Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献_第5页

Board co-option and corporate environmental orientation: New insights from the waste management perspective 董事会增选与企业环境导向：从废物管理角度的新见解

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12567

Ammar Ali Gull, Hoa Luong, Muhammad Nadeem

Research Question/Issue

We investigate the impact of board co-option on corporate environmental orientation from the perspective of waste management. As waste presents damaging effects on the natural environment, climate change, and human health, businesses assume an ethical responsibility to conduct their operations in a sustainable and responsible manner.

Research Findings/Insights

Employing firm-level waste production data, we document a significant negative relationship between board co-option and waste generation, suggesting that co-opted directors help firms reduce their waste—a finding that also carries economic significance. The cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship only holds when a CEO does not chair the board and has a shorter tenure. Furthermore, we find that the board co-option–waste management relationship is stronger in environmentally sensitive industries and is mainly driven by the manufacturing firms. We perform a battery of analyses to rule out endogeneity concerns and check for the robustness of our results. The channel test reveals that CEOs of firms with higher waste management face lower performance-induced turnover, particularly when working with co-opted boards. Finally, we also find that co-option-induced waste management initiatives ultimately increase firms' economic value.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We document that co-opted boards may enhance firms' waste management practices by reducing performance-induced CEO turnover. Thus, we make important contributions to the corporate governance and environmentalism strands of the literature by highlighting the bright side of board co-option for waste reduction initiatives.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Our study provides vital policy implications for regulators and top management teams against the background of public outcry and social pressure to mitigate the damage to the environment and calls for ethical business practices.

我们从废物管理的角度研究了董事会增选对企业环境导向的影响。由于废物会对自然环境、气候变化和人类健康造成破坏性影响，企业有责任以可持续和负责任的方式开展业务。

{"title":"Board co-option and corporate environmental orientation: New insights from the waste management perspective","authors":"Ammar Ali Gull, Hoa Luong, Muhammad Nadeem","doi":"10.1111/corg.12567","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12567","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate the impact of board co-option on corporate environmental orientation from the perspective of waste management. As waste presents damaging effects on the natural environment, climate change, and human health, businesses assume an ethical responsibility to conduct their operations in a sustainable and responsible manner.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Employing firm-level waste production data, we document a significant negative relationship between board co-option and waste generation, suggesting that co-opted directors help firms reduce their waste—a finding that also carries economic significance. The cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship only holds when a CEO does not chair the board and has a shorter tenure. Furthermore, we find that the board co-option–waste management relationship is stronger in environmentally sensitive industries and is mainly driven by the manufacturing firms. We perform a battery of analyses to rule out endogeneity concerns and check for the robustness of our results. The channel test reveals that CEOs of firms with higher waste management face lower performance-induced turnover, particularly when working with co-opted boards. Finally, we also find that co-option-induced waste management initiatives ultimately increase firms' economic value.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We document that co-opted boards may enhance firms' waste management practices by reducing performance-induced CEO turnover. Thus, we make important contributions to the corporate governance and environmentalism strands of the literature by highlighting the bright side of board co-option for waste reduction initiatives.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study provides vital policy implications for regulators and top management teams against the background of public outcry and social pressure to mitigate the damage to the environment and calls for ethical business practices.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 5","pages":"758-785"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12567","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139501370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy 公司治理与不断发展的公司信息披露:研究与政策的全球挑战与机遇

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12565

No abstract is available for this article.

这篇文章没有摘要。

引用次数: 0

Millennial managers 千禧一代管理人员

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12564

Ellie Luu, Silvina Rubio

Research Question/Issue

This paper investigates whether and how millennial mutual fund managers differ from managers born in other generations in terms of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) orientation in portfolio choices and voting decisions.

Research Findings/Insights

We find that millennial mutual fund managers hold portfolios that are more ESG oriented than do managers from other generations, consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that millennials are more driven by purpose than profits. Our findings suggest that the observed relationship is stronger when managers have more discretion over portfolio choices, that is, in active funds and funds with lower flow-performance sensitivity. Furthermore, we find that millennial managers respond more strongly to social movements by reallocating assets into more socially conscious firms. We also find that millennial managers are more supportive of environmental proposals when their outcome is contested.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our paper shows how cultural, political, and economic events, including social movements experienced by people of the same age cohort, shape preferences and beliefs and result in different investment strategies and voting among mutual fund managers. We also show how institutional constraints might limit managers' ability to impose their own preferences when investing or voting their shares.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Millennials are increasingly replacing older generations in managerial roles and investing in the stock market due to wealth transfers from their parents. This study offers insights to policymakers and investors interested in understanding the drivers of ESG investment.

研究问题本文研究千禧一代的共同基金经理与其他年代出生的经理在投资组合选择和投票决定中的环境、社会和治理（ESG）导向方面是否存在差异，以及存在怎样的差异。研究结果/见解我们发现，千禧一代的共同基金经理持有的投资组合比其他年代的经理更注重环境、社会和治理，这与传闻中千禧一代更受目的驱动而非利益驱动的说法一致。我们的研究结果表明，当基金经理对投资组合的选择有更大的自由裁量权时，即在主动型基金和流量-业绩敏感性较低的基金中，观察到的这种关系会更强。此外，我们还发现，千禧一代经理人对社会运动的反应更为强烈，他们会将资产重新配置到更具社会意识的企业中。我们还发现，当环保提案的结果存在争议时，千禧一代经理人更支持环保提案。理论/学术意义我们的论文展示了文化、政治和经济事件，包括同一年龄段的人所经历的社会运动，如何影响偏好和信念，并导致共同基金经理采取不同的投资策略和投票方式。我们还展示了制度约束如何限制基金经理在投资或投票时强加自己偏好的能力。实践者/政策启示由于从父辈那里转移的财富，千禧一代正越来越多地取代老一代人担任管理职务，并投资于股票市场。本研究为有兴趣了解环境、社会和公司治理投资驱动因素的政策制定者和投资者提供了见解。

{"title":"Millennial managers","authors":"Ellie Luu, Silvina Rubio","doi":"10.1111/corg.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper investigates whether and how millennial mutual fund managers differ from managers born in other generations in terms of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) orientation in portfolio choices and voting decisions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that millennial mutual fund managers hold portfolios that are more ESG oriented than do managers from other generations, consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that millennials are more driven by purpose than profits. Our findings suggest that the observed relationship is stronger when managers have more discretion over portfolio choices, that is, in active funds and funds with lower flow-performance sensitivity. Furthermore, we find that millennial managers respond more strongly to social movements by reallocating assets into more socially conscious firms. We also find that millennial managers are more supportive of environmental proposals when their outcome is contested.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our paper shows how cultural, political, and economic events, including social movements experienced by people of the same age cohort, shape preferences and beliefs and result in different investment strategies and voting among mutual fund managers. We also show how institutional constraints might limit managers' ability to impose their own preferences when investing or voting their shares.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Millennials are increasingly replacing older generations in managerial roles and investing in the stock market due to wealth transfers from their parents. This study offers insights to policymakers and investors interested in understanding the drivers of ESG investment.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"732-755"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12564","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135169238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impact of board gender composition on loan covenant violations 董事会性别构成对违反贷款契约的影响

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12561

Md Samsul Alam, Muhammad Atif, Douglas Cumming, Md Shahidul Islam

Research Question/Issue

We examine the role of board gender diversity in attenuating loan covenant violations. We also investigate whether the relationship is influenced by female independent directors. Finally, we examine the channels of this relationship.

Research Findings/Insights

Drawing on gender socialization and diversity theories, our findings show that firms with gender-diverse boards are less likely to violate loan covenants. We also find that boards with more female directors have a stronger impact on loan covenant violations than those with fewer female directors, consistent with critical mass theory. Our results also suggest that the negative relationship stems from female independent directors rather than from female executive directors. Our channel analyses indicate that the relationship is routed through covenant strictness, the financial performance of firms, and better corporate governance. Our further analysis demonstrates that the relationship is pronounced in female-dominated industries and financially distressed firms, as well as in firms whose directors have greater experience. Our results are robust across a series of sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We contribute to an emerging strand of literature that examines the link between board gender diversity and loan covenants. We fill a gap in this stream of literature by providing the first empirical evidence that female directors in the boardroom reduce loan covenant violations through their greater integrative bargaining skills during loan deals, improving firm financial performance, and ensuring good corporate governance. Our study also contributes to the growing literature on the differential effects on corporate policies of female directors (independent and executive) and critical mass.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This finding offers significant policy implications for managers, investors, and policymakers. Given the growing frequency of loan covenant violations, the presence of a gender-diverse board should serve as a potent indicator to creditors who have a concern regarding loans. In addition, our study adds to the ongoing debate regarding the business case of board gender diversity.

研究问题/议题我们研究了董事会性别多元化在减少违反贷款契约方面的作用。我们还研究了这种关系是否受到女性独立董事的影响。最后，我们研究了这种关系的渠道。研究结果/启示根据性别社会化和多元化理论，我们的研究结果表明，董事会性别多元化的公司不太可能违反贷款契约。我们还发现，与女性董事人数较少的董事会相比，女性董事人数较多的董事会对违反贷款契约的影响更大，这与临界质量理论是一致的。我们的结果还表明，这种负面关系源于女性独立董事而非女性执行董事。我们的渠道分析表明，这种关系是通过契约的严格程度、公司的财务业绩和更好的公司治理来实现的。我们的进一步分析表明，在女性占主导地位的行业和陷入财务困境的公司中，以及在董事经验更丰富的公司中，这种关系更为明显。通过一系列敏感性和内生性测试，我们的结果是稳健的。理论/学术意义我们为研究董事会性别多样性与贷款契约之间联系的新兴文献做出了贡献。我们填补了这一文献流中的空白，首次提供了实证证据，证明董事会中的女性董事通过在贷款交易过程中提高综合讨价还价能力、改善公司财务业绩和确保良好的公司治理，减少了违反贷款契约的行为。我们的研究还为越来越多的关于女性董事（独立董事和执行董事）和临界质量对公司政策的不同影响的文献做出了贡献。实践者/政策含义这一发现对管理者、投资者和政策制定者具有重要的政策含义。鉴于违反贷款契约的情况日益频繁，性别多元化董事会的存在应成为债权人关注贷款问题的一个有力指标。此外，我们的研究还为目前关于董事会性别多元化的商业案例的讨论增添了新的内容。

{"title":"The impact of board gender composition on loan covenant violations","authors":"Md Samsul Alam, Muhammad Atif, Douglas Cumming, Md Shahidul Islam","doi":"10.1111/corg.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12561","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the role of board gender diversity in attenuating loan covenant violations. We also investigate whether the relationship is influenced by female independent directors. Finally, we examine the channels of this relationship.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Drawing on gender socialization and diversity theories, our findings show that firms with gender-diverse boards are less likely to violate loan covenants. We also find that boards with more female directors have a stronger impact on loan covenant violations than those with fewer female directors, consistent with critical mass theory. Our results also suggest that the negative relationship stems from female independent directors rather than from female executive directors. Our channel analyses indicate that the relationship is routed through covenant strictness, the financial performance of firms, and better corporate governance. Our further analysis demonstrates that the relationship is pronounced in female-dominated industries and financially distressed firms, as well as in firms whose directors have greater experience. Our results are robust across a series of sensitivity and endogeneity tests.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We contribute to an emerging strand of literature that examines the link between board gender diversity and loan covenants. We fill a gap in this stream of literature by providing the first empirical evidence that female directors in the boardroom reduce loan covenant violations through their greater integrative bargaining skills during loan deals, improving firm financial performance, and ensuring good corporate governance. Our study also contributes to the growing literature on the differential effects on corporate policies of female directors (independent and executive) and critical mass.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This finding offers significant policy implications for managers, investors, and policymakers. Given the growing frequency of loan covenant violations, the presence of a gender-diverse board should serve as a potent indicator to creditors who have a concern regarding loans. In addition, our study adds to the ongoing debate regarding the business case of board gender diversity.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"703-731"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does certification of corporate governance compliance pay off? Evidence from a unique regulatory setting 公司治理合规认证是否有回报？来自独特监管环境的证据

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12563

Abdus Sobhan, Sudipta Bose, Muhammad Shahin Miah, Rushdi Md. Rezaur Razzaque

Research Questions/Issues

Using insights from agency and signaling theories, we examine the effect on companies' market-based performance of a unique monitoring mechanism of compliance with a corporate governance (CG) code, that is, independent certification of compliance with a CG code and type of certification provider. Furthermore, we examine the impact of two boundary conditions, family company status and company-level information asymmetry, influencing the effect of independent CG compliance certification and type of certification provider on the market-based performance of companies.

Research Findings/Insights

Based on 1110 Bangladeshi company-year observations from 2006 to 2017, we firstly find that independent CG compliance certification is positively associated with companies' market-based performance. Secondly, we show that CG compliance certification by a chartered secretarial firm is related to higher market-based performance. Thirdly, we document that family companies attenuate both these associations. Finally, we find that, while company-level information asymmetry reinforces the association between CG compliance certification and market-based performance, it weakens the relationship between certification by a chartered secretarial firm and companies' market-based performance.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our findings are consistent with the agency and signaling theory that independent certification of CG compliance and this certification by a chartered secretarial firm reduce information asymmetry between managers and external investors by signaling enhanced credibility of reported CG compliance information. However, the roles of CG compliance certification and certification by a chartered secretarial firm to reduce agency conflict and provide credible signals are conditional on two boundary conditions: family company status and company-level information asymmetry.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study's findings highlight the economic implications of a unique mechanism for monitoring compliance with an adopted CG code. The findings have significant implications for policy makers and regulators in emerging economies.

研究问题/议题利用代理理论和信号理论的观点，我们研究了公司治理（CG）规范合规性的独特监督机制（即公司治理规范合规性独立认证和认证提供商类型）对公司市场化绩效的影响。此外，我们还考察了家族企业地位和公司层面的信息不对称这两个边界条件对公司治理独立合规认证和认证提供商类型对公司市场化绩效的影响。研究结果/启示基于 2006 年至 2017 年 1110 个孟加拉国公司年度观察数据，我们首先发现独立 CG 合规认证与公司的市场化绩效正相关。其次，我们表明由特许秘书公司进行的企业管治合规认证与较高的市场化绩效相关。第三，我们发现家族企业削弱了这两种关联。最后，我们发现，虽然公司层面的信息不对称加强了企业管治合规认证与市场化绩效之间的关联，但却削弱了特许秘书公司认证与公司市场化绩效之间的关系。理论/学术启示我们的研究结果与代理和信号理论相一致，即企业管治合规的独立认证以及由特许秘书事务所进行的这种认证，通过增强报告的企业管治合规信息的可信度，减少了管理者与外部投资者之间的信息不对称。然而，企业管治合规认证和特许秘书事务所认证在减少代理冲突和提供可信信号方面的作用取决于两个边界条件：家族企业地位和公司层面的信息不对称。实践者/政策启示本研究的结论强调了一种独特的企业管治准则合规监督机制的经济意义。研究结果对新兴经济体的政策制定者和监管者具有重要意义。

{"title":"Does certification of corporate governance compliance pay off? Evidence from a unique regulatory setting","authors":"Abdus Sobhan, Sudipta Bose, Muhammad Shahin Miah, Rushdi Md. Rezaur Razzaque","doi":"10.1111/corg.12563","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12563","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Questions/Issues</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using insights from agency and signaling theories, we examine the effect on companies' market-based performance of a unique monitoring mechanism of compliance with a corporate governance (CG) code, that is, independent certification of compliance with a CG code and type of certification provider. Furthermore, we examine the impact of two boundary conditions, family company status and company-level information asymmetry, influencing the effect of independent CG compliance certification and type of certification provider on the market-based performance of companies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on 1110 Bangladeshi company-year observations from 2006 to 2017, we firstly find that independent CG compliance certification is positively associated with companies' market-based performance. Secondly, we show that CG compliance certification by a chartered secretarial firm is related to higher market-based performance. Thirdly, we document that family companies attenuate both these associations. Finally, we find that, while company-level information asymmetry reinforces the association between CG compliance certification and market-based performance, it weakens the relationship between certification by a chartered secretarial firm and companies' market-based performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings are consistent with the agency and signaling theory that independent certification of CG compliance and this certification by a chartered secretarial firm reduce information asymmetry between managers and external investors by signaling enhanced credibility of reported CG compliance information. However, the roles of CG compliance certification and certification by a chartered secretarial firm to reduce agency conflict and provide credible signals are conditional on two boundary conditions: family company status and company-level information asymmetry.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study's findings highlight the economic implications of a unique mechanism for monitoring compliance with an adopted CG code. The findings have significant implications for policy makers and regulators in emerging economies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"670-702"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12563","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Collusion or governance? Common ownership and corporate risk-taking 合谋还是治理？共同所有权与公司风险承担

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12562

Shouyu Yao, Xinyu Guo, Ahmet Sensoy, John W. Goodell, Feiyang Cheng

Research Question

Disputes over the corporate governance impacts of common ownership continue. Differentiating from existing studies, we focus on the Chinese stock market, exploiting the Top 10 Shareholding File, which includes various investors besides institutional investors, to study the impact of common ownership built through blockholders on corporate risk-taking behavior.

Research Findings

We find that firms with higher common ownership are less likely to engage in corporate risk-taking, with concomitant decreases in future growth rates. Mechanism analysis shows that blockholders' common ownership exerts its influence through increasing market concentration, with concomitant lessening of market competition. Interestingly, further analyses indicate that, in contrast to blockholders, ownership connectedness built by mutual fund families significantly raises corporate risk-taking along with growth. However, individual investors' common ownership does not show the significant statistical relationship with corporate risk-taking.

Theoretical Implications

We add to the debate on common ownership on corporate governance. Consistent with the anti-competition stream of literature, the risk-taking-reduction role we identify for blockholder common ownership supports the theory of anti-competition. Our results highlight the need to consider the heterogeneity of common ownership.

Policy Implications

While blockholder common ownership is evidenced to have a negative effect on corporate risk-taking, with, by extension, a negative impact on economic development, our results also suggest that efficient monitoring mitigates these effects. We also document an interesting heterogeneity in investor types. Mutual fund common ownership, in contrast to blockholder common ownership, is associated with higher risk-taking and more robust firm growth. This suggests the positive role of institutions in corporate governance and the necessity of considering the heterogeneity of common ownership.

研究问题关于共同持股对公司治理影响的争议仍在继续。与现有研究不同的是，我们以中国股市为研究对象，利用除机构投资者外还包括各类投资者的十大持股档案，研究通过大股东建立的共同所有权对公司风险承担行为的影响。研究结果我们发现，共同持股比例越高的公司越不可能进行公司风险承担，其未来增长率也会随之下降。机制分析表明，大股东的共同所有权通过提高市场集中度来施加影响，同时削弱市场竞争。有趣的是，进一步的分析表明，与大股东不同，共同基金家族建立的所有权联系在显著提高企业风险承担能力的同时，也促进了企业的增长。然而，个人投资者的共同所有权并没有显示出与企业风险承担之间的显著统计关系。理论意义我们为共同所有权对公司治理的影响这一争论添砖加瓦。与反竞争的文献流派一致，我们发现的大股东共同所有权在降低风险承担方面的作用支持了反竞争理论。我们的研究结果凸显了考虑共同所有权异质性的必要性。政策启示我们的研究结果表明，大股东共同所有权对企业承担风险有负面影响，进而对经济发展产生负面影响，但我们的研究结果也表明，有效的监督可以减轻这些影响。我们还记录了投资者类型的有趣异质性。共同基金的共同所有权与大股东的共同所有权相反，与更高的风险承担和更强劲的企业增长相关。这表明机构在公司治理中的积极作用以及考虑共同所有权异质性的必要性。

{"title":"Collusion or governance? Common ownership and corporate risk-taking","authors":"Shouyu Yao, Xinyu Guo, Ahmet Sensoy, John W. Goodell, Feiyang Cheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12562","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12562","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Disputes over the corporate governance impacts of common ownership continue. Differentiating from existing studies, we focus on the Chinese stock market, exploiting the Top 10 Shareholding File, which includes various investors besides institutional investors, to study the impact of common ownership built through blockholders on corporate risk-taking behavior.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that firms with higher common ownership are less likely to engage in corporate risk-taking, with concomitant decreases in future growth rates. Mechanism analysis shows that blockholders' common ownership exerts its influence through increasing market concentration, with concomitant lessening of market competition. Interestingly, further analyses indicate that, in contrast to blockholders, ownership connectedness built by mutual fund families significantly raises corporate risk-taking along with growth. However, individual investors' common ownership does not show the significant statistical relationship with corporate risk-taking.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We add to the debate on common ownership on corporate governance. Consistent with the anti-competition stream of literature, the risk-taking-reduction role we identify for blockholder common ownership supports the theory of anti-competition. Our results highlight the need to consider the heterogeneity of common ownership.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>While blockholder common ownership is evidenced to have a negative effect on corporate risk-taking, with, by extension, a negative impact on economic development, our results also suggest that efficient monitoring mitigates these effects. We also document an interesting heterogeneity in investor types. Mutual fund common ownership, in contrast to blockholder common ownership, is associated with higher risk-taking and more robust firm growth. This suggests the positive role of institutions in corporate governance and the necessity of considering the heterogeneity of common ownership.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"645-669"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135251465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Interrogating diversity: Feminism and the destructuration of Australian board appointment practices 质疑多样性：女性主义与澳大利亚董事会任命实践的破坏性

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-10-04 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12559

Claire Wright, Corinne Cortese, Abdullah Al-Mamun, Searat Ali

Research Question/Issue

How have social movements influenced the diversity of Australian corporate leadership? Although board diversity is crucial for corporate governance, the research in this topic is bifurcated between studies examining interlocking directorates and the presence of boardroom gender diversity.

Research Findings/Insights

In this study, we use a novel dataset and method to understand board diversity. We integrate the analysis of social diversity (structural connections) and demographic diversity among ASX50 boards in 2019 and 2023. Social network analysis (SNA) reveals a closely connected corporate community, with prosopography data identifying a narrow range of “acceptable” demographic characteristics.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We extend institutional theory by examining the role of global social movements (GSMs) for the destructuration of board appointment practices and the resulting uneven progress on equality. Activism from the global feminist movement has applied multi-dimensional coercive and normative pressures to develop a “pipeline” and “catalyst” for women's board appointments. Simultaneously, the absence of targeted action on other diversities and the intensification of directors' professional requirements have institutionalized the group's social and demographic profile.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

These findings are relevant to policymakers and corporations, highlighting the role of social movements for disrupting the status quo and the multidimensional institutional pressures needed to destructure entrenched appointment practices.

研究问题/议题社会运动如何影响澳大利亚企业领导层的多样性？尽管董事会多样性对公司治理至关重要，但有关这一主题的研究却分为两类，一类是对互锁董事制度的研究，另一类是对董事会性别多样性的研究。研究结果/见解在本研究中，我们使用了一种新颖的数据集和方法来了解董事会的多样性。我们综合分析了 2019 年和 2023 年 ASX50 董事会的社会多样性（结构联系）和人口多样性。社会网络分析（SNA）揭示了一个联系紧密的企业社区，而前人口统计学数据则确定了 "可接受的 "人口特征的狭窄范围。理论/学术意义我们通过研究全球社会运动（GSMs）在破坏董事会任命惯例方面的作用以及由此导致的不均衡的平等进展，扩展了制度理论。来自全球女权运动的激进主义施加了多维度的强制和规范压力，为女性董事会任命开发了 "管道 "和 "催化剂"。与此同时，由于缺乏针对其他多样性的行动，以及对董事职业要求的强化，使该群体的社会和人口状况制度化。实践者/政策启示这些研究结果对政策制定者和企业都有借鉴意义，强调了社会运动在打破现状方面的作用，以及为改变根深蒂固的任命惯例所需的多维度制度压力。

{"title":"Interrogating diversity: Feminism and the destructuration of Australian board appointment practices","authors":"Claire Wright, Corinne Cortese, Abdullah Al-Mamun, Searat Ali","doi":"10.1111/corg.12559","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12559","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>How have social movements influenced the diversity of Australian corporate leadership? Although board diversity is crucial for corporate governance, the research in this topic is bifurcated between studies examining interlocking directorates and the presence of boardroom gender diversity.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this study, we use a novel dataset and method to understand board diversity. We integrate the analysis of <i>social diversity</i> (structural connections) and <i>demographic diversity</i> among ASX50 boards in 2019 and 2023. Social network analysis (SNA) reveals a closely connected corporate community, with prosopography data identifying a narrow range of “acceptable” demographic characteristics.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We extend institutional theory by examining the role of global social movements (GSMs) for the destructuration of board appointment practices and the resulting uneven progress on equality. Activism from the global feminist movement has applied multi-dimensional coercive and normative pressures to develop a “pipeline” and “catalyst” for women's board appointments. Simultaneously, the absence of targeted action on other diversities and the intensification of directors' professional requirements have institutionalized the group's social and demographic profile.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>These findings are relevant to policymakers and corporations, highlighting the role of social movements for disrupting the status quo and the multidimensional institutional pressures needed to destructure entrenched appointment practices.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"625-644"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12559","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does the age of compensation committee members matter for CEO compensation? 薪酬委员会成员的年龄对首席执行官的薪酬有影响吗？

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12560

Yiwei Li, Michael Clements, Carol Padgett, Xiu-Ye Zhang

Research Question/Issue

We examine the impact of the age of compensation committee (CC) members on CEO compensation. Sociological theory suggests that age is a significant demographic factor influencing behavior. We argue that monitoring intensity increases with age because older directors are more likely to commit to their fiduciary duties.

Research Findings/Insights

Using FTSE 350 firms for the period 2002 to 2017, we find that CC members' age is negatively associated with the level of CEO pay but positively associated with pay–performance sensitivity after controlling for risk aversion attitude, experience in board monitoring, knowledge of the firm, and other firm and CEO characteristics. The relationships remain robust to alternative measures for age and compensation, using two-stage least squares and high-dimensional fixed effects models. Consistent with the view that older individuals tend to hold higher ethical standards and concomitant closer monitoring, we find that age effects are sensitive to the influence of ethical factors and are strongest for those firms for which intense monitoring is most needed. This suggests that age operates via older directors carrying out their roles more assiduously. We further show that our findings are less likely to be driven by director reputational effects, and the relationship between CC member age and CEO compensation persists even when we control for multiple dimensions of culturally inherited attributes of the CC members.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Despite the large literature on the influence of demographic characteristics on corporate governance, this study is the first on the monitoring effect of CC members' age. It contributes to the literature on the influence of demographic characteristic. It also contributes to the literature on CEO compensation by identifying a demographic factor—age—as a determinant of CEO pay, after controlling for the economic and corporate governance variables of the firm.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study highlights the role of demographic factors in explaining the monitoring of the CEO compensation contracting process and provides timely evidence on the recent regulatory changes.

研究问题/议题我们研究薪酬委员会（CC）成员的年龄对首席执行官薪酬的影响。社会学理论认为，年龄是影响行为的重要人口因素。我们认为，监督强度会随着年龄的增长而增加，因为年龄较大的董事更有可能履行其信托责任。研究结果/见解利用 2002 年至 2017 年期间富时 350 指数公司的数据，我们发现，在控制了风险规避态度、董事会监督经验、对公司的了解以及其他公司和首席执行官特征之后，委员会成员的年龄与首席执行官的薪酬水平负相关，但与薪酬-绩效敏感性正相关。通过使用两阶段最小二乘法和高维固定效应模型，这些关系对于年龄和薪酬的其他衡量标准仍然是稳健的。我们发现，年龄效应对道德因素的影响非常敏感，而且对那些最需要严格监督的公司来说，年龄效应最强。这表明，年龄是通过年长的董事更认真地履行职责来发挥作用的。我们进一步表明，我们的研究结果不太可能是由董事的声誉效应驱动的，即使我们对委员会成员的文化传承属性的多个维度进行控制，委员会成员年龄与首席执行官薪酬之间的关系仍然存在。理论/学术意义尽管有大量文献论述了人口特征对公司治理的影响，但本研究是第一项关于委员会成员年龄的监督效应的研究。它为有关人口特征影响的文献做出了贡献。在控制了公司的经济和公司治理变量之后，本研究还发现了一个人口统计因素--年龄--是 CEO 薪酬的决定因素，从而为有关 CEO 薪酬的文献做出了贡献。实践者/政策启示本研究强调了人口统计因素在解释首席执行官薪酬签约过程的监督方面所起的作用，并为近期的监管变化提供了及时的证据。

{"title":"Does the age of compensation committee members matter for CEO compensation?","authors":"Yiwei Li, Michael Clements, Carol Padgett, Xiu-Ye Zhang","doi":"10.1111/corg.12560","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12560","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the impact of the age of compensation committee (CC) members on CEO compensation. Sociological theory suggests that age is a significant demographic factor influencing behavior. We argue that monitoring intensity increases with age because older directors are more likely to commit to their fiduciary duties.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using FTSE 350 firms for the period 2002 to 2017, we find that CC members' age is negatively associated with the level of CEO pay but positively associated with pay–performance sensitivity after controlling for risk aversion attitude, experience in board monitoring, knowledge of the firm, and other firm and CEO characteristics. The relationships remain robust to alternative measures for age and compensation, using two-stage least squares and high-dimensional fixed effects models. Consistent with the view that older individuals tend to hold higher ethical standards and concomitant closer monitoring, we find that age effects are sensitive to the influence of ethical factors and are strongest for those firms for which intense monitoring is most needed. This suggests that age operates via older directors carrying out their roles more assiduously. We further show that our findings are less likely to be driven by director reputational effects, and the relationship between CC member age and CEO compensation persists even when we control for multiple dimensions of culturally inherited attributes of the CC members.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Despite the large literature on the influence of demographic characteristics on corporate governance, this study is the first on the monitoring effect of CC members' age. It contributes to the literature on the influence of demographic characteristic. It also contributes to the literature on CEO compensation by identifying a demographic factor—age—as a determinant of CEO pay, after controlling for the economic and corporate governance variables of the firm.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study highlights the role of demographic factors in explaining the monitoring of the CEO compensation contracting process and provides timely evidence on the recent regulatory changes.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"600-624"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12560","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135830955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Chief executive officer private firm experience and idiosyncratic risk 私营公司首席执行官的经验和特殊风险

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12556

Dev R. Mishra

Research Question/Issue

We examine chief executive officers' (CEOs) lifetime work experience in private firms and its potential influence in shaping managers' style in public firms and their corporate policies and thus the market's perception of a firm's risk.

Research Findings/Insights

We find that the idiosyncratic risk of public firms increases with the extent of CEO work experience in privately owned firms (CEO private experience). While there is no evidence of higher investment risk taking by private CEOs, the proportion of private-firm work experience has a positive association with disclosure deficiency, decrease in manager-owner agency conflicts, and an increase in political risk revelations at earnings conference calls, which, in turn, are associated with the elevation of idiosyncratic risk.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

The findings of this study underscore arguments in the upper echelons theory, imprinting theory, and behavioral agency theory. The study also has implications for literature related to corporate disclosure, governance, and political risk.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Idiosyncratic risk is important for firms, as the literature suggests it hurts a firm's ability to finance future capital investments; therefore, it is optimal for corporate boards to have strategies in place to monitor and offer orientation packages targeted at alleviating CEO style heterogeneities presented by their prior work experience in private firms.

研究问题/议题我们研究首席执行官（CEO）在私营企业的终生工作经历及其对塑造上市公司管理者风格和公司政策的潜在影响，从而研究市场对公司风险的看法。研究结果/见解我们发现，上市公司的特异性风险会随着首席执行官在私营企业的工作经验（首席执行官的私人经验）的增加而增加。虽然没有证据表明私营企业首席执行官会承担更高的投资风险，但私营企业工作经验的比例与信息披露不足、管理者与所有者之间的代理冲突减少以及财报电话会议上政治风险揭示的增加呈正相关，而这反过来又与特异性风险的上升有关。理论/学术启示本研究的结论强调了上层理论、印记理论和行为代理理论的论点。本研究还对与公司信息披露、治理和政治风险相关的文献产生了影响。对实践者/政策的启示闲散风险对公司非常重要，因为有文献表明，它会损害公司为未来资本投资融资的能力；因此，公司董事会最好制定战略，对CEO进行监督，并提供有针对性的指导方案，以缓解CEO因之前在私营企业的工作经历而产生的风格异质性。

{"title":"Chief executive officer private firm experience and idiosyncratic risk","authors":"Dev R. Mishra","doi":"10.1111/corg.12556","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12556","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine chief executive officers' (CEOs) lifetime work experience in private firms and its potential influence in shaping managers' style in public firms and their corporate policies and thus the market's perception of a firm's risk.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that the idiosyncratic risk of public firms increases with the extent of CEO work experience in privately owned firms (<i>CEO private experience</i>). While there is no evidence of higher investment risk taking by private CEOs, the proportion of private-firm work experience has a positive association with disclosure deficiency, decrease in manager-owner agency conflicts, and an increase in political risk revelations at earnings conference calls, which, in turn, are associated with the elevation of idiosyncratic risk.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The findings of this study underscore arguments in the upper echelons theory, imprinting theory, and behavioral agency theory. The study also has implications for literature related to corporate disclosure, governance, and political risk.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Idiosyncratic risk is important for firms, as the literature suggests it hurts a firm's ability to finance future capital investments; therefore, it is optimal for corporate boards to have strategies in place to monitor and offer orientation packages targeted at alleviating CEO style heterogeneities presented by their prior work experience in private firms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 3","pages":"567-589"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135739863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders 代理人优惠：机构双重持有人的保密代理人投票

IF 5.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review

Pub Date : 2023-09-08 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12557

William J. Becker, Sattar Mansi, Maryam Nazari, John K. Wald

Research Question/Issue

For firms with institutional dual holders, is proxy voting affected by whether the vote is confidential? Does confidential voting affect firms' cost of debt?

Research Findings/Insights

Consistent with social exchange theory and reciprocity norms, we find that, in the absence of confidential voting, firms with institutional dual holders gain more favorable votes for proposals and, in particular, for management-sponsored compensation proposals. Further, these firms pay a higher cost of borrowing. This reciprocity relation does not exist if the firm has confidential voting in place.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

The results are consistent with reciprocity norms creating a psychological obligation to repay valuable favors between firm managers and institutional dual holders when proxy votes are not confidential.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

The findings support the popular position that confidential voting is in the best interests of shareholders and rigorous external corporate governance.

对于拥有机构双重持有人的公司，代理投票是否受到投票是否保密的影响？保密投票会影响公司的债务成本吗？与社会交换理论和互惠规范一致，我们发现，在没有保密投票的情况下，具有机构双重持有人的公司获得了更有利的提案投票，尤其是管理层赞助的薪酬提案。此外，这些公司要支付更高的借贷成本。如果公司有保密投票权，这种互惠关系就不存在。结果与互惠规范一致，在代理投票不保密的情况下，互惠规范创造了一种心理义务，即在公司经理和机构双重持有人之间回报有价值的恩惠。调查结果支持了一种流行的观点，即保密投票符合股东的最大利益和严格的外部公司治理。

{"title":"Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders","authors":"William J. Becker, Sattar Mansi, Maryam Nazari, John K. Wald","doi":"10.1111/corg.12557","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12557","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>For firms with institutional dual holders, is proxy voting affected by whether the vote is confidential? Does confidential voting affect firms' cost of debt?</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Consistent with social exchange theory and reciprocity norms, we find that, in the absence of confidential voting, firms with institutional dual holders gain more favorable votes for proposals and, in particular, for management-sponsored compensation proposals. Further, these firms pay a higher cost of borrowing. This reciprocity relation does not exist if the firm has confidential voting in place.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The results are consistent with reciprocity norms creating a psychological obligation to repay valuable favors between firm managers and institutional dual holders when proxy votes are not confidential.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The findings support the popular position that confidential voting is in the best interests of shareholders and rigorous external corporate governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 3","pages":"549-566"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41299140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0