Pub Date : 2024-05-18DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231868
Kathrin Bachleitner
While the international arena is littered with events of war and atrocities, the memory of the Holocaust was institutionalized as the ultimate benchmark of human suffering within the liberal world order. Against the backdrop of such a global memory landscape, this article explores how different memories of trauma interact. Building on literature within international relations, sociology and social psychology, as well as survey data collected from a sample of Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis, its analysis explores how victims of political violence compare their suffering with that of others and why such comparisons slip easily into competition. The analysis found that individuals were competitive with their memories when they showed high levels of patriotic attachment and a real and perceived, yet unrecognized, sense of victimhood. This article thus offers insight into a key issue in peace and conflict studies: the links between traumatic memory, victimhood, international recognition and conflict.
{"title":"Trauma in world politics: Memory dynamics between different victim groups","authors":"Kathrin Bachleitner","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231868","url":null,"abstract":"While the international arena is littered with events of war and atrocities, the memory of the Holocaust was institutionalized as the ultimate benchmark of human suffering within the liberal world order. Against the backdrop of such a global memory landscape, this article explores how different memories of trauma interact. Building on literature within international relations, sociology and social psychology, as well as survey data collected from a sample of Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis, its analysis explores how victims of political violence compare their suffering with that of others and why such comparisons slip easily into competition. The analysis found that individuals were competitive with their memories when they showed high levels of patriotic attachment and a real and perceived, yet unrecognized, sense of victimhood. This article thus offers insight into a key issue in peace and conflict studies: the links between traumatic memory, victimhood, international recognition and conflict.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"121 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-18DOI: 10.1177/00223433241243194
Roseanne W McManus, Tuba Sendinç
When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.
{"title":"Sending the B team: The impact of lesser signals of resolve","authors":"Roseanne W McManus, Tuba Sendinç","doi":"10.1177/00223433241243194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241243194","url":null,"abstract":"When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231865
Andrew Kenealy
This article theoretically clarifies and presents the first large-N empirical support for a centuries-old intuition: that democracies are slow to use violent military force. It argues that democratic and nondemocratic state leaders managing interstate crises experience trade-offs over when to respond, and that democratic institutions incentivize democrats that consider violent military force to delay. The article presents a simplified account of leader choice during crisis and highlights two mechanisms rooted in external and internal politics that may drive delay. Analyses of nearly 950 states experiencing crisis provide support for expectations. Democracy is associated with a roughly 40% lower likelihood of responding to a crisis at any given point in time, conditional on responding with violence. Two illustrative case studies probe the plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. Taken together, the theory and findings illuminate the processes leaders engage as they consider abandoning negotiating tables at home and abroad in favor of the battlefield.
{"title":"The democratic patience","authors":"Andrew Kenealy","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231865","url":null,"abstract":"This article theoretically clarifies and presents the first large-N empirical support for a centuries-old intuition: that democracies are slow to use violent military force. It argues that democratic and nondemocratic state leaders managing interstate crises experience trade-offs over when to respond, and that democratic institutions incentivize democrats that consider violent military force to delay. The article presents a simplified account of leader choice during crisis and highlights two mechanisms rooted in external and internal politics that may drive delay. Analyses of nearly 950 states experiencing crisis provide support for expectations. Democracy is associated with a roughly 40% lower likelihood of responding to a crisis at any given point in time, conditional on responding with violence. Two illustrative case studies probe the plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. Taken together, the theory and findings illuminate the processes leaders engage as they consider abandoning negotiating tables at home and abroad in favor of the battlefield.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"122 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140910669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1177/00223433241235852
Miguel Alberto Gomez, Gregory H Winger
The transnational nature of cyberspace alters the role of third-party countries (TPCs) in international conflict. In the conventional environment, military operations are primarily confined to the boundaries of the combatants or a designated war zone. However, during cyber conflicts, operations may occur on the digital infrastructure of states not otherwise involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, within the cyber conflict literature, little is said about TPCs who, by virtue of interconnectivity, may find themselves involved in a conflict not of their own making. Consequently, we examine the political and diplomatic hazards of cyber operations involving these actors. Through survey experiments involving participants from the United Kingdom and Canada, we assess the public opinion impact of an offensive cyber operation’s revelation on a TPC population. We find that while these incidents are viewed negatively, prior authorization and the involvement of an ally reduces this tendency. Such conditions lead the public to perceive these operations as corresponding with their national interest while suppressing fears of the possible consequences following their indirect involvement.
{"title":"Third-party countries in cyber conflict: Public opinion and conflict spillover in cyberspace","authors":"Miguel Alberto Gomez, Gregory H Winger","doi":"10.1177/00223433241235852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241235852","url":null,"abstract":"The transnational nature of cyberspace alters the role of third-party countries (TPCs) in international conflict. In the conventional environment, military operations are primarily confined to the boundaries of the combatants or a designated war zone. However, during cyber conflicts, operations may occur on the digital infrastructure of states not otherwise involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, within the cyber conflict literature, little is said about TPCs who, by virtue of interconnectivity, may find themselves involved in a conflict not of their own making. Consequently, we examine the political and diplomatic hazards of cyber operations involving these actors. Through survey experiments involving participants from the United Kingdom and Canada, we assess the public opinion impact of an offensive cyber operation’s revelation on a TPC population. We find that while these incidents are viewed negatively, prior authorization and the involvement of an ally reduces this tendency. Such conditions lead the public to perceive these operations as corresponding with their national interest while suppressing fears of the possible consequences following their indirect involvement.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"163 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140910673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-06DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231177
Gabriele Pinto
International football matches are among the highest manifestations of national pride and unity that a country can have in peaceful times. However, some anecdotal evidence suggests that when things go wrong (e.g. when the national team loses), the euphoria surrounding these events can easily turn into xenophobic outbursts. We propose a conceptual framework and an empirical analysis to explain whether sports nationalism can fuel xenophobic behavior and attacks against immigrants. Leveraging on new soccer data from Germany and quasi-experimental econometric techniques, we show the existence of a causal nexus between the national team’s performance in prominent international competitions and shifts in nationalist tendencies and xenophobic behaviors against immigrants. In the immediate days following a defeat of the German national team, there is a significant increase in the number of attacks against immigrants in the country. The opposite happens following a victory. Through a variety of robustness tests and different specifications, we show that the effect is specific to attacks against immigrants and not due to a general increase in violent behavior observed in other studies. Finally, we investigate potential underlying mechanisms by looking at the effect of football matches on reported mood and attitudes against immigrants.
{"title":"Sports nationalism and xenophobia: When cheering turns into violence","authors":"Gabriele Pinto","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231177","url":null,"abstract":"International football matches are among the highest manifestations of national pride and unity that a country can have in peaceful times. However, some anecdotal evidence suggests that when things go wrong (e.g. when the national team loses), the euphoria surrounding these events can easily turn into xenophobic outbursts. We propose a conceptual framework and an empirical analysis to explain whether sports nationalism can fuel xenophobic behavior and attacks against immigrants. Leveraging on new soccer data from Germany and quasi-experimental econometric techniques, we show the existence of a causal nexus between the national team’s performance in prominent international competitions and shifts in nationalist tendencies and xenophobic behaviors against immigrants. In the immediate days following a defeat of the German national team, there is a significant increase in the number of attacks against immigrants in the country. The opposite happens following a victory. Through a variety of robustness tests and different specifications, we show that the effect is specific to attacks against immigrants and not due to a general increase in violent behavior observed in other studies. Finally, we investigate potential underlying mechanisms by looking at the effect of football matches on reported mood and attitudes against immigrants.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140845960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231844
Frederik Gremler, Nils B Weidmann
With the increasing relevance of ethnic groups as political actors, the literature has attempted to identify and study the ethnic organizations representing these groups. How do these organizations use digital communication channels to reach their domestic and international audiences? To enable research on these questions, this article introduces the Ethnic Organizations Online dataset, a new data collection focusing on the online channels that ethnic organizations use. The dataset includes four types of channels: Twitter (since July 2023, rebranded by Elon Musk as X); Facebook; Instagram; and regular websites. It relies on the Ethnic Power Relations – Organizations database, and is therefore compatible with an entire family of datasets on ethnic politics. Featuring more than 2000 online channels used by 265 groups, it allows researchers to study a wide variety of questions related to digital ethnic mobilization. The article presents three examples of how the dataset can be used. We study: (a) how a group’s political goals influence social media adoption; (b) how elections impact the organizations’ communication frequency and how this differs between democracies and autocracies; and (c) how the power status of a group affects the content of their communication. We provide replication codes facilitating the use of the dataset in applied research.
{"title":"Ethnic politics via digital means: Introducing the Ethnic Organizations Online dataset","authors":"Frederik Gremler, Nils B Weidmann","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231844","url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing relevance of ethnic groups as political actors, the literature has attempted to identify and study the ethnic organizations representing these groups. How do these organizations use digital communication channels to reach their domestic and international audiences? To enable research on these questions, this article introduces the Ethnic Organizations Online dataset, a new data collection focusing on the online channels that ethnic organizations use. The dataset includes four types of channels: Twitter (since July 2023, rebranded by Elon Musk as X); Facebook; Instagram; and regular websites. It relies on the Ethnic Power Relations – Organizations database, and is therefore compatible with an entire family of datasets on ethnic politics. Featuring more than 2000 online channels used by 265 groups, it allows researchers to study a wide variety of questions related to digital ethnic mobilization. The article presents three examples of how the dataset can be used. We study: (a) how a group’s political goals influence social media adoption; (b) how elections impact the organizations’ communication frequency and how this differs between democracies and autocracies; and (c) how the power status of a group affects the content of their communication. We provide replication codes facilitating the use of the dataset in applied research.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140808504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-15DOI: 10.1177/00223433231225162
Svetla Ben-Itzhak
The future of international cooperation in outer space was questioned when, in January 2022, Russia announced that it intended to leave the International Space Station (ISS) in 2024. A symbol of post-Cold War reconciliation, the station has linked Washington and Moscow even when relations on the ground frayed. The ISS has become a bedrock of international cooperation, having welcomed 276 individuals from 22 countries since it was first put in orbit in 1998. Russia’s announced departure from the ISS alarmed proponents of international cooperation in space. Its actions, however, do not signal an end but a new phase in international cooperative dynamics in space. This article examines international cooperation in outer space from 1958 until 2023. Using network analysis, it quantifies cooperative relations between states on space matters to examine the current state of international cooperation in space and its evolving dynamics. It finds that international cooperation in space has become increasingly defined by the emergence of distinct clusters of states, termed ‘space blocs’. Recent patterns of international cooperation in space markedly deviate from past dynamics in three key aspects. First, since 2008, distinct, bound space blocs can be clearly detected. Second, the internal composition of recent space blocs has become increasingly reflective of geopolitical affinities and strategic considerations on the ground. Third, although highly bound and distinct, the more recent space blocs are not entirely isolated and have not instituted any exclusionary practices, which is promising for the future of international space cooperation.
{"title":"Network analysis of international cooperation in space 1958–2023: Evidence of space blocs","authors":"Svetla Ben-Itzhak","doi":"10.1177/00223433231225162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231225162","url":null,"abstract":"The future of international cooperation in outer space was questioned when, in January 2022, Russia announced that it intended to leave the International Space Station (ISS) in 2024. A symbol of post-Cold War reconciliation, the station has linked Washington and Moscow even when relations on the ground frayed. The ISS has become a bedrock of international cooperation, having welcomed 276 individuals from 22 countries since it was first put in orbit in 1998. Russia’s announced departure from the ISS alarmed proponents of international cooperation in space. Its actions, however, do not signal an end but a new phase in international cooperative dynamics in space. This article examines international cooperation in outer space from 1958 until 2023. Using network analysis, it quantifies cooperative relations between states on space matters to examine the current state of international cooperation in space and its evolving dynamics. It finds that international cooperation in space has become increasingly defined by the emergence of distinct clusters of states, termed ‘space blocs’. Recent patterns of international cooperation in space markedly deviate from past dynamics in three key aspects. First, since 2008, distinct, bound space blocs can be clearly detected. Second, the internal composition of recent space blocs has become increasingly reflective of geopolitical affinities and strategic considerations on the ground. Third, although highly bound and distinct, the more recent space blocs are not entirely isolated and have not instituted any exclusionary practices, which is promising for the future of international space cooperation.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140557286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-12DOI: 10.1177/00223433231221447
Hye-Ryoung Jung
This article has two aims: (1) to identify the causal effect of income inequality on civil conflict and (2) to find the mechanism in which disadvantaged individuals can mobilize collective violence. Applying the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stopler-Samuelson theorems, this study hypothesizes that workers in land-rich countries – those who face contracted demand in the labor market and consequently a larger income disparity – will have a lower opportunity cost to engage in conflict as trade expands. Exploiting exogenous spatial variation in inequality due to the country’s factor endowment, together with time variation in tariffs arising from the economic liberalization, the work of this research documents a statistically significant and economically meaningful causal effect of inequality on civil conflict. Secondly, to identify the mobilizing effect of inequality, I test whether higher disparity in income distribution within an ethnic group breeds more rebellions initiated by the group. Esteban and Ray’s model claims that an increase in income inequality within an ethnic group makes collective violence more likely, because the poor within the group provide conflict labor, and the rich within the group provide resources for violence. By merging international census data that cover 115 million individuals from 221 ethnic groups with the groups’ conflict records, the analysis empirically identifies that when holding total ethnic income constant, within-group inequality that is proxied by the unemployment rate is strongly correlated with the group’s propensity to initiate armed conflicts. Shedding new light on the prevailing scholarly discord that exclusively chooses either one of class and ethnic cleavages as sources of intrastate violence, the findings of this study imply that if trade-induced labor market shocks increase within-group inequality, it motivates workers to participate in rebellions by lowering their opportunity cost of fighting and mobilizes ethnic collective violence by allowing the ethnic leaders to recruit combatants at a lower cost.
{"title":"The motivating and mobilizing effects of inequality on civil conflict: Focusing on trade-induced labor market shocks","authors":"Hye-Ryoung Jung","doi":"10.1177/00223433231221447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231221447","url":null,"abstract":"This article has two aims: (1) to identify the causal effect of income inequality on civil conflict and (2) to find the mechanism in which disadvantaged individuals can mobilize collective violence. Applying the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stopler-Samuelson theorems, this study hypothesizes that workers in land-rich countries – those who face contracted demand in the labor market and consequently a larger income disparity – will have a lower opportunity cost to engage in conflict as trade expands. Exploiting exogenous spatial variation in inequality due to the country’s factor endowment, together with time variation in tariffs arising from the economic liberalization, the work of this research documents a statistically significant and economically meaningful causal effect of inequality on civil conflict. Secondly, to identify the mobilizing effect of inequality, I test whether higher disparity in income distribution within an ethnic group breeds more rebellions initiated by the group. Esteban and Ray’s model claims that an increase in income inequality within an ethnic group makes collective violence more likely, because the poor within the group provide conflict labor, and the rich within the group provide resources for violence. By merging international census data that cover 115 million individuals from 221 ethnic groups with the groups’ conflict records, the analysis empirically identifies that when holding total ethnic income constant, within-group inequality that is proxied by the unemployment rate is strongly correlated with the group’s propensity to initiate armed conflicts. Shedding new light on the prevailing scholarly discord that exclusively chooses either one of class and ethnic cleavages as sources of intrastate violence, the findings of this study imply that if trade-induced labor market shocks increase within-group inequality, it motivates workers to participate in rebellions by lowering their opportunity cost of fighting and mobilizes ethnic collective violence by allowing the ethnic leaders to recruit combatants at a lower cost.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140551975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433241233960
Amelia C Arsenault, Sarah E Kreps, Keren LG Snider, Daphna Canetti
While conventional terrorism has long been associated with enhanced support for surveillance, scholars have not determined whether variation in the type and outcome of terror attacks, including those emanating from cyberspace, influences public support for these policies. Further, existing studies typically examine public opinion in a single country, thereby failing to investigate cross-national trends in support for surveillance. In this article, we outline a theoretical relationship between cyberattacks and support for surveillance measures and then, through survey experiments conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, explore whether variation in both the type (conventional or cyberterrorism) and outcome (non-lethal or lethal outcomes) of attacks influences support for a range of surveillance tactics. We find that while participants do not base their support for surveillance on attack type or outcome and do not differentiate between surveillance tactics when formulating their preferences, there are considerable cross-national differences in support. Participants from Israel generally responded more favorably to all forms of surveillance, independent of experimental treatment, with British respondents demonstrating high levels of support for CCTV cameras. American respondents, however, were generally less supportive of surveillance measures across treatments, with the differences being most notable in their relative reluctance to support the use of CCTV cameras. These findings have important implications not only for the sustainability of national policies but also for international collaboration to manage emerging risks.
{"title":"Cyber scares and prophylactic policies: Cross-national evidence on the effect of cyberattacks on public support for surveillance","authors":"Amelia C Arsenault, Sarah E Kreps, Keren LG Snider, Daphna Canetti","doi":"10.1177/00223433241233960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241233960","url":null,"abstract":"While conventional terrorism has long been associated with enhanced support for surveillance, scholars have not determined whether variation in the type and outcome of terror attacks, including those emanating from cyberspace, influences public support for these policies. Further, existing studies typically examine public opinion in a single country, thereby failing to investigate cross-national trends in support for surveillance. In this article, we outline a theoretical relationship between cyberattacks and support for surveillance measures and then, through survey experiments conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, explore whether variation in both the type (conventional or cyberterrorism) and outcome (non-lethal or lethal outcomes) of attacks influences support for a range of surveillance tactics. We find that while participants do not base their support for surveillance on attack type or outcome and do not differentiate between surveillance tactics when formulating their preferences, there are considerable cross-national differences in support. Participants from Israel generally responded more favorably to all forms of surveillance, independent of experimental treatment, with British respondents demonstrating high levels of support for CCTV cameras. American respondents, however, were generally less supportive of surveillance measures across treatments, with the differences being most notable in their relative reluctance to support the use of CCTV cameras. These findings have important implications not only for the sustainability of national policies but also for international collaboration to manage emerging risks.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140192827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-15DOI: 10.1177/00223433231215772
Mario Ferrero
The participation of women in armed insurgencies calls into question a widespread belief that women are inherently more peace loving than men on account of their hard-wired caring disposition. To explain why women engage in political violence, existing research either ignores the fundamental collective action problem involved because of motivations focused on the value of the cause, or looks for selective incentives in the form of loot and appropriation, which often cannot be found. This paper offers a simple gendered model of the supply of violence that can account for both peaceful and violent choices and make sense of the apparent extremism of some choices as rational, not fanatical behaviour. Crucially, it regards the individual reward for violence as not material gain, but the possibility of women of breaking out of the cage of traditional gender roles and making a statement by their deeds, thereby joining a cult of heroes and martyrs. For evidence, we turn to the extraordinary involvement of women in the Russian revolutionary movement leading up to the 1917 revolution.
{"title":"Women, political violence and economics","authors":"Mario Ferrero","doi":"10.1177/00223433231215772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231215772","url":null,"abstract":"The participation of women in armed insurgencies calls into question a widespread belief that women are inherently more peace loving than men on account of their hard-wired caring disposition. To explain why women engage in political violence, existing research either ignores the fundamental collective action problem involved because of motivations focused on the value of the cause, or looks for selective incentives in the form of loot and appropriation, which often cannot be found. This paper offers a simple gendered model of the supply of violence that can account for both peaceful and violent choices and make sense of the apparent extremism of some choices as rational, not fanatical behaviour. Crucially, it regards the individual reward for violence as not material gain, but the possibility of women of breaking out of the cage of traditional gender roles and making a statement by their deeds, thereby joining a cult of heroes and martyrs. For evidence, we turn to the extraordinary involvement of women in the Russian revolutionary movement leading up to the 1917 revolution.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140142114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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