Abstract We examine the immediate and bounce-back effects from six modern health crises that preceded Covid-19. Time-series models for a large cross-section of economies indicate that real GDP growth falls by around 2 percentage points in affected economies relative to unaffected economies in the year of the outbreak. Bounce-back in GDP growth is rapid and strong, especially when compared to non-health crises. Unemployment for less educated workers is higher and exhibits more persistence, and there is significantly greater persistence in female unemployment than male. Moreover, the negative initial effects of pandemics and bounce-back are economically contagious through international trade. The negative effects on GDP and unemployment are felt less in economies with larger first-year responses in government spending, especially on health care. Our estimates imply that the impact effect of the Covid-19 shock on world GDP growth is approximately four standard deviations worse than the average past pandemic.
{"title":"Modern Pandemics: Recession and Recovery","authors":"Chang Ma, John H. Rogers, Sili Zhou","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine the immediate and bounce-back effects from six modern health crises that preceded Covid-19. Time-series models for a large cross-section of economies indicate that real GDP growth falls by around 2 percentage points in affected economies relative to unaffected economies in the year of the outbreak. Bounce-back in GDP growth is rapid and strong, especially when compared to non-health crises. Unemployment for less educated workers is higher and exhibits more persistence, and there is significantly greater persistence in female unemployment than male. Moreover, the negative initial effects of pandemics and bounce-back are economically contagious through international trade. The negative effects on GDP and unemployment are felt less in economies with larger first-year responses in government spending, especially on health care. Our estimates imply that the impact effect of the Covid-19 shock on world GDP growth is approximately four standard deviations worse than the average past pandemic.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135837847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We use a general equilibrium model to show that a decrease in workers’ bargaining power amplifies the contribution to the output gap of adjustments along the extensive versus intensive margin of labour utilization. Under standard assumptions on the disutility of labour, this mechanism reduces the cyclical movements of inflation relative to those of the output gap. Micro-level evidence, based on a survey of Italian firms, provides support to the relationship between bargaining power and adjustments along the extensive margin versus the intensive one, as well as to attenuated price response when firms adjust labour input mainly through the extensive margin. A Bayesian estimation using Italian aggregate data for the samples 1970–1990 and 1991–2014 confirms that the decline in workers’ bargaining power has weakened the inflation–output gap relationship.
{"title":"Workers’ Bargaining Power and the Phillips Curve: A Micro–Macro Analysis","authors":"Marco J Lombardi, Marianna Riggi, Eliana Viviano","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We use a general equilibrium model to show that a decrease in workers’ bargaining power amplifies the contribution to the output gap of adjustments along the extensive versus intensive margin of labour utilization. Under standard assumptions on the disutility of labour, this mechanism reduces the cyclical movements of inflation relative to those of the output gap. Micro-level evidence, based on a survey of Italian firms, provides support to the relationship between bargaining power and adjustments along the extensive margin versus the intensive one, as well as to attenuated price response when firms adjust labour input mainly through the extensive margin. A Bayesian estimation using Italian aggregate data for the samples 1970–1990 and 1991–2014 confirms that the decline in workers’ bargaining power has weakened the inflation–output gap relationship.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"221 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136170988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the consequences of bureaucratic discretion in public procurement. I exploit a Hungarian policy reform, which allows a “high-discretion” procedure below a certain contract value At the threshold, I document large discontinuities both in procurement outcomes and in the density of contract values, which indicates that buyers manipulate contract values to avoid auctions. I combine the reform and a structural model to find that discretion increases prices and results in the selection of less productive contractors. I also show that high discretion benefits firms with connections to the party of the central government. I use the structural model to document that public buyers are willing to sacrifice more contract value to increase their discretion if more connected firms are operating in the market. I also use the model to simulate the effects of counterfactual procurement thresholds on different procurement outcomes.
{"title":"Discretion and Favoritism in Public Procurement","authors":"F. Szűcs","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper investigates the consequences of bureaucratic discretion in public procurement. I exploit a Hungarian policy reform, which allows a “high-discretion” procedure below a certain contract value At the threshold, I document large discontinuities both in procurement outcomes and in the density of contract values, which indicates that buyers manipulate contract values to avoid auctions. I combine the reform and a structural model to find that discretion increases prices and results in the selection of less productive contractors. I also show that high discretion benefits firms with connections to the party of the central government. I use the structural model to document that public buyers are willing to sacrifice more contract value to increase their discretion if more connected firms are operating in the market. I also use the model to simulate the effects of counterfactual procurement thresholds on different procurement outcomes.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42193791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially stage a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains where the loyalty of the autocrat’s army is strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option where the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military so as to put down clerics-led rebellions.
{"title":"The Quran and the Sword","authors":"E. Auriol, J. Platteau, T. Verdier","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially stage a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains where the loyalty of the autocrat’s army is strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option where the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military so as to put down clerics-led rebellions.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43429357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michele Battisti, Christian Dustmann, Uta Schönber
Abstract This paper investigates the effects of technological and organizational change (T&O) on jobs and workers. We show that although T&O reduces firm demand for routine relative to abstract task-based jobs, affected workers do not face higher probability of non-employment or lower earnings growth than unaffected workers. Rather, firms that adopt T&O offer routine workers retraining opportunities to upgrade to more abstract jobs. Older workers form an important exception: T&O increases the risk that they permanently withdraw from the labor market and reduces their earnings, regardless of the tasks they performed in the firm prior to T&O.
{"title":"Technological and Organizational Change and the Careers of Workers","authors":"Michele Battisti, Christian Dustmann, Uta Schönber","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper investigates the effects of technological and organizational change (T&O) on jobs and workers. We show that although T&O reduces firm demand for routine relative to abstract task-based jobs, affected workers do not face higher probability of non-employment or lower earnings growth than unaffected workers. Rather, firms that adopt T&O offer routine workers retraining opportunities to upgrade to more abstract jobs. Older workers form an important exception: T&O increases the risk that they permanently withdraw from the labor market and reduces their earnings, regardless of the tasks they performed in the firm prior to T&O.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135582865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sonia Bhalotra, Damian Clarke, Joseph Flavian Gomes, Atheendar Venkataramani
Abstract Millions of women continue to die during and soon after childbirth, even where the knowledge and resources to avoid this are available. We posit that raising the share of women in parliament can trigger action. Leveraging the timing of gender quota legislation across developing countries, we identify sharp sustained reductions of 7%–12% in maternal mortality. Investigating mechanisms, we find that gender quotas lead to increases in percentage points of 5–8 in skilled birth attendance and 4–8 in prenatal care utilization, alongside a decline in fertility of 6%–7% and an increase in the schooling of young women of about 0.5 years. The results are robust to numerous robustness checks. They suggest a new policy tool for tackling maternal mortality.
{"title":"Maternal Mortality and Women’s Political Power","authors":"Sonia Bhalotra, Damian Clarke, Joseph Flavian Gomes, Atheendar Venkataramani","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Millions of women continue to die during and soon after childbirth, even where the knowledge and resources to avoid this are available. We posit that raising the share of women in parliament can trigger action. Leveraging the timing of gender quota legislation across developing countries, we identify sharp sustained reductions of 7%–12% in maternal mortality. Investigating mechanisms, we find that gender quotas lead to increases in percentage points of 5–8 in skilled birth attendance and 4–8 in prenatal care utilization, alongside a decline in fertility of 6%–7% and an increase in the schooling of young women of about 0.5 years. The results are robust to numerous robustness checks. They suggest a new policy tool for tackling maternal mortality.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135677204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study contact tracing in a new macro-epidemiological model with asymptomatic transmission and limited testing capacity. Contact tracing is a testing strategy that aims to reconstruct the infection chain of newly symptomatic agents. This strategy may be unsuccessful because of an externality leading agents to expand their interactions at rates exceeding policymakers’ ability to test all the traced contacts. Complementing contact tracing with timely deployed containment measures (e.g., social distancing or a tighter quarantine policy) corrects this externality and delivers outcomes that are remarkably similar to the benchmark case where tests are unlimited. We provide theoretical underpinnings to the risk of becoming infected in macro-epidemiological models. Our methodology to reconstruct infection chains is not affected by curse-of-dimensionality problems.
{"title":"Pandemic Recessions and Contact Tracing","authors":"Leonardo Melosi, Matthias Rottner","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study contact tracing in a new macro-epidemiological model with asymptomatic transmission and limited testing capacity. Contact tracing is a testing strategy that aims to reconstruct the infection chain of newly symptomatic agents. This strategy may be unsuccessful because of an externality leading agents to expand their interactions at rates exceeding policymakers’ ability to test all the traced contacts. Complementing contact tracing with timely deployed containment measures (e.g., social distancing or a tighter quarantine policy) corrects this externality and delivers outcomes that are remarkably similar to the benchmark case where tests are unlimited. We provide theoretical underpinnings to the risk of becoming infected in macro-epidemiological models. Our methodology to reconstruct infection chains is not affected by curse-of-dimensionality problems.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136141858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the mass movement of sending urban youth to the countryside during China’s Cultural Revolution, many families with multiple age-eligible children were forced to make a send-down choice among the siblings. We exploit this rare social experiment and employ data on urban twins in China to investigate the effect of childhood send-down experience on children’s old-age support to parents. We find that compared with their twin siblings who had stayed in the city, send-downs were less likely to make a monetary transfer to parents and also tended to transfer less. We show that the inferior transfer behavior of send-downs was not due to any income disadvantage or selection of family’s send-down choice in terms of children’s altruism endowment. After ruling out the income and selection channel explanations, we posit that the inferior transfer behavior of send-downs is driven by the adverse effect of childhood send-down experience on children’s willingness to provide old-sage support to parents, which could work through both pure altruism and warm glow.
{"title":"Childhood Send-Down Experience and Old-Age Support to Parents: The Twins Experiment in China","authors":"Hongliang Zhang, Junsen Zhang, Ning Zhang","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the mass movement of sending urban youth to the countryside during China’s Cultural Revolution, many families with multiple age-eligible children were forced to make a send-down choice among the siblings. We exploit this rare social experiment and employ data on urban twins in China to investigate the effect of childhood send-down experience on children’s old-age support to parents. We find that compared with their twin siblings who had stayed in the city, send-downs were less likely to make a monetary transfer to parents and also tended to transfer less. We show that the inferior transfer behavior of send-downs was not due to any income disadvantage or selection of family’s send-down choice in terms of children’s altruism endowment. After ruling out the income and selection channel explanations, we posit that the inferior transfer behavior of send-downs is driven by the adverse effect of childhood send-down experience on children’s willingness to provide old-sage support to parents, which could work through both pure altruism and warm glow.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42864880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore decision-making under uncertainty using a framework that decomposes uncertainty into three distinct layers: (1) risk, which entails inherent randomness within a given probability model; (2) model ambiguity, which entails uncertainty about the probability model to be used; and (3) model misspecification, which entails uncertainty about the presence of the correct probability model among the set of models considered. Using a new experimental design, we isolate and measure attitudes towards each layer separately. We conduct our experiment on three different subject pools and document the existence of a behavioral distinction between the three layers. In addition to providing new insights into the underlying processes behind ambiguity aversion, we provide the first empirical evidence of the role of model misspecification in decision-making under uncertainty.
{"title":"Three Layers of Uncertainty","authors":"I. Aydogan, L. Berger, V. Bosetti, Ning Liu","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We explore decision-making under uncertainty using a framework that decomposes uncertainty into three distinct layers: (1) risk, which entails inherent randomness within a given probability model; (2) model ambiguity, which entails uncertainty about the probability model to be used; and (3) model misspecification, which entails uncertainty about the presence of the correct probability model among the set of models considered. Using a new experimental design, we isolate and measure attitudes towards each layer separately. We conduct our experiment on three different subject pools and document the existence of a behavioral distinction between the three layers. In addition to providing new insights into the underlying processes behind ambiguity aversion, we provide the first empirical evidence of the role of model misspecification in decision-making under uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42802624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study how adverse economic shocks influence political outcomes in strong authoritarian regimes, by examining the export slowdown in China during the mid-2010s. We first show that prefectures that experienced a more severe export slowdown witnessed a significant increase in incidents of labor strikes, using a shift-share instrumental variables strategy. The prefecture party secretary was subsequently more likely to be replaced by the central government, particularly if the rise in strikes was greater than in other prefectures that saw comparable export slowdowns. These patterns are consistent with a simple framework we develop, where the central government makes strategic use of a turnover decision to induce effort from local officials in preserving social stability, and to screen them for retention. In line with the framework’s predictions, we find a heightened emphasis by local party secretaries—particularly younger officials whose career concerns are stronger—on upholding stability following negative export shocks. This is evident in both words (from textual analysis of official speeches) and deeds (from expenditures on public security and social spending).
{"title":"The Political Economy Consequences of China’s Export Slowdown","authors":"Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor, Bingjing Li","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study how adverse economic shocks influence political outcomes in strong authoritarian regimes, by examining the export slowdown in China during the mid-2010s. We first show that prefectures that experienced a more severe export slowdown witnessed a significant increase in incidents of labor strikes, using a shift-share instrumental variables strategy. The prefecture party secretary was subsequently more likely to be replaced by the central government, particularly if the rise in strikes was greater than in other prefectures that saw comparable export slowdowns. These patterns are consistent with a simple framework we develop, where the central government makes strategic use of a turnover decision to induce effort from local officials in preserving social stability, and to screen them for retention. In line with the framework’s predictions, we find a heightened emphasis by local party secretaries—particularly younger officials whose career concerns are stronger—on upholding stability following negative export shocks. This is evident in both words (from textual analysis of official speeches) and deeds (from expenditures on public security and social spending).","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136371388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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