We develop a model of electoral campaigns as dynamic contests in which two office-motivated candidates allocate their budgets over time to affect their odds of winning. We measure the candidates’ evolving odds of winning using a state variable that tends to decay over time, and we refer to it as the candidates’ “relative popularity.” In our baseline model, the equilibrium ratio of spending by each candidate equals the ratio of their initial budgets; spending is independent of past realizations of relative popularity; and there is a positive relationship between the strength of decay in the popularity process and the rate at which candidates increase their spending over time as election day approaches. We use this relationship to recover estimates of the perceived decay rate in popularity leads in actual U.S. subnational elections.
{"title":"Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests","authors":"Avidit Acharya, Edoardo Grillo, Takuo Sugaya, Eray Turkel","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae006","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of electoral campaigns as dynamic contests in which two office-motivated candidates allocate their budgets over time to affect their odds of winning. We measure the candidates’ evolving odds of winning using a state variable that tends to decay over time, and we refer to it as the candidates’ “relative popularity.” In our baseline model, the equilibrium ratio of spending by each candidate equals the ratio of their initial budgets; spending is independent of past realizations of relative popularity; and there is a positive relationship between the strength of decay in the popularity process and the rate at which candidates increase their spending over time as election day approaches. We use this relationship to recover estimates of the perceived decay rate in popularity leads in actual U.S. subnational elections.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139679605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a theory of social norms (or conventions) that implement substantial levels of inequality between men and women, ethnic groups, and classes and that persist over long periods of time despite being inefficient and not supported by formal institutions. Consistent with historical cases, we extend the standard asymmetric stochastic evolutionary game model to allow sub population sizes to differ and idiosyncratic rejection of a status quo convention to be intentional to some degree (rather than purely random as in the standard evolutionary models). In this setting, if idiosyncratic play is sufficiently intentional and the subordinate class sufficiently large relative to the elite, then risk-dominated conventions that are both more unequal and inefficient relative to alternative conventions will be stochastically stable and may persist for long periods. We show that the same is true in a general bipartite network of the population if most of the subordinate groups interactions are local, while the elite is more “cosmopolitan”. We apply the model to the evolution of wage conventions on the bipartite network of workers and employers, and find that an unequal monopsonistic wage convention is robust to the idiosyncratic play of workers that otherwise might displace it.
{"title":"Social Conflict and the Evolution of Unequal Conventions","authors":"Sung-Ha Hwang, Suresh Naidu, Samuel Bowles","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae004","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a theory of social norms (or conventions) that implement substantial levels of inequality between men and women, ethnic groups, and classes and that persist over long periods of time despite being inefficient and not supported by formal institutions. Consistent with historical cases, we extend the standard asymmetric stochastic evolutionary game model to allow sub population sizes to differ and idiosyncratic rejection of a status quo convention to be intentional to some degree (rather than purely random as in the standard evolutionary models). In this setting, if idiosyncratic play is sufficiently intentional and the subordinate class sufficiently large relative to the elite, then risk-dominated conventions that are both more unequal and inefficient relative to alternative conventions will be stochastically stable and may persist for long periods. We show that the same is true in a general bipartite network of the population if most of the subordinate groups interactions are local, while the elite is more “cosmopolitan”. We apply the model to the evolution of wage conventions on the bipartite network of workers and employers, and find that an unequal monopsonistic wage convention is robust to the idiosyncratic play of workers that otherwise might displace it.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139516298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the optimal joint design of incentives and performance rating scales in a principal-manager-worker hierarchy. The principal wants to motivate the worker to exert unobservable effort at the minimum feasible cost. Given the worker’s effort, two signals are realized: public and verifiable output and a private non-verifiable signal known only to the manager. The principal may try to elicit the manager’s private information by requiring her to evaluate the worker’s performance. Payments may depend on output and the manager’s evaluation. I show that the principal can achieve no more than what is feasible with a binary rating scale. I also identify scenarios where subjective evaluations are valuable (non-valuable), reduced transparency is advantageous, and forced ranking outperforms individual evaluations.
{"title":"Agency in Hierarchies: Middle Managers and Performance Evaluations","authors":"Henrique Castro-Pires","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the optimal joint design of incentives and performance rating scales in a principal-manager-worker hierarchy. The principal wants to motivate the worker to exert unobservable effort at the minimum feasible cost. Given the worker’s effort, two signals are realized: public and verifiable output and a private non-verifiable signal known only to the manager. The principal may try to elicit the manager’s private information by requiring her to evaluate the worker’s performance. Payments may depend on output and the manager’s evaluation. I show that the principal can achieve no more than what is feasible with a binary rating scale. I also identify scenarios where subjective evaluations are valuable (non-valuable), reduced transparency is advantageous, and forced ranking outperforms individual evaluations.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139516107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andreas G B Ziegler, Giorgia Romagnoli, Theo Offerman
We examine how the erosion of morals, norms, and norm compliance in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied markets allow traders to exchange at most one unit and provide market power to individual traders by de-activating two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise; (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines aggregate quantities. In an experiment, we compare single-unit to (more common) multi-unit markets, which may activate these forces. Multi-unit markets, in contrast to single-unit markets, lead to a complete erosion of morals. This is associated primarily with a deterioration in norm compliance: the observed level of immoral trade is in contrast with the prevailing social norm. The replacement logic is the main mechanism driving this finding.
{"title":"Morals in Multi-Unit Markets","authors":"Andreas G B Ziegler, Giorgia Romagnoli, Theo Offerman","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae001","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how the erosion of morals, norms, and norm compliance in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied markets allow traders to exchange at most one unit and provide market power to individual traders by de-activating two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise; (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines aggregate quantities. In an experiment, we compare single-unit to (more common) multi-unit markets, which may activate these forces. Multi-unit markets, in contrast to single-unit markets, lead to a complete erosion of morals. This is associated primarily with a deterioration in norm compliance: the observed level of immoral trade is in contrast with the prevailing social norm. The replacement logic is the main mechanism driving this finding.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"167 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139463419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paolo Acciari, Facundo Alvaredo, Salvatore Morelli
We estimate the distribution of wealth in Italy between 1995 and 2016 using a novel source of inheritance tax files, combined with surveys and national accounts. We find that the level of wealth concentration is in line with other European countries; however, its time trend appears more in line with the US, showing a significant increase over the period studied. The country exhibits one of the greatest declines in the wealth share of the bottom 50%. The paper also shows that age plays a marginal role in explaining wealth concentration. Changes in savings, instead, are the predominant force behind the increase in wealth inequality, even at the top. Equity prices also account for a large share of wealth growth above the 99th percentile, whereas changes in house prices play only a minor role. Finally, we document the growing concentration of life-time wealth transfers, and their increasingly favorable tax treatment.
{"title":"The concentration of personal wealth in Italy 1995–2016","authors":"Paolo Acciari, Facundo Alvaredo, Salvatore Morelli","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae002","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the distribution of wealth in Italy between 1995 and 2016 using a novel source of inheritance tax files, combined with surveys and national accounts. We find that the level of wealth concentration is in line with other European countries; however, its time trend appears more in line with the US, showing a significant increase over the period studied. The country exhibits one of the greatest declines in the wealth share of the bottom 50%. The paper also shows that age plays a marginal role in explaining wealth concentration. Changes in savings, instead, are the predominant force behind the increase in wealth inequality, even at the top. Equity prices also account for a large share of wealth growth above the 99th percentile, whereas changes in house prices play only a minor role. Finally, we document the growing concentration of life-time wealth transfers, and their increasingly favorable tax treatment.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139463421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We build a dynamic model where the economy is vulnerable to belief-driven slow-moving debt crises at intermediate debt levels, and rollover crises at both low and high debt levels. Vis-à-vis the threat of slow-moving crises, countercyclical deficits generally welfare-dominate debt reduction policies. In a recession, optimizing governments only deleverage if debt is close to the threshold below which belief-driven slow-moving crises can no longer occur. The welfare benefits from deleveraging instead dominate if governments are concerned with losing market access even at low debt levels. Long bond maturities may fully eliminate belief-driven rollover crises but not slow-moving ones.
{"title":"Debt crises, fast and slow","authors":"Giancarlo Corsetti, Fred Seunghyun Maeng","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad076","url":null,"abstract":"We build a dynamic model where the economy is vulnerable to belief-driven slow-moving debt crises at intermediate debt levels, and rollover crises at both low and high debt levels. Vis-à-vis the threat of slow-moving crises, countercyclical deficits generally welfare-dominate debt reduction policies. In a recession, optimizing governments only deleverage if debt is close to the threshold below which belief-driven slow-moving crises can no longer occur. The welfare benefits from deleveraging instead dominate if governments are concerned with losing market access even at low debt levels. Long bond maturities may fully eliminate belief-driven rollover crises but not slow-moving ones.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139061812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alberto Alesina, Davide Furceri, Jonathan D Ostry, Chris Papageorgiou, Dennis O Quinn
We present two newdatabases we have constructed to explore the electoral consequences of structural economic policy reforms. One database measures reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product, and labor markets covering 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other chronicles the timing and results of national elections. We find that liberalizing reforms are associated with economic benefits that accrue only gradually over time. Because of this delay, liberalizing reforms are costly to democratic incumbents when they are implemented close to elections. Electoral outcomes also depend on the state of the economy: reforms are penalized during contractions but are often rewarded in expansions.
{"title":"Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset","authors":"Alberto Alesina, Davide Furceri, Jonathan D Ostry, Chris Papageorgiou, Dennis O Quinn","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad075","url":null,"abstract":"We present two newdatabases we have constructed to explore the electoral consequences of structural economic policy reforms. One database measures reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product, and labor markets covering 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other chronicles the timing and results of national elections. We find that liberalizing reforms are associated with economic benefits that accrue only gradually over time. Because of this delay, liberalizing reforms are costly to democratic incumbents when they are implemented close to elections. Electoral outcomes also depend on the state of the economy: reforms are penalized during contractions but are often rewarded in expansions.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139052192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyse 69 entries and relocations by the largest Norwegian discount variety chain Europris during the period 2016 to 2019, and measure how its location choices affect local grocery stores’ performance. We use detailed data from a major Norwegian grocery chain, which enables us to combine local grocery stores’ sales and traffic with travelling distance to new or relocated Europris stores, and a two-way fixed effects strategy. Our findings suggest that entries and relocations have significant effects and that the sign of the effect depends on the distance between the stores, creating a non-linear relationship between the effect of entry and the distance between the stores. Sufficiently close entries and relocations increase local demand since more customers are attracted to the market, but, as the distance increases, the competitive effect of a new discount variety store dominates, and local grocery store sales and traffic are reduced. As we move further away, the entry effect is gradually reduced to zero.
{"title":"Co-location, good, bad or both: How do new entries of discount variety stores affect local grocery businesses?","authors":"Charlotte B Evensen, Frode Steen, Simen A Ulsaker","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad074","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse 69 entries and relocations by the largest Norwegian discount variety chain Europris during the period 2016 to 2019, and measure how its location choices affect local grocery stores’ performance. We use detailed data from a major Norwegian grocery chain, which enables us to combine local grocery stores’ sales and traffic with travelling distance to new or relocated Europris stores, and a two-way fixed effects strategy. Our findings suggest that entries and relocations have significant effects and that the sign of the effect depends on the distance between the stores, creating a non-linear relationship between the effect of entry and the distance between the stores. Sufficiently close entries and relocations increase local demand since more customers are attracted to the market, but, as the distance increases, the competitive effect of a new discount variety store dominates, and local grocery store sales and traffic are reduced. As we move further away, the entry effect is gradually reduced to zero.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138682238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Demetrio Guzzardi, Elisa Palagi, Andrea Roventini, Alessandro Santoro
This work reconstructs novel series on income distribution in Italy combining survey data, tax data and National Accounts both at the national and regional levels, and it analyzes the overall progressivity of the tax system. Our new Distributional National Accounts allow to correct for remarkable misreporting of capital income in surveys, to provide more accurate estimates of consumption, and to better account for the role of informal economy. Our fresh estimates show higher income concentration at the top 1% and 0.1% with respect to previous studies in order of 1.5 percentage points. Moreover, the share of national income of the richest top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1% has been steadily increasing after the 2008 crisis. Our results shed further light on the multifaceted nature of inequality in Italy: youngest individuals, women and inhabitants of Southern regions have been increasingly exposed to growing levels of inequality. Finally, the Italian tax system is only slightly progressive up to the 95th percentile of the income distribution, and regressive for the top 5%. Moreover, it is regressive throughout the whole distribution when individuals are ranked with respect to their net wealth.
{"title":"Reconstructing Income Inequality in Italy: New Evidence and Tax System Implications from Distributional National Accounts","authors":"Demetrio Guzzardi, Elisa Palagi, Andrea Roventini, Alessandro Santoro","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad073","url":null,"abstract":"This work reconstructs novel series on income distribution in Italy combining survey data, tax data and National Accounts both at the national and regional levels, and it analyzes the overall progressivity of the tax system. Our new Distributional National Accounts allow to correct for remarkable misreporting of capital income in surveys, to provide more accurate estimates of consumption, and to better account for the role of informal economy. Our fresh estimates show higher income concentration at the top 1% and 0.1% with respect to previous studies in order of 1.5 percentage points. Moreover, the share of national income of the richest top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1% has been steadily increasing after the 2008 crisis. Our results shed further light on the multifaceted nature of inequality in Italy: youngest individuals, women and inhabitants of Southern regions have been increasingly exposed to growing levels of inequality. Finally, the Italian tax system is only slightly progressive up to the 95th percentile of the income distribution, and regressive for the top 5%. Moreover, it is regressive throughout the whole distribution when individuals are ranked with respect to their net wealth.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138682049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomír Cingl, Tomáš Želinský
This paper provides evidence showing that people are more prone to engage in nasty behavior, malevolently causing _nancial harm to other people at own costs, when they make decisions in a group context rather than when making choices individually on their own. We establish this behavioral regularity in a series of large-scale experiments among university students, adolescents, and nationally representative samples of adults – more than ten thousand subjects in total. We test several potential mechanisms, and the results suggest that individual nasty inclinations are systematically more likely to affect behavior when decisions are made under the “cover” of a group, i.e., in a group decision-context that creates a perception of diffused responsibility.
{"title":"Nastiness in Groups","authors":"Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomír Cingl, Tomáš Želinský","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides evidence showing that people are more prone to engage in nasty behavior, malevolently causing _nancial harm to other people at own costs, when they make decisions in a group context rather than when making choices individually on their own. We establish this behavioral regularity in a series of large-scale experiments among university students, adolescents, and nationally representative samples of adults – more than ten thousand subjects in total. We test several potential mechanisms, and the results suggest that individual nasty inclinations are systematically more likely to affect behavior when decisions are made under the “cover” of a group, i.e., in a group decision-context that creates a perception of diffused responsibility.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":" 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138492738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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