Many immigrants to the United States are victims of crimes that occurred in their home countries. US courts usually will not rule on legal violations that occur outside of US territory. However, starting in 1980, US federal courts sometimes allow foreign nationals to use the Alien Tort Statute to seek civil remedies for international law violations on foreign territory. We argue that these civil remedies are justice remittances from the United States to the foreign countries where the violations occurred. We additionally argue that immigrants are a key driving force in generating the demand for these justice remittances. We identify the filing districts for legal complaints that yield Alien Tort Statute judicial opinions. We then use individual-level immigration data from the US Census that we aggregate to match federal judicial districts. We find compelling evidence that immigrants are agents of justice who demand justice remittances from US courts.
{"title":"Immigration, Justice Remittances, and US Courts","authors":"Leslie Johns, Máximo Langer, Margaret E Peters","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf052","url":null,"abstract":"Many immigrants to the United States are victims of crimes that occurred in their home countries. US courts usually will not rule on legal violations that occur outside of US territory. However, starting in 1980, US federal courts sometimes allow foreign nationals to use the Alien Tort Statute to seek civil remedies for international law violations on foreign territory. We argue that these civil remedies are justice remittances from the United States to the foreign countries where the violations occurred. We additionally argue that immigrants are a key driving force in generating the demand for these justice remittances. We identify the filing districts for legal complaints that yield Alien Tort Statute judicial opinions. We then use individual-level immigration data from the US Census that we aggregate to match federal judicial districts. We find compelling evidence that immigrants are agents of justice who demand justice remittances from US courts.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144577986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public perceptions of successful military interventions carry high stakes for democratic governance. Expectations of success help mobilize support for military action, while political punishment for failure deters elected leaders from starting wars they cannot win. What factors drive public perceptions of success? How susceptible are public perceptions of success to elite manipulation? Treating perceptions of success as a dependent variable in their own right, I show that public evaluations are both multifaceted and malleable. I first use a conjoint experiment to capture the multiple factors that influence public perceptions of successful interventions. Two additional survey experiments then gauge whether elite rhetoric and priming can shift public metrics for success. The results show that the public’s concept of success is complex, weighing the ultimate costs and benefits of intervention along multiple dimensions. Leaders, however, have significant power to offset perceptions of and avoid accountability for failure.
{"title":"Good Enough? Public Perceptions of Success in Military Interventions","authors":"Sarah Maxey","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf051","url":null,"abstract":"Public perceptions of successful military interventions carry high stakes for democratic governance. Expectations of success help mobilize support for military action, while political punishment for failure deters elected leaders from starting wars they cannot win. What factors drive public perceptions of success? How susceptible are public perceptions of success to elite manipulation? Treating perceptions of success as a dependent variable in their own right, I show that public evaluations are both multifaceted and malleable. I first use a conjoint experiment to capture the multiple factors that influence public perceptions of successful interventions. Two additional survey experiments then gauge whether elite rhetoric and priming can shift public metrics for success. The results show that the public’s concept of success is complex, weighing the ultimate costs and benefits of intervention along multiple dimensions. Leaders, however, have significant power to offset perceptions of and avoid accountability for failure.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144577902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Qingqian He, Xun Pang, Yaqian He, Yekai Xu, Matthew H Connolly
s As global warming intensifies water stress, the geopolitics of shared water resources have become increasingly urgent, complex, and contentious. This study investigates the role of agricultural geography—specifically the size, location, and spatial configuration of agricultural land—in shaping water stress and its management, ultimately influencing the likelihood of international water conflict. To empirically address these dynamics, we introduce novel spatiotemporal measures of agricultural land features, using remotely sensed data and Geographic Information System (GIS) tools. Analyzing data from 311 country dyads within 58 international river basins over seven years, our study finds that extensive agricultural land spanning multiple sovereign territories in shared basins is associated with a high probability of international water conflict. While the upstream-downstream configuration does not inherently heighten conflict risk, the likelihood rises with larger upstream agricultural areas, particularly when coupled with extensive downstream agricultural land. These findings enhance our understanding of how geographic factors beyond mere proximity shape international security dynamics, and offer practical implications for conflict prevention, water resource management, and climate change governance.
{"title":"Agricultural Geography and International Water Conflict: Evidence from Remotely Sensed Data","authors":"Qingqian He, Xun Pang, Yaqian He, Yekai Xu, Matthew H Connolly","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf048","url":null,"abstract":"s As global warming intensifies water stress, the geopolitics of shared water resources have become increasingly urgent, complex, and contentious. This study investigates the role of agricultural geography—specifically the size, location, and spatial configuration of agricultural land—in shaping water stress and its management, ultimately influencing the likelihood of international water conflict. To empirically address these dynamics, we introduce novel spatiotemporal measures of agricultural land features, using remotely sensed data and Geographic Information System (GIS) tools. Analyzing data from 311 country dyads within 58 international river basins over seven years, our study finds that extensive agricultural land spanning multiple sovereign territories in shared basins is associated with a high probability of international water conflict. While the upstream-downstream configuration does not inherently heighten conflict risk, the likelihood rises with larger upstream agricultural areas, particularly when coupled with extensive downstream agricultural land. These findings enhance our understanding of how geographic factors beyond mere proximity shape international security dynamics, and offer practical implications for conflict prevention, water resource management, and climate change governance.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carolina Moehlecke, Guilherme N Fasolin, Matias Spektor
Recent scholarship shows that public attitudes toward foreign direct investment (FDI) are shaped by non-economic factors such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, and foreign threat perceptions. However, the influence of socially irresponsible behavior by investing firms on such attitudes remains underexplored. In this research note, we investigate individuals’ preferences regarding socially irresponsible FDI through a conjoint experiment conducted in Brazil, a key destination for international capital inflows in the Global South. We find that investing firms’ corrupt and environmentally damaging behavior significantly reduces public support for FDI, even when respondents are prompted to consider substantial job creation by the firm under challenging economic conditions. This effect persists among high-skilled labor, a group that typically stands to benefit the most from FDI. These findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of public attitudes toward FDI by highlighting the salience of negative externalities over economic benefits. Ultimately, the study offers a cautionary tale for firms, policymakers, and civil society, underscoring public sensitivity to the social costs of globalization and the potential reputational risks of prioritizing expected economic benefits over responsible conduct.
{"title":"Beyond Jobs: When Citizens Reject Socially Irresponsible Foreign Direct Investment","authors":"Carolina Moehlecke, Guilherme N Fasolin, Matias Spektor","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf046","url":null,"abstract":"Recent scholarship shows that public attitudes toward foreign direct investment (FDI) are shaped by non-economic factors such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, and foreign threat perceptions. However, the influence of socially irresponsible behavior by investing firms on such attitudes remains underexplored. In this research note, we investigate individuals’ preferences regarding socially irresponsible FDI through a conjoint experiment conducted in Brazil, a key destination for international capital inflows in the Global South. We find that investing firms’ corrupt and environmentally damaging behavior significantly reduces public support for FDI, even when respondents are prompted to consider substantial job creation by the firm under challenging economic conditions. This effect persists among high-skilled labor, a group that typically stands to benefit the most from FDI. These findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of public attitudes toward FDI by highlighting the salience of negative externalities over economic benefits. Ultimately, the study offers a cautionary tale for firms, policymakers, and civil society, underscoring public sensitivity to the social costs of globalization and the potential reputational risks of prioritizing expected economic benefits over responsible conduct.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The United States has historically been the world's leader in refugee resettlement. Yet, there has been little scholarship on the determinants of US refugee admissions policies. This paper asks, why does the United States resettle refugees from certain countries over others? How have these priorities changed over time? This paper argues that refugee admissions should be understood as more than a humanitarian initiative, but also reflects foreign policy priorities. This interplay between humanitarian factors and geopolitics is a key component of strategic humanitarianism. After the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the United States used refugee policy to resettle refugees from areas where it has been militarily involved and as a strategy to discredit foreign policy rivals. Yet, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks dramatically altered the foreign policy priorities of the United States. In the post-9/11 period, the United States is expected to have resettled far fewer refugees from military conflicts and Muslim-majority nations. A statistical analysis of refugee resettlement from 1990–2019 reveals that the United States prioritized refugees from its conflicts abroad in the 1990s, but that this preference declined considerably with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
{"title":"Strategic Humanitarianism and US Refugee Admissions after the Cold War","authors":"Idean Salehyan","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf045","url":null,"abstract":"The United States has historically been the world's leader in refugee resettlement. Yet, there has been little scholarship on the determinants of US refugee admissions policies. This paper asks, why does the United States resettle refugees from certain countries over others? How have these priorities changed over time? This paper argues that refugee admissions should be understood as more than a humanitarian initiative, but also reflects foreign policy priorities. This interplay between humanitarian factors and geopolitics is a key component of strategic humanitarianism. After the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the United States used refugee policy to resettle refugees from areas where it has been militarily involved and as a strategy to discredit foreign policy rivals. Yet, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks dramatically altered the foreign policy priorities of the United States. In the post-9/11 period, the United States is expected to have resettled far fewer refugees from military conflicts and Muslim-majority nations. A statistical analysis of refugee resettlement from 1990–2019 reveals that the United States prioritized refugees from its conflicts abroad in the 1990s, but that this preference declined considerably with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"271 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francesco Nicoli, Brian Burgoon, David van der Duin
Even in the face of rising security threats, European regional security cooperation is fraught. The issue strikes at the heart of national sovereignty that citizens and governments can be jealous to preserve. Political support for European security integration is arguably sensitive not only to financial and sovereignty costs, but also to specific design choices—its scope and level of military commitments, its governance and sources of financing. To explore these issues, we carried out a conjoint experiment in five Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain) in November 2022 focused on public support for alternative designs of European defense union. The results show that these Western European publics are most supportive of policy packages requiring EU-level governance, joint procurement of military equipment, and repurposing of existing national expenditure as the preferred form of financing. Citizens in different Western European countries have generally aligned preferences regarding such security cooperation. The results suggest that European citizens support creating joint institutions and policies that substantially pool sovereignty even in the security realm—provided such pooling stays within a range of particular policy designs.
{"title":"Citizen Support for a European Defense Union: An International Conjoint Experiment on Security Cooperation in Europe","authors":"Francesco Nicoli, Brian Burgoon, David van der Duin","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf044","url":null,"abstract":"Even in the face of rising security threats, European regional security cooperation is fraught. The issue strikes at the heart of national sovereignty that citizens and governments can be jealous to preserve. Political support for European security integration is arguably sensitive not only to financial and sovereignty costs, but also to specific design choices—its scope and level of military commitments, its governance and sources of financing. To explore these issues, we carried out a conjoint experiment in five Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain) in November 2022 focused on public support for alternative designs of European defense union. The results show that these Western European publics are most supportive of policy packages requiring EU-level governance, joint procurement of military equipment, and repurposing of existing national expenditure as the preferred form of financing. Citizens in different Western European countries have generally aligned preferences regarding such security cooperation. The results suggest that European citizens support creating joint institutions and policies that substantially pool sovereignty even in the security realm—provided such pooling stays within a range of particular policy designs.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Firms in production networks often favor liberalization through free trade agreements (FTAs) over multilateral liberalization because of its potential discriminatory effects against firms outside the FTA, but also, as this article explores, relative to competing firms within the FTA area. The selectivity and flexibility inherent in FTA liberalization accommodate heterogeneity among firms in trade preferences, incentivizing them to lobby individually for specific FTA design configurations aligned with their particular production organizations. This article theorizes how the interaction between two variables—(1) inter-firm heterogeneity in production organization and (2) asymmetric liberalization through FTA design configurations—determines heterogeneity in FTA utilization among firms, favoring some over others within the trade area. These arguments are examined in the context of the Thai automotive industry and the FTAs signed by Thailand with other Southeast Asian countries, Japan, India, and Australia, drawing on interviews and administrative records. The empirical evidence supports the explanatory power of these variables in accounting for inter-firm heterogeneity in trade preferences, lobbying patterns, and FTA utilization. Automakers lobbied for FTA configurations that selectively liberalize their trade flows relative to competitors within the trade area, primarily using FTAs for hierarchical and captive cross-border input trade with subsidiaries and long-term suppliers.
{"title":"Firm Heterogeneity and Asymmetric Liberalization Drive Differential Utilization of FTAs among Firms in Production Networks","authors":"Antonio Postigo","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf038","url":null,"abstract":"Firms in production networks often favor liberalization through free trade agreements (FTAs) over multilateral liberalization because of its potential discriminatory effects against firms outside the FTA, but also, as this article explores, relative to competing firms within the FTA area. The selectivity and flexibility inherent in FTA liberalization accommodate heterogeneity among firms in trade preferences, incentivizing them to lobby individually for specific FTA design configurations aligned with their particular production organizations. This article theorizes how the interaction between two variables—(1) inter-firm heterogeneity in production organization and (2) asymmetric liberalization through FTA design configurations—determines heterogeneity in FTA utilization among firms, favoring some over others within the trade area. These arguments are examined in the context of the Thai automotive industry and the FTAs signed by Thailand with other Southeast Asian countries, Japan, India, and Australia, drawing on interviews and administrative records. The empirical evidence supports the explanatory power of these variables in accounting for inter-firm heterogeneity in trade preferences, lobbying patterns, and FTA utilization. Automakers lobbied for FTA configurations that selectively liberalize their trade flows relative to competitors within the trade area, primarily using FTAs for hierarchical and captive cross-border input trade with subsidiaries and long-term suppliers.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144269403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Who files petitions against repressive regimes in the United Nations? Victims of human rights abuse face high personal costs of participation, including retaliation from the government against whom they are filing a complaint. There is also a significant information barrier. Despite these costs, several hundred petitions (or complaints) have been filed against repressive governments in just one United Nations treaty body. I frame filing international petitions as a form of antiregime mobilization; if mistreated, political individuals and organizations file petitions as a part of their broader mobilization efforts to improve human rights. This article introduces individual-level data of individuals who file complaints in the United Nations. I find there are two main categories of petitioners: (1) individuals with prior political involvement and (2) individuals represented by civil society organizations. This dataset includes identities of individuals, involvement of legal representation, specific rights under contestation, and other identifying individual characteristics. These data on individuals who overcome high costs help improve our understanding of broader processes of mobilization, both domestic and international.
{"title":"Individual Mobilization by Victims of Human Rights Abuse: Who Files Petitions in the United Nations?","authors":"Rachel J Schoner","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf043","url":null,"abstract":"Who files petitions against repressive regimes in the United Nations? Victims of human rights abuse face high personal costs of participation, including retaliation from the government against whom they are filing a complaint. There is also a significant information barrier. Despite these costs, several hundred petitions (or complaints) have been filed against repressive governments in just one United Nations treaty body. I frame filing international petitions as a form of antiregime mobilization; if mistreated, political individuals and organizations file petitions as a part of their broader mobilization efforts to improve human rights. This article introduces individual-level data of individuals who file complaints in the United Nations. I find there are two main categories of petitioners: (1) individuals with prior political involvement and (2) individuals represented by civil society organizations. This dataset includes identities of individuals, involvement of legal representation, specific rights under contestation, and other identifying individual characteristics. These data on individuals who overcome high costs help improve our understanding of broader processes of mobilization, both domestic and international.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144252407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What makes a human rights argument effective? When challenging a state's human rights practices, actors can draw on a range of discursive options and frames. Current research on human rights argumentation highlights the strategic use of different rhetorical frames by actors to create political outcomes on a case-by-case basis. This analysis, however, is the first to measure the determinants of effective argumentation, the role of legal rhetoric, and the patterns that make successful arguments, on a global and systematic scale. This study uses data on all recommendations from the first two cycles of the Universal Periodic Review, covering all United Nations member states, a United Nations mechanism by which all states are reviewed regularly on their human rights practices. Using an original coding of legal and nonlegal recommendations, this paper tests the theory that arguments framed on legal references will be the most effective, emphasizing the particular importance of legal rhetoric in international politics. The findings support this theory, showing that human rights arguments framed with legal references are substantially more likely to succeed than those framed on other grounds. These findings raise important points for the role of legal rhetoric in human rights and in international relations more broadly.
{"title":"The Argumentative Power of International Law: Legal Rhetoric, Human Rights, and the Universal Periodic Review","authors":"Kyle Reed","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf042","url":null,"abstract":"What makes a human rights argument effective? When challenging a state's human rights practices, actors can draw on a range of discursive options and frames. Current research on human rights argumentation highlights the strategic use of different rhetorical frames by actors to create political outcomes on a case-by-case basis. This analysis, however, is the first to measure the determinants of effective argumentation, the role of legal rhetoric, and the patterns that make successful arguments, on a global and systematic scale. This study uses data on all recommendations from the first two cycles of the Universal Periodic Review, covering all United Nations member states, a United Nations mechanism by which all states are reviewed regularly on their human rights practices. Using an original coding of legal and nonlegal recommendations, this paper tests the theory that arguments framed on legal references will be the most effective, emphasizing the particular importance of legal rhetoric in international politics. The findings support this theory, showing that human rights arguments framed with legal references are substantially more likely to succeed than those framed on other grounds. These findings raise important points for the role of legal rhetoric in human rights and in international relations more broadly.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144145485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nonstate actors play powerful roles in global governance institutions (GGIs) as advocates, experts, representatives, regulators, monitors, and implementing agents. However, the extent to which their inclusion affects the degree to which citizens find GGIs more legitimate has not been systematically investigated, nor have the conditions under which citizens might do so. In this contribution, we theoretically argue that such inclusion effectively enhances the social legitimacy of GGIs, but only to the extent that citizens expect nonstate actors to provide relevant governance contributions. We find strong empirical evidence for this argument in two large-N conjoint experiments fielded in Brazil, Germany, South Africa, and the United States. First, our results suggest that citizens, on average, ascribe more legitimacy to GGIs if learning that nonstate actors have a say in important decisions. Second, the strength of this effect depends on the degree to which citizens expect nonstate actors to provide expertise, representation, public interest orientation, transparency, or operational capacity. Third, expected governance contributions remarkably vary among different types of nonstate actors in kind and degree. In line with our overall argument, findings suggest that nonstate actor participation plays a more complex and significant role in the social legitimation of global governance than previously understood.
{"title":"Nonstate Actor Inclusion and the Social Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions","authors":"Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, Soetkin Verhaegen, Sigrid Quack","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf040","url":null,"abstract":"Nonstate actors play powerful roles in global governance institutions (GGIs) as advocates, experts, representatives, regulators, monitors, and implementing agents. However, the extent to which their inclusion affects the degree to which citizens find GGIs more legitimate has not been systematically investigated, nor have the conditions under which citizens might do so. In this contribution, we theoretically argue that such inclusion effectively enhances the social legitimacy of GGIs, but only to the extent that citizens expect nonstate actors to provide relevant governance contributions. We find strong empirical evidence for this argument in two large-N conjoint experiments fielded in Brazil, Germany, South Africa, and the United States. First, our results suggest that citizens, on average, ascribe more legitimacy to GGIs if learning that nonstate actors have a say in important decisions. Second, the strength of this effect depends on the degree to which citizens expect nonstate actors to provide expertise, representation, public interest orientation, transparency, or operational capacity. Third, expected governance contributions remarkably vary among different types of nonstate actors in kind and degree. In line with our overall argument, findings suggest that nonstate actor participation plays a more complex and significant role in the social legitimation of global governance than previously understood.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144113623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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