Ethnic groups employ different strategies to pursue demands for self-determination. While some act within conventional channels of political contestation, others choose non-conventional strategies, including violence and rebellion. We conceive of this as a result of bargaining between group and state and argue that both sides’ institutions affect the likelihood of escalation. Specifically, groups with traditional authorities have the capacity and incentives to escalate conflicts. Only when such institutions are matched with internal accountability mechanisms can groups credibly commit so that bargaining failure and violence less likely. Similarly, states with open elections can tie their hands more effectively, and constitutional regulations of traditional authorities formalize state-group interactions, which also mitigates the effect of traditional authorities on conflict. We use new global data on groups that demand self-determination, their traditional political institutions, and their strategy choice from 2005 to 2015. We find support for our argument using various identification and estimation approaches. Groups with traditional authorities are much more likely to use violence, a finding that is not sensitive to the omission of unobserved confounders. Furthermore, this relationship is moderated by group-level audience costs and the strategic environment provided by the state. Our findings advance new perspectives on the interactions of customary and national institutions in determining subnational conflict.
{"title":"Traditional Authorities and Strategies in Demands for Self-Determination","authors":"Clara Neupert-Wentz, Friederike Luise Kelle","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae134","url":null,"abstract":"Ethnic groups employ different strategies to pursue demands for self-determination. While some act within conventional channels of political contestation, others choose non-conventional strategies, including violence and rebellion. We conceive of this as a result of bargaining between group and state and argue that both sides’ institutions affect the likelihood of escalation. Specifically, groups with traditional authorities have the capacity and incentives to escalate conflicts. Only when such institutions are matched with internal accountability mechanisms can groups credibly commit so that bargaining failure and violence less likely. Similarly, states with open elections can tie their hands more effectively, and constitutional regulations of traditional authorities formalize state-group interactions, which also mitigates the effect of traditional authorities on conflict. We use new global data on groups that demand self-determination, their traditional political institutions, and their strategy choice from 2005 to 2015. We find support for our argument using various identification and estimation approaches. Groups with traditional authorities are much more likely to use violence, a finding that is not sensitive to the omission of unobserved confounders. Furthermore, this relationship is moderated by group-level audience costs and the strategic environment provided by the state. Our findings advance new perspectives on the interactions of customary and national institutions in determining subnational conflict.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142908549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many theories attempt to explain the determinants of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their design. Existing accounts, however, focus almost exclusively on structural or domestic factors and ignore individual leaders. In this paper, I develop and test novel theoretical claims regarding executive leaders’ prior career in business and their trade cooperation policy once in office. I construct a new dataset on the heads of the executive’s business managerial experience and test my main claims in a time-series-cross-sectional setting covering 185 countries from 1948 to 2009. To establish causality, I rely on an instrumental variable strategy and leverage exogenous transitions due to sudden deaths or terminal illness in office. The results show that businesspersons-turned-politicians are more likely to enter PTAs and are more likely to sign deeper PTAs. The relationship is further investigated in an illustrative case study of the 1988—Canada trade deal. The substantive effect of business experience is comparable to that of established factors in the literature, such as regime type, and is robust to numerous tests, specifications, subsamples, and measurements of business experience.
{"title":"Preferential Trade Agreements and Leaders’ Business Experience","authors":"Nicola Nones","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae129","url":null,"abstract":"Many theories attempt to explain the determinants of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their design. Existing accounts, however, focus almost exclusively on structural or domestic factors and ignore individual leaders. In this paper, I develop and test novel theoretical claims regarding executive leaders’ prior career in business and their trade cooperation policy once in office. I construct a new dataset on the heads of the executive’s business managerial experience and test my main claims in a time-series-cross-sectional setting covering 185 countries from 1948 to 2009. To establish causality, I rely on an instrumental variable strategy and leverage exogenous transitions due to sudden deaths or terminal illness in office. The results show that businesspersons-turned-politicians are more likely to enter PTAs and are more likely to sign deeper PTAs. The relationship is further investigated in an illustrative case study of the 1988—Canada trade deal. The substantive effect of business experience is comparable to that of established factors in the literature, such as regime type, and is robust to numerous tests, specifications, subsamples, and measurements of business experience.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142415574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many types of civil unrest, including protest, violent conflict, and rebellion, have been found to be subject to both inter- and intra-state contagion. These spillover effects are conventionally tested through the application of parametric structural models that are estimated using observational data. Drawing on research in methods for network analysis, we note important challenges in conducting causal inference on contagion effects in observational data. We review a recently developed non-parametric test—the “split-halves test”—that is robust to confounding and apply the test to replication data from several recent studies in which researchers tested for contagion in civil unrest. We find that about half the time findings in the published literature fail to replicate with the split-halves test. Across ten total replications, we do not see strong patterns in terms of which results do and do not replicate. We do, however, find evidence for general contagion in six of the replications, indicating that contagion is a prevalent phenomenon in civil unrest. As such, we recommend that researchers (1) use the split-halves test as a general-purpose robustness check for parametric models of contagion in the study of civil unrest, and (2) consider modeling contagion in research on civil unrest.
{"title":"Causal Evidence for Theories of Contagious Civil Unrest","authors":"Rebekah Fyfe, Bruce Desmarais","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae124","url":null,"abstract":"Many types of civil unrest, including protest, violent conflict, and rebellion, have been found to be subject to both inter- and intra-state contagion. These spillover effects are conventionally tested through the application of parametric structural models that are estimated using observational data. Drawing on research in methods for network analysis, we note important challenges in conducting causal inference on contagion effects in observational data. We review a recently developed non-parametric test—the “split-halves test”—that is robust to confounding and apply the test to replication data from several recent studies in which researchers tested for contagion in civil unrest. We find that about half the time findings in the published literature fail to replicate with the split-halves test. Across ten total replications, we do not see strong patterns in terms of which results do and do not replicate. We do, however, find evidence for general contagion in six of the replications, indicating that contagion is a prevalent phenomenon in civil unrest. As such, we recommend that researchers (1) use the split-halves test as a general-purpose robustness check for parametric models of contagion in the study of civil unrest, and (2) consider modeling contagion in research on civil unrest.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142415576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most fundamental economic policy choices a society makes is how to order its global economic relations. What models do states use to structure this multifaceted decision, and how do they choose among these alternatives? We combine data on trade policies, foreign investment, exchange rates, capital flows, and international treaties to discover states’ strategies of global economic engagement. We identify five distinct strategies through dynamic clustering. We then examine the economic and political drivers of states’ choices among these competing strategies, focusing on the tradeoffs between public and private goods activated by differing styles of openness. In particular, we uncover a model of high global integration favored by (party-based) nondemocracies that emphasizes sacrificing consumption for production and embraces the risk of tight integration with global markets. We also uncover a cautious model of partial globalization favored by (large) democracies. Decisions over global economic engagement are clustered and multidimensional: Uncovering this variety unlocks new findings about the nonlinear effects of democracy on foreign economic policy.
{"title":"Democracy and Clustered Models of Global Economic Engagement","authors":"ByungKoo Kim, Iain Osgood","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae130","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most fundamental economic policy choices a society makes is how to order its global economic relations. What models do states use to structure this multifaceted decision, and how do they choose among these alternatives? We combine data on trade policies, foreign investment, exchange rates, capital flows, and international treaties to discover states’ strategies of global economic engagement. We identify five distinct strategies through dynamic clustering. We then examine the economic and political drivers of states’ choices among these competing strategies, focusing on the tradeoffs between public and private goods activated by differing styles of openness. In particular, we uncover a model of high global integration favored by (party-based) nondemocracies that emphasizes sacrificing consumption for production and embraces the risk of tight integration with global markets. We also uncover a cautious model of partial globalization favored by (large) democracies. Decisions over global economic engagement are clustered and multidimensional: Uncovering this variety unlocks new findings about the nonlinear effects of democracy on foreign economic policy.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142415577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jean-Christophe Boucher, Lauren Rutherglen, So Youn Kim
s The growth and success of right-wing populist movements globally has been remarkable since the early 2010s. Indeed, populist parties in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and North America have received tremendous electoral success, shaping a movement for the people and by the people within the political sphere. To what extent do populist movements influence other such programs across national borders? Research has suggested that globalization has facilitated the spread of populist ideology. Transnational populism emphasizes the “people” as a “horizontal, membership-based collective with membership premised on an in/out logic between nations, allowing populist national movements to engage and share a global ideological program. This paper seeks to understand and measure to what extent populism has become a transnational movement and identify how populism moves across national borders through online political participation. To explore this question, we collected over 6.7 million digital trace data on X/Twitter during Canada’s January–February 2022 Freedom Convoy movement. Receiving support from thousands of citizens, the Freedom Convoy revealed the ability of populist ideology to move aimlessly across international borders. We used a deep-learning model applied to text analysis to implement a classification task to measure populist narratives during the movement.
{"title":"Transnationalism and Populist Networks in a Digital Era: Canada and the Freedom Convoy","authors":"Jean-Christophe Boucher, Lauren Rutherglen, So Youn Kim","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae131","url":null,"abstract":"s The growth and success of right-wing populist movements globally has been remarkable since the early 2010s. Indeed, populist parties in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and North America have received tremendous electoral success, shaping a movement for the people and by the people within the political sphere. To what extent do populist movements influence other such programs across national borders? Research has suggested that globalization has facilitated the spread of populist ideology. Transnational populism emphasizes the “people” as a “horizontal, membership-based collective with membership premised on an in/out logic between nations, allowing populist national movements to engage and share a global ideological program. This paper seeks to understand and measure to what extent populism has become a transnational movement and identify how populism moves across national borders through online political participation. To explore this question, we collected over 6.7 million digital trace data on X/Twitter during Canada’s January–February 2022 Freedom Convoy movement. Receiving support from thousands of citizens, the Freedom Convoy revealed the ability of populist ideology to move aimlessly across international borders. We used a deep-learning model applied to text analysis to implement a classification task to measure populist narratives during the movement.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"227 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Do military alliances promote human rights? Scholars and practitioners generally believe they do not because states form alliances largely to advance their strategic interests and thus are not interested in members' domestic policies. I claim that some states may care about their allies' human rights practices. Specifically, democracies are concerned that alliance relationships with rights-abusing governments harm their reputation, and thus urge their allies to improve human rights. However, this rights-promoting motivation is constrained because democracies also need to preserve alliance partnerships with governments that may rely on repression for their internal security. Empirical analyses of alliance relationships between democracies and autocracies provide support for this argument. Autocracies with a powerful democratic ally implement relatively advanced human rights protection; however, this association becomes weaker as the risk of domestic conflict becomes higher. These findings suggest the importance of considering democratic allies in the international promotion of human rights.
s 军事联盟促进人权吗？学者和实践者普遍认为不会，因为国家结盟主要是为了推进其战略利益，因此对盟友的国内政策不感兴趣。我认为，一些国家可能会关心其盟友的人权实践。具体来说，民主国家担心与践踏人权的政府结盟会损害自己的声誉，因此会敦促盟国改善人权状况。然而，这种促进人权的动机也会受到限制，因为民主国家也需要维护与那些可能依靠镇压来保障国内安全的政府的同盟关系。对民主政体与专制政体之间联盟关系的经验分析为这一论点提供了支持。拥有强大民主盟友的专制国家会实施相对先进的人权保护；然而，随着国内冲突风险的增加，这种关联性也会减弱。这些研究结果表明，在国际上促进人权时必须考虑民主盟友。
{"title":"Human Rights Promotion and Democratic Allies","authors":"Yasuki Kudo","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae122","url":null,"abstract":"s Do military alliances promote human rights? Scholars and practitioners generally believe they do not because states form alliances largely to advance their strategic interests and thus are not interested in members' domestic policies. I claim that some states may care about their allies' human rights practices. Specifically, democracies are concerned that alliance relationships with rights-abusing governments harm their reputation, and thus urge their allies to improve human rights. However, this rights-promoting motivation is constrained because democracies also need to preserve alliance partnerships with governments that may rely on repression for their internal security. Empirical analyses of alliance relationships between democracies and autocracies provide support for this argument. Autocracies with a powerful democratic ally implement relatively advanced human rights protection; however, this association becomes weaker as the risk of domestic conflict becomes higher. These findings suggest the importance of considering democratic allies in the international promotion of human rights.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"122 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article introduces a new phenomenon in the study of civil war: tribal wartime social order. The proposed theory of tribalocracy, or tribal rule, integrates insights from civil war studies, anthropology, and sociology to provide a nuanced account of social order and its transformation in tribal warzones. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in the Hauran region in southern Syria, the proposed theory explains how endogenous rebel groups, seeking to maximize a wide range of benefits rendered by tribal shaykhs, refrain from establishing a new form of order. Instead, they co-opt, reassert, and operate under a pre-existing order in reserve. In so doing, rebels rule minimally, leaving most of the local affairs in the hands of civilian actors closely monitored by tribal shaykhs. Given the fluid and volatile nature of wartime order, the proposed theory offers a compelling explanatory framework to account for the transition in the forms of wartime social order from a civilian model to one dominated by rebels. The theory and empirical results expand our understanding of the localized and kinship-based forms of solidarity, the origins of rebel organizations, the source of wartime social order, civilian agency, and the roles played by tribal shaykhs under rebel rule.
{"title":"Tribalocracy: Tribal Wartime Social Order and Its Transformation in Southern Syria","authors":"Abdullah al-Jabassini","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae133","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces a new phenomenon in the study of civil war: tribal wartime social order. The proposed theory of tribalocracy, or tribal rule, integrates insights from civil war studies, anthropology, and sociology to provide a nuanced account of social order and its transformation in tribal warzones. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in the Hauran region in southern Syria, the proposed theory explains how endogenous rebel groups, seeking to maximize a wide range of benefits rendered by tribal shaykhs, refrain from establishing a new form of order. Instead, they co-opt, reassert, and operate under a pre-existing order in reserve. In so doing, rebels rule minimally, leaving most of the local affairs in the hands of civilian actors closely monitored by tribal shaykhs. Given the fluid and volatile nature of wartime order, the proposed theory offers a compelling explanatory framework to account for the transition in the forms of wartime social order from a civilian model to one dominated by rebels. The theory and empirical results expand our understanding of the localized and kinship-based forms of solidarity, the origins of rebel organizations, the source of wartime social order, civilian agency, and the roles played by tribal shaykhs under rebel rule.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"122 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Offshore finance allows foreign banks to create US dollars under the laws of an offshore jurisdiction. How and why does this affect international monetary power? Conceptually, I argue that offshore finance bifurcates across borders the shared power of the state and banks to create money, combining the US dollar with mostly English law. Empirically, I demonstrate that more US dollars are created offshore outside US jurisdiction than onshore within it. Offshore finance increases liquidity, at higher risk, and leads to a cross-border entanglement of issuing country, offshore financial centers, borrowers, and global banks. In short, offshore finance changes the power inherent in money. Consequently, international monetary power has become the ability to get access to offshore dollars in combination with the capacity to determine international liquidity and to set, select, or circumvent the related rules. It is constrained by the hierarchically organized social credit relations that money consists of. The international monetary power of the United States has become an instance of indirect rule with global banks having been delegated the prerogative of US dollar creation. As is common with indirect rule, it entails a difficult balancing act between geographical reach and centralization of power.
{"title":"Outsourcing Empire: International Monetary Power in the Age of Offshore Finance","authors":"Andrea Binder","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae123","url":null,"abstract":"Offshore finance allows foreign banks to create US dollars under the laws of an offshore jurisdiction. How and why does this affect international monetary power? Conceptually, I argue that offshore finance bifurcates across borders the shared power of the state and banks to create money, combining the US dollar with mostly English law. Empirically, I demonstrate that more US dollars are created offshore outside US jurisdiction than onshore within it. Offshore finance increases liquidity, at higher risk, and leads to a cross-border entanglement of issuing country, offshore financial centers, borrowers, and global banks. In short, offshore finance changes the power inherent in money. Consequently, international monetary power has become the ability to get access to offshore dollars in combination with the capacity to determine international liquidity and to set, select, or circumvent the related rules. It is constrained by the hierarchically organized social credit relations that money consists of. The international monetary power of the United States has become an instance of indirect rule with global banks having been delegated the prerogative of US dollar creation. As is common with indirect rule, it entails a difficult balancing act between geographical reach and centralization of power.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has increasingly used peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to manage crises between and within states. The mandates of contemporary PKOs are demanding, calling on peacekeeping personnel to separate belligerent parties, enforce ceasefire agreements, and protect the physical security of civilians. The pursuit of these distinct objectives presents a unique challenge for the UN because it relies on member states to volunteer personnel for these missions. Therefore, the achievement of mandated goals depends on the ability of diverse national contingents to overcome coordination problems and function as a cohesive force. Integrating research of PKOs and international military coalitions, we argue that as national contingents share operational experience within a UN mission, they develop common institutional practices, and become more effective at protecting the civilian population. Using monthly data on UN PKOs from 1990 to 2019, we find that increasing operational experience within a peacekeeping coalition reduces civilian fatalities significantly.
{"title":"Learning to Fight Together: UN Peacekeeping Coalitions and Civilian Protection","authors":"Michael A Morgan, Daniel S Morey","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae118","url":null,"abstract":"Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has increasingly used peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to manage crises between and within states. The mandates of contemporary PKOs are demanding, calling on peacekeeping personnel to separate belligerent parties, enforce ceasefire agreements, and protect the physical security of civilians. The pursuit of these distinct objectives presents a unique challenge for the UN because it relies on member states to volunteer personnel for these missions. Therefore, the achievement of mandated goals depends on the ability of diverse national contingents to overcome coordination problems and function as a cohesive force. Integrating research of PKOs and international military coalitions, we argue that as national contingents share operational experience within a UN mission, they develop common institutional practices, and become more effective at protecting the civilian population. Using monthly data on UN PKOs from 1990 to 2019, we find that increasing operational experience within a peacekeeping coalition reduces civilian fatalities significantly.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We are encouraged to think of refugees as resilient people with agency and capacity for flourishing, rather than passive victims needing help. This framing purports to uphold and celebrate refugees’ humanity. But some scholars worry that it problematically serves to demand resilience from refugees, normalize their displacement, and legitimate state bordering practices. This article builds on this critique by examining how powerful actors have long attributed resilience to vulnerable others to legitimate domination and control. I focus on the deployment of resilience-talk by white enslavers and their supporters to justify Black enslavement in the American South. Their philosophical, climatological, and epidemiological arguments about the resilient Black slave were supplemented with a claim that Black people could not survive liberation in the American North. I probe the resonances of this resilience-talk with contemporary invocations of the resilience of refugees in the Global South, and their supposed non-resilience in the Global North.
{"title":"Resilience and Domination: Resonances of Racial Slavery in Refugee Exclusion","authors":"Luke Glanville","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae116","url":null,"abstract":"We are encouraged to think of refugees as resilient people with agency and capacity for flourishing, rather than passive victims needing help. This framing purports to uphold and celebrate refugees’ humanity. But some scholars worry that it problematically serves to demand resilience from refugees, normalize their displacement, and legitimate state bordering practices. This article builds on this critique by examining how powerful actors have long attributed resilience to vulnerable others to legitimate domination and control. I focus on the deployment of resilience-talk by white enslavers and their supporters to justify Black enslavement in the American South. Their philosophical, climatological, and epidemiological arguments about the resilient Black slave were supplemented with a claim that Black people could not survive liberation in the American North. I probe the resonances of this resilience-talk with contemporary invocations of the resilience of refugees in the Global South, and their supposed non-resilience in the Global North.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141994387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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