Saki Kuzushima, Itsuki Umeyama, Kenneth Mori McElwain, Yuki Shiraito
Recent research on international organizations (IOs) has highlighted their capacity to influence state behavior by shaping domestic public opinion, a key channel for policy change. This paper investigates an important extension of this mechanism: whether domestic leaders can proactively leverage IO endorsements to bolster support for contentious policies. Drawing on a survey experiment examining attitudes toward a controversial tax increase in Japan, we test how the effectiveness of this tactic depends on how IOs are perceived across multiple dimensions, including neutrality and expertise. Our results show that referencing IO endorsements reduces resistance to the policy. Crucially, their impact is strongest when the IO is seen as aligned with national interests. In contrast, traits such as impartiality and technical expertise—emphasized in previous studies—play a more limited role. Moreover, the persuasive power of endorsements is concentrated among government supporters, further underscoring the importance of perceived interest alignment as a critical dimension of persuasiveness. These findings offer new insights into when and how IOs shape mass attitudes and call attention to the strategic value of perceived IO biases for domestic elites.
{"title":"IO Endorsements, Perceived Alignment, and Public Support for Unpopular Policies","authors":"Saki Kuzushima, Itsuki Umeyama, Kenneth Mori McElwain, Yuki Shiraito","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf073","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research on international organizations (IOs) has highlighted their capacity to influence state behavior by shaping domestic public opinion, a key channel for policy change. This paper investigates an important extension of this mechanism: whether domestic leaders can proactively leverage IO endorsements to bolster support for contentious policies. Drawing on a survey experiment examining attitudes toward a controversial tax increase in Japan, we test how the effectiveness of this tactic depends on how IOs are perceived across multiple dimensions, including neutrality and expertise. Our results show that referencing IO endorsements reduces resistance to the policy. Crucially, their impact is strongest when the IO is seen as aligned with national interests. In contrast, traits such as impartiality and technical expertise—emphasized in previous studies—play a more limited role. Moreover, the persuasive power of endorsements is concentrated among government supporters, further underscoring the importance of perceived interest alignment as a critical dimension of persuasiveness. These findings offer new insights into when and how IOs shape mass attitudes and call attention to the strategic value of perceived IO biases for domestic elites.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145089668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholarship on international sovereignty generally adopts a binary conception: territories either have international recognition, or they lack it and remain unrecognized entities within fragmented states. In this article, we challenge this binary frame by introducing the notion of functional sovereignty: contested territories in practice enjoy varying degrees of sovereignty over governance functions that require external acceptance for their operation. To illustrate, we introduce a new dataset of functional sovereignty over vehicle license plates, currency, passport issuance, postal service, and national Internet domains within unrecognized (de facto) states. We theorize disputes over these functions as not only a matter of practicality, but also as contestations over symbolic assertions of sovereign statehood. Analysis of de facto state governance over these five functions shows that contested territories collectively exhibit gradations of functional sovereignty, defying binary classifications. Further, we draw conceptual and empirical distinctions between functional sovereignty and proximate phenomena, including statehood, rebel governance, and global governance. Our findings urge a greater focus on the practical dimensions of sovereignty, above and beyond its international legal aspect, for a more grounded understanding of the politics of international recognition.
{"title":"Functional Sovereignty in Contested Territories","authors":"Adrian Florea, Reyko Huang","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf069","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarship on international sovereignty generally adopts a binary conception: territories either have international recognition, or they lack it and remain unrecognized entities within fragmented states. In this article, we challenge this binary frame by introducing the notion of functional sovereignty: contested territories in practice enjoy varying degrees of sovereignty over governance functions that require external acceptance for their operation. To illustrate, we introduce a new dataset of functional sovereignty over vehicle license plates, currency, passport issuance, postal service, and national Internet domains within unrecognized (de facto) states. We theorize disputes over these functions as not only a matter of practicality, but also as contestations over symbolic assertions of sovereign statehood. Analysis of de facto state governance over these five functions shows that contested territories collectively exhibit gradations of functional sovereignty, defying binary classifications. Further, we draw conceptual and empirical distinctions between functional sovereignty and proximate phenomena, including statehood, rebel governance, and global governance. Our findings urge a greater focus on the practical dimensions of sovereignty, above and beyond its international legal aspect, for a more grounded understanding of the politics of international recognition.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145089710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates how the concept of the international community was rhetorically constructed in public diplomatic discourse and endowed with both agential status and moral authority. It argues that this conceptual innovation emerged during a critical juncture in the 1920s–1930s, amid debates on collective security within the League of Nations. In response to acts of aggression that undermined the newly established international order, diplomats employed contested notions of “crime” and “punishment” to characterize state behavior. In the League's debates over the first international sanctions, references to extra-legal moral principles were used to bolster both the legitimacy and efficacy of the legal regime. Since the principle of sovereign equality precluded any single state from claiming moral authority, diplomats instead innovatively portrayed the international community as a fictive agent endowed with superior moral standing. This rhetorical move helped legitimize calls for punishing aggressors. Adopting a historically informed constructivist approach, the article illuminates how conceptual transformations within the normative order unfold through diplomatic practice. It shows how diplomatic forums can serve as platforms for conceptual innovation with lasting impact on public discourse on world politics.
本文探讨了国际社会概念是如何在公共外交话语中被修辞学地建构，并被赋予代理地位和道德权威的。它认为，这一概念创新出现在20世纪20年代至30年代的一个关键时刻，当时正值国际联盟（League of Nations）内部关于集体安全的辩论。为了应对破坏新建立的国际秩序的侵略行为，外交官们使用有争议的“犯罪”和“惩罚”概念来描述国家行为。在联盟关于第一次国际制裁的辩论中，法外道德原则被用来加强法律制度的合法性和效力。由于主权平等的原则排除了任何单一国家声称道德权威的可能性，外交官们创新性地将国际社会描绘成一个具有优越道德地位的虚构代理人。这一措辞上的举动有助于使惩罚侵略者的呼声合法化。本文采用历史建构主义的方法，阐明了规范秩序中的概念转变是如何通过外交实践展开的。它展示了外交论坛如何能够作为概念创新的平台，对世界政治的公共话语产生持久的影响。
{"title":"Crime and Punishment in International Politics: On the Agency and Moral Standing of Community","authors":"Evgeny Roshchin","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf062","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates how the concept of the international community was rhetorically constructed in public diplomatic discourse and endowed with both agential status and moral authority. It argues that this conceptual innovation emerged during a critical juncture in the 1920s–1930s, amid debates on collective security within the League of Nations. In response to acts of aggression that undermined the newly established international order, diplomats employed contested notions of “crime” and “punishment” to characterize state behavior. In the League's debates over the first international sanctions, references to extra-legal moral principles were used to bolster both the legitimacy and efficacy of the legal regime. Since the principle of sovereign equality precluded any single state from claiming moral authority, diplomats instead innovatively portrayed the international community as a fictive agent endowed with superior moral standing. This rhetorical move helped legitimize calls for punishing aggressors. Adopting a historically informed constructivist approach, the article illuminates how conceptual transformations within the normative order unfold through diplomatic practice. It shows how diplomatic forums can serve as platforms for conceptual innovation with lasting impact on public discourse on world politics.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144987426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maria A Lotito, Christopher W Shay, Michael A Rubin
Under what conditions do states sponsor foreign nonviolent campaigns (FNCs) seeking to overthrow incumbent regimes? While political ideology plays a role, motivating liberal democracies to support (typically pro-democratic) campaigns, we argue strategic and material factors—specifically geo-political alignment and economic dependence—are central to explaining state sponsorship of FNCs, often overriding ideological and normative factors. A potential sponsor, whether democratic or autocratic, is unlikely to support FNCs when doing so jeopardizes a strategic partnership with the target regime, which may retaliate against the sponsor. Additionally, democracies are particularly deterred from supporting FNCs when the target regime can retaliate economically, such as by disrupting trade or other vital economic ties. To test these arguments, we leverage data from the External Support for Non-violent Campaigns Dataset, which documents global instances of state support for non-violent campaigns from 2000 to 2014. Consistent with our theory, we find that liberal democracies make up the vast majority of sponsors, but also that geo-political alignment between potential sponsor and target regime is strongly and negatively correlated with the provision of support. Moreover, economic dependence on the target reduces the likelihood of support among liberal democracies.
{"title":"Into the Fray: Explaining State Support for Non-Violent Resistance Movements Abroad","authors":"Maria A Lotito, Christopher W Shay, Michael A Rubin","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf068","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions do states sponsor foreign nonviolent campaigns (FNCs) seeking to overthrow incumbent regimes? While political ideology plays a role, motivating liberal democracies to support (typically pro-democratic) campaigns, we argue strategic and material factors—specifically geo-political alignment and economic dependence—are central to explaining state sponsorship of FNCs, often overriding ideological and normative factors. A potential sponsor, whether democratic or autocratic, is unlikely to support FNCs when doing so jeopardizes a strategic partnership with the target regime, which may retaliate against the sponsor. Additionally, democracies are particularly deterred from supporting FNCs when the target regime can retaliate economically, such as by disrupting trade or other vital economic ties. To test these arguments, we leverage data from the External Support for Non-violent Campaigns Dataset, which documents global instances of state support for non-violent campaigns from 2000 to 2014. Consistent with our theory, we find that liberal democracies make up the vast majority of sponsors, but also that geo-political alignment between potential sponsor and target regime is strongly and negatively correlated with the provision of support. Moreover, economic dependence on the target reduces the likelihood of support among liberal democracies.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144930636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the high incidence of farmer–herder conflicts in Nigeria, large-N quantitative research on the religious dimension of these conflicts remains scarce. This study addresses that gap using data from Rounds 7 and 8 of the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Nigeria in 2017 and 2020, respectively. Specifically, it examines how religious affiliation and the religious composition of an area influence concerns about farmer–herder conflicts. Regression analysis reveals no significant difference in concern between individuals living in predominantly Muslim versus Christian areas. However, religious affiliation plays a crucial role, with Muslims generally expressing less concern about these conflicts than their Christian counterparts. Disaggregating the data by survey year, a shifting pattern emerges: In 2017, individuals in predominantly Muslim areas were less concerned about farmer–herder conflicts than those in Christian areas, but by 2020, this trend had reversed. This shift may be linked to the rise in banditry involving nomadic pastoralists in Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim Northwest region. Notably, in 2020, Muslims and Christians exhibited no significant differences in their level of concern. Further analysis shows that Muslims and residents of predominantly Muslim areas are more likely to perceive a decline in farmer–herder conflicts and report fewer experiences of pastoral conflicts around their dwellings.
{"title":"Is There a Religious Dimension to Concern about Farmer–Herder Conflicts in Nigeria?","authors":"Daniel Tuki","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf061","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the high incidence of farmer–herder conflicts in Nigeria, large-N quantitative research on the religious dimension of these conflicts remains scarce. This study addresses that gap using data from Rounds 7 and 8 of the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Nigeria in 2017 and 2020, respectively. Specifically, it examines how religious affiliation and the religious composition of an area influence concerns about farmer–herder conflicts. Regression analysis reveals no significant difference in concern between individuals living in predominantly Muslim versus Christian areas. However, religious affiliation plays a crucial role, with Muslims generally expressing less concern about these conflicts than their Christian counterparts. Disaggregating the data by survey year, a shifting pattern emerges: In 2017, individuals in predominantly Muslim areas were less concerned about farmer–herder conflicts than those in Christian areas, but by 2020, this trend had reversed. This shift may be linked to the rise in banditry involving nomadic pastoralists in Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim Northwest region. Notably, in 2020, Muslims and Christians exhibited no significant differences in their level of concern. Further analysis shows that Muslims and residents of predominantly Muslim areas are more likely to perceive a decline in farmer–herder conflicts and report fewer experiences of pastoral conflicts around their dwellings.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144915543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does economic development reduce religious conflict? Many believe that cleavages and conflict over religion should become less pronounced in developed countries. In this article, we argue that economic development can actually increase the risk of religious conflict by helping create the background conditions that give rise to it. More specifically, when countries devote more economic resources to interfering in religious affairs, they experience correspondingly higher levels of religious hostilities. Conversely, if countries have fewer resources to devote to interfering in the religious realm—a situation naturally characteristic of poorer countries—they experience less religious conflict. Thus, poor countries do not necessarily experience higher rates of religious conflict than wealthy countries. We test this theory using a country-level, time-series analysis of a global sample of countries from 1991 to 2018. We find strong support for our theory. The results are robust to a wide range of model specifications and statistical approaches. Our findings make an important contribution to a long-standing conversation on the causes of religious conflict in the modern world.
{"title":"Why Economic Development Does Not Diminish Religious Conflict","authors":"Nilay Saiya, Stuti Manchanda","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf060","url":null,"abstract":"Does economic development reduce religious conflict? Many believe that cleavages and conflict over religion should become less pronounced in developed countries. In this article, we argue that economic development can actually increase the risk of religious conflict by helping create the background conditions that give rise to it. More specifically, when countries devote more economic resources to interfering in religious affairs, they experience correspondingly higher levels of religious hostilities. Conversely, if countries have fewer resources to devote to interfering in the religious realm—a situation naturally characteristic of poorer countries—they experience less religious conflict. Thus, poor countries do not necessarily experience higher rates of religious conflict than wealthy countries. We test this theory using a country-level, time-series analysis of a global sample of countries from 1991 to 2018. We find strong support for our theory. The results are robust to a wide range of model specifications and statistical approaches. Our findings make an important contribution to a long-standing conversation on the causes of religious conflict in the modern world.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144901704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper theorizes dissociation as a key but overlooked dynamic in the (re)constitution of international pecking orders. Conceptually, dissociation captures how actors look to ensure they are considered separate from, dissimilar, and fundamentally uncomparable to certain “others” with whom comparison is considered undesirable and disempowering. Drawing on original archival research, we showcase the value-added of this conceptual lens by examining the reformulation of the British imperial hierarchy at the 1907 Imperial Conference, which formally institutionalized “Dominion” status for the first time. We show how the British settler-colonies sought to dissociate themselves from the backward and racialized “Crown Colonies,” ultimately adopting the label “Dominion” to assert their status as a qualitatively distinct type of polity. We further argue that dissociation often relies on—and reinforces—racialized logics, which actors draw upon to naturalize social boundaries. Our argument suggests that actors are not merely concerned with being “above” other actors in their comparison group on a status ladder. Rather, we demonstrate how actors also struggle to construct pecking orders and social boundaries so that they are considered not simply superior to, but categorically different from—and ultimately uncomparable to—those they deem inferior.
{"title":"The Making of “Dominion” Status at the 1907 Imperial Conference: Dissociation, Racialization, and the (Re)Constitution of International Pecking Orders","authors":"John de Bhal, Alexandra Stafford","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf058","url":null,"abstract":"This paper theorizes dissociation as a key but overlooked dynamic in the (re)constitution of international pecking orders. Conceptually, dissociation captures how actors look to ensure they are considered separate from, dissimilar, and fundamentally uncomparable to certain “others” with whom comparison is considered undesirable and disempowering. Drawing on original archival research, we showcase the value-added of this conceptual lens by examining the reformulation of the British imperial hierarchy at the 1907 Imperial Conference, which formally institutionalized “Dominion” status for the first time. We show how the British settler-colonies sought to dissociate themselves from the backward and racialized “Crown Colonies,” ultimately adopting the label “Dominion” to assert their status as a qualitatively distinct type of polity. We further argue that dissociation often relies on—and reinforces—racialized logics, which actors draw upon to naturalize social boundaries. Our argument suggests that actors are not merely concerned with being “above” other actors in their comparison group on a status ladder. Rather, we demonstrate how actors also struggle to construct pecking orders and social boundaries so that they are considered not simply superior to, but categorically different from—and ultimately uncomparable to—those they deem inferior.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I question a familiar assumption in International Relations (IR): that the balance of power and anarchy are mutually reinforcing concepts. I argue instead that this relationship is neither natural nor necessary. Modern understandings of anarchy do not reflect timeless features of international politics, but are historically contingent outcomes of changes in how the balance of power concept itself has been understood and deployed. Drawing on conceptual history, I trace how the balance of power transitioned from a principle embodying Europe’s public interest in the eighteenth century to an expression of national rivalry and competitive self-interest in the nineteenth. This transformation was underpinned by a broader redefinition of the public/private distinction, which enabled states to be imagined as atomistic units operating in decentralized, market-like competition—what came to be seen as anarchy. By recovering the practical history of the balance of power, I reinterpret the genealogy of two foundational IR concepts and call for greater reflexivity about the analytical tools through which international relations are theorized.
{"title":"Anarchy Is What the Balance of Power Made of It: Two Core Concepts and the Public/Private Distinction in International Relations","authors":"Morten Skumsrud Andersen","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf064","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I question a familiar assumption in International Relations (IR): that the balance of power and anarchy are mutually reinforcing concepts. I argue instead that this relationship is neither natural nor necessary. Modern understandings of anarchy do not reflect timeless features of international politics, but are historically contingent outcomes of changes in how the balance of power concept itself has been understood and deployed. Drawing on conceptual history, I trace how the balance of power transitioned from a principle embodying Europe’s public interest in the eighteenth century to an expression of national rivalry and competitive self-interest in the nineteenth. This transformation was underpinned by a broader redefinition of the public/private distinction, which enabled states to be imagined as atomistic units operating in decentralized, market-like competition—what came to be seen as anarchy. By recovering the practical history of the balance of power, I reinterpret the genealogy of two foundational IR concepts and call for greater reflexivity about the analytical tools through which international relations are theorized.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144901708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When donors extend foreign aid, they often attach requirements to these funds. While requirements are intended to improve the effectiveness of aid, they also render recipient governments accountable to donors. How does the public in recipient countries view these requirements attached to development finance? We argue that individuals’ assessment of aid requirements is a function of their trust in their own government, as well as the foreign donor. When citizens trust their government, aid requirements activate sovereignty concerns, and individuals view them negatively. But when individuals distrust their government, they see requirements as a source of external accountability. Citizens also consider the donor; foreign accountability is welcome only if the donor is trusted. We test our argument using Afrobarometer data on public attitudes toward aid conditionality and an original survey fielded in Kenya, finding evidence that supports our contentions. Our study contributes to an understanding of accountability in global governance.
{"title":"Accountable to Whom? Public Opinion of Aid Conditionality in Recipient Countries","authors":"Richard Clark, Lindsay R Dolan, Alexandra O Zeitz","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf057","url":null,"abstract":"When donors extend foreign aid, they often attach requirements to these funds. While requirements are intended to improve the effectiveness of aid, they also render recipient governments accountable to donors. How does the public in recipient countries view these requirements attached to development finance? We argue that individuals’ assessment of aid requirements is a function of their trust in their own government, as well as the foreign donor. When citizens trust their government, aid requirements activate sovereignty concerns, and individuals view them negatively. But when individuals distrust their government, they see requirements as a source of external accountability. Citizens also consider the donor; foreign accountability is welcome only if the donor is trusted. We test our argument using Afrobarometer data on public attitudes toward aid conditionality and an original survey fielded in Kenya, finding evidence that supports our contentions. Our study contributes to an understanding of accountability in global governance.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144825659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is a lightly edited version of the presidential address I delivered at the sixty-fifth annual convention of the International Studies Association in San Francisco, USA, on April 4, 2024. In this essay, I explore the stories that we tell about the international, and relations, and the possibility of telling different stories—and perhaps the need to tell different stories—in the future. I begin by weighing the international, and exploring what is at stake when setting up a focus on international relations, as distinct from other kinds of relations. I then shift focus to relations. A focus on relations, rather than entities or things, encourages us to consider how these relations are developed, nurtured, ruptured, and restored, and to examine both the conditions and affordances of these processes. Finally, I take on the question of how to tell different stories in the future. I hope to show that questions of futurity are necessarily questions of justice and questions of ethics, and that we as a scholarly community must ask ourselves what we owe, and to whom, in our work if we are going to honor our obligations to our past and future selves and others.
{"title":"Telling Stories of International Relations","authors":"Laura J Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf055","url":null,"abstract":"This is a lightly edited version of the presidential address I delivered at the sixty-fifth annual convention of the International Studies Association in San Francisco, USA, on April 4, 2024. In this essay, I explore the stories that we tell about the international, and relations, and the possibility of telling different stories—and perhaps the need to tell different stories—in the future. I begin by weighing the international, and exploring what is at stake when setting up a focus on international relations, as distinct from other kinds of relations. I then shift focus to relations. A focus on relations, rather than entities or things, encourages us to consider how these relations are developed, nurtured, ruptured, and restored, and to examine both the conditions and affordances of these processes. Finally, I take on the question of how to tell different stories in the future. I hope to show that questions of futurity are necessarily questions of justice and questions of ethics, and that we as a scholarly community must ask ourselves what we owe, and to whom, in our work if we are going to honor our obligations to our past and future selves and others.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144577985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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