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Non-family shareholder governance and the digital transformation of family firms: Evidence from China 非家族股东治理与家族企业数字化转型:来自中国的证据
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12517
Shanzhong Du, Lianfu Ma, Zhuo Li, Chengcheng Ma

Research Question/Issue

We investigate the influence of non-family shareholder governance on Chinese family firms' digital transformation strategies.

Research Findings/Insights

We use the socioemotional wealth theory to examine the impact of non-family shareholder governance on family firms' digital transformation. We find that the influence of non-family shareholder governance by appointing directors can significantly promote the implementation of digital transformation strategies through their capital and human effects in family firms. In contrast, non-family shareholders only play a positive role in family firms' digital transformation when they are blockholders. In addition, non-family shareholder governance plays a significant role in promoting the digital transformation of family firms with entrepreneurship and a high degree of industry competition. Regarding external digital development, the Broadband China policy complements family firms' digital transformation strategies. The characteristics of the appointed directors suggest that the introduction of appointed directors, an excess of appointed directors, and the inclusion of appointed directors with digital expertise can effectively promote the digital transformation of family firms. The characteristics of controlling families show that socioemotional wealth can further optimize the relationship between non-family shareholder governance and digital transformation.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We not only verify the rationality and effectiveness of non-family shareholder governance in combination with digital transformation strategies but also further observe the impact of the heterogeneity of directors appointed by non-family shareholders on family firms' digital transformation strategies. Thus, our study tests the influence of non-family shareholder governance on digital transformation and enriches the literature on non-family shareholder governance and family firms' strategies.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study offers insights to family firms regarding how to effectively promote non-family shareholders' participation in corporate governance and help family firms to achieve the goal of “everlasting foundation.”

研究问题 我们研究非家族股东治理对中国家族企业数字化转型战略的影响。 研究结果/见解 我们运用社会情感财富理论研究非家族股东治理对家族企业数字化转型的影响。我们发现,非家族股东通过委派董事对家族企业治理的影响可以通过其资本效应和人力效应显著促进家族企业数字化转型战略的实施。相比之下,非家族股东只有在作为大股东时才会对家族企业的数字化转型起到积极作用。此外,非家族股东治理在促进具有创业精神和高度行业竞争的家族企业数字化转型方面发挥着重要作用。在外部数字化发展方面,"宽带中国 "政策与家族企业的数字化转型战略相辅相成。委任董事的特征表明,引入委任董事、过多委任董事以及吸收具有数字化专长的委任董事,可以有效促进家族企业的数字化转型。控股家族的特征表明,社会情感财富可以进一步优化非家族股东治理与数字化转型之间的关系。 理论/学术意义 我们不仅验证了非家族股东治理与数字化转型战略相结合的合理性和有效性,还进一步观察了非家族股东委派董事的异质性对家族企业数字化转型战略的影响。因此,我们的研究检验了非家族股东治理对数字化转型的影响,丰富了有关非家族股东治理与家族企业战略的文献。 实践者/政策启示 本研究为家族企业如何有效促进非家族股东参与公司治理提供了启示,有助于家族企业实现 "基业长青 "的目标。
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引用次数: 0
Seen and not heard: A comparative case study of women on boards and process loss beyond critical mass 看到和没有听到:董事会女性成员和超过临界质量的流程损失的比较案例研究
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-03-16 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12524
Louise Tilbury, Ruth Sealy

Research Question/Issue

Building on a classic model of socio-cognitive board processes, we consider the behaviors of men and women directors in boardrooms. We question whether having a critical mass of women on boards, defined as three or more women, removes barriers to women's participation in the boardroom, asking “How does gender influence board processes in boards with three or more women?”

Research Findings/Insights

Using a comparative case study of three boards through board observation and qualitative interviews, we question the assumption that a critical mass of women delivers effective board processes. We reinterpret the need for women to collaborate supportively as process loss, defined as interaction difficulties preventing groups reaching full potential, revealing potential barriers for women non-executive directors to contribute across the whole agenda, particularly during critical debates.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Critical mass theory ignores important interactions between gender and other job-related characteristics to underestimate social complexity in the boardroom. Building on an existing typology of diversity, we suggest that gender in the boardroom can operate as status diversity (disparity), as well as information-based diversity (variety) and value-based diversity (separation).

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Chairs and board evaluators who observe board meetings should be vigilant for patterns of participation and collaboration that indicate that women directors are experiencing restricted access to discussion, in particular if women are interrupted. Board leadership decisions should be reviewed regularly to ensure they are supporting board effectiveness, maintaining focus on the task rather than navigating complex social dynamics.

研究问题/议题 基于董事会社会认知过程的经典模型,我们考虑了男女董事在董事会中的行为。我们提出的问题是:"在有三名或三名以上女性的董事会中,性别是如何影响董事会进程的? 研究结果/见解 通过对三个董事会的观察和定性访谈进行比较案例研究,我们对 "临界数量的女性会带来有效的董事会程序 "这一假设提出了质疑。我们将女性支持性合作的需求重新解释为过程损失,其定义为阻碍团体充分发挥潜力的互动困难,揭示了女性非执行董事在整个议程中做出贡献的潜在障碍,尤其是在关键辩论期间。 理论/学术意义 临界质量理论忽视了性别与其他工作相关特征之间的重要相互作用,从而低估了董事会中的社会复杂性。在现有多样性类型学的基础上,我们认为董事会中的性别可以作为地位多样性(差异)、基于信息的多样性(多样性)和基于价值的多样性(分离)来运作。 实践者/政策影响 观察董事会会议的主席和董事会评估人员应警惕参与和合作模式,因为这表明女性董事参与讨论的机会受到限制,尤其是当女性被打断时。应定期审查董事会领导层的决策,以确保这些决策有助于提高董事会的效率,保持对任务的关注,而不是驾驭复杂的社会动态。
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引用次数: 0
The impact of share-pledging purposes on firm performance and innovation 股权质押目的对公司绩效和创新的影响
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12519
Xiao Jia, Ellen Jin Jiang, Rui Wang

Research question

Share pledging by controlling shareholders can be motivated by business or personal purposes. We investigate whether the firm performance and innovation outputs are different for firms with controlling shareholders pledging shares to support their firm's financing (business-pledging firms) and those pledging shares for increasing personal wealth (individual-pledging firms).

Research findings

Using data from publicly listed Chinese firms, we find that business-pledging firms are associated with higher changes in Tobin's Q and more patent outputs compared with individual-pledging firms. In additional tests, we show that the impact of share-pledging purposes on firm performance and innovative outputs is more pronounced for Chinese non-state-owned enterprises, which have relatively limited access to traditional bank loans.

Theoretical implications

In this study, we bring new empirical evidence to agency theory, especially the “principal–principal” problem. We identify two inherently different purposes in share-pledging cases—business pledging and individual pledging. We show that in business-pledging cases, pledgers' interests become more aligned with outside shareholders, and pledgers have higher incentives to enhance firm value and innovation productivity, relative to individual pledging. This paper adds to the evidence on the bright side of share pledges.

Practitioner implications

This paper sheds light on the recent policy debate regarding the costs and benefits of share pledging and has implications for regulators and investors. Thus, it may be vital for publicly listed firms to disclose the purposes of share pledging.

研究问题 控股股东质押股份的动机可以是商业目的,也可以是个人目的。我们研究了控股股东为支持公司融资而质押股份的公司(商业质押型公司)和为增加个人财富而质押股份的公司(个人质押型公司)在公司业绩和创新产出方面是否存在差异。 研究结果 利用中国上市公司的数据,我们发现与个人质押企业相比,企业质押企业的托宾 Q 值变化更大,专利产出更多。在额外的测试中,我们发现股权质押对企业绩效和创新产出的影响在中国非国有企业中更为明显,因为这些企业获得传统银行贷款的机会相对有限。 理论意义 在本研究中,我们为代理理论,尤其是 "委托人-委托人 "问题提供了新的经验证据。我们在股权质押案例中发现了两种本质上不同的目的--企业质押和个人质押。我们发现,在企业质押案例中,质押人的利益与外部股东更加一致,相对于个人质押,质押人更有动力提升公司价值和创新生产力。本文补充了有关股权质押光明面的证据。 对从业者的启示 本文揭示了近期有关股权质押成本与收益的政策辩论,对监管者和投资者具有启示意义。因此,上市公司披露股票质押的目的可能至关重要。
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引用次数: 0
Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy 公司治理与不断演变的公司披露:研究与政策的全球挑战与机遇
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-03-10 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12522

No abstract is available for this article.

这篇文章没有摘要。
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引用次数: 0
CGIR Paper Development Workshop CGIR纸张开发研讨会
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-03-10 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12520

No abstract is available for this article.

这篇文章没有摘要。
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引用次数: 0
CGIR Special Issues CGIR特刊
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-03-10 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12521

No abstract is available for this article.

这篇文章没有摘要。
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引用次数: 0
Social capital and stock price crash risk: Evidence from US terrorist attacks 社会资本与股价崩盘风险:来自美国恐怖袭击的证据
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-02-08 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12515
Hyejin Mun, Seongjae Mun, Hyeong Joon Kim
<div> <section> <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3> <p>This study examines whether social capital's monitoring role intensifies during post-terrorism periods, as terrorism influences citizens' willingness to change society and increases stakeholder participation. Focusing on firms' stock price crash risk, caused by managers' opportunistic behavior (viz., bad news hoarding), we hypothesize that social capital under terrorism reduces stock price crash risk, as it is expected to play an external monitoring governance role.</p> </section> <section> <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3> <p>Using US public firms, a county-level social capital index, and terrorist attacks from 1992 to 2014, we find that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters significantly reduces stock price crash risk during post-terrorism periods. The results are robust to propensity score matching and instrumental variable regressions, and a battery of sensitivity tests. Overall, we suggest that stakeholders' willingness (that is intensified by terrorism) to monitor firms' bad news hoarding is channeled through social capital. Furthermore, the monitoring role of social capital under terrorism is significant for firms with poor internal monitoring, more institutional investors, less entrenched managers, CEOs preferring bad news hoarding, and accompanied by improvement of analysts' forecasts, suggesting that the impact of external governance may differ by firms' governance characteristics.</p> </section> <section> <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3> <p>We contribute to the corporate governance literature by investigating the role of social capital as external governance. While terrorism brings serious damage and economic costs, our study shows that it gives rise to the increased role of social capital, suggesting a novel perspective that terrorism's unexpected socio-psychological outcome, being non-financial social threats, leads to positive corporate behaviors by stimulating stakeholders' willingness to monitor firms. Our study is also consistent with the literature that social capital particularly matters in certain periods, such as traumatic events. Furthermore, the impact of a firm's external monitor differs by its governance characteristics, highlighting the importance of corporate governance.</p> </section> <section> <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3> <p>We suggest that social capital serves as firms' external monitor by restraining managers' bad news hoarding under certain circumstances, providing implications for policymakers and practitioners. According to our results, traumatic events, such as terrorism, could be viewed as the moderator
研究问题/议题 本研究探讨在后恐怖主义时期,社会资本的监督作用是否会加强,因为恐怖主义会影响公民改变社会的意愿并增加利益相关者的参与。我们以管理者的机会主义行为(即囤积坏消息)导致的公司股价暴跌风险为重点,假设恐怖主义下的社会资本可降低股价暴跌风险,因为它有望发挥外部监督治理作用。 研究结果/见解 利用美国上市公司、县级社会资本指数和 1992 年至 2014 年的恐怖袭击,我们发现公司总部周围的社会资本能显著降低后恐怖袭击时期的股价暴跌风险。这些结果在倾向得分匹配、工具变量回归和一系列敏感性测试中都是稳健的。总之,我们认为利益相关者监督公司囤积坏消息的意愿(恐怖主义加剧了这种意愿)是通过社会资本传递的。此外,对于内部监控不力、机构投资者较多、管理者根基不稳、首席执行官偏好囤积坏消息以及分析师预测改善的公司,社会资本在恐怖主义下的监督作用显著,这表明外部治理的影响可能因公司治理特征的不同而不同。 理论/学术意义 我们通过研究社会资本作为外部治理的作用,为公司治理文献做出了贡献。虽然恐怖主义带来了严重的破坏和经济损失,但我们的研究表明,恐怖主义导致了社会资本作用的增强,提出了一个新的视角,即恐怖主义意外的社会心理结果,即非财务性的社会威胁,通过激发利益相关者监督公司的意愿,导致了积极的公司行为。我们的研究也与文献中的观点一致,即社会资本在创伤性事件等特定时期尤为重要。此外,企业外部监督者的影响因其治理特征而异,这凸显了公司治理的重要性。 实践者/政策启示 我们认为,社会资本在某些情况下可以抑制管理者囤积坏消息,从而起到企业外部监督者的作用,这为政策制定者和实践者提供了启示。根据我们的研究结果,恐怖主义等创伤性事件可被视为社会资本对企业影响的调节因素,这强调了在没有悲剧性事件发生的情况下强化社会资本(或使其更加有效)的必要性。同时,我们也可以将社会资本视为个人在后恐怖主义时期监督意愿增强的中介因素,从而强调当地社区需要足够的社会资本。
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引用次数: 0
Stock market response to the statement on the purpose of a corporation: A vindication of stakeholder theory 股票市场对公司宗旨声明的反应:利益相关者理论的证明
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12508
Mina Glambosky, Surendranath Rakesh Jory, Thanh Ngo

Research Question/Issue

On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable (2019) released a statement signed by 181 chief executive officers (CEOs) of well-known US corporations, in which they pledged “a fundamental commitment” to “deliver value to all” stakeholders. This study examines the stock market reaction to this new statement on the purpose of a corporation.

Research Findings/Insights

Based on a sample of 163 publicly listed companies that signed the pledge, the results show that investors react positively to a firm's pledge in the days surrounding the statement release. The consensus among stock market investors was robust, characterized by the low volatility in the share price post-announcement date. The decision by these companies, though intended to maximize the wealth of all stakeholders, rather than shareholders alone, carries an opportunity cost. Specifically, a post-announcement decline in share buybacks by pledge firms relative to control firms is observed, though investors embracing stakeholder theory appear undeterred by the reduction in distributions.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

This study provides empirical support that, in the evolving business environment, companies must emphasize issues that concern customers, employees, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the government. Failure to prioritize these issues may engender public backlash, especially in the age of social media. However, the attention to stakeholders is compatible with the focus on shareholder performance. Performance suffers when customers leave, workers feel dissatisfied, NGOs call for boycotts, and governments levy fines. Corporations seeking to increase shareholder wealth will need to fully embrace stakeholder concerns.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study shows that adopting a stakeholder perspective unlocked value that would not have been achieved had the focus remained on shareholder primacy. The excess values may derive from greater customer loyalty, improved employee motivation, better supplier relations, supportive financiers, maximizing revenue, minimizing costs, and/or yielding higher profits. Shareholders anticipate greater long-term value from companies emphasizing employees, communities, supply chain, financiers, and shareholders.

2019年8月19日,商业圆桌会议(2019)发布了一份由181名美国知名企业首席执行官签署的声明,承诺“为所有利益相关者创造价值”。本研究考察了股票市场对公司目的这一新声明的反应。研究结果/见解基于163家签署了承诺的上市公司的样本,结果显示,投资者在声明发布的几天内对公司的承诺反应积极。股市投资者的共识是强劲的,其特点是公告发布后股价波动较小。尽管这些公司的决策是为了使所有利益相关者的财富最大化,而不仅仅是股东的财富最大化,但这是有机会成本的。具体而言,我们观察到质押公司的股票回购在公告发布后相对于控股公司有所下降,尽管信奉利益相关者理论的投资者似乎并未被分配减少所吓倒。本研究提供了实证支持,在不断变化的商业环境中,公司必须重视与客户、员工、非政府组织(ngo)和政府有关的问题。如果不能优先考虑这些问题,可能会引起公众的强烈反对,尤其是在社交媒体时代。然而,对利益相关者的关注与对股东绩效的关注是相容的。当顾客离开、员工感到不满、非政府组织呼吁抵制、政府征收罚款时,业绩就会受到影响。寻求增加股东财富的公司需要充分考虑利益相关者的担忧。从业者/政策启示本研究表明,采用利益相关者视角释放的价值,如果焦点仍然是股东至上,就无法实现。超额价值可能来自于更大的客户忠诚度、更好的员工激励、更好的供应商关系、支持性融资、最大化收入、最小化成本和/或产生更高的利润。股东期望从重视员工、社区、供应链、金融家和股东的公司获得更大的长期价值。
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引用次数: 2
Unification of power and responsibilities for state-owned enterprises: A quasi-natural experiment 国有企业权责统一:一个准自然实验
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12514
Ning Hu, Shilei Yu, Yanan Cao, Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo, Yu Wang

Research Question/Issue

Based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory, this paper uses the establishment of local State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions (SASACs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate whether and how SASACs improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Research Findings/Insights

(1) After the establishment of SASACs, and compared to those not supervised by the SASACs (i.e., the control group), SOEs governed by local SASACs (i.e., the treatment group) have experienced a significant increase in decentralization and empowerment from the government, proxied by corporate pyramid levels. We also find increased pay-performance sensitivity for SOE managers and higher productivity measured by total factor productivity (TFP). (2) SASACs adopt different strategies to manage SOEs in monopolistic and competitive industries. (3) The above effect of the SASACs is more pronounced in SOEs supervised by high-quality governments that effectively protect property rights, enforce fair contracts, apply laws and regulations to everyone, and sufficiently refrain from expropriation.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Using a quasi-natural experiment, this paper expands the existing literature on SOE reform from the perspective of incentive reform at the regulatory level based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

(1) Privatization is not necessarily the only optimal solution for SOE reform. We show that the unification of power and responsibilities can be very effective and is perhaps less costly and more practical than privatization. Thus, our study provides an encouraging solution for SOE reform for other countries. (2) Countries experiencing SOE reform should also work on strengthening their government quality in order to fully maximize the benefit of the reform.

本文基于产权理论和授权理论,以地方国资委的设立为准自然实验,考察国资委是否以及如何提高国有企业的效率。(1)国资委成立后,与不受国资委监管的国有企业(即对照组)相比,由地方国资委管理的国有企业(即处理组)的政府放权和授权程度显著提高,以企业金字塔层级为代表。我们还发现,国有企业管理者的薪酬绩效敏感性增加,全要素生产率(TFP)衡量的生产率也更高。(2)国资委对垄断行业和竞争性行业国有企业的管理策略不同。(3)国资委的上述作用在国有企业中更为明显,这些国有企业由高质量的政府监管,政府有效保护产权,执行公平合同,法律法规适用于每个人,并充分避免征收。本文运用准自然实验,以产权理论和授权理论为基础,从监管层面的激励改革视角,对已有的国有企业改革文献进行了拓展。(1)私有化不一定是国有企业改革的唯一最佳解决方案。我们表明,权力和责任的统一可以非常有效,也许比私有化成本更低,更实际。因此,我们的研究为其他国家的国有企业改革提供了一个令人鼓舞的解决方案。(2)进行国有企业改革的国家还应努力提高政府质量,以充分发挥改革效益的最大化。
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引用次数: 1
How boards manage the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness: Illuminating the four board conflict climates 董事会如何处理认知冲突和凝聚力之间的紧张关系:照亮四种董事会冲突氛围
IF 5.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Pub Date : 2023-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12516
Marilieke Engbers, Svetlana N. Khapova

Research Question/Issue

Although both cognitive conflict and cohesiveness are quintessential for a supervisory board to fulfill its monitoring and advisory role, cognitive conflict may equally create tension that negatively affects board cohesiveness and performance. How boards manage this tension between conflict and cohesiveness is the key concern of this paper.

Research Findings/Insights

Analysis of the multicase data from 17 Dutch two-tier supervisory boards reveals that how boards manage the tension between conflict and cohesiveness depends on three attributes: (a) board cohesiveness, (b) the board's conflict norms formation and (c) the board's dominant conflict management style. These attributes shape volatile board conflict climates. Four conflict climates are identified: (a) compliance climate, (b) pseudocohesive climate, (c) conflict climate, and (d) agree-to-disagree climate.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our study makes three contributions. First, it suggests that boards avoid conflict but are nonetheless often not cohesive. Second, it reveals that boards have conflict management styles that include action patterns distinct from those reported in the extant literature since these patterns emerged from exploring what board members think and feel but do not openly say. Third, we develop new insights into how boards implicitly and continuously form conflict norms and propose that boards require explicit, conscious, and shared conflict norms to enact productive conflict management action patterns.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

A conceptual model is proposed that facilitates reflection of board decision-making and effectiveness and that maps out actions the boards can take to address the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness.

研究问题/议题 虽然认知冲突和凝聚力都是监事会履行其监督和咨询职责的必要条件,但认知冲突同样会造成紧张关系,从而对董事会的凝聚力和绩效产生负面影响。董事会如何处理这种冲突与凝聚力之间的矛盾,是本文关注的重点。 研究结果/见解 对 17 个荷兰两级监事会的多案例数据进行分析后发现,董事会如何管理冲突与凝聚力之间的紧张关系取决于三个属性:(a)董事会的凝聚力;(b)董事会冲突规范的形成;(c)董事会主导的冲突管理风格。这些属性决定了动荡的董事会冲突氛围。确定了四种冲突氛围:(a) 服从氛围,(b) 伪凝聚氛围,(c) 冲突氛围,以及 (d) 同意-反对氛围。 理论/学术意义 我们的研究有三方面的贡献。首先,它表明董事会可以避免冲突,但往往缺乏凝聚力。其次,它揭示了董事会的冲突管理方式,其中包括与现有文献报道不同的行动模式,因为这些模式是通过探究董事会成员的所思所感而产生的,但并没有公开说出来。第三,我们对董事会如何潜移默化地持续形成冲突规范有了新的认识,并提出董事会需要明确、有意识和共享的冲突规范来制定富有成效的冲突管理行动模式。 实践者/政策启示 我们提出了一个概念模型,该模型有助于反思董事会的决策和有效性,并描绘出董事会可以采取的行动,以解决认知冲突和凝聚力之间的矛盾。
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Corporate Governance-An International Review
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