Pub Date : 2024-07-29DOI: 10.1177/00223433241262912
Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg
This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.
{"title":"Organized violence 1989–2023, and the prevalence of organized crime groups","authors":"Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg","doi":"10.1177/00223433241262912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241262912","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"183 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141794948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-24DOI: 10.1177/00223433241249329
Kyosuke Kikuta, Yuta Kamahara
Although civil war devastates the environment, we still do not understand the role of environmental policies in post-war countries and often have a pessimistic view without empirical evidence. This study challenges this view by arguing that the introduction of independent monitoring mechanisms can make environmental regulations effective even in post-war countries and also by exploiting analytical opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 2011–2013, the government implemented independent monitoring mechanisms to lessen the side effects of mining activities on deforestation. The reform, however, only applied to mining permit zones, which had arbitrary grid-based shapes. This allows combining a geographic regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences to a difference-in-geographic-discontinuity (DiGD) design. With satellite-based data available at every 30 metres for over 40 million cells in the DRC, the analysis indicates that the 2011–2013 reform decreased deforestation rates immediately inside the mining permit zones. The effect existed even in the areas of continuing armed conflicts. Further analysis of causal mechanisms suggests that the 2011–2013 reform facilitated the compliance of existing operators and also screened out incompliant operators. Overall, these findings imply that the environmental effects of civil war can depend on post-war policies — a missing link in the literature on environmental security.
{"title":"Environmental protection after civil war: A difference-in-geographic-discontinuity approach","authors":"Kyosuke Kikuta, Yuta Kamahara","doi":"10.1177/00223433241249329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241249329","url":null,"abstract":"Although civil war devastates the environment, we still do not understand the role of environmental policies in post-war countries and often have a pessimistic view without empirical evidence. This study challenges this view by arguing that the introduction of independent monitoring mechanisms can make environmental regulations effective even in post-war countries and also by exploiting analytical opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 2011–2013, the government implemented independent monitoring mechanisms to lessen the side effects of mining activities on deforestation. The reform, however, only applied to mining permit zones, which had arbitrary grid-based shapes. This allows combining a geographic regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences to a difference-in-geographic-discontinuity (DiGD) design. With satellite-based data available at every 30 metres for over 40 million cells in the DRC, the analysis indicates that the 2011–2013 reform decreased deforestation rates immediately inside the mining permit zones. The effect existed even in the areas of continuing armed conflicts. Further analysis of causal mechanisms suggests that the 2011–2013 reform facilitated the compliance of existing operators and also screened out incompliant operators. Overall, these findings imply that the environmental effects of civil war can depend on post-war policies — a missing link in the literature on environmental security.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141448684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433241243178
Omer Zarpli, Dursun Peksen
Do elections matter for sanction effectiveness? Scholars have long highlighted the importance of domestic political factors in target (i.e. sanctioned) states in explaining when economic sanctions work. This line of research, however, has primarily focused on political regime characteristics and interest groups that are relatively low time-variant during sanction episodes. Building on this literature, we explore the effect of temporal proximity to elections. While the impact of elections have been examined in the context of military conflicts, their possible effects on sanction effectiveness have not been subject to systematic scrutiny. We argue that target governments are more likely to comply with sender demands as elections loom near in order to avoid the likely political costs of sanctions. The effect of elections, however, is likely to vary across different election characteristics and political regime types. We assess the empirical merits of our claims using data on over 1,000 sanction cases between 1950 and 2020. The results from a battery of empirical tests, including those that account for potential selection bias, support our hypotheses. We find that elections have a positive effect on sanction success, and this effect is more prominent in less democratic states that hold competitive elections. This suggests that even if sanctions have a relatively low success rate against non-democratic polities, elections may provide a window of opportunity for senders to extract concessions from target states.
{"title":"Election proximity and the effectiveness of economic sanctions","authors":"Omer Zarpli, Dursun Peksen","doi":"10.1177/00223433241243178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241243178","url":null,"abstract":"Do elections matter for sanction effectiveness? Scholars have long highlighted the importance of domestic political factors in target (i.e. sanctioned) states in explaining when economic sanctions work. This line of research, however, has primarily focused on political regime characteristics and interest groups that are relatively low time-variant during sanction episodes. Building on this literature, we explore the effect of temporal proximity to elections. While the impact of elections have been examined in the context of military conflicts, their possible effects on sanction effectiveness have not been subject to systematic scrutiny. We argue that target governments are more likely to comply with sender demands as elections loom near in order to avoid the likely political costs of sanctions. The effect of elections, however, is likely to vary across different election characteristics and political regime types. We assess the empirical merits of our claims using data on over 1,000 sanction cases between 1950 and 2020. The results from a battery of empirical tests, including those that account for potential selection bias, support our hypotheses. We find that elections have a positive effect on sanction success, and this effect is more prominent in less democratic states that hold competitive elections. This suggests that even if sanctions have a relatively low success rate against non-democratic polities, elections may provide a window of opportunity for senders to extract concessions from target states.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"132 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141159666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-18DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231868
Kathrin Bachleitner
While the international arena is littered with events of war and atrocities, the memory of the Holocaust was institutionalized as the ultimate benchmark of human suffering within the liberal world order. Against the backdrop of such a global memory landscape, this article explores how different memories of trauma interact. Building on literature within international relations, sociology and social psychology, as well as survey data collected from a sample of Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis, its analysis explores how victims of political violence compare their suffering with that of others and why such comparisons slip easily into competition. The analysis found that individuals were competitive with their memories when they showed high levels of patriotic attachment and a real and perceived, yet unrecognized, sense of victimhood. This article thus offers insight into a key issue in peace and conflict studies: the links between traumatic memory, victimhood, international recognition and conflict.
{"title":"Trauma in world politics: Memory dynamics between different victim groups","authors":"Kathrin Bachleitner","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231868","url":null,"abstract":"While the international arena is littered with events of war and atrocities, the memory of the Holocaust was institutionalized as the ultimate benchmark of human suffering within the liberal world order. Against the backdrop of such a global memory landscape, this article explores how different memories of trauma interact. Building on literature within international relations, sociology and social psychology, as well as survey data collected from a sample of Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis, its analysis explores how victims of political violence compare their suffering with that of others and why such comparisons slip easily into competition. The analysis found that individuals were competitive with their memories when they showed high levels of patriotic attachment and a real and perceived, yet unrecognized, sense of victimhood. This article thus offers insight into a key issue in peace and conflict studies: the links between traumatic memory, victimhood, international recognition and conflict.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"121 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-18DOI: 10.1177/00223433241243194
Roseanne W McManus, Tuba Sendinç
When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.
{"title":"Sending the B team: The impact of lesser signals of resolve","authors":"Roseanne W McManus, Tuba Sendinç","doi":"10.1177/00223433241243194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241243194","url":null,"abstract":"When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231865
Andrew Kenealy
This article theoretically clarifies and presents the first large-N empirical support for a centuries-old intuition: that democracies are slow to use violent military force. It argues that democratic and nondemocratic state leaders managing interstate crises experience trade-offs over when to respond, and that democratic institutions incentivize democrats that consider violent military force to delay. The article presents a simplified account of leader choice during crisis and highlights two mechanisms rooted in external and internal politics that may drive delay. Analyses of nearly 950 states experiencing crisis provide support for expectations. Democracy is associated with a roughly 40% lower likelihood of responding to a crisis at any given point in time, conditional on responding with violence. Two illustrative case studies probe the plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. Taken together, the theory and findings illuminate the processes leaders engage as they consider abandoning negotiating tables at home and abroad in favor of the battlefield.
{"title":"The democratic patience","authors":"Andrew Kenealy","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231865","url":null,"abstract":"This article theoretically clarifies and presents the first large-N empirical support for a centuries-old intuition: that democracies are slow to use violent military force. It argues that democratic and nondemocratic state leaders managing interstate crises experience trade-offs over when to respond, and that democratic institutions incentivize democrats that consider violent military force to delay. The article presents a simplified account of leader choice during crisis and highlights two mechanisms rooted in external and internal politics that may drive delay. Analyses of nearly 950 states experiencing crisis provide support for expectations. Democracy is associated with a roughly 40% lower likelihood of responding to a crisis at any given point in time, conditional on responding with violence. Two illustrative case studies probe the plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. Taken together, the theory and findings illuminate the processes leaders engage as they consider abandoning negotiating tables at home and abroad in favor of the battlefield.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"122 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140910669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1177/00223433241235852
Miguel Alberto Gomez, Gregory H Winger
The transnational nature of cyberspace alters the role of third-party countries (TPCs) in international conflict. In the conventional environment, military operations are primarily confined to the boundaries of the combatants or a designated war zone. However, during cyber conflicts, operations may occur on the digital infrastructure of states not otherwise involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, within the cyber conflict literature, little is said about TPCs who, by virtue of interconnectivity, may find themselves involved in a conflict not of their own making. Consequently, we examine the political and diplomatic hazards of cyber operations involving these actors. Through survey experiments involving participants from the United Kingdom and Canada, we assess the public opinion impact of an offensive cyber operation’s revelation on a TPC population. We find that while these incidents are viewed negatively, prior authorization and the involvement of an ally reduces this tendency. Such conditions lead the public to perceive these operations as corresponding with their national interest while suppressing fears of the possible consequences following their indirect involvement.
{"title":"Third-party countries in cyber conflict: Public opinion and conflict spillover in cyberspace","authors":"Miguel Alberto Gomez, Gregory H Winger","doi":"10.1177/00223433241235852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241235852","url":null,"abstract":"The transnational nature of cyberspace alters the role of third-party countries (TPCs) in international conflict. In the conventional environment, military operations are primarily confined to the boundaries of the combatants or a designated war zone. However, during cyber conflicts, operations may occur on the digital infrastructure of states not otherwise involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, within the cyber conflict literature, little is said about TPCs who, by virtue of interconnectivity, may find themselves involved in a conflict not of their own making. Consequently, we examine the political and diplomatic hazards of cyber operations involving these actors. Through survey experiments involving participants from the United Kingdom and Canada, we assess the public opinion impact of an offensive cyber operation’s revelation on a TPC population. We find that while these incidents are viewed negatively, prior authorization and the involvement of an ally reduces this tendency. Such conditions lead the public to perceive these operations as corresponding with their national interest while suppressing fears of the possible consequences following their indirect involvement.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"163 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140910673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-06DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231177
Gabriele Pinto
International football matches are among the highest manifestations of national pride and unity that a country can have in peaceful times. However, some anecdotal evidence suggests that when things go wrong (e.g. when the national team loses), the euphoria surrounding these events can easily turn into xenophobic outbursts. We propose a conceptual framework and an empirical analysis to explain whether sports nationalism can fuel xenophobic behavior and attacks against immigrants. Leveraging on new soccer data from Germany and quasi-experimental econometric techniques, we show the existence of a causal nexus between the national team’s performance in prominent international competitions and shifts in nationalist tendencies and xenophobic behaviors against immigrants. In the immediate days following a defeat of the German national team, there is a significant increase in the number of attacks against immigrants in the country. The opposite happens following a victory. Through a variety of robustness tests and different specifications, we show that the effect is specific to attacks against immigrants and not due to a general increase in violent behavior observed in other studies. Finally, we investigate potential underlying mechanisms by looking at the effect of football matches on reported mood and attitudes against immigrants.
{"title":"Sports nationalism and xenophobia: When cheering turns into violence","authors":"Gabriele Pinto","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231177","url":null,"abstract":"International football matches are among the highest manifestations of national pride and unity that a country can have in peaceful times. However, some anecdotal evidence suggests that when things go wrong (e.g. when the national team loses), the euphoria surrounding these events can easily turn into xenophobic outbursts. We propose a conceptual framework and an empirical analysis to explain whether sports nationalism can fuel xenophobic behavior and attacks against immigrants. Leveraging on new soccer data from Germany and quasi-experimental econometric techniques, we show the existence of a causal nexus between the national team’s performance in prominent international competitions and shifts in nationalist tendencies and xenophobic behaviors against immigrants. In the immediate days following a defeat of the German national team, there is a significant increase in the number of attacks against immigrants in the country. The opposite happens following a victory. Through a variety of robustness tests and different specifications, we show that the effect is specific to attacks against immigrants and not due to a general increase in violent behavior observed in other studies. Finally, we investigate potential underlying mechanisms by looking at the effect of football matches on reported mood and attitudes against immigrants.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140845960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231844
Frederik Gremler, Nils B Weidmann
With the increasing relevance of ethnic groups as political actors, the literature has attempted to identify and study the ethnic organizations representing these groups. How do these organizations use digital communication channels to reach their domestic and international audiences? To enable research on these questions, this article introduces the Ethnic Organizations Online dataset, a new data collection focusing on the online channels that ethnic organizations use. The dataset includes four types of channels: Twitter (since July 2023, rebranded by Elon Musk as X); Facebook; Instagram; and regular websites. It relies on the Ethnic Power Relations – Organizations database, and is therefore compatible with an entire family of datasets on ethnic politics. Featuring more than 2000 online channels used by 265 groups, it allows researchers to study a wide variety of questions related to digital ethnic mobilization. The article presents three examples of how the dataset can be used. We study: (a) how a group’s political goals influence social media adoption; (b) how elections impact the organizations’ communication frequency and how this differs between democracies and autocracies; and (c) how the power status of a group affects the content of their communication. We provide replication codes facilitating the use of the dataset in applied research.
{"title":"Ethnic politics via digital means: Introducing the Ethnic Organizations Online dataset","authors":"Frederik Gremler, Nils B Weidmann","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231844","url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing relevance of ethnic groups as political actors, the literature has attempted to identify and study the ethnic organizations representing these groups. How do these organizations use digital communication channels to reach their domestic and international audiences? To enable research on these questions, this article introduces the Ethnic Organizations Online dataset, a new data collection focusing on the online channels that ethnic organizations use. The dataset includes four types of channels: Twitter (since July 2023, rebranded by Elon Musk as X); Facebook; Instagram; and regular websites. It relies on the Ethnic Power Relations – Organizations database, and is therefore compatible with an entire family of datasets on ethnic politics. Featuring more than 2000 online channels used by 265 groups, it allows researchers to study a wide variety of questions related to digital ethnic mobilization. The article presents three examples of how the dataset can be used. We study: (a) how a group’s political goals influence social media adoption; (b) how elections impact the organizations’ communication frequency and how this differs between democracies and autocracies; and (c) how the power status of a group affects the content of their communication. We provide replication codes facilitating the use of the dataset in applied research.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140808504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-15DOI: 10.1177/00223433231225162
Svetla Ben-Itzhak
The future of international cooperation in outer space was questioned when, in January 2022, Russia announced that it intended to leave the International Space Station (ISS) in 2024. A symbol of post-Cold War reconciliation, the station has linked Washington and Moscow even when relations on the ground frayed. The ISS has become a bedrock of international cooperation, having welcomed 276 individuals from 22 countries since it was first put in orbit in 1998. Russia’s announced departure from the ISS alarmed proponents of international cooperation in space. Its actions, however, do not signal an end but a new phase in international cooperative dynamics in space. This article examines international cooperation in outer space from 1958 until 2023. Using network analysis, it quantifies cooperative relations between states on space matters to examine the current state of international cooperation in space and its evolving dynamics. It finds that international cooperation in space has become increasingly defined by the emergence of distinct clusters of states, termed ‘space blocs’. Recent patterns of international cooperation in space markedly deviate from past dynamics in three key aspects. First, since 2008, distinct, bound space blocs can be clearly detected. Second, the internal composition of recent space blocs has become increasingly reflective of geopolitical affinities and strategic considerations on the ground. Third, although highly bound and distinct, the more recent space blocs are not entirely isolated and have not instituted any exclusionary practices, which is promising for the future of international space cooperation.
{"title":"Network analysis of international cooperation in space 1958–2023: Evidence of space blocs","authors":"Svetla Ben-Itzhak","doi":"10.1177/00223433231225162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231225162","url":null,"abstract":"The future of international cooperation in outer space was questioned when, in January 2022, Russia announced that it intended to leave the International Space Station (ISS) in 2024. A symbol of post-Cold War reconciliation, the station has linked Washington and Moscow even when relations on the ground frayed. The ISS has become a bedrock of international cooperation, having welcomed 276 individuals from 22 countries since it was first put in orbit in 1998. Russia’s announced departure from the ISS alarmed proponents of international cooperation in space. Its actions, however, do not signal an end but a new phase in international cooperative dynamics in space. This article examines international cooperation in outer space from 1958 until 2023. Using network analysis, it quantifies cooperative relations between states on space matters to examine the current state of international cooperation in space and its evolving dynamics. It finds that international cooperation in space has become increasingly defined by the emergence of distinct clusters of states, termed ‘space blocs’. Recent patterns of international cooperation in space markedly deviate from past dynamics in three key aspects. First, since 2008, distinct, bound space blocs can be clearly detected. Second, the internal composition of recent space blocs has become increasingly reflective of geopolitical affinities and strategic considerations on the ground. Third, although highly bound and distinct, the more recent space blocs are not entirely isolated and have not instituted any exclusionary practices, which is promising for the future of international space cooperation.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140557286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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