Pub Date : 2024-03-01Epub Date: 2023-02-09DOI: 10.1177/19433875231155727
Kimberly Oslin, Meryam Shikara, Joshua Yoon, Pharibe Pope, Kelly Bridgham, Suneet Waghmarae, Andrea Hebert, Fan Liang, Kalpesh Vakharia, Natalie Justicz
Study design: Case series.
Objective: This retrospective review of frontal sinus fractures aims to describe our current experience managing these fractures at an urban level I trauma center.
Methods: An institutional database of 2081 patients who presented with maxillofacial fractures on computed tomography face/sinus in 2019 was queried for all patients with traumatic frontal sinus fractures. Demographics, trauma-related history, management approach, and follow-up data were collected and analyzed.
Results: Sixty-three (7.3%) patients had at least one fracture involving the frontal sinus. The most common etiologies were assaults, falls, and motor vehicle accidents. Surgical repair was performed in 26.8% of patients with frontal sinus fractures, and the other 73.2% were observed. Fractures that were displaced, comminuted, obstructive of the frontal sinus outflow tract, or associated with a dural tear or cerebrospinal fluid leak were more likely to be operative.
Conclusions: The majority of frontal sinus fractures in this study were treated with observation. Despite advances in transnasal endoscopic approaches, many surgeons still rely on open approaches to repair frontal sinus fractures.
{"title":"Management of Frontal Sinus Fractures at a Level 1 Trauma Center: Retrospective Study and Review of the Literature.","authors":"Kimberly Oslin, Meryam Shikara, Joshua Yoon, Pharibe Pope, Kelly Bridgham, Suneet Waghmarae, Andrea Hebert, Fan Liang, Kalpesh Vakharia, Natalie Justicz","doi":"10.1177/19433875231155727","DOIUrl":"10.1177/19433875231155727","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Study design: </strong>Case series.</p><p><strong>Objective: </strong>This retrospective review of frontal sinus fractures aims to describe our current experience managing these fractures at an urban level I trauma center.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>An institutional database of 2081 patients who presented with maxillofacial fractures on computed tomography face/sinus in 2019 was queried for all patients with traumatic frontal sinus fractures. Demographics, trauma-related history, management approach, and follow-up data were collected and analyzed.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Sixty-three (7.3%) patients had at least one fracture involving the frontal sinus. The most common etiologies were assaults, falls, and motor vehicle accidents. Surgical repair was performed in 26.8% of patients with frontal sinus fractures, and the other 73.2% were observed. Fractures that were displaced, comminuted, obstructive of the frontal sinus outflow tract, or associated with a dural tear or cerebrospinal fluid leak were more likely to be operative.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>The majority of frontal sinus fractures in this study were treated with observation. Despite advances in transnasal endoscopic approaches, many surgeons still rely on open approaches to repair frontal sinus fractures.</p>","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"59 1","pages":"24-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10874201/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73095361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433231225814
Jelena Vićić, Erik Gartzke
Russia’s cyber-enabled influence operations (CEIO) have garnered significant public, academic and policy interest. 126 million Americans were reportedly exposed to Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US election on Facebook. Indeed, to the extent that such efforts shape political outcomes, they may prove far more consequential than other, more flamboyant forms of cyber conflict. Importantly, CEIOs highlight the human dimension of cyber conflict. Focused on ‘hacking human minds’ and affecting individuals behind keyboards, as opposed to hacking networked systems, CEIOs represent an emergent form of state cyber activity. Importantly, data for studying CEIOs are often publicly available. We employ semantic network analysis (SNA) to assess data seldom analyzed in cybersecurity research – the text of actual advertisements from a prominent CEIO. We examine the content, as well as the scope and scale of the Russian-orchestrated social media campaign. While often described as ‘disinformation,’ our analysis shows that the information utilized in the Russian CEIO was generally factually correct. Further, it appears that African Americans, not white conservatives, were the target demographic that Russia sought to influence. We conclude with speculation, based on our findings, about the likely motives for the CEIO.
{"title":"Cyber-enabled influence operations as a ‘center of gravity’ in cyberconflict: The example of Russian foreign interference in the 2016 US federal election","authors":"Jelena Vićić, Erik Gartzke","doi":"10.1177/00223433231225814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231225814","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s cyber-enabled influence operations (CEIO) have garnered significant public, academic and policy interest. 126 million Americans were reportedly exposed to Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US election on Facebook. Indeed, to the extent that such efforts shape political outcomes, they may prove far more consequential than other, more flamboyant forms of cyber conflict. Importantly, CEIOs highlight the human dimension of cyber conflict. Focused on ‘hacking human minds’ and affecting individuals behind keyboards, as opposed to hacking networked systems, CEIOs represent an emergent form of state cyber activity. Importantly, data for studying CEIOs are often publicly available. We employ semantic network analysis (SNA) to assess data seldom analyzed in cybersecurity research – the text of actual advertisements from a prominent CEIO. We examine the content, as well as the scope and scale of the Russian-orchestrated social media campaign. While often described as ‘disinformation,’ our analysis shows that the information utilized in the Russian CEIO was generally factually correct. Further, it appears that African Americans, not white conservatives, were the target demographic that Russia sought to influence. We conclude with speculation, based on our findings, about the likely motives for the CEIO.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"94 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139988582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-22DOI: 10.1177/00223433231211770
Lindsey Pruett, Alex Dyzenhaus, Sabrina Karim, Dao Freeman
During highly uncertain, post-conflict elections, police officers and youth-wing party activists often engage in low-intensity electoral violence, which cannot be readily explained by national-level, institutional, elite-level strategic incentives for violence. Responding to calls to examine ‘non-strategic’ election violence, this article examines both the key actors most likely to perpetrate violence on-the-ground, and the micro-level perceptions underlying their decisions. In post-conflict contexts, police and youth-wing party activists operate within uncertain, information-poor and weakly institutionalized settings. Consequently, their pre-existing attitudes towards the use of violence, democracy, electoral institutions and towards other political actors influence how and when they engage in electoral violence. We proposed two different paths for reducing this uncertainty and improving attitudes: a) civic engagement programs and b) experience with ‘crucial’ elections, which we defined as the first post-conflict election following the withdrawal of external guarantors of electoral security. We employed a unique, locally led field experiment and panel data collected during the 2017 Liberian election to demonstrate how a ‘crucial election’ improved attitudes of both police and youth activists, while civic engagement programming did not. The findings suggested that elections following major structural reforms may reinforce democratization by improving the attitudes of the actors most likely to participate in violence.
{"title":"Election violence prevention during democratic transitions: A field experiment with youth and police in Liberia","authors":"Lindsey Pruett, Alex Dyzenhaus, Sabrina Karim, Dao Freeman","doi":"10.1177/00223433231211770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231211770","url":null,"abstract":"During highly uncertain, post-conflict elections, police officers and youth-wing party activists often engage in low-intensity electoral violence, which cannot be readily explained by national-level, institutional, elite-level strategic incentives for violence. Responding to calls to examine ‘non-strategic’ election violence, this article examines both the key actors most likely to perpetrate violence on-the-ground, and the micro-level perceptions underlying their decisions. In post-conflict contexts, police and youth-wing party activists operate within uncertain, information-poor and weakly institutionalized settings. Consequently, their pre-existing attitudes towards the use of violence, democracy, electoral institutions and towards other political actors influence how and when they engage in electoral violence. We proposed two different paths for reducing this uncertainty and improving attitudes: a) civic engagement programs and b) experience with ‘crucial’ elections, which we defined as the first post-conflict election following the withdrawal of external guarantors of electoral security. We employed a unique, locally led field experiment and panel data collected during the 2017 Liberian election to demonstrate how a ‘crucial election’ improved attitudes of both police and youth activists, while civic engagement programming did not. The findings suggested that elections following major structural reforms may reinforce democratization by improving the attitudes of the actors most likely to participate in violence.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-22DOI: 10.1177/00223433241226559
Nadiya Kostyuk
Understanding the diffusion of military capabilities is a central issue in international relations. Despite this, only a few works attempt to explain this phenomenon, focusing on threats. This article explains why threats alone cannot account for cybercapacity-development diffusion and introduces a more consistent explanation: the role of alliances. Allies with cybercapacity help partner-countries without cybercapacity start developing their own capacity to increase the alliance’s overall security by reducing mutual vulnerabilities in cyberspace. Partner-countries that lack cybercapacity are eager to accept this option because it is more favorable than developing cybercapacity on their own. Partner-countries may also start investing in cybersecurity to reduce the likelihood of being abandoned in other, conventional, domains. My new cross-sectional time-series dataset on indicators of a state’s cybercapacity-development initiation for 2000–18 provides robust empirical support for this argument and offers important implications for scholarship on arms, allies, and diffusion.
{"title":"Allies and diffusion of state military cybercapacity","authors":"Nadiya Kostyuk","doi":"10.1177/00223433241226559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241226559","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the diffusion of military capabilities is a central issue in international relations. Despite this, only a few works attempt to explain this phenomenon, focusing on threats. This article explains why threats alone cannot account for cybercapacity-development diffusion and introduces a more consistent explanation: the role of alliances. Allies with cybercapacity help partner-countries without cybercapacity start developing their own capacity to increase the alliance’s overall security by reducing mutual vulnerabilities in cyberspace. Partner-countries that lack cybercapacity are eager to accept this option because it is more favorable than developing cybercapacity on their own. Partner-countries may also start investing in cybersecurity to reduce the likelihood of being abandoned in other, conventional, domains. My new cross-sectional time-series dataset on indicators of a state’s cybercapacity-development initiation for 2000–18 provides robust empirical support for this argument and offers important implications for scholarship on arms, allies, and diffusion.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-22DOI: 10.1177/00223433231220272
Yelena Biberman, Christopher B Mann
What is the relationship between governance and security? What impact, if any, does state presence have on civilians’ perceptions of security in militarized conflict zones? The existing literature suggests that government control over a restive region means order and security for the local population. We propose a ‘mental mapping’ framework for the relationship between state presence and security perceptions in militarized ethnic peripheries, drawing on prior research in urban planning about how attitudes are shaped by living environments. We use a survey experiment to measure the effect of the physical presence of government institutions on civilians’ sense of how safe they imagine their city to be, demonstrating a mental mapping mechanism between the physical presence of the state and perceptions of safety. We show that residents who encounter images of state institutions on a map of Srinagar – the largest city and summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, India – are more likely to perceive their city as less secure than those who encounter a map without images or a placebo map. This experimental evidence implies that government security presence is not always perceived as security by the civilian population.
{"title":"The effects of state presence on the mental mapping of security: Evidence from an experiment in Kashmir","authors":"Yelena Biberman, Christopher B Mann","doi":"10.1177/00223433231220272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231220272","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relationship between governance and security? What impact, if any, does state presence have on civilians’ perceptions of security in militarized conflict zones? The existing literature suggests that government control over a restive region means order and security for the local population. We propose a ‘mental mapping’ framework for the relationship between state presence and security perceptions in militarized ethnic peripheries, drawing on prior research in urban planning about how attitudes are shaped by living environments. We use a survey experiment to measure the effect of the physical presence of government institutions on civilians’ sense of how safe they imagine their city to be, demonstrating a mental mapping mechanism between the physical presence of the state and perceptions of safety. We show that residents who encounter images of state institutions on a map of Srinagar – the largest city and summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, India – are more likely to perceive their city as less secure than those who encounter a map without images or a placebo map. This experimental evidence implies that government security presence is not always perceived as security by the civilian population.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-20DOI: 10.1177/00223433231219440
Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, Sam Whitt
Cyber operations ranging from deception and espionage to disruption and high-end degradation have become a central feature of modern statecraft in the digital age, yet we lack a clear understanding of how decision-makers employ and respond to cyber operations in times of crisis. Our research provides theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence for understanding how decision-makers react to cyber triggers and utilize cyber responses during crises. Specifically, we argue that the availability of cyber response creates off-ramps for non-escalatory engagement. Based on experimental wargames involving rival states with power parity in militarized disputes and randomized cyber triggers and response options, we find the availability of cyber response options reduces escalatory behavior via a substitution mechanism. In the absence of cyber response options, however, participants pursue more conventional, escalatory actions, regardless of the triggering mechanism. Our findings underscore how enhancing the availability of cyber response options might reduce strategic escalation risks and offer the space to bargain during periods of conflict.
{"title":"How cyber operations can reduce escalation pressures: Evidence from an experimental wargame study","authors":"Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, Sam Whitt","doi":"10.1177/00223433231219440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231219440","url":null,"abstract":"Cyber operations ranging from deception and espionage to disruption and high-end degradation have become a central feature of modern statecraft in the digital age, yet we lack a clear understanding of how decision-makers employ and respond to cyber operations in times of crisis. Our research provides theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence for understanding how decision-makers react to cyber triggers and utilize cyber responses during crises. Specifically, we argue that the availability of cyber response creates off-ramps for non-escalatory engagement. Based on experimental wargames involving rival states with power parity in militarized disputes and randomized cyber triggers and response options, we find the availability of cyber response options reduces escalatory behavior via a substitution mechanism. In the absence of cyber response options, however, participants pursue more conventional, escalatory actions, regardless of the triggering mechanism. Our findings underscore how enhancing the availability of cyber response options might reduce strategic escalation risks and offer the space to bargain during periods of conflict.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"51 12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433231217687
Harry Oppenheimer
Social scientists do not directly study cyberattacks; they draw inferences from attack reports that are public and visible. Like human rights violations or war casualties, there are missing cyberattacks that researchers have not observed. The existing approach is to either ignore missing data and assume they do not exist or argue that reported attacks accurately represent the missing events. This article is the first to detail the steps between attack, discovery and public report to identify sources of bias in cyber data. Visibility bias presents significant inferential challenges for cybersecurity – some attacks are easy to observe or claimed by attackers, while others take a long time to surface or are carried out by actors seeking to hide their actions. The article argues that missing attacks in public reporting likely share features of reported attacks that take the longest to surface. It builds on datasets of cyberattacks by or against Five Eyes (an intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) governments and adds new data on when attacks occurred, when the media first reported them, and the characteristics of attackers and techniques. Leveraging survival models, it demonstrates how the delay between attack and disclosure depends on both the attacker’s identity (state or non-state) and the technical characteristics of the attack (whether it targets information confidentiality, integrity, or availability). The article argues that missing cybersecurity events are least likely to be carried out by non-state actors or target information availability. Our understanding of ‘persistent engagement,’ relative capabilities, ‘intelligence contests’ and cyber coercion rely on accurately measuring restraint. This article’s findings cast significant doubt on whether researchers have accurately measured and observed restraint, and informs how others should consider external validity. This article has implications for our understanding of data bias, empirical cybersecurity research and secrecy in international relations.
{"title":"How the process of discovering cyberattacks biases our understanding of cybersecurity","authors":"Harry Oppenheimer","doi":"10.1177/00223433231217687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231217687","url":null,"abstract":"Social scientists do not directly study cyberattacks; they draw inferences from attack reports that are public and visible. Like human rights violations or war casualties, there are missing cyberattacks that researchers have not observed. The existing approach is to either ignore missing data and assume they do not exist or argue that reported attacks accurately represent the missing events. This article is the first to detail the steps between attack, discovery and public report to identify sources of bias in cyber data. Visibility bias presents significant inferential challenges for cybersecurity – some attacks are easy to observe or claimed by attackers, while others take a long time to surface or are carried out by actors seeking to hide their actions. The article argues that missing attacks in public reporting likely share features of reported attacks that take the longest to surface. It builds on datasets of cyberattacks by or against Five Eyes (an intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) governments and adds new data on when attacks occurred, when the media first reported them, and the characteristics of attackers and techniques. Leveraging survival models, it demonstrates how the delay between attack and disclosure depends on both the attacker’s identity (state or non-state) and the technical characteristics of the attack (whether it targets information confidentiality, integrity, or availability). The article argues that missing cybersecurity events are least likely to be carried out by non-state actors or target information availability. Our understanding of ‘persistent engagement,’ relative capabilities, ‘intelligence contests’ and cyber coercion rely on accurately measuring restraint. This article’s findings cast significant doubt on whether researchers have accurately measured and observed restraint, and informs how others should consider external validity. This article has implications for our understanding of data bias, empirical cybersecurity research and secrecy in international relations.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.1177/00223433231211766
Johannes Karreth, Jaroslav Tir, Jason Quinn, Madhav Joshi
Recent research shows that comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are effective in ending civil wars and improving post-conflict conditions, but CPAs emerge in only a fraction of civil wars. This study provides systematic evidence about the origins of CPAs and the role of international actors in facilitating their signing. We argue that mediation is more likely to be successful and that CPAs are more likely to emerge in those civil war countries that are members in a higher number of IGOs with high economic leverage. Using their financial and institutional leverage, these IGOs can help the combatants overcome the credible commitment problems associated with entering into mediation, and with making sufficient concessions and compromises to reach and sign a CPA. Analyzing all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2011, we find that a conflict country’s memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage increase the odds of (1) mediation occurring and (2) mediation subsequently leading to the signing of CPAs. This finding is robust to common sources of spurious relationships between international institutions and the behavior of conflict parties. Participating in IGOs with high economic leverage carries important positive consequences for civil war management and enhances the impact of mediation on getting conflict parties to sign CPAs.
{"title":"Civil war mediation in the shadow of IGOs: The path to comprehensive peace agreements","authors":"Johannes Karreth, Jaroslav Tir, Jason Quinn, Madhav Joshi","doi":"10.1177/00223433231211766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231211766","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research shows that comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are effective in ending civil wars and improving post-conflict conditions, but CPAs emerge in only a fraction of civil wars. This study provides systematic evidence about the origins of CPAs and the role of international actors in facilitating their signing. We argue that mediation is more likely to be successful and that CPAs are more likely to emerge in those civil war countries that are members in a higher number of IGOs with high economic leverage. Using their financial and institutional leverage, these IGOs can help the combatants overcome the credible commitment problems associated with entering into mediation, and with making sufficient concessions and compromises to reach and sign a CPA. Analyzing all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2011, we find that a conflict country’s memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage increase the odds of (1) mediation occurring and (2) mediation subsequently leading to the signing of CPAs. This finding is robust to common sources of spurious relationships between international institutions and the behavior of conflict parties. Participating in IGOs with high economic leverage carries important positive consequences for civil war management and enhances the impact of mediation on getting conflict parties to sign CPAs.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.1177/00223433231211762
Fahd Humayun
Can representation in foreign policy deliberations – in particular, increased female representation – impact deliberators’ support for interstate conflict resolution? While existing work on gender representation in IR suggests that increased female representation should moderate intragroup hawkishness, making conflict resolution more viable, I offer empirical evidence that qualifies this idea, based on a survey experiment on 149 male and 55 female elite Pakistani legislators. Politicians of both sexes were randomly assigned to ‘listen in’ on a hypothetical national security deliberation that was either all-male or gender-mixed. I find that politicians’ decisionmaking in these hypothetical committees was informed simultaneously by notions of committee competence and by inferences about the social desirability of hawkish outcomes in deliberative settings. Specifically, respondents assigned to gender-mixed committees became less supportive of external conflict resolution. I show how different mechanisms accounted for this increased hawkishness for men and women. Female politicians assigned to gender-mixed committees became more conscious and wary of how their participation, the result of increased representation, would be perceived, compelling them to opt for more hawkish policies. Male politicians, in contrast, attempted to overcompensate for the increased visibility of female representation by resorting to greater levels of aggression.
{"title":"Gendering hawkishness in the war room: Evidence from Pakistani politicians","authors":"Fahd Humayun","doi":"10.1177/00223433231211762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231211762","url":null,"abstract":"Can representation in foreign policy deliberations – in particular, increased female representation – impact deliberators’ support for interstate conflict resolution? While existing work on gender representation in IR suggests that increased female representation should moderate intragroup hawkishness, making conflict resolution more viable, I offer empirical evidence that qualifies this idea, based on a survey experiment on 149 male and 55 female elite Pakistani legislators. Politicians of both sexes were randomly assigned to ‘listen in’ on a hypothetical national security deliberation that was either all-male or gender-mixed. I find that politicians’ decisionmaking in these hypothetical committees was informed simultaneously by notions of committee competence and by inferences about the social desirability of hawkish outcomes in deliberative settings. Specifically, respondents assigned to gender-mixed committees became less supportive of external conflict resolution. I show how different mechanisms accounted for this increased hawkishness for men and women. Female politicians assigned to gender-mixed committees became more conscious and wary of how their participation, the result of increased representation, would be perceived, compelling them to opt for more hawkish policies. Male politicians, in contrast, attempted to overcompensate for the increased visibility of female representation by resorting to greater levels of aggression.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-31DOI: 10.1177/00223433231220264
Christos Makridis, Lennart Maschmeyer, Max Smeets
What determines media coverage on cyber conflict (CC)? Media bias fostering misperception is a well-established problem in conflict reporting. Because of the secrecy and complexity surrounding cyber operations (COs), where most data moreover come from marketing publications by private sector firms, this problem is likely to be especially pronounced in reporting on cyber threats. Because media reporting shapes public perception, such bias can shape conflict dynamics and outcomes with potentially destabilizing consequences. Yet little research has examined media bias systematically. This study connects existing literature on media reporting bias with the CC literature to formulate four theoretical explanations for variation in reporting on COs based on four corresponding characteristics of a CO. We introduce a new dataset of COs reporting by the private sector, which we call the Cyber Conflict Media Coverage Dataset, and media reporting on each of these operations. Consequently, we conduct a statistical analysis to identify which of these characteristics correlate with reporting quantity. This analysis shows that the use of novel techniques, specifically zero-day exploits, is a highly significant predictor of coverage quantity. Operations targeting the military or financial sector generate less coverage. We also find that cyber effect operations tend to receive more coverage compared to espionage, but this result is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the predictive models explain limited variation in news coverage. These findings indicate that COs are treated differently in the media than other forms of conflict, and help explain persistent threat perception among the public despite the absence of catastrophic cyberattacks.
是什么决定了媒体对网络冲突 (CC) 的报道？媒体偏见造成误解是冲突报道中一个公认的问题。由于网络行动（CO）的保密性和复杂性，而且大多数数据来自私营企业的营销出版物，因此这一问题在有关网络威胁的报道中可能尤为突出。由于媒体报道会影响公众的看法，因此这种偏见可能会影响冲突的态势和结果，从而造成潜在的不稳定后果。然而，很少有研究对媒体偏见进行系统研究。本研究将有关媒体报道偏见的现有文献与有关冲突的文献联系起来，根据冲突的四个相应特征，提出了有关冲突报道差异的四种理论解释。我们引入了一个新的数据集，即网络冲突媒体报道数据集（Cyber Conflict Media Coverage Dataset），该数据集包含了私营部门对 CO 的报道，以及媒体对这些行动的报道。因此，我们进行了统计分析，以确定这些特征中哪些与报道数量相关。分析表明，新技术的使用，特别是零日漏洞的使用，是预测报道数量的一个非常重要的因素。针对军事或金融部门的行动产生的报道较少。我们还发现，与间谍活动相比，网络效应行动往往得到更多的报道，但这一结果在统计上并不显著。尽管如此，预测模型仍能解释新闻报道中的有限差异。这些发现表明，与其他形式的冲突相比，媒体对 COs 的处理方式有所不同，这也有助于解释为什么尽管没有发生灾难性的网络攻击，但公众对 COs 的威胁感依然存在。
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