s Recent data show systematic changes in the diplomacy and practice of war. Conquests, peace treaties, declarations of war, and state boundary changes have declined or disappeared. There are still wars, but they are increasingly fait accomplis, and their outcomes are often not recognized as legal. How can we explain this wide-ranging but seemingly contradictory transformation? Existing accounts, such as those based on a territorial integrity norm, do not adequately explain these changes. This paper uses norm dynamics theory to show that all of these changes can be explained as ‘ripple effects’ of war becoming illegitimate as a way to solve international disputes. The kinds of rhetorical justifications states can convincingly give for engaging in violence have changed. States are navigating this changed international social environment through legitimacy management behaviors. The paper specifies three types of ripple effect, Reframing, Displacement, and Consistency-Maintenance, corresponding to changes in what states say, the actions they perform, and how the audience reacts. We show how this theory unifies all of the existing data into a single explanatory framework. We also apply the theory to the decline of peace treaties to show how ripple effects play out in more detail.
{"title":"The Ripple Effects of the Illegitimacy of War","authors":"Joseph O'Mahoney","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae082","url":null,"abstract":"s Recent data show systematic changes in the diplomacy and practice of war. Conquests, peace treaties, declarations of war, and state boundary changes have declined or disappeared. There are still wars, but they are increasingly fait accomplis, and their outcomes are often not recognized as legal. How can we explain this wide-ranging but seemingly contradictory transformation? Existing accounts, such as those based on a territorial integrity norm, do not adequately explain these changes. This paper uses norm dynamics theory to show that all of these changes can be explained as ‘ripple effects’ of war becoming illegitimate as a way to solve international disputes. The kinds of rhetorical justifications states can convincingly give for engaging in violence have changed. States are navigating this changed international social environment through legitimacy management behaviors. The paper specifies three types of ripple effect, Reframing, Displacement, and Consistency-Maintenance, corresponding to changes in what states say, the actions they perform, and how the audience reacts. We show how this theory unifies all of the existing data into a single explanatory framework. We also apply the theory to the decline of peace treaties to show how ripple effects play out in more detail.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s American exceptionalism is enjoying a revival of scholarly interest amid new approaches to studying foreign policy narratives and unease regarding how US policymakers will manage a less unipolar international system. That revival coincides temporally, though not yet substantively, with growing attention to racialized dynamics and Eurocentrism within international relations. This article examines how core strands of American exceptionalism—the prevailing narrative framing of US foreign policy—reflect a whitewashed understanding of US foreign policy that can best be understood as the product of racialized subject-positioning that saturated its historical development. After conceptualizing American exceptionalism, it develops a theoretical framework to capture how racialized subject-positioning stratifies understandings of a nation’s role in the world. It proceeds to investigate how this process shaped the development of American exceptionalism in line with epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence, producing exceptionalist narratives that neglect non-white populations as meaningful others in the construction of US national identity and that negate US interactions with those groups as relevant evidence that might undercut its exceptionalism. These whitewashing effects remained embedded even as overtly racist discourse became delegitimized, posing enduring obstacles for US diplomacy today.
{"title":"Whitewashing American Exceptionalism: Racialized Subject-Positioning and US Foreign Policy","authors":"Richard W Maass","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae085","url":null,"abstract":"s American exceptionalism is enjoying a revival of scholarly interest amid new approaches to studying foreign policy narratives and unease regarding how US policymakers will manage a less unipolar international system. That revival coincides temporally, though not yet substantively, with growing attention to racialized dynamics and Eurocentrism within international relations. This article examines how core strands of American exceptionalism—the prevailing narrative framing of US foreign policy—reflect a whitewashed understanding of US foreign policy that can best be understood as the product of racialized subject-positioning that saturated its historical development. After conceptualizing American exceptionalism, it develops a theoretical framework to capture how racialized subject-positioning stratifies understandings of a nation’s role in the world. It proceeds to investigate how this process shaped the development of American exceptionalism in line with epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence, producing exceptionalist narratives that neglect non-white populations as meaningful others in the construction of US national identity and that negate US interactions with those groups as relevant evidence that might undercut its exceptionalism. These whitewashing effects remained embedded even as overtly racist discourse became delegitimized, posing enduring obstacles for US diplomacy today.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s The Russo–Ukraine War raises important questions on the dynamics of regional leadership and followership in what may be termed “Russian-led Eurasia.” These questions, in particular, the strength of Russian leadership in the region is complicated by the ambiguity in existing literature and competing images of Russia's relations with long-standing allies—notably Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—which are often portrayed in terms of a “community of fate” or partners destined for closer integration but also as a “community of fortune” or ad hoc, situational partners, loosely centered on Russia. This article offers an innovative theoretical and methodological exploration of Russia's relations with regional partner states by utilizing the English School of International Relations and regional integration organizations to assess Russia's regional leadership. As argued in this article, Russian-led Eurasia may be understood as an example of a regional interstate society with Russian hegemony serving as a socially conferred, binding institution. But this hegemony is inherently unstable owing to Russia's inability to balance hegemonic “rights” with “responsibilities.” War in Ukraine did not create this problem, but it has created the conditions for leadership transition in the region.
{"title":"Russia's Leadership in Eurasia: Holding Together or Falling Apart?","authors":"Sean Roberts, Ulrike Ziemer","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae088","url":null,"abstract":"s The Russo–Ukraine War raises important questions on the dynamics of regional leadership and followership in what may be termed “Russian-led Eurasia.” These questions, in particular, the strength of Russian leadership in the region is complicated by the ambiguity in existing literature and competing images of Russia's relations with long-standing allies—notably Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—which are often portrayed in terms of a “community of fate” or partners destined for closer integration but also as a “community of fortune” or ad hoc, situational partners, loosely centered on Russia. This article offers an innovative theoretical and methodological exploration of Russia's relations with regional partner states by utilizing the English School of International Relations and regional integration organizations to assess Russia's regional leadership. As argued in this article, Russian-led Eurasia may be understood as an example of a regional interstate society with Russian hegemony serving as a socially conferred, binding institution. But this hegemony is inherently unstable owing to Russia's inability to balance hegemonic “rights” with “responsibilities.” War in Ukraine did not create this problem, but it has created the conditions for leadership transition in the region.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anna Holzscheiter, Thurid Bahr, Laura Pantzerhielm, Martin Grandjean
In this paper, regime complexes are conceptualized as dynamic networks constituted by relations between international organizations (IOs). We introduce “IO positioning” as a conceptual lens for studying patterns and shifts in IO networks resulting from negotiations between IOs over their distinctiveness and social membership in complex organizational fields. We suggest that IO positioning has two constitutive effects. First, on the level of individual IOs, positioning affects IO identities within the field as these are (re)negotiated in relations with other organizations. Secondly, the positioning practices of IOs have constitutive effects on the contours of entire policy fields too; they form and shift the boundaries of regime complexes. Empirically, the paper examines the utility of our approach by analyzing the history, dynamics, and positioning effects of interorganizational relations between eight IOs in global health governance—an area of international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as exceptionally fragmented, complex, and densely populated. Examining relations between our eight IOs, we provide network analytical longitudinal data of in- and out-reporting by IOs derived from IOs’ annual reports between 1970 and 2017. We triangulate our network analysis with data derived from semi-structured interviews with health IO professionals.
{"title":"Positioning among International Organizations: Shifting Centers of Gravity in Global Health Governance","authors":"Anna Holzscheiter, Thurid Bahr, Laura Pantzerhielm, Martin Grandjean","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae073","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, regime complexes are conceptualized as dynamic networks constituted by relations between international organizations (IOs). We introduce “IO positioning” as a conceptual lens for studying patterns and shifts in IO networks resulting from negotiations between IOs over their distinctiveness and social membership in complex organizational fields. We suggest that IO positioning has two constitutive effects. First, on the level of individual IOs, positioning affects IO identities within the field as these are (re)negotiated in relations with other organizations. Secondly, the positioning practices of IOs have constitutive effects on the contours of entire policy fields too; they form and shift the boundaries of regime complexes. Empirically, the paper examines the utility of our approach by analyzing the history, dynamics, and positioning effects of interorganizational relations between eight IOs in global health governance—an area of international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as exceptionally fragmented, complex, and densely populated. Examining relations between our eight IOs, we provide network analytical longitudinal data of in- and out-reporting by IOs derived from IOs’ annual reports between 1970 and 2017. We triangulate our network analysis with data derived from semi-structured interviews with health IO professionals.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141074170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do consolidated democracies incorporate international human rights law (IHRL) treaties into national law? Existing research suggests contrastive accounts of the participation of democracies in IHRL regimes. While overall more likely to ratify, consolidated democracies are sometimes reluctant to accept demanding human rights commitments and less likely than both newly democratic and authoritarian regimes to incorporate international law in their constitutions. To theorize why established democracies commit to IHRL, this paper provides a comparative process tracing of the decisions to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into national law in Denmark and Sweden in the early 1990s. Why did these solid democracies with an exceptional commitment to human rights wait over 40 years to give domestic effect to a treaty they had helped create? Assessing rival theories of state commitment to human rights norms, the findings suggest that contextual developments in European law provided an opportunity for domestic political elites to seek insurance by incorporating the ECHR to place constraints on executive power. The argument qualifies claims about material strategizing or socialization to European norms as the primary drivers of incorporation.
{"title":"Why Incorporate the ECHR? The Domestic Incentives of Human Rights Commitment","authors":"Johan Karlsson Schaffer","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae039","url":null,"abstract":"Why do consolidated democracies incorporate international human rights law (IHRL) treaties into national law? Existing research suggests contrastive accounts of the participation of democracies in IHRL regimes. While overall more likely to ratify, consolidated democracies are sometimes reluctant to accept demanding human rights commitments and less likely than both newly democratic and authoritarian regimes to incorporate international law in their constitutions. To theorize why established democracies commit to IHRL, this paper provides a comparative process tracing of the decisions to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into national law in Denmark and Sweden in the early 1990s. Why did these solid democracies with an exceptional commitment to human rights wait over 40 years to give domestic effect to a treaty they had helped create? Assessing rival theories of state commitment to human rights norms, the findings suggest that contextual developments in European law provided an opportunity for domestic political elites to seek insurance by incorporating the ECHR to place constraints on executive power. The argument qualifies claims about material strategizing or socialization to European norms as the primary drivers of incorporation.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140910650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conventional wisdom on alliances proposes that leaders comply with alliances because the public opposes violating alliance commitments. However, this assumes that the public can easily judge whether or not a particular policy violates an alliance treaty. This article challenges this assumption and develops a theory that elites have the opportunity to shape public understanding as to whether an action violates an alliance treaty. It shows that while alliance commitments continue to have an important impact on public opinion, signals from unified elites can significantly reduce public pressure to support an ally by arguing that the alliance treaty does not create a legal obligation to intervene. In a pair of experiments on large samples of American adults, we found that a unified signal from the president and the Senate opposition leader can significantly reduce support for sending troops to the embattled ally. Consistent with elite cueing theory, the president’s ability to move public opinion in this manner is eliminated if the Senate opposition leader disagrees with his argument.
{"title":"Manipulating Public Beliefs about Alliance Compliance: A Survey Experiment","authors":"Dan Reiter, Brian Greenhill","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae075","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom on alliances proposes that leaders comply with alliances because the public opposes violating alliance commitments. However, this assumes that the public can easily judge whether or not a particular policy violates an alliance treaty. This article challenges this assumption and develops a theory that elites have the opportunity to shape public understanding as to whether an action violates an alliance treaty. It shows that while alliance commitments continue to have an important impact on public opinion, signals from unified elites can significantly reduce public pressure to support an ally by arguing that the alliance treaty does not create a legal obligation to intervene. In a pair of experiments on large samples of American adults, we found that a unified signal from the president and the Senate opposition leader can significantly reduce support for sending troops to the embattled ally. Consistent with elite cueing theory, the president’s ability to move public opinion in this manner is eliminated if the Senate opposition leader disagrees with his argument.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140903311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International criminal justice is filled with living, dead, and dying bodies. While witnesses detail atrocities in the courtroom, such testimonies are largely considered for their evidentiary value to establish innocence or guilt. In this article, I explore how death, grief, and mourning are represented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). I focus on the ICTY documentary, Crimes Before the ICTY: Višegrad, to analyse how filmic representations of international criminal justice register dead, dying, and grieving bodies. Drawing on Queer Death Studies and relational ontologies, I explore the more-than-human and non/living worlds through which death, grief, and mourning are represented in the film. A queer relational approach reveals and challenges the construction of the dead as evidence and death worlds as crime scenes. This approach illuminates how the natural world and buildings, bridges, and artifacts are vestiges, witnesses, and sites of death and grief in Višegrad. My analysis explores how these representations in the ICTY documentary reinforce civilizational logics and reductive representations of violence at the same time as they illuminate relational encounters of death and dying in international criminal justice, thus enriching attempts to see, know, and feel loss in the wake of violence.
{"title":"Death, Grief, and Mourning in an ICTY Film: Exploring Relational and Non/Living Worlds","authors":"Caitlin Biddolph","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae076","url":null,"abstract":"International criminal justice is filled with living, dead, and dying bodies. While witnesses detail atrocities in the courtroom, such testimonies are largely considered for their evidentiary value to establish innocence or guilt. In this article, I explore how death, grief, and mourning are represented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). I focus on the ICTY documentary, Crimes Before the ICTY: Višegrad, to analyse how filmic representations of international criminal justice register dead, dying, and grieving bodies. Drawing on Queer Death Studies and relational ontologies, I explore the more-than-human and non/living worlds through which death, grief, and mourning are represented in the film. A queer relational approach reveals and challenges the construction of the dead as evidence and death worlds as crime scenes. This approach illuminates how the natural world and buildings, bridges, and artifacts are vestiges, witnesses, and sites of death and grief in Višegrad. My analysis explores how these representations in the ICTY documentary reinforce civilizational logics and reductive representations of violence at the same time as they illuminate relational encounters of death and dying in international criminal justice, thus enriching attempts to see, know, and feel loss in the wake of violence.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140903313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s This article draws on regime newspaper archives and the Arabic-language speeches of and interviews with Syrian president Bashar al-Asad over the last two decades to track how Syrian governmental rhetoric on the question of “terrorism” has changed over time. Engaging with the literature on how ideas, technologies, and contentious repertoires diffuse and spread and how regimes learn from each other, I show how the Asad regime has moved from a discourse that saw “terrorism” as a Western and/or Israeli concept used to delegitimize primarily Palestinian and Lebanese resistance sponsored by Damascus to a discourse that embraces the rhetoric of the “war on terror” in order to legitimize the regime's counterinsurgency policies during the current conflict. I argue that this rhetorical shift is dependent on the ethno-sectarian identity of the population in question through a comparison of regime rhetoric on three separate uprisings in recent Syrian history: the current uprising (2011–present); the Kurdish uprising of 2004; and the Druze uprising in 2000. Since the current uprising is seen as a predominantly Sunni Arab affair, the Syrian regime has used “war on terror” rhetoric in ways that it did not during the Kurdish and Druze uprisings. I then situate this rhetorical move in time as a post-9/11 development by comparing current regime rhetoric with that of the Hafez al-Asad regime's rhetoric during the uprising centered in Hama in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
{"title":"How Bashar al-Asad Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the “War on Terror”","authors":"Sean Lee","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae066","url":null,"abstract":"s This article draws on regime newspaper archives and the Arabic-language speeches of and interviews with Syrian president Bashar al-Asad over the last two decades to track how Syrian governmental rhetoric on the question of “terrorism” has changed over time. Engaging with the literature on how ideas, technologies, and contentious repertoires diffuse and spread and how regimes learn from each other, I show how the Asad regime has moved from a discourse that saw “terrorism” as a Western and/or Israeli concept used to delegitimize primarily Palestinian and Lebanese resistance sponsored by Damascus to a discourse that embraces the rhetoric of the “war on terror” in order to legitimize the regime's counterinsurgency policies during the current conflict. I argue that this rhetorical shift is dependent on the ethno-sectarian identity of the population in question through a comparison of regime rhetoric on three separate uprisings in recent Syrian history: the current uprising (2011–present); the Kurdish uprising of 2004; and the Druze uprising in 2000. Since the current uprising is seen as a predominantly Sunni Arab affair, the Syrian regime has used “war on terror” rhetoric in ways that it did not during the Kurdish and Druze uprisings. I then situate this rhetorical move in time as a post-9/11 development by comparing current regime rhetoric with that of the Hafez al-Asad regime's rhetoric during the uprising centered in Hama in the late 1970s and early 1980s.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displaced persons’ unwillingness to risk the high uncertainty of life under such regimes, and when the host country is democratic, refugee volume is similarly curbed due to democratic constraints on the host government. Consequently, a majority of refugees are clustered into anocratic regimes. Using a global dataset, a series of statistical analyses found strong evidence in support of our theoretical expectations regarding not only the hypothesized correlation between regime type and refugee movements but also the preferences of host governments and displaced persons that we theorize underlie this relationship.
{"title":"Political Regimes and Refugee Entries: The Preferences and Decisions of Displaced Persons and Host Governments","authors":"Masaaki Higashijima, Yujin Woo","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae077","url":null,"abstract":"s What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displaced persons’ unwillingness to risk the high uncertainty of life under such regimes, and when the host country is democratic, refugee volume is similarly curbed due to democratic constraints on the host government. Consequently, a majority of refugees are clustered into anocratic regimes. Using a global dataset, a series of statistical analyses found strong evidence in support of our theoretical expectations regarding not only the hypothesized correlation between regime type and refugee movements but also the preferences of host governments and displaced persons that we theorize underlie this relationship.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"133 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Over the last twenty years, the international relations literature has sought to understand the conditions in which peacekeeping operations (PKOs) occur and the efficacy of their presence. Much work has focused on PKOs’ relationship to civilians in civil conflict, but less is understood about the influences on peacekeeping missions’ quality. If PKOs commit human rights abuses, how might other actors deter exploitive PKO behavior in the domestic context? We argue international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) provide a monitoring and socializing effect on PKOs. Using the Peacekeeper Attributes (PKAT) and Transnational Social Movements (TSMO) datasets, we analyze peacekeeping missions from 2007 to 2013. Through zero-inflated negative binomial regression, we found that the presence of general INGOs decreases rates of misconduct, and human rights INGOs decrease rates of misconduct. However, we find that the presence of women’s rights-focused INGOs does not decrease rates of sexual misconduct among PKO troops.
s 在过去的二十年中，国际关系文献一直在试图了解维和行动（PKOs）发生的条件及其存在的效力。许多研究集中于维和行动与国内冲突中平民的关系，但对维和特派团质量的影响因素了解较少。如果维和行动有侵犯人权的行为，那么其他行动者如何在国内环境中阻止维和行动的剥削行为？我们认为，国际非政府组织（INGOs）对维和行动具有监督和社会化的作用。利用维和人员属性（PKAT）和跨国社会运动（TSMO）数据集，我们分析了 2007 年至 2013 年的维和任务。通过零膨胀负二项回归，我们发现一般国际非政府组织的存在会降低不当行为发生率，而人权国际非政府组织会降低不当行为发生率。然而，我们发现关注妇女权利的国际非政府组织的存在并不会降低维和部队中的不当性行为发生率。
{"title":"Spiral to Surveillance: The Effect of INGOs on Levels of Peacekeeper Misconduct","authors":"Morgan Barney, Kellan Borror","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae072","url":null,"abstract":"s Over the last twenty years, the international relations literature has sought to understand the conditions in which peacekeeping operations (PKOs) occur and the efficacy of their presence. Much work has focused on PKOs’ relationship to civilians in civil conflict, but less is understood about the influences on peacekeeping missions’ quality. If PKOs commit human rights abuses, how might other actors deter exploitive PKO behavior in the domestic context? We argue international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) provide a monitoring and socializing effect on PKOs. Using the Peacekeeper Attributes (PKAT) and Transnational Social Movements (TSMO) datasets, we analyze peacekeeping missions from 2007 to 2013. Through zero-inflated negative binomial regression, we found that the presence of general INGOs decreases rates of misconduct, and human rights INGOs decrease rates of misconduct. However, we find that the presence of women’s rights-focused INGOs does not decrease rates of sexual misconduct among PKO troops.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140819983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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