Among the defining features of the contemporary global economy are the digital disruption of economic sectors and the accompanying political and regulatory conflicts. Across the world, multinational technology firms have mobilized consumers as a key ally in these conflicts, a critical element of the platform power they wield. In this article, I examine how non-consumer identities can limit the exercise of platform power by such firms. By synthesizing the concept of platform power with research on political consumerism and national identity, I argue that activating national identity can generate opposition to policies favorable to multinational technology firms and, in turn, curtail their ability to appeal to public support. Empirically, this article uses an online, nationally representative survey fielded in Canada. I explore the determinants of support for global regulatory cooperation and the domestic policy status quo, as well as the causal effect of consumer and national identity framing using vignette experiments across three issue areas: banking, telecommunications, and taxation. The findings reveal that activating consumer identities consistently shifts support but the effect of national identity is more variable. This article thus contributes to scholarship on the digital economic transformation and the exercise of business power in the global economy.
{"title":"National Identity and the Limits of Platform Power in the Global Economy","authors":"Tyler Girard","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae090","url":null,"abstract":"Among the defining features of the contemporary global economy are the digital disruption of economic sectors and the accompanying political and regulatory conflicts. Across the world, multinational technology firms have mobilized consumers as a key ally in these conflicts, a critical element of the platform power they wield. In this article, I examine how non-consumer identities can limit the exercise of platform power by such firms. By synthesizing the concept of platform power with research on political consumerism and national identity, I argue that activating national identity can generate opposition to policies favorable to multinational technology firms and, in turn, curtail their ability to appeal to public support. Empirically, this article uses an online, nationally representative survey fielded in Canada. I explore the determinants of support for global regulatory cooperation and the domestic policy status quo, as well as the causal effect of consumer and national identity framing using vignette experiments across three issue areas: banking, telecommunications, and taxation. The findings reveal that activating consumer identities consistently shifts support but the effect of national identity is more variable. This article thus contributes to scholarship on the digital economic transformation and the exercise of business power in the global economy.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars commonly argue that international law and organizations promote democracy by helping dictators to credibly commit to accountability, individual rights, and transparency. Yet dictators routinely join treaties and international organizations without transitioning to democracy. International law and organizations can generate asymmetric costs for domestic actors because international rules often apply to both governments and non-state actors, yet dictators can limit how these rules are upheld at the domestic and international level. We argue that dictators are most likely to join such treaties and international organizations when they face strong domestic political competition. We illustrate our argument using the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has extensive powers to prosecute individuals for international crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. We show that ICC investigations and prosecutions have become a tool for incumbent dictators to target their domestic opponents. We examine the implications of our theory for multiple outcome variables, including the decision to join the ICC, violence, and the survival of dictators in power. Our evidence suggests that dictators are most likely to join the ICC when they face strong political opponents and are subsequently less likely to commit violence and more likely to survive in office.
{"title":"The Politics of Punishment: Why Dictators Join the International Criminal Court","authors":"Leslie Johns, Francesca Parente","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae087","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars commonly argue that international law and organizations promote democracy by helping dictators to credibly commit to accountability, individual rights, and transparency. Yet dictators routinely join treaties and international organizations without transitioning to democracy. International law and organizations can generate asymmetric costs for domestic actors because international rules often apply to both governments and non-state actors, yet dictators can limit how these rules are upheld at the domestic and international level. We argue that dictators are most likely to join such treaties and international organizations when they face strong domestic political competition. We illustrate our argument using the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has extensive powers to prosecute individuals for international crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. We show that ICC investigations and prosecutions have become a tool for incumbent dictators to target their domestic opponents. We examine the implications of our theory for multiple outcome variables, including the decision to join the ICC, violence, and the survival of dictators in power. Our evidence suggests that dictators are most likely to join the ICC when they face strong political opponents and are subsequently less likely to commit violence and more likely to survive in office.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Recent data show systematic changes in the diplomacy and practice of war. Conquests, peace treaties, declarations of war, and state boundary changes have declined or disappeared. There are still wars, but they are increasingly fait accomplis, and their outcomes are often not recognized as legal. How can we explain this wide-ranging but seemingly contradictory transformation? Existing accounts, such as those based on a territorial integrity norm, do not adequately explain these changes. This paper uses norm dynamics theory to show that all of these changes can be explained as ‘ripple effects’ of war becoming illegitimate as a way to solve international disputes. The kinds of rhetorical justifications states can convincingly give for engaging in violence have changed. States are navigating this changed international social environment through legitimacy management behaviors. The paper specifies three types of ripple effect, Reframing, Displacement, and Consistency-Maintenance, corresponding to changes in what states say, the actions they perform, and how the audience reacts. We show how this theory unifies all of the existing data into a single explanatory framework. We also apply the theory to the decline of peace treaties to show how ripple effects play out in more detail.
{"title":"The Ripple Effects of the Illegitimacy of War","authors":"Joseph O'Mahoney","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae082","url":null,"abstract":"s Recent data show systematic changes in the diplomacy and practice of war. Conquests, peace treaties, declarations of war, and state boundary changes have declined or disappeared. There are still wars, but they are increasingly fait accomplis, and their outcomes are often not recognized as legal. How can we explain this wide-ranging but seemingly contradictory transformation? Existing accounts, such as those based on a territorial integrity norm, do not adequately explain these changes. This paper uses norm dynamics theory to show that all of these changes can be explained as ‘ripple effects’ of war becoming illegitimate as a way to solve international disputes. The kinds of rhetorical justifications states can convincingly give for engaging in violence have changed. States are navigating this changed international social environment through legitimacy management behaviors. The paper specifies three types of ripple effect, Reframing, Displacement, and Consistency-Maintenance, corresponding to changes in what states say, the actions they perform, and how the audience reacts. We show how this theory unifies all of the existing data into a single explanatory framework. We also apply the theory to the decline of peace treaties to show how ripple effects play out in more detail.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s American exceptionalism is enjoying a revival of scholarly interest amid new approaches to studying foreign policy narratives and unease regarding how US policymakers will manage a less unipolar international system. That revival coincides temporally, though not yet substantively, with growing attention to racialized dynamics and Eurocentrism within international relations. This article examines how core strands of American exceptionalism—the prevailing narrative framing of US foreign policy—reflect a whitewashed understanding of US foreign policy that can best be understood as the product of racialized subject-positioning that saturated its historical development. After conceptualizing American exceptionalism, it develops a theoretical framework to capture how racialized subject-positioning stratifies understandings of a nation’s role in the world. It proceeds to investigate how this process shaped the development of American exceptionalism in line with epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence, producing exceptionalist narratives that neglect non-white populations as meaningful others in the construction of US national identity and that negate US interactions with those groups as relevant evidence that might undercut its exceptionalism. These whitewashing effects remained embedded even as overtly racist discourse became delegitimized, posing enduring obstacles for US diplomacy today.
{"title":"Whitewashing American Exceptionalism: Racialized Subject-Positioning and US Foreign Policy","authors":"Richard W Maass","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae085","url":null,"abstract":"s American exceptionalism is enjoying a revival of scholarly interest amid new approaches to studying foreign policy narratives and unease regarding how US policymakers will manage a less unipolar international system. That revival coincides temporally, though not yet substantively, with growing attention to racialized dynamics and Eurocentrism within international relations. This article examines how core strands of American exceptionalism—the prevailing narrative framing of US foreign policy—reflect a whitewashed understanding of US foreign policy that can best be understood as the product of racialized subject-positioning that saturated its historical development. After conceptualizing American exceptionalism, it develops a theoretical framework to capture how racialized subject-positioning stratifies understandings of a nation’s role in the world. It proceeds to investigate how this process shaped the development of American exceptionalism in line with epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence, producing exceptionalist narratives that neglect non-white populations as meaningful others in the construction of US national identity and that negate US interactions with those groups as relevant evidence that might undercut its exceptionalism. These whitewashing effects remained embedded even as overtly racist discourse became delegitimized, posing enduring obstacles for US diplomacy today.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s The Russo–Ukraine War raises important questions on the dynamics of regional leadership and followership in what may be termed “Russian-led Eurasia.” These questions, in particular, the strength of Russian leadership in the region is complicated by the ambiguity in existing literature and competing images of Russia's relations with long-standing allies—notably Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—which are often portrayed in terms of a “community of fate” or partners destined for closer integration but also as a “community of fortune” or ad hoc, situational partners, loosely centered on Russia. This article offers an innovative theoretical and methodological exploration of Russia's relations with regional partner states by utilizing the English School of International Relations and regional integration organizations to assess Russia's regional leadership. As argued in this article, Russian-led Eurasia may be understood as an example of a regional interstate society with Russian hegemony serving as a socially conferred, binding institution. But this hegemony is inherently unstable owing to Russia's inability to balance hegemonic “rights” with “responsibilities.” War in Ukraine did not create this problem, but it has created the conditions for leadership transition in the region.
{"title":"Russia's Leadership in Eurasia: Holding Together or Falling Apart?","authors":"Sean Roberts, Ulrike Ziemer","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae088","url":null,"abstract":"s The Russo–Ukraine War raises important questions on the dynamics of regional leadership and followership in what may be termed “Russian-led Eurasia.” These questions, in particular, the strength of Russian leadership in the region is complicated by the ambiguity in existing literature and competing images of Russia's relations with long-standing allies—notably Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—which are often portrayed in terms of a “community of fate” or partners destined for closer integration but also as a “community of fortune” or ad hoc, situational partners, loosely centered on Russia. This article offers an innovative theoretical and methodological exploration of Russia's relations with regional partner states by utilizing the English School of International Relations and regional integration organizations to assess Russia's regional leadership. As argued in this article, Russian-led Eurasia may be understood as an example of a regional interstate society with Russian hegemony serving as a socially conferred, binding institution. But this hegemony is inherently unstable owing to Russia's inability to balance hegemonic “rights” with “responsibilities.” War in Ukraine did not create this problem, but it has created the conditions for leadership transition in the region.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anna Holzscheiter, Thurid Bahr, Laura Pantzerhielm, Martin Grandjean
In this paper, regime complexes are conceptualized as dynamic networks constituted by relations between international organizations (IOs). We introduce “IO positioning” as a conceptual lens for studying patterns and shifts in IO networks resulting from negotiations between IOs over their distinctiveness and social membership in complex organizational fields. We suggest that IO positioning has two constitutive effects. First, on the level of individual IOs, positioning affects IO identities within the field as these are (re)negotiated in relations with other organizations. Secondly, the positioning practices of IOs have constitutive effects on the contours of entire policy fields too; they form and shift the boundaries of regime complexes. Empirically, the paper examines the utility of our approach by analyzing the history, dynamics, and positioning effects of interorganizational relations between eight IOs in global health governance—an area of international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as exceptionally fragmented, complex, and densely populated. Examining relations between our eight IOs, we provide network analytical longitudinal data of in- and out-reporting by IOs derived from IOs’ annual reports between 1970 and 2017. We triangulate our network analysis with data derived from semi-structured interviews with health IO professionals.
{"title":"Positioning among International Organizations: Shifting Centers of Gravity in Global Health Governance","authors":"Anna Holzscheiter, Thurid Bahr, Laura Pantzerhielm, Martin Grandjean","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae073","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, regime complexes are conceptualized as dynamic networks constituted by relations between international organizations (IOs). We introduce “IO positioning” as a conceptual lens for studying patterns and shifts in IO networks resulting from negotiations between IOs over their distinctiveness and social membership in complex organizational fields. We suggest that IO positioning has two constitutive effects. First, on the level of individual IOs, positioning affects IO identities within the field as these are (re)negotiated in relations with other organizations. Secondly, the positioning practices of IOs have constitutive effects on the contours of entire policy fields too; they form and shift the boundaries of regime complexes. Empirically, the paper examines the utility of our approach by analyzing the history, dynamics, and positioning effects of interorganizational relations between eight IOs in global health governance—an area of international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as exceptionally fragmented, complex, and densely populated. Examining relations between our eight IOs, we provide network analytical longitudinal data of in- and out-reporting by IOs derived from IOs’ annual reports between 1970 and 2017. We triangulate our network analysis with data derived from semi-structured interviews with health IO professionals.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141074170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do consolidated democracies incorporate international human rights law (IHRL) treaties into national law? Existing research suggests contrastive accounts of the participation of democracies in IHRL regimes. While overall more likely to ratify, consolidated democracies are sometimes reluctant to accept demanding human rights commitments and less likely than both newly democratic and authoritarian regimes to incorporate international law in their constitutions. To theorize why established democracies commit to IHRL, this paper provides a comparative process tracing of the decisions to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into national law in Denmark and Sweden in the early 1990s. Why did these solid democracies with an exceptional commitment to human rights wait over 40 years to give domestic effect to a treaty they had helped create? Assessing rival theories of state commitment to human rights norms, the findings suggest that contextual developments in European law provided an opportunity for domestic political elites to seek insurance by incorporating the ECHR to place constraints on executive power. The argument qualifies claims about material strategizing or socialization to European norms as the primary drivers of incorporation.
{"title":"Why Incorporate the ECHR? The Domestic Incentives of Human Rights Commitment","authors":"Johan Karlsson Schaffer","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae039","url":null,"abstract":"Why do consolidated democracies incorporate international human rights law (IHRL) treaties into national law? Existing research suggests contrastive accounts of the participation of democracies in IHRL regimes. While overall more likely to ratify, consolidated democracies are sometimes reluctant to accept demanding human rights commitments and less likely than both newly democratic and authoritarian regimes to incorporate international law in their constitutions. To theorize why established democracies commit to IHRL, this paper provides a comparative process tracing of the decisions to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into national law in Denmark and Sweden in the early 1990s. Why did these solid democracies with an exceptional commitment to human rights wait over 40 years to give domestic effect to a treaty they had helped create? Assessing rival theories of state commitment to human rights norms, the findings suggest that contextual developments in European law provided an opportunity for domestic political elites to seek insurance by incorporating the ECHR to place constraints on executive power. The argument qualifies claims about material strategizing or socialization to European norms as the primary drivers of incorporation.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140910650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conventional wisdom on alliances proposes that leaders comply with alliances because the public opposes violating alliance commitments. However, this assumes that the public can easily judge whether or not a particular policy violates an alliance treaty. This article challenges this assumption and develops a theory that elites have the opportunity to shape public understanding as to whether an action violates an alliance treaty. It shows that while alliance commitments continue to have an important impact on public opinion, signals from unified elites can significantly reduce public pressure to support an ally by arguing that the alliance treaty does not create a legal obligation to intervene. In a pair of experiments on large samples of American adults, we found that a unified signal from the president and the Senate opposition leader can significantly reduce support for sending troops to the embattled ally. Consistent with elite cueing theory, the president’s ability to move public opinion in this manner is eliminated if the Senate opposition leader disagrees with his argument.
{"title":"Manipulating Public Beliefs about Alliance Compliance: A Survey Experiment","authors":"Dan Reiter, Brian Greenhill","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae075","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom on alliances proposes that leaders comply with alliances because the public opposes violating alliance commitments. However, this assumes that the public can easily judge whether or not a particular policy violates an alliance treaty. This article challenges this assumption and develops a theory that elites have the opportunity to shape public understanding as to whether an action violates an alliance treaty. It shows that while alliance commitments continue to have an important impact on public opinion, signals from unified elites can significantly reduce public pressure to support an ally by arguing that the alliance treaty does not create a legal obligation to intervene. In a pair of experiments on large samples of American adults, we found that a unified signal from the president and the Senate opposition leader can significantly reduce support for sending troops to the embattled ally. Consistent with elite cueing theory, the president’s ability to move public opinion in this manner is eliminated if the Senate opposition leader disagrees with his argument.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140903311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International criminal justice is filled with living, dead, and dying bodies. While witnesses detail atrocities in the courtroom, such testimonies are largely considered for their evidentiary value to establish innocence or guilt. In this article, I explore how death, grief, and mourning are represented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). I focus on the ICTY documentary, Crimes Before the ICTY: Višegrad, to analyse how filmic representations of international criminal justice register dead, dying, and grieving bodies. Drawing on Queer Death Studies and relational ontologies, I explore the more-than-human and non/living worlds through which death, grief, and mourning are represented in the film. A queer relational approach reveals and challenges the construction of the dead as evidence and death worlds as crime scenes. This approach illuminates how the natural world and buildings, bridges, and artifacts are vestiges, witnesses, and sites of death and grief in Višegrad. My analysis explores how these representations in the ICTY documentary reinforce civilizational logics and reductive representations of violence at the same time as they illuminate relational encounters of death and dying in international criminal justice, thus enriching attempts to see, know, and feel loss in the wake of violence.
{"title":"Death, Grief, and Mourning in an ICTY Film: Exploring Relational and Non/Living Worlds","authors":"Caitlin Biddolph","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae076","url":null,"abstract":"International criminal justice is filled with living, dead, and dying bodies. While witnesses detail atrocities in the courtroom, such testimonies are largely considered for their evidentiary value to establish innocence or guilt. In this article, I explore how death, grief, and mourning are represented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). I focus on the ICTY documentary, Crimes Before the ICTY: Višegrad, to analyse how filmic representations of international criminal justice register dead, dying, and grieving bodies. Drawing on Queer Death Studies and relational ontologies, I explore the more-than-human and non/living worlds through which death, grief, and mourning are represented in the film. A queer relational approach reveals and challenges the construction of the dead as evidence and death worlds as crime scenes. This approach illuminates how the natural world and buildings, bridges, and artifacts are vestiges, witnesses, and sites of death and grief in Višegrad. My analysis explores how these representations in the ICTY documentary reinforce civilizational logics and reductive representations of violence at the same time as they illuminate relational encounters of death and dying in international criminal justice, thus enriching attempts to see, know, and feel loss in the wake of violence.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140903313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s This article draws on regime newspaper archives and the Arabic-language speeches of and interviews with Syrian president Bashar al-Asad over the last two decades to track how Syrian governmental rhetoric on the question of “terrorism” has changed over time. Engaging with the literature on how ideas, technologies, and contentious repertoires diffuse and spread and how regimes learn from each other, I show how the Asad regime has moved from a discourse that saw “terrorism” as a Western and/or Israeli concept used to delegitimize primarily Palestinian and Lebanese resistance sponsored by Damascus to a discourse that embraces the rhetoric of the “war on terror” in order to legitimize the regime's counterinsurgency policies during the current conflict. I argue that this rhetorical shift is dependent on the ethno-sectarian identity of the population in question through a comparison of regime rhetoric on three separate uprisings in recent Syrian history: the current uprising (2011–present); the Kurdish uprising of 2004; and the Druze uprising in 2000. Since the current uprising is seen as a predominantly Sunni Arab affair, the Syrian regime has used “war on terror” rhetoric in ways that it did not during the Kurdish and Druze uprisings. I then situate this rhetorical move in time as a post-9/11 development by comparing current regime rhetoric with that of the Hafez al-Asad regime's rhetoric during the uprising centered in Hama in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
{"title":"How Bashar al-Asad Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the “War on Terror”","authors":"Sean Lee","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae066","url":null,"abstract":"s This article draws on regime newspaper archives and the Arabic-language speeches of and interviews with Syrian president Bashar al-Asad over the last two decades to track how Syrian governmental rhetoric on the question of “terrorism” has changed over time. Engaging with the literature on how ideas, technologies, and contentious repertoires diffuse and spread and how regimes learn from each other, I show how the Asad regime has moved from a discourse that saw “terrorism” as a Western and/or Israeli concept used to delegitimize primarily Palestinian and Lebanese resistance sponsored by Damascus to a discourse that embraces the rhetoric of the “war on terror” in order to legitimize the regime's counterinsurgency policies during the current conflict. I argue that this rhetorical shift is dependent on the ethno-sectarian identity of the population in question through a comparison of regime rhetoric on three separate uprisings in recent Syrian history: the current uprising (2011–present); the Kurdish uprising of 2004; and the Druze uprising in 2000. Since the current uprising is seen as a predominantly Sunni Arab affair, the Syrian regime has used “war on terror” rhetoric in ways that it did not during the Kurdish and Druze uprisings. I then situate this rhetorical move in time as a post-9/11 development by comparing current regime rhetoric with that of the Hafez al-Asad regime's rhetoric during the uprising centered in Hama in the late 1970s and early 1980s.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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