Initiatives by agents in a favorable contingency can reshuffle transnational areas of practice and show how fields shape communities of practice (CoPs). The article examines how CoPs emerge and develop and why this happens in some areas and not others. It also explores whether CoPs should be situated within conflictual theories of the international, like field theory. The article argues that CoPs emerge through four stages, whereby (i) the initiative that resourceful agents take at the critical juncture of different fields of practice is followed by (ii) a power reshuffle in the fields concerned due to other organizations recognizing what those agents can offer. The result is (iii) the selective consolidation of common practices only in those fields where organizations engage in collective learning and share the same taken-for-granted. Upon meeting these conditions, (iv) the CoP can resist the competition from other organizations in its field and endure. Empirically, the article examines the case of a CoP that emerged in Dubai from the world’s largest humanitarian free zone and as part of the field of humanitarian logistics. Ultimately, CoPs are an ordering principle of international relations that does not contradict—but exists within—the tenets of field theory.
{"title":"From Conflict to Communities: Fields’ Reshuffles and the Emergence of Communities of Practice in Humanitarian Logistics","authors":"Seila Panizzolo","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf009","url":null,"abstract":"Initiatives by agents in a favorable contingency can reshuffle transnational areas of practice and show how fields shape communities of practice (CoPs). The article examines how CoPs emerge and develop and why this happens in some areas and not others. It also explores whether CoPs should be situated within conflictual theories of the international, like field theory. The article argues that CoPs emerge through four stages, whereby (i) the initiative that resourceful agents take at the critical juncture of different fields of practice is followed by (ii) a power reshuffle in the fields concerned due to other organizations recognizing what those agents can offer. The result is (iii) the selective consolidation of common practices only in those fields where organizations engage in collective learning and share the same taken-for-granted. Upon meeting these conditions, (iv) the CoP can resist the competition from other organizations in its field and endure. Empirically, the article examines the case of a CoP that emerged in Dubai from the world’s largest humanitarian free zone and as part of the field of humanitarian logistics. Ultimately, CoPs are an ordering principle of international relations that does not contradict—but exists within—the tenets of field theory.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143546348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s The Russian invasion of Ukraine has escalated geopolitical rivalry and debate about the demise of the liberal international order and the changing distribution of power within the international system. Peacekeeping has been a key component of the liberal international order at least since the end of the Cold War, if not before. Peacekeeping boomed in the era of US unipolarity, with twenty new United Nations (UN) operations alone launched between 1989 and 1994. At the time of writing, c. 60,000 blue helmets are deployed around the world, and a peacekeeping operation is being mooted for postwar Gaza. Given the growing geopolitical rivalry between East and West, a relative erosion of US power, and much talk of a new age of multipolarity, where does this leave peace operations and peacekeeping? This paper explores the impact of different distributions of power in the international system (namely, multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity) on peace operations. The paper goes through relevant military interventions beginning with the post-1815 Congress system and reaching up to the present day. The paper shows that a multipolar distribution of power is most propitious for the global deployment of peacekeepers, and suggests that peace operations may in future express international cooperation more than unipolar power.
{"title":"“Peacekeeping Proneness”: Which Type of International System Is Most Likely to Enhance the Supply of Peacekeepers?","authors":"Philip Cunliffe","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae151","url":null,"abstract":"s The Russian invasion of Ukraine has escalated geopolitical rivalry and debate about the demise of the liberal international order and the changing distribution of power within the international system. Peacekeeping has been a key component of the liberal international order at least since the end of the Cold War, if not before. Peacekeeping boomed in the era of US unipolarity, with twenty new United Nations (UN) operations alone launched between 1989 and 1994. At the time of writing, c. 60,000 blue helmets are deployed around the world, and a peacekeeping operation is being mooted for postwar Gaza. Given the growing geopolitical rivalry between East and West, a relative erosion of US power, and much talk of a new age of multipolarity, where does this leave peace operations and peacekeeping? This paper explores the impact of different distributions of power in the international system (namely, multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity) on peace operations. The paper goes through relevant military interventions beginning with the post-1815 Congress system and reaching up to the present day. The paper shows that a multipolar distribution of power is most propitious for the global deployment of peacekeepers, and suggests that peace operations may in future express international cooperation more than unipolar power.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"549 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143083694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J P Singh, Amarda Shehu, Manpriya Dua, Caroline Wesson
How do countries narrate their values and priorities in artificial intelligence infrastructures in comparative national and global contexts? This paper analyzes the policies governing national and regional artificial intelligence infrastructures to advance an understanding of “entangled narratives” in global affairs. It does so by utilizing artificial intelligence techniques that assist with generalizability and model building without sacrificing granularity. In particular, the machine learning and natural language processing big data models used alongside some process-tracing demonstrate the ways artificial intelligence infrastructural plans diverge, cluster, and transform along several topical dimensions in comparative contexts. The paper's entangled narrative approach adds to international relations (IR) theorizing about infrastructural narratives and technological diffusion. We provide patterned and granular results at various levels, which challenge and refine existing theories that attribute differences in infrastructures and technological adoption to geopolitical competition and imitation, top-down or linear international diffusion effects, and differences in political systems.
{"title":"Entangled Narratives: Insights from Social and Computer Sciences on National Artificial Intelligence Infrastructures","authors":"J P Singh, Amarda Shehu, Manpriya Dua, Caroline Wesson","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqaf001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf001","url":null,"abstract":"How do countries narrate their values and priorities in artificial intelligence infrastructures in comparative national and global contexts? This paper analyzes the policies governing national and regional artificial intelligence infrastructures to advance an understanding of “entangled narratives” in global affairs. It does so by utilizing artificial intelligence techniques that assist with generalizability and model building without sacrificing granularity. In particular, the machine learning and natural language processing big data models used alongside some process-tracing demonstrate the ways artificial intelligence infrastructural plans diverge, cluster, and transform along several topical dimensions in comparative contexts. The paper's entangled narrative approach adds to international relations (IR) theorizing about infrastructural narratives and technological diffusion. We provide patterned and granular results at various levels, which challenge and refine existing theories that attribute differences in infrastructures and technological adoption to geopolitical competition and imitation, top-down or linear international diffusion effects, and differences in political systems.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143077486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alice Iannantuoni, Simone Dietrich, Bernhard Reinsberg
The study of international organizations’ (IOs) peer review systems has focused largely on their efficacy in disseminating best practices, with mixed results. This paper informs the debate from a new angle: We evaluate the extent to which decisions about who reviews whom and where result from bureaucratic guidelines, or whether these decisions are shaped by the particularistic interests of member states that would need to be considered in efficacy evaluations of peer reviews. Our empirical case is the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) which requires that DAC donors have their practices reviewed by two peer examiners every few years. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, we study (i) the assignment of peer examiners (1962–2020) and (ii) the selection of recipient countries visited for in-depth assessment during the review (1994–2020). Our analyses show that the choice of peer examiners is driven by the IO’s bureaucratic process. The selection of recipient countries for field visits is also largely in line with Secretariat guidelines, with some room for the preferences of reviewed donors to play a role.
{"title":"Who Reviews Whom, Where, and Why? Evidence from the Peer Review Process of the OECD Development Assistance Committee","authors":"Alice Iannantuoni, Simone Dietrich, Bernhard Reinsberg","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae138","url":null,"abstract":"The study of international organizations’ (IOs) peer review systems has focused largely on their efficacy in disseminating best practices, with mixed results. This paper informs the debate from a new angle: We evaluate the extent to which decisions about who reviews whom and where result from bureaucratic guidelines, or whether these decisions are shaped by the particularistic interests of member states that would need to be considered in efficacy evaluations of peer reviews. Our empirical case is the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) which requires that DAC donors have their practices reviewed by two peer examiners every few years. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, we study (i) the assignment of peer examiners (1962–2020) and (ii) the selection of recipient countries visited for in-depth assessment during the review (1994–2020). Our analyses show that the choice of peer examiners is driven by the IO’s bureaucratic process. The selection of recipient countries for field visits is also largely in line with Secretariat guidelines, with some room for the preferences of reviewed donors to play a role.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142974723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s While states are not human beings, they are institutionalized social groups. It is humans who constitute and run them. Consequently, it is argued that countries can be interviewed. This claim is based on in-depth interviews with seventy Israeli and British officials, which “captured” states’ anxiety. In ontological security studies, countries’ anxieties are typically inferred from historical and narrative analysis. The article lays another path to establish that states are anxious. Despite the increasing acknowledgement of the “emotional turn” in international relations, there is a notable lack of methodological focus on how emotions impact statecraft. This study bridges the gap by showing how interviewing can investigate the internal lives of states. The research also addresses critiques of ontological security studies, namely the challenge of applying an individual-level concept to state behavior and empirically validating its relevance in statecraft. It traced how officials’ anxiety about their country’s policies “scales up” to the state level. The rich evidence—coming from country officials themselves—affirmed ontological security’s capacity to explain state behavior and underscored the importance of integrating political psychology into international relations research. Moreover, it is the first study to use elite interviews to investigate whether countries experience ontological insecurity.
{"title":"Can States Be Interviewed?","authors":"Tadek Markiewicz","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae153","url":null,"abstract":"s While states are not human beings, they are institutionalized social groups. It is humans who constitute and run them. Consequently, it is argued that countries can be interviewed. This claim is based on in-depth interviews with seventy Israeli and British officials, which “captured” states’ anxiety. In ontological security studies, countries’ anxieties are typically inferred from historical and narrative analysis. The article lays another path to establish that states are anxious. Despite the increasing acknowledgement of the “emotional turn” in international relations, there is a notable lack of methodological focus on how emotions impact statecraft. This study bridges the gap by showing how interviewing can investigate the internal lives of states. The research also addresses critiques of ontological security studies, namely the challenge of applying an individual-level concept to state behavior and empirically validating its relevance in statecraft. It traced how officials’ anxiety about their country’s policies “scales up” to the state level. The rich evidence—coming from country officials themselves—affirmed ontological security’s capacity to explain state behavior and underscored the importance of integrating political psychology into international relations research. Moreover, it is the first study to use elite interviews to investigate whether countries experience ontological insecurity.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"393 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142924994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s The number of preferential trade agreements signed among non-democratic states (autocratic PTAs) has grown significantly over the last decades. Trade policy scholarship remains silent on the institutional design of these autocratic economic arrangements. In this paper, we explore the core institutional characteristic of autocratic PTAs—their depth. It has been shown that many North–South and, increasingly, South–South PTAs tend to be deep, yet the depth of PTAs comprised of autocratic members remains puzzling, as government elites are faced with competing pressures for economic integration and political survival. We argue that autocratic PTAs tend to have considerable depth when it comes to the coverage of certain trade-plus issues, such as investment and trade-in services, due to the desire of government elites to attract trade and investment and enhance the ruling regime's legitimacy and political survival. However, dispute settlement provisions that could breach domestic political autonomy are carefully eschewed. We also expect to see higher levels of agreement flexibility in deep autocratic PTAs, reflecting autocrats’ dual interests in economic openness and political control. We test these expectations using data from the Design of Trade Agreements Database and we carry out interviews with trade officials to clarify the mechanisms at work.
{"title":"The Design of Autocratic Trade Agreements: Economic Integration and Political Survival","authors":"Evgeny Postnikov, Jonas Gamso","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae152","url":null,"abstract":"s The number of preferential trade agreements signed among non-democratic states (autocratic PTAs) has grown significantly over the last decades. Trade policy scholarship remains silent on the institutional design of these autocratic economic arrangements. In this paper, we explore the core institutional characteristic of autocratic PTAs—their depth. It has been shown that many North–South and, increasingly, South–South PTAs tend to be deep, yet the depth of PTAs comprised of autocratic members remains puzzling, as government elites are faced with competing pressures for economic integration and political survival. We argue that autocratic PTAs tend to have considerable depth when it comes to the coverage of certain trade-plus issues, such as investment and trade-in services, due to the desire of government elites to attract trade and investment and enhance the ruling regime's legitimacy and political survival. However, dispute settlement provisions that could breach domestic political autonomy are carefully eschewed. We also expect to see higher levels of agreement flexibility in deep autocratic PTAs, reflecting autocrats’ dual interests in economic openness and political control. We test these expectations using data from the Design of Trade Agreements Database and we carry out interviews with trade officials to clarify the mechanisms at work.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142887390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s International human rights institutions impose obligations on their member states that extend long past the ratification stage. Each year, states receive tens, or even hundreds, of recommendations from international human rights bodies. These recommendations demand that states change their human rights policies and practices. While recent scholarship has emphasized the important role of domestic institutions and civil society actors in facilitating compliance with these recommendations, comparatively little research examines how the quality of the recommendations themselves affects compliance outcomes. Using two novel datasets, this paper sets out to understand the nexus between recommendation quality and compliance. Our research suggests that highly precise recommendations move the needle away from inaction on international human rights institutions’ rulings and recommendations but make full compliance more difficult. This paper advances the existing literature on the dynamics of compliance and places some of the responsibility for compliance on the international human rights institutions themselves.
{"title":"Moving the Needle: Recommendation Precision and Compliance with Women’s Rights Recommendations","authors":"Jillienne Haglund, Courtney Hillebrecht","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae155","url":null,"abstract":"s International human rights institutions impose obligations on their member states that extend long past the ratification stage. Each year, states receive tens, or even hundreds, of recommendations from international human rights bodies. These recommendations demand that states change their human rights policies and practices. While recent scholarship has emphasized the important role of domestic institutions and civil society actors in facilitating compliance with these recommendations, comparatively little research examines how the quality of the recommendations themselves affects compliance outcomes. Using two novel datasets, this paper sets out to understand the nexus between recommendation quality and compliance. Our research suggests that highly precise recommendations move the needle away from inaction on international human rights institutions’ rulings and recommendations but make full compliance more difficult. This paper advances the existing literature on the dynamics of compliance and places some of the responsibility for compliance on the international human rights institutions themselves.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"164 9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142887388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does public opinion on international affairs affect elites’ policy preferences? Most research assumes that it does, but this key assumption is difficult to test empirically given limited research access to elite decision-makers. We examine elite responsiveness to public opinion on sanctioning Russia during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. We fielded a preregistered experiment within the 2022 TRIP survey of US foreign policy practitioners, offering a rare opportunity for a fairly large elite survey experiment ($N = 253$). We used contemporary public polling highly supportive of increasing sanctions as an information treatment. Our research design, involving a salient issue and real-world treatment, substantially expands on previous work. Exposure to the treatment raises elite support for increasing sanctions from 68.0 percent to 76.3 percent (+8.3 pp.). While meaningful, this effect is smaller than those identified elsewhere. We argue that this difference is driven by pretreatment dynamics related to issue salience and ceiling effects and is therefore all the more notable. We provide evidence for substantial treatment effect heterogeneity depending on subject-matter expertise, degree of involvement in political decision-making, and gender, but not party identification. While our results support previous research, they highlight issues of external validity and the context-dependence of elite responsiveness.
{"title":"Does Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Affect Elite Preferences? Evidence from the 2022 US Sanctions against Russia","authors":"Anton Peez, Felix S Bethke","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae145","url":null,"abstract":"Does public opinion on international affairs affect elites’ policy preferences? Most research assumes that it does, but this key assumption is difficult to test empirically given limited research access to elite decision-makers. We examine elite responsiveness to public opinion on sanctioning Russia during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. We fielded a preregistered experiment within the 2022 TRIP survey of US foreign policy practitioners, offering a rare opportunity for a fairly large elite survey experiment ($N = 253$). We used contemporary public polling highly supportive of increasing sanctions as an information treatment. Our research design, involving a salient issue and real-world treatment, substantially expands on previous work. Exposure to the treatment raises elite support for increasing sanctions from 68.0 percent to 76.3 percent (+8.3 pp.). While meaningful, this effect is smaller than those identified elsewhere. We argue that this difference is driven by pretreatment dynamics related to issue salience and ceiling effects and is therefore all the more notable. We provide evidence for substantial treatment effect heterogeneity depending on subject-matter expertise, degree of involvement in political decision-making, and gender, but not party identification. While our results support previous research, they highlight issues of external validity and the context-dependence of elite responsiveness.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pablo M Pinto, Stephanie J Rickard, James Raymond Vreeland
Does the intervention of an international organization in domestic politics render policy change more popular? While voters may ultimately care only about policy outcomes, the involvement of international actors often seems to lead to resentment. Still, citizens may have greater faith in the wisdom of international actors than in their own government. As others have argued, a well-respected international actor might provide a cue, especially for voters considering controversial policies like spending cuts. We test this argument in a novel pre–post experimental panel study conducted in Spain. We find that citizens become less opposed to unpopular spending cuts when informed that they are required by an international institution. The effects differ, however, across the two organizations that we test: They are stronger for the European Union than for the International Monetary Fund. Our findings lend support to studies arguing that the endorsement of specific international organizations can help push through otherwise unpopular policies.
{"title":"The Effect of International Actors on Public Support for Government Spending Decisions","authors":"Pablo M Pinto, Stephanie J Rickard, James Raymond Vreeland","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae150","url":null,"abstract":"Does the intervention of an international organization in domestic politics render policy change more popular? While voters may ultimately care only about policy outcomes, the involvement of international actors often seems to lead to resentment. Still, citizens may have greater faith in the wisdom of international actors than in their own government. As others have argued, a well-respected international actor might provide a cue, especially for voters considering controversial policies like spending cuts. We test this argument in a novel pre–post experimental panel study conducted in Spain. We find that citizens become less opposed to unpopular spending cuts when informed that they are required by an international institution. The effects differ, however, across the two organizations that we test: They are stronger for the European Union than for the International Monetary Fund. Our findings lend support to studies arguing that the endorsement of specific international organizations can help push through otherwise unpopular policies.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142841971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin Daßler, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Martijn Huysmans
Materially powerful states tend to dominate both the creation of international organizations (IOs) as well as subsequent IO policymaking. Materially weak states are nevertheless expected to participate in IOs since it is generally assumed that they will still profit from cooperation and prefer power to be exercised through institutions. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how exactly institutional rules protect weak states from the powerful in IOs. This paper develops a theory of institutional design that specifies the institutional power equilibrium at the heart of IOs’ constitutional treaties. Through the inclusion of veto or exit rights, weak states obtain formal safeguards against exploitation by the powerful during an IO’s operation. This expectation of a power equilibrium in IOs’ design is borne out in design patterns within the constitutional treaties of IOs created between 1945 and 2005. Our results indicate that the distribution of power among an IO’s founding members indeed affects the inclusion of institutional safeguards in their constitutional treaties and that veto and exit rights are functional substitutes in this regard. Our findings matter since the institutional power equilibrium at IO creation has important implications for relations between the materially powerful and the weak during IO operations.
{"title":"Insuring the Weak: The Institutional Power Equilibrium in International Organizations","authors":"Benjamin Daßler, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Martijn Huysmans","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae146","url":null,"abstract":"Materially powerful states tend to dominate both the creation of international organizations (IOs) as well as subsequent IO policymaking. Materially weak states are nevertheless expected to participate in IOs since it is generally assumed that they will still profit from cooperation and prefer power to be exercised through institutions. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how exactly institutional rules protect weak states from the powerful in IOs. This paper develops a theory of institutional design that specifies the institutional power equilibrium at the heart of IOs’ constitutional treaties. Through the inclusion of veto or exit rights, weak states obtain formal safeguards against exploitation by the powerful during an IO’s operation. This expectation of a power equilibrium in IOs’ design is borne out in design patterns within the constitutional treaties of IOs created between 1945 and 2005. Our results indicate that the distribution of power among an IO’s founding members indeed affects the inclusion of institutional safeguards in their constitutional treaties and that veto and exit rights are functional substitutes in this regard. Our findings matter since the institutional power equilibrium at IO creation has important implications for relations between the materially powerful and the weak during IO operations.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142810083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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