Pub Date : 2025-05-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433251318931
Sam Whitt, Douglas Page
How does war affect social preferences toward people with conflict-related outgroup identities? While the literature often reports prosocial treatment of ingroups, such benevolence is rarely seen toward potential outgroups. We consider the case of Ukraine, where many people with Russian identity markers reside. We ask whether people in Ukraine who identify as Russian by ethnicity or language have become stigmatized following Russia’s invasion. To measure social preferences, we introduce a variant of the Equality Equivalency Test (EET) as a third-party dictator game, where respondents decide between equal or unequal allocations of money involving two recipients. We run the EET in a January 2023 nationwide survey in Ukraine where dictator recipients are randomized by Ukrainian and Russian ethnicity, language, and/or Ukrainian civic identity. We also randomize priming on conflict-related victimization experiences. Despite widespread devastation across Ukraine by Russian forces, the majority of respondents, who identify as ethnic Ukrainians, treat Russian identifiers benevolently (fairly) relative to Ukrainians, and only a minority of respondents behaved malevolently (spitefully) toward them. Priming on victimization has minimal negative effects on benevolence. Our findings reinforce research on rising civic nationalism in Ukraine, transcending ethnolinguistic understandings of identity and belonging. Our results have implications for war as an instrument of nation-building and social cohesion, bolstering Ukraine’s ability to mitigate internal divisions amid Russia’s invasion.
{"title":"War, social preferences, and anti-outgroup behavior: Experimental evidence from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Sam Whitt, Douglas Page","doi":"10.1177/00223433251318931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251318931","url":null,"abstract":"How does war affect social preferences toward people with conflict-related outgroup identities? While the literature often reports prosocial treatment of ingroups, such benevolence is rarely seen toward potential outgroups. We consider the case of Ukraine, where many people with Russian identity markers reside. We ask whether people in Ukraine who identify as Russian by ethnicity or language have become stigmatized following Russia’s invasion. To measure social preferences, we introduce a variant of the Equality Equivalency Test (EET) as a third-party dictator game, where respondents decide between equal or unequal allocations of money involving two recipients. We run the EET in a January 2023 nationwide survey in Ukraine where dictator recipients are randomized by Ukrainian and Russian ethnicity, language, and/or Ukrainian civic identity. We also randomize priming on conflict-related victimization experiences. Despite widespread devastation across Ukraine by Russian forces, the majority of respondents, who identify as ethnic Ukrainians, treat Russian identifiers benevolently (fairly) relative to Ukrainians, and only a minority of respondents behaved malevolently (spitefully) toward them. Priming on victimization has minimal negative effects on benevolence. Our findings reinforce research on rising civic nationalism in Ukraine, transcending ethnolinguistic understandings of identity and belonging. Our results have implications for war as an instrument of nation-building and social cohesion, bolstering Ukraine’s ability to mitigate internal divisions amid Russia’s invasion.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144067141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433251324342
Lindsey A Goldberg
Why do armed rebel movements perpetrate intragroup reproductive violence? While extant research predominantly focuses on wartime sexual violence against civilians, the targeting of rebel women with reproductive violence remains underexplored. My research contributes new insights on how women’s idealized roles within armed rebellions shape the likelihood of these groups engaging in various forms of intragroup reproductive violence. I theorize that forced abortions are more likely to occur within rebellions that idealize women’s contributions through masculine duties like frontline combat because in these cases, pregnancy is perceived as antithetical to women’s expected contributions to the rebel movement. Conversely, forced pregnancies are more likely to occur within rebel movements that idealize women’s feminine support roles away from the frontlines because in these cases, pregnancy and motherhood are often part of rebel women’s expected contributions. I provide illustrative examples of armed rebellions characterized by these dynamics, and I introduce novel data on intragroup reproductive violence across a global sample of rebel organizations. Using this new dataset, I statistically evaluate my hypotheses and find empirical support for my claims. This research focuses on gender-based violence that occurs within rebel organizations, providing new data and new insights regarding the intragroup gender dynamics that promote reproductive violence against rebel women.
{"title":"Women’s roles and reproductive violence within armed rebellions","authors":"Lindsey A Goldberg","doi":"10.1177/00223433251324342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251324342","url":null,"abstract":"Why do armed rebel movements perpetrate intragroup reproductive violence? While extant research predominantly focuses on wartime sexual violence against civilians, the targeting of rebel women with reproductive violence remains underexplored. My research contributes new insights on how women’s idealized roles within armed rebellions shape the likelihood of these groups engaging in various forms of intragroup reproductive violence. I theorize that forced abortions are more likely to occur within rebellions that idealize women’s contributions through masculine duties like frontline combat because in these cases, pregnancy is perceived as antithetical to women’s expected contributions to the rebel movement. Conversely, forced pregnancies are more likely to occur within rebel movements that idealize women’s feminine support roles away from the frontlines because in these cases, pregnancy and motherhood are often part of rebel women’s expected contributions. I provide illustrative examples of armed rebellions characterized by these dynamics, and I introduce novel data on intragroup reproductive violence across a global sample of rebel organizations. Using this new dataset, I statistically evaluate my hypotheses and find empirical support for my claims. This research focuses on gender-based violence that occurs within rebel organizations, providing new data and new insights regarding the intragroup gender dynamics that promote reproductive violence against rebel women.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144067144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433251331486
Yuleng Zeng, Andreas Dür
Economic sanctions could cause substantial harm to target states, forcing them to undertake tough guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Although existing research has argued that sanctioned countries reduce their military spending in absolute terms, it is unclear whether they do trade more guns for butter in relative terms. We argue that in the short run, sanctioned states have an incentive to channel proportionally more resources to the military for two primary reasons. First, this allows them to signal their resolve not to back down to sanctioning states and potentially maintain their bargaining leverage. Second, higher relative military spending can strengthen leaders’ hold on power by improving their ability to co-opt and repress political opponents. However, this combined incentive to signal resolve and consolidate power weakens after the initial economic and political shocks. As such, we also expect that the increase in relative military spending will diminish gradually. To test our theory, we propose a new measurement of sanction shocks that carefully accounts for the salience, costs, and duration of different sanction episodes. Using this measure, we apply dynamic panel modeling to examine the military spending of 166 countries from 1962 to 2015. We find strong support for our theoretical expectations. In response to sanction shocks, target states choose to spend proportionally more on the military; this increase peaks in the first few years and dissipates over time. These results hold important implications for research on both economic sanctions and military spending.
{"title":"Shock and awe: Economic sanctions and relative military spending","authors":"Yuleng Zeng, Andreas Dür","doi":"10.1177/00223433251331486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251331486","url":null,"abstract":"Economic sanctions could cause substantial harm to target states, forcing them to undertake tough guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Although existing research has argued that sanctioned countries reduce their military spending in absolute terms, it is unclear whether they do trade more guns for butter in relative terms. We argue that in the short run, sanctioned states have an incentive to channel proportionally more resources to the military for two primary reasons. First, this allows them to signal their resolve not to back down to sanctioning states and potentially maintain their bargaining leverage. Second, higher relative military spending can strengthen leaders’ hold on power by improving their ability to co-opt and repress political opponents. However, this combined incentive to signal resolve and consolidate power weakens after the initial economic and political shocks. As such, we also expect that the increase in relative military spending will diminish gradually. To test our theory, we propose a new measurement of sanction shocks that carefully accounts for the salience, costs, and duration of different sanction episodes. Using this measure, we apply dynamic panel modeling to examine the military spending of 166 countries from 1962 to 2015. We find strong support for our theoretical expectations. In response to sanction shocks, target states choose to spend proportionally more on the military; this increase peaks in the first few years and dissipates over time. These results hold important implications for research on both economic sanctions and military spending.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"122 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144067142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-13DOI: 10.1177/00223433251318566
Anna Belli, Victor Villa, Marina Mastrorillo, Antonio Scognamillo, Chun Song, Adriana Ignaciuk, Grazia Pacillo
Climate variability is increasingly gaining recognition as a factor exacerbating risks to peace in Africa, particularly in contexts characterized by weak institutions and fragile agri-food systems. Existing literature has highlighted the intricate indirect pathways that can lead to increasing conflicts following a climatic shock, including reduced agricultural yields, increased food insecurity, and other socio-economic channels that are highly context-specific as well as difficult to quantify. This study investigates the nexus between climate variability (proxied by temperature anomalies) and violent conflicts as mediated by child acute malnutrition in Nigeria. Starting from previous quantitative analyses that implicitly assumed the existence of a singular transmission pathway linking climate variability to conflict, this study employs a structural equation model that accommodates the presence of multiple, albeit unobserved, mediating factors. In doing so, it pioneers the use of children’s nutritional indicators as mediating factors to capture the multidimensional nature of the climate–conflict relationship. The novel approach proposed for this analysis increases the accuracy of estimating the indirect impacts of climate variability on conflict, as mediated by child nutritional outcomes, and contributes to the literature linked to the humanitarian, development and peace nexus. From a policy perspective, our findings aim to inform and support identifying policies and interventions aimed at mitigating the threat posed by climate variability to human security through the nutrition channel.
{"title":"Malnutrition and violent conflict in a heating world: A mediation analysis on the climate–conflict nexus in Nigeria","authors":"Anna Belli, Victor Villa, Marina Mastrorillo, Antonio Scognamillo, Chun Song, Adriana Ignaciuk, Grazia Pacillo","doi":"10.1177/00223433251318566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251318566","url":null,"abstract":"Climate variability is increasingly gaining recognition as a factor exacerbating risks to peace in Africa, particularly in contexts characterized by weak institutions and fragile agri-food systems. Existing literature has highlighted the intricate indirect pathways that can lead to increasing conflicts following a climatic shock, including reduced agricultural yields, increased food insecurity, and other socio-economic channels that are highly context-specific as well as difficult to quantify. This study investigates the nexus between climate variability (proxied by temperature anomalies) and violent conflicts as mediated by child acute malnutrition in Nigeria. Starting from previous quantitative analyses that implicitly assumed the existence of a singular transmission pathway linking climate variability to conflict, this study employs a structural equation model that accommodates the presence of multiple, albeit unobserved, mediating factors. In doing so, it pioneers the use of children’s nutritional indicators as mediating factors to capture the multidimensional nature of the climate–conflict relationship. The novel approach proposed for this analysis increases the accuracy of estimating the indirect impacts of climate variability on conflict, as mediated by child nutritional outcomes, and contributes to the literature linked to the humanitarian, development and peace nexus. From a policy perspective, our findings aim to inform and support identifying policies and interventions aimed at mitigating the threat posed by climate variability to human security through the nutrition channel.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143945748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-10DOI: 10.1177/00223433251333389
Juliana Tappe Ortiz
Rebel leaders can prolong civil wars. Although past research has examined how rebel groups have shaped civil wars, little attention has been paid to rebel leaders. I argue that civil wars last longer and are less likely to be terminated in government-favorable outcomes when rebel leaders with training in a nonstate armed group are in charge, in contrast to leaders with no training or state military service. Nonstate training makes leaders more capable of continuing the conflict with few weapons and resources and more willing to persevere because of their combatant socialization. The rebel leaders trained in creativity and perseverance are more likely to make strategic choices that heighten bargaining challenges and the risk of bargaining failure thus leading to longer wars. I test propositions through a quantitative analysis of all rebel leaders in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2015. The analysis is supplemented with a qualitative discussion based on personal interviews with top-level leaders of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.
{"title":"Trained to rebel: Rebel leaders’ military training and the dynamics of civil conflicts","authors":"Juliana Tappe Ortiz","doi":"10.1177/00223433251333389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251333389","url":null,"abstract":"Rebel leaders can prolong civil wars. Although past research has examined how rebel groups have shaped civil wars, little attention has been paid to rebel leaders. I argue that civil wars last longer and are less likely to be terminated in government-favorable outcomes when rebel leaders with training in a nonstate armed group are in charge, in contrast to leaders with no training or state military service. Nonstate training makes leaders more capable of continuing the conflict with few weapons and resources and more willing to persevere because of their combatant socialization. The rebel leaders trained in creativity and perseverance are more likely to make strategic choices that heighten bargaining challenges and the risk of bargaining failure thus leading to longer wars. I test propositions through a quantitative analysis of all rebel leaders in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2015. The analysis is supplemented with a qualitative discussion based on personal interviews with top-level leaders of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143932474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-06DOI: 10.1177/00223433241300862
Håvard Hegre, Paola Vesco, Michael Colaresi, Jonas Vestby, Alexa Timlick, Noorain Syed Kazmi, Angelica Lindqvist-McGowan, Friederike Becker, Marco Binetti, Tobias Bodentien, Tobias Bohne, Patrick T. Brandt, Thomas Chadefaux, Simon Drauz, Christoph Dworschak, Vito D’Orazio, Hannah Frank, Cornelius Fritz, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Sonja Häffner, Martin Hofer, Finn L Klebe, Luca Macis, Alexandra Malaga, Marius Mehrl, Nils W Metternich, Daniel Mittermaier, David Muchlinski, Hannes Mueller, Christian Oswald, Paola Pisano, David Randahl, Christopher Rauh, Lotta Rüter, Thomas Schincariol, Benjamin Seimon, Elena Siletti, Marco Tagliapietra, Chandler Thornhill, Johan Vegelius, Julian Walterskirchen
Governmental and nongovernmental organizations have increasingly relied on early-warning systems of conflict to support their decisionmaking. Predictions of war intensity as probability distributions prove closer to what policymakers need than point estimates, as they encompass useful representations of both the most likely outcome and the lower-probability risk that conflicts escalate catastrophically. Point-estimate predictions, by contrast, fail to represent the inherent uncertainty in the distribution of conflict fatalities. Yet, current early warning systems are preponderantly focused on providing point estimates, while efforts to forecast conflict fatalities as a probability distribution remain sparse. Building on the predecessor VIEWS competition, we organize a prediction challenge to encourage endeavours in this direction. We invite researchers across multiple disciplinary fields, from conflict studies to computer science, to forecast the number of fatalities in state-based armed conflicts, in the form of the UCDP ‘best’ estimates aggregated to two units of analysis (country-months and PRIO-GRID-months), with estimates of uncertainty. This article introduces the goal and motivation behind the prediction challenge, presents a set of evaluation metrics to assess the performance of the forecasting models, describes the benchmark models which the contributions are evaluated against, and summarizes the salient features of the submitted contributions.
{"title":"The 2023/24 VIEWS Prediction challenge: Predicting the number of fatalities in armed conflict, with uncertainty","authors":"Håvard Hegre, Paola Vesco, Michael Colaresi, Jonas Vestby, Alexa Timlick, Noorain Syed Kazmi, Angelica Lindqvist-McGowan, Friederike Becker, Marco Binetti, Tobias Bodentien, Tobias Bohne, Patrick T. Brandt, Thomas Chadefaux, Simon Drauz, Christoph Dworschak, Vito D’Orazio, Hannah Frank, Cornelius Fritz, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Sonja Häffner, Martin Hofer, Finn L Klebe, Luca Macis, Alexandra Malaga, Marius Mehrl, Nils W Metternich, Daniel Mittermaier, David Muchlinski, Hannes Mueller, Christian Oswald, Paola Pisano, David Randahl, Christopher Rauh, Lotta Rüter, Thomas Schincariol, Benjamin Seimon, Elena Siletti, Marco Tagliapietra, Chandler Thornhill, Johan Vegelius, Julian Walterskirchen","doi":"10.1177/00223433241300862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241300862","url":null,"abstract":"Governmental and nongovernmental organizations have increasingly relied on early-warning systems of conflict to support their decisionmaking. Predictions of war intensity as probability distributions prove closer to what policymakers need than point estimates, as they encompass useful representations of both the most likely outcome and the lower-probability risk that conflicts escalate catastrophically. Point-estimate predictions, by contrast, fail to represent the inherent uncertainty in the distribution of conflict fatalities. Yet, current early warning systems are preponderantly focused on providing point estimates, while efforts to forecast conflict fatalities as a probability distribution remain sparse. Building on the predecessor VIEWS competition, we organize a prediction challenge to encourage endeavours in this direction. We invite researchers across multiple disciplinary fields, from conflict studies to computer science, to forecast the number of fatalities in state-based armed conflicts, in the form of the UCDP ‘best’ estimates aggregated to two units of analysis (country-months and PRIO-GRID-months), with estimates of uncertainty. This article introduces the goal and motivation behind the prediction challenge, presents a set of evaluation metrics to assess the performance of the forecasting models, describes the benchmark models which the contributions are evaluated against, and summarizes the salient features of the submitted contributions.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"119 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143916082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-06DOI: 10.1177/00223433251324149
{"title":"CORRIGENDUM to Mitigating election violence locally: UN peacekeepers’ election-education campaigns in Côte d’Ivoire by Hannah Smidt","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/00223433251324149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251324149","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143915955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The risks of child recruitment by non-state armed groups are geographically, temporally and contextually situated. There are multilayered, multivariate arrays of risk factors associated with non-state armed groups, with conflicts, and with contexts. Using Bayesian network modelling with a global dataset of non-state armed group child recruitment practices between 2010 and 2022, we demonstrate the theoretical and practical importance of adopting a situational perspective to understand child recruitment risks. Methodologically, we demonstrate a robust model-checking process that checks the adequacy of our data, the magnitude and direction of estimated effects, and shows greater than 80% accuracy in predicting child recruitment by non-state armed groups. We review and contrast our approach with standard general linear modelling used in quantitative child recruitment research over the past two decades. Through adopting a situated orientation, and applying analytical tools appropriate to that orientation, we challenge and extend existing theory and propose new theoretical insights on child recruitment risks. We show how important violence is as a predictor of child recruitment risks and, using a new measure of fighting force efficacy, show that, contrary to published theory, less effective non-state armed groups were more likely to recruit children than more effective ones. But even these most notable results we show to vary markedly across situations.
{"title":"Reliable knowledge claims on the recruitment and use of children: An empirical perspective","authors":"Timothy Lynam, Dustin Johnson, Catherine Baillie Abidi","doi":"10.1177/00223433251318862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251318862","url":null,"abstract":"The risks of child recruitment by non-state armed groups are geographically, temporally and contextually situated. There are multilayered, multivariate arrays of risk factors associated with non-state armed groups, with conflicts, and with contexts. Using Bayesian network modelling with a global dataset of non-state armed group child recruitment practices between 2010 and 2022, we demonstrate the theoretical and practical importance of adopting a situational perspective to understand child recruitment risks. Methodologically, we demonstrate a robust model-checking process that checks the adequacy of our data, the magnitude and direction of estimated effects, and shows greater than 80% accuracy in predicting child recruitment by non-state armed groups. We review and contrast our approach with standard general linear modelling used in quantitative child recruitment research over the past two decades. Through adopting a situated orientation, and applying analytical tools appropriate to that orientation, we challenge and extend existing theory and propose new theoretical insights on child recruitment risks. We show how important violence is as a predictor of child recruitment risks and, using a new measure of fighting force efficacy, show that, contrary to published theory, less effective non-state armed groups were more likely to recruit children than more effective ones. But even these most notable results we show to vary markedly across situations.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143901559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-19DOI: 10.1177/00223433251317838
Yuliya Kosyakova, Irena Kogan, Frank van Tubergen
This study makes three key contributions to the literature on the effect of conflict-induced violence on wartime migration. First, while conflict-induced violence is often treated as a monolithic factor, we consider conflict-induced violence as multidimensional, varying in intensity, type and proximity. Second, by including both movers and stayers, we address the mobility bias prevalent in the literature and examine both mobility and immobility in the context of conflict. Third, we contribute to debates on destination choices by empirically testing the likelihood of internal displacement versus seeking refuge abroad. Using dynamic models and unique comparative data from the OneUA project, which surveyed 24,000 Ukrainian women in Ukraine and eight other European countries, we examine the migration behaviors of those who stayed in their pre-war residence, relocated internally (internally displaced persons), or fled abroad during the first 6 months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Our findings reveal a curvilinear relationship between conflict-induced violence and migration propensity: violence initially increases migration but diminishes beyond a threshold. We also find that forewarnings and indirect threats have a stronger influence on migration than direct threats. Violence catalyzes migration among vulnerable groups, narrowing demographic disparities in migration propensity. However, resourceful individuals retain an advantage in early migration, perpetuating inequalities in escape opportunities. Additionally, we observe distinct patterns of internal versus international migration in response to stronger conflict-induced violence, providing theoretical and empirical insights into the dynamics of wartime migration.
{"title":"Multidimensional effects of conflict-induced violence on wartime migration decisions: evidence from Ukraine","authors":"Yuliya Kosyakova, Irena Kogan, Frank van Tubergen","doi":"10.1177/00223433251317838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251317838","url":null,"abstract":"This study makes three key contributions to the literature on the effect of conflict-induced violence on wartime migration. First, while conflict-induced violence is often treated as a monolithic factor, we consider conflict-induced violence as multidimensional, varying in intensity, type and proximity. Second, by including both movers and stayers, we address the mobility bias prevalent in the literature and examine both mobility and immobility in the context of conflict. Third, we contribute to debates on destination choices by empirically testing the likelihood of internal displacement versus seeking refuge abroad. Using dynamic models and unique comparative data from the OneUA project, which surveyed 24,000 Ukrainian women in Ukraine and eight other European countries, we examine the migration behaviors of those who stayed in their pre-war residence, relocated internally (internally displaced persons), or fled abroad during the first 6 months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Our findings reveal a curvilinear relationship between conflict-induced violence and migration propensity: violence initially increases migration but diminishes beyond a threshold. We also find that forewarnings and indirect threats have a stronger influence on migration than direct threats. Violence catalyzes migration among vulnerable groups, narrowing demographic disparities in migration propensity. However, resourceful individuals retain an advantage in early migration, perpetuating inequalities in escape opportunities. Additionally, we observe distinct patterns of internal versus international migration in response to stronger conflict-induced violence, providing theoretical and empirical insights into the dynamics of wartime migration.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143851043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-19DOI: 10.1177/00223433251322596
Madhav Joshi, Matthew Hauenstein, Jason Quinn
This article presents an expansion of the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset, incorporating data on partial agreements and newly established Comprehensive Peace Agreements. The new Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset now includes coding for 51 provisions across 42 Comprehensive Peace Agreements and 236 partial peace agreements (with 78% of these negotiated prior to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 22% negotiated during the 10-year Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation process). This expanded dataset offers nuanced insights into the negotiation and implementation processes of Comprehensive Peace Agreements, the types of provisions negotiated within partial agreements, those later incorporated into Comprehensive Peace Agreements, and those renegotiated throughout the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation period. The article details the methodology and criteria employed for integrating partial agreements into the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset, provides descriptive statistics on the provisions within these agreements, and examines the implementation trajectories of pre-Comprehensive Peace Agreement partial agreements and Comprehensive Peace Agreements for up to 10 years. Additionally, it examines the interrelatedness among partial agreements, Comprehensive Peace Agreements, and Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation processes. One of the key applications of the partial peace agreement data presented is the empirical testing of the gradualism proposition in trust-building. The findings indicate that Comprehensive Peace Agreements exhibit a higher overall implementation rate when a greater number of partial agreements are negotiated beforehand. However, this is conditional and influenced by the duration of the negotiation process. The article concludes with a discussion of the challenges and limitations encountered, along with suggestions for future research on civil war peace agreements.
{"title":"Expanding the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset: Partial peace agreements in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiation and implementation process, 1989–2021","authors":"Madhav Joshi, Matthew Hauenstein, Jason Quinn","doi":"10.1177/00223433251322596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251322596","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents an expansion of the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset, incorporating data on partial agreements and newly established Comprehensive Peace Agreements. The new Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset now includes coding for 51 provisions across 42 Comprehensive Peace Agreements and 236 partial peace agreements (with 78% of these negotiated prior to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 22% negotiated during the 10-year Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation process). This expanded dataset offers nuanced insights into the negotiation and implementation processes of Comprehensive Peace Agreements, the types of provisions negotiated within partial agreements, those later incorporated into Comprehensive Peace Agreements, and those renegotiated throughout the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation period. The article details the methodology and criteria employed for integrating partial agreements into the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset, provides descriptive statistics on the provisions within these agreements, and examines the implementation trajectories of pre-Comprehensive Peace Agreement partial agreements and Comprehensive Peace Agreements for up to 10 years. Additionally, it examines the interrelatedness among partial agreements, Comprehensive Peace Agreements, and Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation processes. One of the key applications of the partial peace agreement data presented is the empirical testing of the gradualism proposition in trust-building. The findings indicate that Comprehensive Peace Agreements exhibit a higher overall implementation rate when a greater number of partial agreements are negotiated beforehand. However, this is conditional and influenced by the duration of the negotiation process. The article concludes with a discussion of the challenges and limitations encountered, along with suggestions for future research on civil war peace agreements.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143851040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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