s What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displaced persons’ unwillingness to risk the high uncertainty of life under such regimes, and when the host country is democratic, refugee volume is similarly curbed due to democratic constraints on the host government. Consequently, a majority of refugees are clustered into anocratic regimes. Using a global dataset, a series of statistical analyses found strong evidence in support of our theoretical expectations regarding not only the hypothesized correlation between regime type and refugee movements but also the preferences of host governments and displaced persons that we theorize underlie this relationship.
{"title":"Political Regimes and Refugee Entries: The Preferences and Decisions of Displaced Persons and Host Governments","authors":"Masaaki Higashijima, Yujin Woo","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae077","url":null,"abstract":"s What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displaced persons’ unwillingness to risk the high uncertainty of life under such regimes, and when the host country is democratic, refugee volume is similarly curbed due to democratic constraints on the host government. Consequently, a majority of refugees are clustered into anocratic regimes. Using a global dataset, a series of statistical analyses found strong evidence in support of our theoretical expectations regarding not only the hypothesized correlation between regime type and refugee movements but also the preferences of host governments and displaced persons that we theorize underlie this relationship.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"133 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Over the last twenty years, the international relations literature has sought to understand the conditions in which peacekeeping operations (PKOs) occur and the efficacy of their presence. Much work has focused on PKOs’ relationship to civilians in civil conflict, but less is understood about the influences on peacekeeping missions’ quality. If PKOs commit human rights abuses, how might other actors deter exploitive PKO behavior in the domestic context? We argue international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) provide a monitoring and socializing effect on PKOs. Using the Peacekeeper Attributes (PKAT) and Transnational Social Movements (TSMO) datasets, we analyze peacekeeping missions from 2007 to 2013. Through zero-inflated negative binomial regression, we found that the presence of general INGOs decreases rates of misconduct, and human rights INGOs decrease rates of misconduct. However, we find that the presence of women’s rights-focused INGOs does not decrease rates of sexual misconduct among PKO troops.
s 在过去的二十年中，国际关系文献一直在试图了解维和行动（PKOs）发生的条件及其存在的效力。许多研究集中于维和行动与国内冲突中平民的关系，但对维和特派团质量的影响因素了解较少。如果维和行动有侵犯人权的行为，那么其他行动者如何在国内环境中阻止维和行动的剥削行为？我们认为，国际非政府组织（INGOs）对维和行动具有监督和社会化的作用。利用维和人员属性（PKAT）和跨国社会运动（TSMO）数据集，我们分析了 2007 年至 2013 年的维和任务。通过零膨胀负二项回归，我们发现一般国际非政府组织的存在会降低不当行为发生率，而人权国际非政府组织会降低不当行为发生率。然而，我们发现关注妇女权利的国际非政府组织的存在并不会降低维和部队中的不当性行为发生率。
{"title":"Spiral to Surveillance: The Effect of INGOs on Levels of Peacekeeper Misconduct","authors":"Morgan Barney, Kellan Borror","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae072","url":null,"abstract":"s Over the last twenty years, the international relations literature has sought to understand the conditions in which peacekeeping operations (PKOs) occur and the efficacy of their presence. Much work has focused on PKOs’ relationship to civilians in civil conflict, but less is understood about the influences on peacekeeping missions’ quality. If PKOs commit human rights abuses, how might other actors deter exploitive PKO behavior in the domestic context? We argue international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) provide a monitoring and socializing effect on PKOs. Using the Peacekeeper Attributes (PKAT) and Transnational Social Movements (TSMO) datasets, we analyze peacekeeping missions from 2007 to 2013. Through zero-inflated negative binomial regression, we found that the presence of general INGOs decreases rates of misconduct, and human rights INGOs decrease rates of misconduct. However, we find that the presence of women’s rights-focused INGOs does not decrease rates of sexual misconduct among PKO troops.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140819983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do insurgents resort to kidnapping in civil war? What explains variation in the selection and intensity of the tactic over time and space? Despite an increase in the use of kidnapping over time, existing research has yet to develop an explanation that explains spatiotemporal variation and extends beyond financial motivations. I argue the decision to kidnap hostages is shaped by insurgents’ behavioral interactions in the conflict environment. It occurs under two conditions: to generate support and reinstate bargaining capacity when organizations suffer military losses on the battlefield and to enforce loyalties and display strength when organizations face violent competition from other non-state actors. The observable implications of the theory are tested at the macro- and micro levels. At the macro-level, I conduct a quantitative cross-group analysis on over 200 organizations involved in an armed intrastate conflict (1989–2018). At the micro level, I consider the kidnapping strategy of the Taliban in Afghanistan over time and space (2010–2018). Taken together, the analyses provide robust support for the theory.
{"title":"Taking Civilians: Terrorist Kidnapping in Civil War","authors":"Blair Welsh","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae074","url":null,"abstract":"Why do insurgents resort to kidnapping in civil war? What explains variation in the selection and intensity of the tactic over time and space? Despite an increase in the use of kidnapping over time, existing research has yet to develop an explanation that explains spatiotemporal variation and extends beyond financial motivations. I argue the decision to kidnap hostages is shaped by insurgents’ behavioral interactions in the conflict environment. It occurs under two conditions: to generate support and reinstate bargaining capacity when organizations suffer military losses on the battlefield and to enforce loyalties and display strength when organizations face violent competition from other non-state actors. The observable implications of the theory are tested at the macro- and micro levels. At the macro-level, I conduct a quantitative cross-group analysis on over 200 organizations involved in an armed intrastate conflict (1989–2018). At the micro level, I consider the kidnapping strategy of the Taliban in Afghanistan over time and space (2010–2018). Taken together, the analyses provide robust support for the theory.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140819982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s A growing subset of peacekeeping literature focuses on explaining peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of civilians within postconflict protection. However, what happens after the abuse has received limited attention. Most of the time, peacekeepers do not receive any type of punishment following abuse allegations. What explains why peacekeepers are punished for abuse allegations? I argue that the presence of child victims increases the chances that peacekeepers are punished. Two mechanisms are highlighted through which the presence of child victims increases the chance of punishment: (i) the increased moral and legal obligation of UN member states to protect children and (ii) the increased shaming and media focus on child victims, which heightens public focus. The empirical analyses of UN and Troop-Contributing Country punishment actions between 2007 and 2017 provide robust support for the argument that the presence of child victims increases peacekeeper punishment. This research builds on studies of SEA, peacekeeping dynamics, and victimhood.
s 越来越多的维和文献侧重于解释维和人员在冲突后保护工作中对平民的性剥削和性虐待（SEA）。然而，虐待发生后的情况受到的关注有限。大多数情况下，维和人员在受到虐待指控后不会受到任何形式的惩罚。是什么原因导致维和人员因虐待指控而受到惩罚？我认为，儿童受害者的存在增加了维和人员受到惩罚的机会。我强调了儿童受害者的存在会增加惩罚机会的两个机制：(i) 联合国会员国保护儿童的道德和法律义务增加；(ii) 对儿童受害者的羞辱和媒体关注增加，从而提高了公众的关注度。对 2007 年至 2017 年期间联合国和部队派遣国惩罚行动的实证分析为儿童受害者的存在会增加维和人员惩罚的论点提供了有力支持。这项研究建立在对海难、维和动态和受害者身份的研究基础之上。
{"title":"Child Victims and the Punishment of UN Peacekeepers for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse","authors":"Audrey L Comstock","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae063","url":null,"abstract":"s A growing subset of peacekeeping literature focuses on explaining peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of civilians within postconflict protection. However, what happens after the abuse has received limited attention. Most of the time, peacekeepers do not receive any type of punishment following abuse allegations. What explains why peacekeepers are punished for abuse allegations? I argue that the presence of child victims increases the chances that peacekeepers are punished. Two mechanisms are highlighted through which the presence of child victims increases the chance of punishment: (i) the increased moral and legal obligation of UN member states to protect children and (ii) the increased shaming and media focus on child victims, which heightens public focus. The empirical analyses of UN and Troop-Contributing Country punishment actions between 2007 and 2017 provide robust support for the argument that the presence of child victims increases peacekeeper punishment. This research builds on studies of SEA, peacekeeping dynamics, and victimhood.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140808571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
State-building by external actors can be understood as a practice of intervention in post-conflict spaces characterized by convergences and contestations between different actors striving for power and legitimacy. Informal non-state (armed) groups and clientele networks profit from the contingencies during transition and “capture” emerging formal state institutions to secure private gains and public positions. Order in this newly formed state is established through a dynamic process involving both external actors and domestic power networks. Most of the literature on intervention either focuses on top-down effects of external actors or resistance by local actors, thus falling short of describing the timeless ties of post-war networks and individuals in their day-to-day interaction patterns. How can we then understand the interaction and collusion between post-conflict power networks and external “statebuilders”? We use Bourdieu’s concept of the field to examine the local spaces of interventions and argue that interventions are social and relational practices characterized by day-to-day routines and overlapping, yet co-existing modes of formal and informal interactions. Empirically, we rely on qualitative social network analysis and interviews to visibilize these social practices and collusion between external actors and power networks in Kosovo and its impact on “state-building” efforts by the international community.
{"title":"Transient States and Timeless Ties: (In)Formality, Power Networks, and the EU Mission in Kosovo","authors":"Siddharth Tripathi, Solveig Richter","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae055","url":null,"abstract":"State-building by external actors can be understood as a practice of intervention in post-conflict spaces characterized by convergences and contestations between different actors striving for power and legitimacy. Informal non-state (armed) groups and clientele networks profit from the contingencies during transition and “capture” emerging formal state institutions to secure private gains and public positions. Order in this newly formed state is established through a dynamic process involving both external actors and domestic power networks. Most of the literature on intervention either focuses on top-down effects of external actors or resistance by local actors, thus falling short of describing the timeless ties of post-war networks and individuals in their day-to-day interaction patterns. How can we then understand the interaction and collusion between post-conflict power networks and external “statebuilders”? We use Bourdieu’s concept of the field to examine the local spaces of interventions and argue that interventions are social and relational practices characterized by day-to-day routines and overlapping, yet co-existing modes of formal and informal interactions. Empirically, we rely on qualitative social network analysis and interviews to visibilize these social practices and collusion between external actors and power networks in Kosovo and its impact on “state-building” efforts by the international community.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140642995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does a leader’s childhood exposure to war influence their propensity to initiate conflicts? While much research explains leaders’ national security policies using their combat and rebel experiences, few scholars have examined the effects of childhood wartime violence. I develop and test two competing arguments about the effects of childhood war trauma on future conflict behavior. One argument expects that leaders exposed to war at a young age will be less likely to initiate conflict because they fear its consequences. An alternative perspective expects that these leaders are more likely to initiate conflict out of anger and a desire for revenge. I test my hypotheses using an original dataset and a research design that reduces inference barriers. Leveraging variations in the level of violence experienced during wartime, I only compare leaders who were exposed to foreign military invasions as children. I find that those who experienced severe war trauma, such as family deaths, injuries, or displacement, are less likely to initiate interstate conflicts than those who did not experience such traumatic events. These effects are substantial, particularly when political constraints are weak. My results suggest that childhood war trauma has a long-term impact on leaders’ conservatism about using force.
{"title":"Fear or Anger? Leaders’ Childhood War Trauma and Interstate Conflict Initiation","authors":"James D Kim","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae069","url":null,"abstract":"How does a leader’s childhood exposure to war influence their propensity to initiate conflicts? While much research explains leaders’ national security policies using their combat and rebel experiences, few scholars have examined the effects of childhood wartime violence. I develop and test two competing arguments about the effects of childhood war trauma on future conflict behavior. One argument expects that leaders exposed to war at a young age will be less likely to initiate conflict because they fear its consequences. An alternative perspective expects that these leaders are more likely to initiate conflict out of anger and a desire for revenge. I test my hypotheses using an original dataset and a research design that reduces inference barriers. Leveraging variations in the level of violence experienced during wartime, I only compare leaders who were exposed to foreign military invasions as children. I find that those who experienced severe war trauma, such as family deaths, injuries, or displacement, are less likely to initiate interstate conflicts than those who did not experience such traumatic events. These effects are substantial, particularly when political constraints are weak. My results suggest that childhood war trauma has a long-term impact on leaders’ conservatism about using force.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140637759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Foreign military personnel routinely participate in educational and cultural programs administered by the U.S. military. In addition to bolstering the capacity of the recipient military, one of the primary goals of these programs is to professionalize the military of the recipient state. It is hoped not only that the soldiers will internalize norms of human rights and democracy themselves but also that they will become influential members of the military in the future. Existing cross-national research, along with selective anecdotes of U.S.-trained soldiers leading coups and rebellions, suggests that military aid may be ineffective. To date, however, a nuanced understanding of the more granular effects of military aid on the recipient country has been hindered by a lack of data and a focus on the macro-level. We address this lacuna by examining norm transmission among a sample of the Hungarian officer corps. We show that while soldiers who graduated from IMET programs display more favorability toward human rights and democracy, they do not believe the military should remain insulated from policymaking. We believe this is a valuable step toward a deeper understanding of how U.S. military aid shapes recipient militaries and, more broadly, how norms are transmitted between allies.
s 外籍军事人员经常参加由美军管理的教育和文化项目。除了加强受援国军队的能力外，这些项目的主要目标之一是使受援国军队专业化。人们不仅希望这些士兵能将人权和民主准则内化于心，还希望他们将来能成为军队中具有影响力的成员。现有的跨国研究以及美国训练的士兵领导政变和叛乱的一些轶事表明，军事援助可能是无效的。然而，迄今为止，由于缺乏数据和只关注宏观层面，对军事援助对受援国更细微影响的细致了解一直受到阻碍。我们通过研究匈牙利军官团样本中的规范传播，弥补了这一空白。我们的研究表明，虽然从 IMET 项目毕业的士兵对人权和民主表现出更多的好感，但他们并不认为军队应该与政策制定保持隔绝。我们认为，这是深入了解美国军事援助如何塑造受援国军队，以及更广泛地说，规范如何在盟国之间传播的重要一步。
{"title":"Foreign Military Training and Socialization: An Examination of Human Capital and Norm Transmission Between Allies","authors":"Sándor Fábián, Andrew Boutton","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae040","url":null,"abstract":"s Foreign military personnel routinely participate in educational and cultural programs administered by the U.S. military. In addition to bolstering the capacity of the recipient military, one of the primary goals of these programs is to professionalize the military of the recipient state. It is hoped not only that the soldiers will internalize norms of human rights and democracy themselves but also that they will become influential members of the military in the future. Existing cross-national research, along with selective anecdotes of U.S.-trained soldiers leading coups and rebellions, suggests that military aid may be ineffective. To date, however, a nuanced understanding of the more granular effects of military aid on the recipient country has been hindered by a lack of data and a focus on the macro-level. We address this lacuna by examining norm transmission among a sample of the Hungarian officer corps. We show that while soldiers who graduated from IMET programs display more favorability toward human rights and democracy, they do not believe the military should remain insulated from policymaking. We believe this is a valuable step toward a deeper understanding of how U.S. military aid shapes recipient militaries and, more broadly, how norms are transmitted between allies.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140637758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s While the shadow economy seems to have both positive and negative effects on a country’s macroeconomy, almost all governments have attempted to control the shadow economy to prevent the loss of tax revenues and the attendant impact on the government budget. Even though official development assistance (ODA) has no formal link with the shadow economy, we often observe a relationship between the two in recipient countries. We argue that ODA can increase the size of the shadow economy in recipient countries through both government and individual-level flows of ODA to the shadow economy. We analyzed data on the shadow economies of 107 ODA recipients from 1990 to 2018 using both fixed effect and Driscoll–Kraay estimators. The results show that recipients receiving a higher volume of ODA are more likely to have a larger shadow economy. Moreover, the relationship between ODA and the shadow economy is stronger in more corrupt recipients. We dealt with endogeneity issues using the generalized method of moments, which supported our findings.
{"title":"The Shadow of Official Development Assistance: ODA, Corruption, and the Shadow Economy in Recipients","authors":"Chungshik Moon, Youngwan Kim, Da Sul Kim","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae070","url":null,"abstract":"s While the shadow economy seems to have both positive and negative effects on a country’s macroeconomy, almost all governments have attempted to control the shadow economy to prevent the loss of tax revenues and the attendant impact on the government budget. Even though official development assistance (ODA) has no formal link with the shadow economy, we often observe a relationship between the two in recipient countries. We argue that ODA can increase the size of the shadow economy in recipient countries through both government and individual-level flows of ODA to the shadow economy. We analyzed data on the shadow economies of 107 ODA recipients from 1990 to 2018 using both fixed effect and Driscoll–Kraay estimators. The results show that recipients receiving a higher volume of ODA are more likely to have a larger shadow economy. Moreover, the relationship between ODA and the shadow economy is stronger in more corrupt recipients. We dealt with endogeneity issues using the generalized method of moments, which supported our findings.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article offers an ethnographic account of ongoing border conflicts in south Lebanon between members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and residents in a south Lebanese border village. It emphasizes the specific experiences of this border population with foreign intervention and land expropriations. It places UNIFIL’s current intervention in a long history of Western imperialism in the region. It underlines how UNIFIL weakens the Lebanese state by taking over the sovereign functions a state typically performs. It examines current border contestations in a context of Israeli settler colonialism and its long-term role in shaping the livelihoods in south Lebanese border villages. It argues for the importance of understanding border conflicts and the work of international interventions in their specific local and historical contexts.
{"title":"UNIFIL’s “Blue Line” Demarcation: Spatial Ordering, Political Subjectivity, and Settler Colonialism in South Lebanese Borderlands","authors":"Susann Kassem","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae051","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers an ethnographic account of ongoing border conflicts in south Lebanon between members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and residents in a south Lebanese border village. It emphasizes the specific experiences of this border population with foreign intervention and land expropriations. It places UNIFIL’s current intervention in a long history of Western imperialism in the region. It underlines how UNIFIL weakens the Lebanese state by taking over the sovereign functions a state typically performs. It examines current border contestations in a context of Israeli settler colonialism and its long-term role in shaping the livelihoods in south Lebanese border villages. It argues for the importance of understanding border conflicts and the work of international interventions in their specific local and historical contexts.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rebel groups often develop governance during war by establishing administrative structures, engaging in taxation, and providing social services to the local population. Rebel governance structures, however, vary depending on the extent to which they include participatory arrangements. Some rebel groups allow civilian participation in their governance during the war, while others have highly hierarchical structures strictly limiting civilian participation. This paper examines whether and how the governance activities of rebel groups and participatory arrangements and institutions that they adopt during the war affect the durability of peace. I argue that participatory rebel governance can be particularly effective in establishing durable peace after the war. Civilian participation under rebel governance facilitates civilian political participation after conflict ends, which, in turn, discourages the use of political violence in response to grievances. Using rebel governance data between 1945 and 2012, I find strong empirical support for my argument. I then demonstrate the plausibility of the causal mechanism in the case of Indonesian and the Philippine civil wars. By establishing a strong positive empirical relationship between rebel wartime governance and the durability of peace, this paper identifies another important effect of rebel governance on conflict processes and outcomes in addition to its demonstrated effect on negotiations between warring parties and post-war democratization.
{"title":"Participatory Rebel Governance and Durability of Peace","authors":"Hyunjung Park","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae061","url":null,"abstract":"Rebel groups often develop governance during war by establishing administrative structures, engaging in taxation, and providing social services to the local population. Rebel governance structures, however, vary depending on the extent to which they include participatory arrangements. Some rebel groups allow civilian participation in their governance during the war, while others have highly hierarchical structures strictly limiting civilian participation. This paper examines whether and how the governance activities of rebel groups and participatory arrangements and institutions that they adopt during the war affect the durability of peace. I argue that participatory rebel governance can be particularly effective in establishing durable peace after the war. Civilian participation under rebel governance facilitates civilian political participation after conflict ends, which, in turn, discourages the use of political violence in response to grievances. Using rebel governance data between 1945 and 2012, I find strong empirical support for my argument. I then demonstrate the plausibility of the causal mechanism in the case of Indonesian and the Philippine civil wars. By establishing a strong positive empirical relationship between rebel wartime governance and the durability of peace, this paper identifies another important effect of rebel governance on conflict processes and outcomes in addition to its demonstrated effect on negotiations between warring parties and post-war democratization.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140608164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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