How does rebel news affect the way civilians perceive the balance of power during conflict? While media campaigns are a common tactic during conflict for both insurgents and governments, there is very little empirical research that explores their effect on civilians. I argue that these campaigns play an important role in the construction of a rebel group’s reputation during conflict and the perception of their organization among non-combatants. This is because civilians suffer from an information disadvantage and struggle to accurately gauge the relative strength of actors in the conflict. I exploit the plausibly random introduction of the Taliban’s official radio station in Kabul during May 2018 to test the effect of rebel news on civilian attitudes. NATO’s Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research survey happened to field a wave directly before and after this event. I use difference-in-differences to estimate the effect of exposure to the Taliban’s news and demonstrate that it increased perceptions of the group’s strength. This finding has important implications for the study of civilian attitude formation and support during conflict.
{"title":"Mere Puffery or Convincing Claims? Rebel News and Civilian Perceptions of the Balance of Power","authors":"Caleb Lucas","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae142","url":null,"abstract":"How does rebel news affect the way civilians perceive the balance of power during conflict? While media campaigns are a common tactic during conflict for both insurgents and governments, there is very little empirical research that explores their effect on civilians. I argue that these campaigns play an important role in the construction of a rebel group’s reputation during conflict and the perception of their organization among non-combatants. This is because civilians suffer from an information disadvantage and struggle to accurately gauge the relative strength of actors in the conflict. I exploit the plausibly random introduction of the Taliban’s official radio station in Kabul during May 2018 to test the effect of rebel news on civilian attitudes. NATO’s Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research survey happened to field a wave directly before and after this event. I use difference-in-differences to estimate the effect of exposure to the Taliban’s news and demonstrate that it increased perceptions of the group’s strength. This finding has important implications for the study of civilian attitude formation and support during conflict.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142810067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Generalized trust has attracted attention as a non-material disposition that affects risk perception in political and economic international cooperation. However, its effect on public support for free trade or trade agreements has been debated. This debate centers on whether the economic impacts of trade are evident or uncertain to ordinary citizens because generalized trust operates only when trade impacts are uncertain and risk perception is crucial. However, the visibility of trade impacts varies significantly depending on the economic environment. This study explores the role of industrial tertiarization, the shift from agriculture and manufacturing to services, in altering the visibility of trade impacts. It hypothesizes that generalized trust shapes trade preferences primarily in highly tertiarized local economies. Using data from the 2016 American National Election Studies and World Values Survey Wave 7, this hypothesis was tested and confirmed. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the influence of generalized trust on trade preferences varies with the level of local tertiarization. It also proposes new causal mechanisms for understanding anti-globalism in developed countries and suggests that the influence of economic impacts on trade preferences may similarly depend on local tertiarization levels.
{"title":"When Generalized Trust Matters? Impact of Industrial Tertiarization on Trade Preference Formation","authors":"Masafumi Fujita","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae143","url":null,"abstract":"Generalized trust has attracted attention as a non-material disposition that affects risk perception in political and economic international cooperation. However, its effect on public support for free trade or trade agreements has been debated. This debate centers on whether the economic impacts of trade are evident or uncertain to ordinary citizens because generalized trust operates only when trade impacts are uncertain and risk perception is crucial. However, the visibility of trade impacts varies significantly depending on the economic environment. This study explores the role of industrial tertiarization, the shift from agriculture and manufacturing to services, in altering the visibility of trade impacts. It hypothesizes that generalized trust shapes trade preferences primarily in highly tertiarized local economies. Using data from the 2016 American National Election Studies and World Values Survey Wave 7, this hypothesis was tested and confirmed. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the influence of generalized trust on trade preferences varies with the level of local tertiarization. It also proposes new causal mechanisms for understanding anti-globalism in developed countries and suggests that the influence of economic impacts on trade preferences may similarly depend on local tertiarization levels.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142805343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Megan Becker, Jonathan Markowitz, Sarah Orsborn, Isabelle Nazha, Srividya Dasaraju, Lindsay Lauder
What are the causal pathways through which natural resources are linked to civil conflict? Ross evaluates ten causal pathways across thirteen conflicts to offer the most comprehensive answer to date. However, nearly 20 years later, all thirteen conflicts have ended, and more sources are available, motivating the question: Would the findings hold if replicated today? We employ a new explicit standards approach to replicate Ross’ thirteen cases twice: First, using his original seventy-eight sources and second, employing a more up-to-date set of conflict end-dates and over 500 sources. Most findings (75 percent) hold, while 25 percent do not. We find stronger evidence for Ross’ claim that looting resources is linked to longer conflicts and that resources motivate government repression. However, we also overturn some of his key claims, by demonstrating that resources do, in fact, affect conflict onset by funding rebel start-up costs and generating grievances amongst the population.
{"title":"Replicating the Resource Curse: A Qualitative Replication of Ross 2004","authors":"Megan Becker, Jonathan Markowitz, Sarah Orsborn, Isabelle Nazha, Srividya Dasaraju, Lindsay Lauder","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae125","url":null,"abstract":"What are the causal pathways through which natural resources are linked to civil conflict? Ross evaluates ten causal pathways across thirteen conflicts to offer the most comprehensive answer to date. However, nearly 20 years later, all thirteen conflicts have ended, and more sources are available, motivating the question: Would the findings hold if replicated today? We employ a new explicit standards approach to replicate Ross’ thirteen cases twice: First, using his original seventy-eight sources and second, employing a more up-to-date set of conflict end-dates and over 500 sources. Most findings (75 percent) hold, while 25 percent do not. We find stronger evidence for Ross’ claim that looting resources is linked to longer conflicts and that resources motivate government repression. However, we also overturn some of his key claims, by demonstrating that resources do, in fact, affect conflict onset by funding rebel start-up costs and generating grievances amongst the population.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142805342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research note introduces new global data on self-coups—rapid moves by sitting executive leaders to “overthrow” their own governments and illegitimately maintain or extend power. Self-coups are distinct from ordinary coups (sudden illegal attempts by other elites to topple the sitting executive) and overlap with incumbent takeovers (incremental quasi-legal steps by the sitting executive to amass power). Still, there is conceptual discord about what delineates self-coups and a resultant lack of consensus about basic facts, even about where and when self-coups have happened. To provide a firmer foundation for investigating the self-coup phenomenon systematically, I draw from eight datasets and original data collection and coding to present comprehensive data on 147 individual events (plus 90 candidate incidents that did not fully meet the criteria) in the 1950–2022 period. The dataset provides information on the perpetrators, targets, flashpoint dates, and methods of these events. Illustrative statistical analysis suggests that following a self-coup, the level of international economic aid tends to have a negative effect on the probability that a country will hold competitive elections. Future research may apply these data for a better understanding of the causes of self-coups and the long-term effects of self-coups on political and economic development.
{"title":"Power Grabs from the Top: A Database of Self-Coups","authors":"Arthur A Goldsmith","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae147","url":null,"abstract":"This research note introduces new global data on self-coups—rapid moves by sitting executive leaders to “overthrow” their own governments and illegitimately maintain or extend power. Self-coups are distinct from ordinary coups (sudden illegal attempts by other elites to topple the sitting executive) and overlap with incumbent takeovers (incremental quasi-legal steps by the sitting executive to amass power). Still, there is conceptual discord about what delineates self-coups and a resultant lack of consensus about basic facts, even about where and when self-coups have happened. To provide a firmer foundation for investigating the self-coup phenomenon systematically, I draw from eight datasets and original data collection and coding to present comprehensive data on 147 individual events (plus 90 candidate incidents that did not fully meet the criteria) in the 1950–2022 period. The dataset provides information on the perpetrators, targets, flashpoint dates, and methods of these events. Illustrative statistical analysis suggests that following a self-coup, the level of international economic aid tends to have a negative effect on the probability that a country will hold competitive elections. Future research may apply these data for a better understanding of the causes of self-coups and the long-term effects of self-coups on political and economic development.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142805341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs increase repression in borrowing countries? We argue that repression worsens when autocratic governments enter conditional lending arrangements with the IMF. Autocracies are likelier than democracies to harshly crackdown during episodes of heightened protest and unrest triggered by IMF-mandated adjustment and structural reform programs. But harsh repression of anticipated spikes in dissent spurred by liberalization-oriented IMF conditions may also be used by autocrats to proactively signal their commitment to preserve regime insiders’ advantages. We present several tests of the arguments in the article. In the first test, we use a compound instrumental variable to estimate the conditional difference in human rights scores between IMF program participation and non-participation in both democratic and autocratic country-years (1975–2014). We do not find evidence for clear links between IMF program participation and human rights in developing democracies. In autocracies, however, the relationship between IMF lending programs and human rights respect is consistently negative and significant. In further tests, we isolate the impact of different types of IMF conditionality. Evidence suggests that IMF programs with more numerous structural reforms (namely, pro-privatization conditions) are associated with lower human rights protections in autocratic countries.
{"title":"IMF Lending Programs and Repression in Autocracies","authors":"Stephen C Nelson, Christopher P Dinkel","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae149","url":null,"abstract":"Do International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs increase repression in borrowing countries? We argue that repression worsens when autocratic governments enter conditional lending arrangements with the IMF. Autocracies are likelier than democracies to harshly crackdown during episodes of heightened protest and unrest triggered by IMF-mandated adjustment and structural reform programs. But harsh repression of anticipated spikes in dissent spurred by liberalization-oriented IMF conditions may also be used by autocrats to proactively signal their commitment to preserve regime insiders’ advantages. We present several tests of the arguments in the article. In the first test, we use a compound instrumental variable to estimate the conditional difference in human rights scores between IMF program participation and non-participation in both democratic and autocratic country-years (1975–2014). We do not find evidence for clear links between IMF program participation and human rights in developing democracies. In autocracies, however, the relationship between IMF lending programs and human rights respect is consistently negative and significant. In further tests, we isolate the impact of different types of IMF conditionality. Evidence suggests that IMF programs with more numerous structural reforms (namely, pro-privatization conditions) are associated with lower human rights protections in autocratic countries.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"113 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142805340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Processes that occasionally, but not always, produce extreme values are notoriously difficult to model, as a small number of extreme observations may have a large impact on the results. Existing methods for handling extreme values are often arbitrary and leave researchers without guidance regarding this problem. In this paper, we propose an extreme value and zero-inflated negative binomial (EVZINB) regression model, which allows for separate modeling of extreme and nonextreme observations to solve this problem. The EVZINB model offers an elegant solution to modeling data with extreme values and allows researchers to draw additional inferences about both extreme and nonextreme observations. We illustrate the usefulness of the EVZINB model by replicating a study on the effects of the deployment of UN peacekeepers on one-sided violence against civilians.
{"title":"Inference with Extremes: Accounting for Extreme Values in Count Regression Models","authors":"David Randahl, Johan Vegelius","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae137","url":null,"abstract":"Processes that occasionally, but not always, produce extreme values are notoriously difficult to model, as a small number of extreme observations may have a large impact on the results. Existing methods for handling extreme values are often arbitrary and leave researchers without guidance regarding this problem. In this paper, we propose an extreme value and zero-inflated negative binomial (EVZINB) regression model, which allows for separate modeling of extreme and nonextreme observations to solve this problem. The EVZINB model offers an elegant solution to modeling data with extreme values and allows researchers to draw additional inferences about both extreme and nonextreme observations. We illustrate the usefulness of the EVZINB model by replicating a study on the effects of the deployment of UN peacekeepers on one-sided violence against civilians.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142599694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political lending is problematic for the operations of multilateral development banks (MDBs) since politically motivated aid has a greater default risk than other aid projects. MDB bureaucrats, therefore, face a dilemma. On the one hand, they want to please major shareholders by engaging in political lending. On the other hand, they want to mitigate their MDB's exposure to excessive risk. One way to solve this dilemma is to share the risk of loans with other lenders through co-financing. I expect that as countries’ share of politically motivated aid increases, these countries’ portfolios will receive more co-financed loans. Using newly collected loan-level data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, I find that UNSC membership increases the number of co-financed loans by 38.5 percent and increases the share of co-financed loans in a country's European Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan portfolio by 19.1 percentage points. I demonstrate that these results are consistent with the argument that MDB bureaucrats want to mitigate risk.
政治贷款对多边开发银行（mdb）的运作来说是个问题，因为出于政治动机的援助比其他援助项目有更大的违约风险。因此，多边开发银行的官僚们面临两难境地。一方面，他们想通过政治贷款取悦大股东。另一方面，他们希望减轻多边开发银行的过度风险敞口。解决这一困境的一种方法是通过共同融资与其他贷方分担贷款风险。我预计，随着各国在政治动机援助中所占份额的增加，这些国家的投资组合将获得更多的共同融资贷款。根据欧洲复兴开发银行（European Bank for Reconstruction and Development）最新收集的贷款水平数据，我发现，联合国安理会成员国的联合融资贷款数量增加38.5%，联合融资贷款在欧洲复兴开发银行（European Bank for Reconstruction and Development）贷款组合中的份额增加19.1个百分点。我证明，这些结果与多边开发银行官员希望降低风险的论点是一致的。
{"title":"Diffusing Risk: Bureaucratic Agency, UN Security Council Horse-Trading, and the Role of Co-Financing","authors":"Stefano Jud","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae140","url":null,"abstract":"Political lending is problematic for the operations of multilateral development banks (MDBs) since politically motivated aid has a greater default risk than other aid projects. MDB bureaucrats, therefore, face a dilemma. On the one hand, they want to please major shareholders by engaging in political lending. On the other hand, they want to mitigate their MDB's exposure to excessive risk. One way to solve this dilemma is to share the risk of loans with other lenders through co-financing. I expect that as countries’ share of politically motivated aid increases, these countries’ portfolios will receive more co-financed loans. Using newly collected loan-level data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, I find that UNSC membership increases the number of co-financed loans by 38.5 percent and increases the share of co-financed loans in a country's European Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan portfolio by 19.1 percentage points. I demonstrate that these results are consistent with the argument that MDB bureaucrats want to mitigate risk.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142902257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Studies of migration-related security concerns have focused on the emergence of these concerns through securitization or their potential dissolution through desecuritization. This paper challenges the conventional view of these processes—securitization and desecuritization—as oppositional and mutually exclusive. Instead, it argues that they are imbricated in complex ways in an arena of contestation where actors vie for legitimacy and justify their claims through ongoing actions and reactions. Focusing on the Global South case of securitized migration in the Dominican Republic, this paper conceptualizes desecuritization not as a discrete outcome measured by success or failure, but as a dynamic process evolving through interactions with securitization. By examining the role of non-state actors in contesting securitized policies, the paper reveals that such contestation can paradoxically intensify securitization through a “security backlash” that delegitimizes these actors and discredits their rights-based claims. This dynamic underscores the “resilience” of securitization amidst persistent contestation. Ultimately, the paper demonstrates desecuritization as iterative contestation rather than static outcomes, emphasizing the agency of non-state actors in shaping security narratives and practices while acknowledging their limitations against powerful state actors. These insights from a study of South–South migration extend the application of the securitization framework beyond convenient Western contexts and challenge perceived geographic boundaries.
{"title":"Contesting the Securitization of Migration: NGOs, IGOs, and the Security Backlash","authors":"Jean-Pierre Murray","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae139","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of migration-related security concerns have focused on the emergence of these concerns through securitization or their potential dissolution through desecuritization. This paper challenges the conventional view of these processes—securitization and desecuritization—as oppositional and mutually exclusive. Instead, it argues that they are imbricated in complex ways in an arena of contestation where actors vie for legitimacy and justify their claims through ongoing actions and reactions. Focusing on the Global South case of securitized migration in the Dominican Republic, this paper conceptualizes desecuritization not as a discrete outcome measured by success or failure, but as a dynamic process evolving through interactions with securitization. By examining the role of non-state actors in contesting securitized policies, the paper reveals that such contestation can paradoxically intensify securitization through a “security backlash” that delegitimizes these actors and discredits their rights-based claims. This dynamic underscores the “resilience” of securitization amidst persistent contestation. Ultimately, the paper demonstrates desecuritization as iterative contestation rather than static outcomes, emphasizing the agency of non-state actors in shaping security narratives and practices while acknowledging their limitations against powerful state actors. These insights from a study of South–South migration extend the application of the securitization framework beyond convenient Western contexts and challenge perceived geographic boundaries.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142541376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For years, scholars in international relations have addressed questions related to regime complexity and its effects. However, there is a lack of understanding of how individuals react to clashes of international law obligations when assessing domestic policies. In this article, we study the extent to which citizens are concerned with compliance and noncompliance with international law when their governments design domestic laws to implement international obligations. We are, in particular, interested in whether citizens’ reactions to clashes of international obligations are driven by concerns about being exposed internationally for breaching international law or concerns about tangible material costs. Our empirical analysis is based on an experiment embedded in a survey of Swiss citizens’ attitudes toward environmental issues. The experiment first shows that individuals react to both information about compliance as well as noncompliance, whereas the shifts are more notable in the case of negative information about noncompliance. Second, we find that information about the country being subject to international adjudication (what we call exposure costs) in case of noncompliance is more consequential than information about material costs (facing retaliation).
{"title":"Dealing with Clashes of International Law: A Microlevel Study of Climate and Trade","authors":"Manfred Elsig, Gabriele Spilker","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae136","url":null,"abstract":"For years, scholars in international relations have addressed questions related to regime complexity and its effects. However, there is a lack of understanding of how individuals react to clashes of international law obligations when assessing domestic policies. In this article, we study the extent to which citizens are concerned with compliance and noncompliance with international law when their governments design domestic laws to implement international obligations. We are, in particular, interested in whether citizens’ reactions to clashes of international obligations are driven by concerns about being exposed internationally for breaching international law or concerns about tangible material costs. Our empirical analysis is based on an experiment embedded in a survey of Swiss citizens’ attitudes toward environmental issues. The experiment first shows that individuals react to both information about compliance as well as noncompliance, whereas the shifts are more notable in the case of negative information about noncompliance. Second, we find that information about the country being subject to international adjudication (what we call exposure costs) in case of noncompliance is more consequential than information about material costs (facing retaliation).","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142448216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s How does military experience change individual foreign policy preferences? Prior research on military service focuses on the effects of combat experience on political participation and policy preferences, but combat is not the only military experience that influences attitudes. Living overseas is a common military experience with the potential to shape foreign policy preferences. Using observational data from a sample of military elites and original survey data from a sample of military veterans, I leverage semi-random and non-voluntary assignments to overseas military bases to investigate the relationship between overseas exposure and foreign policy preferences. The data provides evidence that overseas military service increases the likelihood of calling for international engagement, decreases nationalist attitudes, and increases the willingness of military members to assist individual allies. The ability to shape the preferences of military members has important implications for the development of foreign policy and the stability of international engagement.
s 军事经历如何改变个人的外交政策偏好？以往有关服兵役的研究主要集中在战斗经历对政治参与和政策偏好的影响上，但战斗并不是影响人们态度的唯一军事经历。海外生活是一种常见的军事经历，有可能影响外交政策偏好。利用军事精英样本的观察数据和退伍军人样本的原始调查数据，我利用半随机和非自愿派往海外军事基地的任务来研究海外经历与外交政策偏好之间的关系。数据提供的证据表明，海外兵役增加了呼吁国际参与的可能性，降低了民族主义态度，并增加了军人协助个别盟友的意愿。塑造军人偏好的能力对外交政策的制定和国际参与的稳定性具有重要影响。
{"title":"Nationalism, Internationalism, and Interventionism: How Overseas Military Service Influences Foreign Policy Attitudes","authors":"Bradford Waldie","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae127","url":null,"abstract":"s How does military experience change individual foreign policy preferences? Prior research on military service focuses on the effects of combat experience on political participation and policy preferences, but combat is not the only military experience that influences attitudes. Living overseas is a common military experience with the potential to shape foreign policy preferences. Using observational data from a sample of military elites and original survey data from a sample of military veterans, I leverage semi-random and non-voluntary assignments to overseas military bases to investigate the relationship between overseas exposure and foreign policy preferences. The data provides evidence that overseas military service increases the likelihood of calling for international engagement, decreases nationalist attitudes, and increases the willingness of military members to assist individual allies. The ability to shape the preferences of military members has important implications for the development of foreign policy and the stability of international engagement.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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