Luis L Schenoni, Gary Goertz, Andrew P Owsiak, Paul F Diehl
s After the Napoleonic Wars interstate war regularly occurred throughout the Western Hemisphere—until in matter of decades it disappeared. After the 1930s even low-level militarized interstate conflict became less frequent, shorter, and less severe over time. What explains the change in this specific region and historical jucture? We argue that leaders in the Americas identified territorial disputes and foreign intervention as interrelated problems that frequently caused the interstate war. In response, they developed a unique regional norm-complex that bundled together the norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention with the principle of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm complex emerged via Latin American entrepreneurship shortly after independence, cascaded with Pan-Americanism, and crystallized around the signature of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty in the early 1930s. We explain how, why, and when norm complexes develop. We then investigate the evolution and effects of the Latin American norm complex via statistics and within-case counterfactuals. We conclude that interstate war disappeared from the Americas with the acceptance and codification of this norm-complex.
{"title":"The Saavedra Lamas Peace: How a Norm Complex Evolved and Crystallized to Eliminate War in the Americas","authors":"Luis L Schenoni, Gary Goertz, Andrew P Owsiak, Paul F Diehl","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae047","url":null,"abstract":"s After the Napoleonic Wars interstate war regularly occurred throughout the Western Hemisphere—until in matter of decades it disappeared. After the 1930s even low-level militarized interstate conflict became less frequent, shorter, and less severe over time. What explains the change in this specific region and historical jucture? We argue that leaders in the Americas identified territorial disputes and foreign intervention as interrelated problems that frequently caused the interstate war. In response, they developed a unique regional norm-complex that bundled together the norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention with the principle of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm complex emerged via Latin American entrepreneurship shortly after independence, cascaded with Pan-Americanism, and crystallized around the signature of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty in the early 1930s. We explain how, why, and when norm complexes develop. We then investigate the evolution and effects of the Latin American norm complex via statistics and within-case counterfactuals. We conclude that interstate war disappeared from the Americas with the acceptance and codification of this norm-complex.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140545533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
European Union (EU) diplomatic representation in third countries is performed by both the Member States and by the EU Delegation. This hybrid system of representation functions through EU coordination. As social media have become important channels of state representation, coordination also takes place in the domain of digital diplomacy. This article analyzes how the EU Member State embassies and the EU Delegation coordinate EU representation through online and offline interactions. It investigates the practices of coordination and maps routines of digital sociability. The United States’ capital Washington, DC provides a context of both strong bilateral relations and a history of shared EU interests. The study draws on observations on Twitter (later renamed X) between 2019 and 2021 and reflections from diplomats who engage in the coordination of EU representation, collected through an online survey and interviews. By examining the reciprocity between online and offline interactions, the study illuminates how relationships are cultivated, a sense of collective belonging is fostered, and social order is negotiated. The findings enhance our understanding of how digital diplomacy is deeply embedded within diplomatic contexts and their distinctive practices. They contribute to advancing knowledge about the interplay of digital diplomacy, multilateral representation, and the dynamics that shape diplomatic engagements.
{"title":"Diplomatic Representation and Online/Offline Interactions: EU Coordination and Digital Sociability","authors":"Elsa Hedling","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae022","url":null,"abstract":"European Union (EU) diplomatic representation in third countries is performed by both the Member States and by the EU Delegation. This hybrid system of representation functions through EU coordination. As social media have become important channels of state representation, coordination also takes place in the domain of digital diplomacy. This article analyzes how the EU Member State embassies and the EU Delegation coordinate EU representation through online and offline interactions. It investigates the practices of coordination and maps routines of digital sociability. The United States’ capital Washington, DC provides a context of both strong bilateral relations and a history of shared EU interests. The study draws on observations on Twitter (later renamed X) between 2019 and 2021 and reflections from diplomats who engage in the coordination of EU representation, collected through an online survey and interviews. By examining the reciprocity between online and offline interactions, the study illuminates how relationships are cultivated, a sense of collective belonging is fostered, and social order is negotiated. The findings enhance our understanding of how digital diplomacy is deeply embedded within diplomatic contexts and their distinctive practices. They contribute to advancing knowledge about the interplay of digital diplomacy, multilateral representation, and the dynamics that shape diplomatic engagements.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140542098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Declaration of positionality and the confession of privilege as a way of revealing unequal power dynamics in knowledge production has become an increasingly encouraged reflexive practice in international relations and other disciplines. However, we interrogate the potentially negative implications of this methodology, occurring through a reification of material, assumed, and imagined hierarchies between people, which then is advertised and (re)produced by its utterance. We further query the modernist origins of reflexive methodology, which has inspired the practice of declaring positionality, and argue that its underpinning coloniality has bearings for its use today. We then explore how this coloniality manifests: Thus, first, we consider the extent to which publicly acknowledging privilege paradoxically acts as a means of centering whiteness through the narcissistic gaze and an assertion of legitimacy. Second, we argue positionality statements offer a redemption of guilt for the hegemonic researcher. And lastly, rather than ameliorating unequal power dynamics in the production of knowledge, we contend positionality statements may constitute hidden power moves in which one is able to signal and reinstate one’s authority vis-à-vis people, but especially women, of color. We end with a call for a reparative scholarship that acknowledges these limitations in positionality statements.
{"title":"Positionality Statements as a Function of Coloniality: Interrogating Reflexive Methodologies","authors":"Jasmine K Gani, Rabea M Khan","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae038","url":null,"abstract":"s Declaration of positionality and the confession of privilege as a way of revealing unequal power dynamics in knowledge production has become an increasingly encouraged reflexive practice in international relations and other disciplines. However, we interrogate the potentially negative implications of this methodology, occurring through a reification of material, assumed, and imagined hierarchies between people, which then is advertised and (re)produced by its utterance. We further query the modernist origins of reflexive methodology, which has inspired the practice of declaring positionality, and argue that its underpinning coloniality has bearings for its use today. We then explore how this coloniality manifests: Thus, first, we consider the extent to which publicly acknowledging privilege paradoxically acts as a means of centering whiteness through the narcissistic gaze and an assertion of legitimacy. Second, we argue positionality statements offer a redemption of guilt for the hegemonic researcher. And lastly, rather than ameliorating unequal power dynamics in the production of knowledge, we contend positionality statements may constitute hidden power moves in which one is able to signal and reinstate one’s authority vis-à-vis people, but especially women, of color. We end with a call for a reparative scholarship that acknowledges these limitations in positionality statements.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140542163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Through a close textual analysis of US diplomatic cables and other relevant documents, this article provides new empirical data to trace the mutual construction of Mali as a site of terrorist threat. It argues that this mutual construction paradoxically enhanced the agency of Malian foreign policy elites in negotiations with their US interlocutors and highlights the effectiveness of Malian deployment of this discourse to shape the terms upon which intervention took place in the 2002–2012 period. It shifts the focus of the analysis of intervention in Mali both in space and in time through centering the US–Mali relationship pre-2012, displacing the dominant post-2013 France–Mali frame. This opens up a new dialectical and interimperial perspective on the agency of the Malian foreign policy elite in shaping the terms upon which intervention took place. This demonstrates the need for both a wider lens and a longer historical scope on investigations of intervention, particularly relevant as this discourse of terrorist threat has since 2013 spread beyond Mali to the wider Sahel region.
s 本文通过对美国外交电报和其他相关文件进行严密的文本分析，提供了新的实证数据，以追溯马里作为恐怖主义威胁之地的相互建构过程。文章认为，这种相互建构自相矛盾地增强了马里外交政策精英在与美国对话者谈判时的能动性，并强调了马里在 2002-2012 年期间利用这种话语来塑造干预条件的有效性。通过以 2012 年前美国与马里的关系为中心，取代 2013 年后法国与马里的主导框架，该报告在空间和时间上转移了马里干预分析的重点。这开辟了一个新的辩证和临时帝国视角，以审视马里外交政策精英在塑造干预条件方面的作用。这表明，对干预的调查需要更广阔的视角和更长远的历史范围，尤其是自 2013 年以来，恐怖主义威胁的论述已从马里蔓延到更广泛的萨赫勒地区。
{"title":"The Construction of Terrorist Threat in Mali: Agency and Narratives of Intervention","authors":"Joe Gazeley","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae056","url":null,"abstract":"s Through a close textual analysis of US diplomatic cables and other relevant documents, this article provides new empirical data to trace the mutual construction of Mali as a site of terrorist threat. It argues that this mutual construction paradoxically enhanced the agency of Malian foreign policy elites in negotiations with their US interlocutors and highlights the effectiveness of Malian deployment of this discourse to shape the terms upon which intervention took place in the 2002–2012 period. It shifts the focus of the analysis of intervention in Mali both in space and in time through centering the US–Mali relationship pre-2012, displacing the dominant post-2013 France–Mali frame. This opens up a new dialectical and interimperial perspective on the agency of the Malian foreign policy elite in shaping the terms upon which intervention took place. This demonstrates the need for both a wider lens and a longer historical scope on investigations of intervention, particularly relevant as this discourse of terrorist threat has since 2013 spread beyond Mali to the wider Sahel region.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140539052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s How do citizens of US allies assess different reassurance strategies? This article investigates the effects of US reassurance policies on public opinion in allied states. We design and conduct a survey experiment in five Central–Eastern European states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania—in March 2022. Set against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this experiment asked respondents to evaluate four types of reassurance strategies, each a critical tool in US crisis response policy: military deployments, diplomatic summitry, economic sanctions, and public reaffirmations of security guarantees. The international security literature typically values capabilities for their deterrence and reassurance benefits, while largely dismissing public reaffirmations as “cheap talk” and economic sanctions as being ineffective. Yet we find preferences for the use of economic sanctions and public statements as reassurance strategies during crises, in part because these approaches help states manage escalation risks.
s 美国盟国的公民如何评价不同的再保证战略？本文研究了美国安抚政策对盟国民意的影响。我们于 2022 年 3 月在五个中东欧国家--爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、波兰和罗马尼亚--设计并开展了一项调查实验。实验以俄罗斯入侵乌克兰为背景，要求受访者评估四种安抚策略，每种策略都是美国危机应对政策的重要工具：军事部署、外交峰会、经济制裁和公开重申安全保证。国际安全文献通常重视能力的威慑和安抚作用，而将公开重申视为 "廉价言论"，并认为经济制裁无效。然而，我们发现在危机期间，人们更倾向于使用经济制裁和公开声明作为安抚策略，部分原因是这些方法有助于国家管理危机升级的风险。
{"title":"Credibility in Crises: How Patrons Reassure Their Allies","authors":"Lauren Sukin, Alexander Lanoszka","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae062","url":null,"abstract":"s How do citizens of US allies assess different reassurance strategies? This article investigates the effects of US reassurance policies on public opinion in allied states. We design and conduct a survey experiment in five Central–Eastern European states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania—in March 2022. Set against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this experiment asked respondents to evaluate four types of reassurance strategies, each a critical tool in US crisis response policy: military deployments, diplomatic summitry, economic sanctions, and public reaffirmations of security guarantees. The international security literature typically values capabilities for their deterrence and reassurance benefits, while largely dismissing public reaffirmations as “cheap talk” and economic sanctions as being ineffective. Yet we find preferences for the use of economic sanctions and public statements as reassurance strategies during crises, in part because these approaches help states manage escalation risks.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140534109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s Under what conditions do armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war? Existing research suggests foreign states’ material support is critical to explaining armed groups' conduct during civil war and, thereby, war intensification, duration, and outcomes. Thus far, little attention has been paid to understanding whether and how foreign support influences whether armed groups fight civil wars in the first place, largely due to data limitations. Armed group-level datasets have included only those already engaged in significant civil war violence, which introduces selection bias that precludes investigating factors that influence which groups fight civil wars. Leveraging the new Armed Groups Dataset (AGD), which measures characteristics of armed groups engaged in lower-level violence, we conduct a preliminary empirical investigation into the explanatory role of foreign sponsorship in group-level variation in civil war. While foreign sponsorship and civil war are correlated, there is little evidence that sponsorship has substantial independent explanatory value in predicting civil war. Rather, the evidence is consistent with claims that armed groups’ organizational characteristics account for both access to foreign sponsorship and, independently, their likelihood of escalating civil war.
s 在什么情况下，武装组织会将其活动升级为内战？现有研究表明，外国的物质支持对于解释武装组织在内战期间的行为，进而解释战争的加剧、持续时间和结果至关重要。迄今为止，人们很少关注外国支持是否以及如何影响武装组织是否首先发动内战，这主要是由于数据的局限性。武装团体层面的数据集只包括那些已经参与重大内战暴力活动的团体，这就带来了选择偏差，无法调查影响哪些团体打内战的因素。新的武装团体数据集（AGD）测量了参与低层次暴力的武装团体的特征，利用该数据集，我们对外国赞助在内战团体层面变化中的解释作用进行了初步的实证调查。虽然外国赞助与内战相关，但几乎没有证据表明赞助在预测内战方面具有实质性的独立解释价值。相反，证据与以下说法一致，即武装团体的组织特征既是获得外国赞助的原因，也是其内战升级可能性的独立原因。
{"title":"Foreign Sponsorship of Armed Groups and Civil War","authors":"Michael A Rubin, Iris Malone","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae065","url":null,"abstract":"s Under what conditions do armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war? Existing research suggests foreign states’ material support is critical to explaining armed groups' conduct during civil war and, thereby, war intensification, duration, and outcomes. Thus far, little attention has been paid to understanding whether and how foreign support influences whether armed groups fight civil wars in the first place, largely due to data limitations. Armed group-level datasets have included only those already engaged in significant civil war violence, which introduces selection bias that precludes investigating factors that influence which groups fight civil wars. Leveraging the new Armed Groups Dataset (AGD), which measures characteristics of armed groups engaged in lower-level violence, we conduct a preliminary empirical investigation into the explanatory role of foreign sponsorship in group-level variation in civil war. While foreign sponsorship and civil war are correlated, there is little evidence that sponsorship has substantial independent explanatory value in predicting civil war. Rather, the evidence is consistent with claims that armed groups’ organizational characteristics account for both access to foreign sponsorship and, independently, their likelihood of escalating civil war.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140534107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
s In many regions of the world, liberal politics is on the retreat. This development is usually explained with reference to inherently political phenomena. We propose an alternative explanation, linking democratic backsliding to deep-reaching demographic change caused by mass emigration. We argue that because migrants tend to be more politically liberal, their departure, if quantitatively significant, can hurt liberal democracy. Empirically, we focus on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Since 2004, the region has lost about 9 percent of its population due to migration to Western Europe. Drawing on data from 430,000 individuals and a panel analysis, we show that CEE migrants systematically hold more liberal values than non-migrants and that their exit went along with a deterioration of democracy in their home countries. Further analyses show that the mechanism we describe generalizes to various other world regions. Mass emigration may pose a challenge to democratic development in migrant-sending countries around the globe.
s 在世界许多地区，自由主义政治正在消退。人们通常用内在的政治现象来解释这种发展。我们提出了另一种解释，将民主倒退与大规模移民造成的影响深远的人口变化联系起来。我们认为，由于移民往往在政治上更加自由，因此他们的离开（如果数量巨大）会损害自由民主。在实证方面，我们将重点放在中欧和东欧（CEE）。自 2004 年以来，由于移民到西欧，该地区的人口减少了约 9%。利用 43 万人的数据和面板分析，我们发现中东欧地区的移民比非移民系统地持有更多的自由主义价值观，而且他们的离开伴随着其母国民主的恶化。进一步的分析表明，我们所描述的机制适用于世界其他各个地区。大规模移民可能对全球移民输出国的民主发展构成挑战。
{"title":"Mass Emigration and the Erosion of Liberal Democracy","authors":"Daniel Auer, Max Schaub","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae026","url":null,"abstract":"s In many regions of the world, liberal politics is on the retreat. This development is usually explained with reference to inherently political phenomena. We propose an alternative explanation, linking democratic backsliding to deep-reaching demographic change caused by mass emigration. We argue that because migrants tend to be more politically liberal, their departure, if quantitatively significant, can hurt liberal democracy. Empirically, we focus on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Since 2004, the region has lost about 9 percent of its population due to migration to Western Europe. Drawing on data from 430,000 individuals and a panel analysis, we show that CEE migrants systematically hold more liberal values than non-migrants and that their exit went along with a deterioration of democracy in their home countries. Further analyses show that the mechanism we describe generalizes to various other world regions. Mass emigration may pose a challenge to democratic development in migrant-sending countries around the globe.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"263 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140534135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Uses of artificial intelligence (AI) are growing around the world. What will influence AI adoption in the international security realm? Research on automation bias suggests that humans can often be overconfident in AI, whereas research on algorithm aversion shows that, as the stakes of a decision rise, humans become more cautious about trusting algorithms. We theorize about the relationship between background knowledge about AI, trust in AI, and how these interact with other factors to influence the probability of automation bias in the international security context. We test these in a preregistered task identification experiment across a representative sample of 9,000 adults in nine countries with varying levels of AI industries. The results strongly support the theory, especially concerning AI background knowledge. A version of the Dunning–Kruger effect appears to be at play, whereby those with the lowest level of experience with AI are slightly more likely to be algorithm-averse, then automation bias occurs at lower levels of knowledge before leveling off as a respondent’s AI background reaches the highest levels. Additional results show effects from the task’s difficulty, overall AI trust, and whether a human or AI decision aid is described as highly competent or less competent.
{"title":"Bending the Automation Bias Curve: A Study of Human and AI-Based Decision Making in National Security Contexts","authors":"Michael C Horowitz, Lauren Kahn","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae020","url":null,"abstract":"Uses of artificial intelligence (AI) are growing around the world. What will influence AI adoption in the international security realm? Research on automation bias suggests that humans can often be overconfident in AI, whereas research on algorithm aversion shows that, as the stakes of a decision rise, humans become more cautious about trusting algorithms. We theorize about the relationship between background knowledge about AI, trust in AI, and how these interact with other factors to influence the probability of automation bias in the international security context. We test these in a preregistered task identification experiment across a representative sample of 9,000 adults in nine countries with varying levels of AI industries. The results strongly support the theory, especially concerning AI background knowledge. A version of the Dunning–Kruger effect appears to be at play, whereby those with the lowest level of experience with AI are slightly more likely to be algorithm-averse, then automation bias occurs at lower levels of knowledge before leveling off as a respondent’s AI background reaches the highest levels. Additional results show effects from the task’s difficulty, overall AI trust, and whether a human or AI decision aid is described as highly competent or less competent.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are agreements between states and victims an effective way to achieve reparations for human rights violations? We identify and evaluate a legal instrument hitherto ignored in analyses of the Inter-American Human Rights System: compliance agreements. These agreements emerged as a tool to negotiate the implementation of recommendations made by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to states responsible for human rights violations. In the first part of the paper, we theorize the role of agreements in securing state compliance, and discuss the problem of self-selection in legal settlements. We then document the emergence of this legal instrument and its novel role in the Inter-American System. In the third part, we provide statistical evidence from event history, matching, difference-in-differences, and sensitivity analyses showing that agreements increase the probability of compliance and cut the expected time to compliance by more than half. Agreements thus contribute to a potential solution for the perceived crisis of compliance in the Inter-American Human Rights System. However, the Commission must offer greater transparency to facilitate the evaluation of this mechanism.
{"title":"Compliance Agreements: Emergent Flexibility in the Inter-American Human Rights System","authors":"Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Mariana Brocca, Isabel Anayanssi Orizaga Inzunza","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae032","url":null,"abstract":"Are agreements between states and victims an effective way to achieve reparations for human rights violations? We identify and evaluate a legal instrument hitherto ignored in analyses of the Inter-American Human Rights System: compliance agreements. These agreements emerged as a tool to negotiate the implementation of recommendations made by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to states responsible for human rights violations. In the first part of the paper, we theorize the role of agreements in securing state compliance, and discuss the problem of self-selection in legal settlements. We then document the emergence of this legal instrument and its novel role in the Inter-American System. In the third part, we provide statistical evidence from event history, matching, difference-in-differences, and sensitivity analyses showing that agreements increase the probability of compliance and cut the expected time to compliance by more than half. Agreements thus contribute to a potential solution for the perceived crisis of compliance in the Inter-American Human Rights System. However, the Commission must offer greater transparency to facilitate the evaluation of this mechanism.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing research shows that economic coercion successfully influences targeted states’ behavior 38 percent of the time. This article integrates research on economic sanctions and foreign aid by assessing the relative effectiveness of two types of economic coercion: economic sanctions and foreign aid suspensions. It argues that suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government’s budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid suspensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. A quantitative analysis estimates the success rate of imposed aid suspensions to be 44 percent and that of economic sanctions to be 26 percent. The results are robust across two alternative datasets on economic coercion, and qualitative evidence corroborates the outlined mechanisms. The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion.
{"title":"Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions?","authors":"Claas Mertens","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae016","url":null,"abstract":"Existing research shows that economic coercion successfully influences targeted states’ behavior 38 percent of the time. This article integrates research on economic sanctions and foreign aid by assessing the relative effectiveness of two types of economic coercion: economic sanctions and foreign aid suspensions. It argues that suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government’s budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid suspensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. A quantitative analysis estimates the success rate of imposed aid suspensions to be 44 percent and that of economic sanctions to be 26 percent. The results are robust across two alternative datasets on economic coercion, and qualitative evidence corroborates the outlined mechanisms. The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：