cohesiveness, (b) the board's conflict norms formation and (c) the board's dominant conflict management style. These attributes shape volatile board conflict climates. Four conflict climates are identified: (a) compliance climate, (b) pseudocohesive climate, (c) conflict climate, and (d) agree-to-disagree climate.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study makes three contributions. First, it suggests that boards avoid conflict but are nonetheless often not cohesive. Second, it reveals that boards have conflict management styles that include action patterns distinct from those reported in the extant literature since these patterns emerged from exploring what board members think and feel but do not openly say. Third, we develop new insights into how boards implicitly and continuously form conflict norms and propose that boards require explicit, conscious, and shared conflict norms to enact productive conflict management action patterns.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A conceptual model is proposed that facilitates reflection of board decision-making and effectiveness and that maps out actions the boards can take to address the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"63-88"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12516","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42827921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Romania 经合组织对罗马尼亚国有企业公司治理的回顾

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-27 DOI: 10.1787/fabf20a8-en

引用次数: 1

Safeguarding State-Owned Enterprises from Undue Influence 保护国有企业不受不当影响

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-26 DOI: 10.1787/47444e1c-en

引用次数: 0

When does a female leadership advantage exist? Evidence from SOEs in China 女性领导优势何时存在?来自中国国有企业的证据

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12510

Hanchen Li, Xiaochuan Tong

Research Question/Issue

We approach the ongoing debate in the literature on when and why a female leadership advantage exists in the context of China. In particular, we examine whether female CEOs outperform male CEOs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Research Findings/Insights

We show that a female leadership advantage exists in SOEs. We find that the female leadership increased performance is attributed to improved profitability, capital structure, and operating efficiency. The magnitude of this gender effect is bigger in central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) than that in local state-owned enterprises (LSOEs). The results are robust to additional tests that mitigate the sample selection and other endogeneity concerns.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We use the role congruity theory to motivate and develop the hypotheses drawing insights upon the literature in psychology and leadership. Female CEOs are perceived as less congruent with their leadership roles given the gender role stereotypes. Thus, they face more challenges and difficulties than male CEOs. These obstacles take at least two forms which are significant in SOEs: shareholder activism and sex discrimination. Female CEOs have to outperform their male counterparts to alleviate the pressure from shareholder activism and showcase their managerial skills and abilities.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

For the state shareholders, the extra scrutiny in selecting female CEOs should be lifted given this outperformance. The evidence is also relevant for CEOs to choose their career paths among different types of firms, for boards of directors on their strategic decisions on CEO hiring, and for policy makers to promote the female leadership advantage.

研究问题/议题我们探讨了在中国背景下女性领导优势何时以及为何存在的文献中正在进行的辩论。我们特别研究了国有企业中女性ceo是否优于男性ceo。研究结果/见解我们发现，女性在国有企业中存在领导优势。我们发现，女性领导层的绩效提升主要归因于盈利能力、资本结构和运营效率的改善。这种性别效应在中央国有企业中比在地方国有企业中更大。结果是稳健的额外测试，减轻了样本选择和其他内生性问题。理论/学术意义我们使用角色一致性理论来激励和发展假设，并从心理学和领导力的文献中获得见解。鉴于性别角色刻板印象，女性首席执行官被认为与她们的领导角色不太一致。因此，她们比男性ceo面临更多的挑战和困难。这些障碍至少有两种形式，在国有企业中很重要:股东维权主义和性别歧视。女性ceo必须表现得比男性同行更好，以减轻股东维权主义的压力，并展示自己的管理技巧和能力。对于国有股东来说，考虑到这种优异的表现，在选择女性首席执行官时应该取消额外的审查。对于CEO在不同类型企业中选择职业道路，对于董事会在CEO招聘方面的战略决策，对于政策制定者促进女性领导优势也有一定的参考意义。

{"title":"When does a female leadership advantage exist? Evidence from SOEs in China","authors":"Hanchen Li, Xiaochuan Tong","doi":"10.1111/corg.12510","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12510","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We approach the ongoing debate in the literature on when and why a female leadership advantage exists in the context of China. In particular, we examine whether female CEOs outperform male CEOs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs).</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We show that a female leadership advantage exists in SOEs. We find that the female leadership increased performance is attributed to improved profitability, capital structure, and operating efficiency. The magnitude of this gender effect is bigger in central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) than that in local state-owned enterprises (LSOEs). The results are robust to additional tests that mitigate the sample selection and other endogeneity concerns.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We use the role congruity theory to motivate and develop the hypotheses drawing insights upon the literature in psychology and leadership. Female CEOs are perceived as less congruent with their leadership roles given the gender role stereotypes. Thus, they face more challenges and difficulties than male CEOs. These obstacles take at least two forms which are significant in SOEs: shareholder activism and sex discrimination. Female CEOs have to outperform their male counterparts to alleviate the pressure from shareholder activism and showcase their managerial skills and abilities.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>For the state shareholders, the extra scrutiny in selecting female CEOs should be lifted given this outperformance. The evidence is also relevant for CEOs to choose their career paths among different types of firms, for boards of directors on their strategic decisions on CEO hiring, and for policy makers to promote the female leadership advantage.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"945-970"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45044706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

CEO turnover: Cross-country effects CEO更替：跨国效应

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12506

Natasha Burns, Kristina Minnick, Laura Starks

Research Question/Issue

We examine how countries' cultural and legal environment, in addition to firm-level governance mechanisms, affects firms' retention and termination decision of the CEO.

Research Findings/Insights

Previous research focuses primarily on the effects of governance structures and incentives on turnover. In this paper, we focus on two additional institutions—cultural and legal. We find that in cultures characterized by higher individualism, competition, and stronger views that hard work leads to success, boards are more likely to replace CEOs in response to poor shareholder performance. Conversely, we find that in more corrupt cultures and cultures more protective of employees, there is lower turnover–performance sensitivity.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Williamson (2000) provided a framework consisting of four levels of institutional influences on economic activity: (1) cultural norms, (2) the legal system, (3) governance structures, and (4) resource allocation and employment. Previous research focuses primarily on the two highest levels; we focus on the two more basic levels, cultural and legal, while controlling for firm-level governance.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Cultural values and legal conditions combine with the firm's governance structure to affect CEO turnover and its sensitivity to firm shareholder performance.

世界各地的公司董事会及其管理层面临着不同的环境，包括文化、法律和监管属性的差异。研究这些变化对董事会首席执行官签约和监督过程的影响，与Williamson（2000）对制度影响的强调一致，我们发现首席执行官更替随着主要影响而系统地变化。具体而言，CEO更替受到一个国家的投资者保护、劳动力刚性以及外部和内部治理机制的影响。初稿，2018年12月30日

{"title":"CEO turnover: Cross-country effects","authors":"Natasha Burns, Kristina Minnick, Laura Starks","doi":"10.1111/corg.12506","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12506","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine how countries' cultural and legal environment, in addition to firm-level governance mechanisms, affects firms' retention and termination decision of the CEO.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Previous research focuses primarily on the effects of governance structures and incentives on turnover. In this paper, we focus on two additional institutions—cultural and legal. We find that in cultures characterized by higher individualism, competition, and stronger views that hard work leads to success, boards are more likely to replace CEOs in response to poor shareholder performance. Conversely, we find that in more corrupt cultures and cultures more protective of employees, there is lower turnover–performance sensitivity.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Williamson (2000) provided a framework consisting of four levels of institutional influences on economic activity: (1) cultural norms, (2) the legal system, (3) governance structures, and (4) resource allocation and employment. Previous research focuses primarily on the two highest levels; we focus on the two more basic levels, cultural and legal, while controlling for firm-level governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Cultural values and legal conditions combine with the firm's governance structure to affect CEO turnover and its sensitivity to firm shareholder performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"820-844"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46429636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Sustainability Policies and Practices for Corporate Governance in Latin America 拉丁美洲公司治理的可持续性政策和实践

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI: 10.1787/76df2285-en

引用次数: 1

An axe to grind: Family outsiders and firms doing good 一把斧头：家族外部人士和做好事的公司

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12509

Fuxiu Jiang, Ping Jiang, Xiaojia Zheng

Research Question/Issue

This paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.

Research Findings/Insights

In a hand-collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside-promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Our evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.

本文考察了非家族成员(即家族外部成员)担任董事会主席与企业慈善事业之间的关系。研究结果/见解在一份手工收集的中国家族企业数据集中，我们发现，当董事会主席是非家族成员时，企业在慈善事业上的投资会减少。然而，当董事长的自由裁量权受到限制时，这种影响就会减轻，比如在知名度很高的公司或由创始家族控制的公司。当董事长的利益与控股家族更一致、董事长是内部晋升者或创始团队成员、董事会主席与家族的目标更一致、利益相关者对企业社会责任的要求更高或投资者对盈利能力的关注较低时，非家族主席与企业慈善事业的负相关关系也较弱。进一步分析表明，非家族主席有助于企业减少对慈善事业的过度投资，董事会主席对慈善捐赠的影响比首席执行官更显著，并且结果不受控股家族征用问题的驱动。我们的研究突出了家族企业董事会主席的异质性、董事会主席对企业社会绩效的显著影响以及与董事会主席相关的代理问题，这些都是以往文献中未被充分探讨的主题。从业者/政策启示我们的证据为从业者提供了关于董事会主席对企业慈善事业影响的见解。家族企业需要重视董事会主席的招聘，并全面看待家族企业的专业化，因为非家族董事会主席可能会对企业的利益相关者关系管理产生负面影响，但会通过减少过多的慈善活动带来好处。此外，从业者应该意识到董事会主席产生的代理问题。激励或监督主席可能有助于解决潜在的利益冲突。

{"title":"An axe to grind: Family outsiders and firms doing good","authors":"Fuxiu Jiang, Ping Jiang, Xiaojia Zheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12509","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12509","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In a hand-collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside-promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"921-944"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45742289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy 公司治理与不断发展的公司信息披露:研究与政策的全球挑战与机遇

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12498

No abstract is available for this article.

这篇文章没有摘要。

引用次数: 0

首页上一页

下一页尾页

类型

全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

数据库

全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

期刊

Corporate Governance-An International Review

全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.

﹀