Pub Date : 2024-04-12DOI: 10.1177/00223433231221447
Hye-Ryoung Jung
This article has two aims: (1) to identify the causal effect of income inequality on civil conflict and (2) to find the mechanism in which disadvantaged individuals can mobilize collective violence. Applying the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stopler-Samuelson theorems, this study hypothesizes that workers in land-rich countries – those who face contracted demand in the labor market and consequently a larger income disparity – will have a lower opportunity cost to engage in conflict as trade expands. Exploiting exogenous spatial variation in inequality due to the country’s factor endowment, together with time variation in tariffs arising from the economic liberalization, the work of this research documents a statistically significant and economically meaningful causal effect of inequality on civil conflict. Secondly, to identify the mobilizing effect of inequality, I test whether higher disparity in income distribution within an ethnic group breeds more rebellions initiated by the group. Esteban and Ray’s model claims that an increase in income inequality within an ethnic group makes collective violence more likely, because the poor within the group provide conflict labor, and the rich within the group provide resources for violence. By merging international census data that cover 115 million individuals from 221 ethnic groups with the groups’ conflict records, the analysis empirically identifies that when holding total ethnic income constant, within-group inequality that is proxied by the unemployment rate is strongly correlated with the group’s propensity to initiate armed conflicts. Shedding new light on the prevailing scholarly discord that exclusively chooses either one of class and ethnic cleavages as sources of intrastate violence, the findings of this study imply that if trade-induced labor market shocks increase within-group inequality, it motivates workers to participate in rebellions by lowering their opportunity cost of fighting and mobilizes ethnic collective violence by allowing the ethnic leaders to recruit combatants at a lower cost.
{"title":"The motivating and mobilizing effects of inequality on civil conflict: Focusing on trade-induced labor market shocks","authors":"Hye-Ryoung Jung","doi":"10.1177/00223433231221447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231221447","url":null,"abstract":"This article has two aims: (1) to identify the causal effect of income inequality on civil conflict and (2) to find the mechanism in which disadvantaged individuals can mobilize collective violence. Applying the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stopler-Samuelson theorems, this study hypothesizes that workers in land-rich countries – those who face contracted demand in the labor market and consequently a larger income disparity – will have a lower opportunity cost to engage in conflict as trade expands. Exploiting exogenous spatial variation in inequality due to the country’s factor endowment, together with time variation in tariffs arising from the economic liberalization, the work of this research documents a statistically significant and economically meaningful causal effect of inequality on civil conflict. Secondly, to identify the mobilizing effect of inequality, I test whether higher disparity in income distribution within an ethnic group breeds more rebellions initiated by the group. Esteban and Ray’s model claims that an increase in income inequality within an ethnic group makes collective violence more likely, because the poor within the group provide conflict labor, and the rich within the group provide resources for violence. By merging international census data that cover 115 million individuals from 221 ethnic groups with the groups’ conflict records, the analysis empirically identifies that when holding total ethnic income constant, within-group inequality that is proxied by the unemployment rate is strongly correlated with the group’s propensity to initiate armed conflicts. Shedding new light on the prevailing scholarly discord that exclusively chooses either one of class and ethnic cleavages as sources of intrastate violence, the findings of this study imply that if trade-induced labor market shocks increase within-group inequality, it motivates workers to participate in rebellions by lowering their opportunity cost of fighting and mobilizes ethnic collective violence by allowing the ethnic leaders to recruit combatants at a lower cost.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140551975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433241233960
Amelia C Arsenault, Sarah E Kreps, Keren LG Snider, Daphna Canetti
While conventional terrorism has long been associated with enhanced support for surveillance, scholars have not determined whether variation in the type and outcome of terror attacks, including those emanating from cyberspace, influences public support for these policies. Further, existing studies typically examine public opinion in a single country, thereby failing to investigate cross-national trends in support for surveillance. In this article, we outline a theoretical relationship between cyberattacks and support for surveillance measures and then, through survey experiments conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, explore whether variation in both the type (conventional or cyberterrorism) and outcome (non-lethal or lethal outcomes) of attacks influences support for a range of surveillance tactics. We find that while participants do not base their support for surveillance on attack type or outcome and do not differentiate between surveillance tactics when formulating their preferences, there are considerable cross-national differences in support. Participants from Israel generally responded more favorably to all forms of surveillance, independent of experimental treatment, with British respondents demonstrating high levels of support for CCTV cameras. American respondents, however, were generally less supportive of surveillance measures across treatments, with the differences being most notable in their relative reluctance to support the use of CCTV cameras. These findings have important implications not only for the sustainability of national policies but also for international collaboration to manage emerging risks.
{"title":"Cyber scares and prophylactic policies: Cross-national evidence on the effect of cyberattacks on public support for surveillance","authors":"Amelia C Arsenault, Sarah E Kreps, Keren LG Snider, Daphna Canetti","doi":"10.1177/00223433241233960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241233960","url":null,"abstract":"While conventional terrorism has long been associated with enhanced support for surveillance, scholars have not determined whether variation in the type and outcome of terror attacks, including those emanating from cyberspace, influences public support for these policies. Further, existing studies typically examine public opinion in a single country, thereby failing to investigate cross-national trends in support for surveillance. In this article, we outline a theoretical relationship between cyberattacks and support for surveillance measures and then, through survey experiments conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel, explore whether variation in both the type (conventional or cyberterrorism) and outcome (non-lethal or lethal outcomes) of attacks influences support for a range of surveillance tactics. We find that while participants do not base their support for surveillance on attack type or outcome and do not differentiate between surveillance tactics when formulating their preferences, there are considerable cross-national differences in support. Participants from Israel generally responded more favorably to all forms of surveillance, independent of experimental treatment, with British respondents demonstrating high levels of support for CCTV cameras. American respondents, however, were generally less supportive of surveillance measures across treatments, with the differences being most notable in their relative reluctance to support the use of CCTV cameras. These findings have important implications not only for the sustainability of national policies but also for international collaboration to manage emerging risks.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140192827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-15DOI: 10.1177/00223433231215772
Mario Ferrero
The participation of women in armed insurgencies calls into question a widespread belief that women are inherently more peace loving than men on account of their hard-wired caring disposition. To explain why women engage in political violence, existing research either ignores the fundamental collective action problem involved because of motivations focused on the value of the cause, or looks for selective incentives in the form of loot and appropriation, which often cannot be found. This paper offers a simple gendered model of the supply of violence that can account for both peaceful and violent choices and make sense of the apparent extremism of some choices as rational, not fanatical behaviour. Crucially, it regards the individual reward for violence as not material gain, but the possibility of women of breaking out of the cage of traditional gender roles and making a statement by their deeds, thereby joining a cult of heroes and martyrs. For evidence, we turn to the extraordinary involvement of women in the Russian revolutionary movement leading up to the 1917 revolution.
{"title":"Women, political violence and economics","authors":"Mario Ferrero","doi":"10.1177/00223433231215772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231215772","url":null,"abstract":"The participation of women in armed insurgencies calls into question a widespread belief that women are inherently more peace loving than men on account of their hard-wired caring disposition. To explain why women engage in political violence, existing research either ignores the fundamental collective action problem involved because of motivations focused on the value of the cause, or looks for selective incentives in the form of loot and appropriation, which often cannot be found. This paper offers a simple gendered model of the supply of violence that can account for both peaceful and violent choices and make sense of the apparent extremism of some choices as rational, not fanatical behaviour. Crucially, it regards the individual reward for violence as not material gain, but the possibility of women of breaking out of the cage of traditional gender roles and making a statement by their deeds, thereby joining a cult of heroes and martyrs. For evidence, we turn to the extraordinary involvement of women in the Russian revolutionary movement leading up to the 1917 revolution.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140142114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-08DOI: 10.1177/00223433231215785
Jordan Becker, Seth Benson, J Paul Dunne, Edmund Malesky
Theoretical and empirical research on causes and consequences of defense spending is plentiful. Most of this research uses ‘top line’ defense spending data, either as a share of GDP or as a raw monetary figure. Empirical research has been limited, however, by the ‘blunt’ nature of this data, which does not help to explain what countries are spending on. We introduce a dataset that provides information on disaggregated defense spending from 35 NATO and EU members over as many as 51 years. We discuss the main features of this data in the paper, and the replication files will enable other scholars to automate accessing it in the future. In addition to automating the extraction of NATO and European Defence Agency data on overall military expenditures, we make data on equipment, personnel, operating, and infrastructure spending available in a single dataset. We illustrate the utility of the disaggregated defense spending dataset by replicating canonical and newer analyses using both the overall data and its disaggregated components. The findings differ depending on which type of spending is considered. We found that differences in the relationship between national wealth and defense spending depended on the category of spending considered, as did the tendency toward ‘free-riding’. These exercises shed new light on seminal theories on burden-sharing and the political economy of security. Our initial analysis suggests that disaggregating defense spending is likely to improve the analysis of old and emerging research questions of considerable policy importance, and points to several opportunities to do so.
{"title":"Disaggregated defense spending: Introduction to data","authors":"Jordan Becker, Seth Benson, J Paul Dunne, Edmund Malesky","doi":"10.1177/00223433231215785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231215785","url":null,"abstract":"Theoretical and empirical research on causes and consequences of defense spending is plentiful. Most of this research uses ‘top line’ defense spending data, either as a share of GDP or as a raw monetary figure. Empirical research has been limited, however, by the ‘blunt’ nature of this data, which does not help to explain what countries are spending on. We introduce a dataset that provides information on disaggregated defense spending from 35 NATO and EU members over as many as 51 years. We discuss the main features of this data in the paper, and the replication files will enable other scholars to automate accessing it in the future. In addition to automating the extraction of NATO and European Defence Agency data on overall military expenditures, we make data on equipment, personnel, operating, and infrastructure spending available in a single dataset. We illustrate the utility of the disaggregated defense spending dataset by replicating canonical and newer analyses using both the overall data and its disaggregated components. The findings differ depending on which type of spending is considered. We found that differences in the relationship between national wealth and defense spending depended on the category of spending considered, as did the tendency toward ‘free-riding’. These exercises shed new light on seminal theories on burden-sharing and the political economy of security. Our initial analysis suggests that disaggregating defense spending is likely to improve the analysis of old and emerging research questions of considerable policy importance, and points to several opportunities to do so.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-08DOI: 10.1177/00223433231220275
Enzo Nussio, Govinda Clayton
This article introduces the Lynching in Latin America (LYLA) dataset. Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence, but the systematic study of this phenomenon has previously been hampered by a lack of cross-national event data. The LYLA data covers reported lynching incidents across Latin America between 2010 and 2019. In total, it includes 2818 lynching events in 18 countries. The data features information on the alleged wrongdoing that motivated the event, the type of violence deployed, the size of the mob, the exact date of the event and geo-coded coordinates capturing where the event took place at the street level. The LYLA data provides an empirical basis to assess questions concerning the conditions that give rise to lynching, the impact of lynching on communities and social processes, and policies to prevent this form of violence. This article introduces the rationale for the data collection, the coding rules and procedures, and offers an illustrative example of how this data can be used, focusing on state illegitimacy as a key condition for lynching.
{"title":"Introducing the Lynching in Latin America (LYLA) dataset","authors":"Enzo Nussio, Govinda Clayton","doi":"10.1177/00223433231220275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231220275","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces the Lynching in Latin America (LYLA) dataset. Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence, but the systematic study of this phenomenon has previously been hampered by a lack of cross-national event data. The LYLA data covers reported lynching incidents across Latin America between 2010 and 2019. In total, it includes 2818 lynching events in 18 countries. The data features information on the alleged wrongdoing that motivated the event, the type of violence deployed, the size of the mob, the exact date of the event and geo-coded coordinates capturing where the event took place at the street level. The LYLA data provides an empirical basis to assess questions concerning the conditions that give rise to lynching, the impact of lynching on communities and social processes, and policies to prevent this form of violence. This article introduces the rationale for the data collection, the coding rules and procedures, and offers an illustrative example of how this data can be used, focusing on state illegitimacy as a key condition for lynching.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-01Epub Date: 2023-02-09DOI: 10.1177/19433875231155727
Kimberly Oslin, Meryam Shikara, Joshua Yoon, Pharibe Pope, Kelly Bridgham, Suneet Waghmarae, Andrea Hebert, Fan Liang, Kalpesh Vakharia, Natalie Justicz
Study design: Case series.
Objective: This retrospective review of frontal sinus fractures aims to describe our current experience managing these fractures at an urban level I trauma center.
Methods: An institutional database of 2081 patients who presented with maxillofacial fractures on computed tomography face/sinus in 2019 was queried for all patients with traumatic frontal sinus fractures. Demographics, trauma-related history, management approach, and follow-up data were collected and analyzed.
Results: Sixty-three (7.3%) patients had at least one fracture involving the frontal sinus. The most common etiologies were assaults, falls, and motor vehicle accidents. Surgical repair was performed in 26.8% of patients with frontal sinus fractures, and the other 73.2% were observed. Fractures that were displaced, comminuted, obstructive of the frontal sinus outflow tract, or associated with a dural tear or cerebrospinal fluid leak were more likely to be operative.
Conclusions: The majority of frontal sinus fractures in this study were treated with observation. Despite advances in transnasal endoscopic approaches, many surgeons still rely on open approaches to repair frontal sinus fractures.
{"title":"Management of Frontal Sinus Fractures at a Level 1 Trauma Center: Retrospective Study and Review of the Literature.","authors":"Kimberly Oslin, Meryam Shikara, Joshua Yoon, Pharibe Pope, Kelly Bridgham, Suneet Waghmarae, Andrea Hebert, Fan Liang, Kalpesh Vakharia, Natalie Justicz","doi":"10.1177/19433875231155727","DOIUrl":"10.1177/19433875231155727","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Study design: </strong>Case series.</p><p><strong>Objective: </strong>This retrospective review of frontal sinus fractures aims to describe our current experience managing these fractures at an urban level I trauma center.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>An institutional database of 2081 patients who presented with maxillofacial fractures on computed tomography face/sinus in 2019 was queried for all patients with traumatic frontal sinus fractures. Demographics, trauma-related history, management approach, and follow-up data were collected and analyzed.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Sixty-three (7.3%) patients had at least one fracture involving the frontal sinus. The most common etiologies were assaults, falls, and motor vehicle accidents. Surgical repair was performed in 26.8% of patients with frontal sinus fractures, and the other 73.2% were observed. Fractures that were displaced, comminuted, obstructive of the frontal sinus outflow tract, or associated with a dural tear or cerebrospinal fluid leak were more likely to be operative.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>The majority of frontal sinus fractures in this study were treated with observation. Despite advances in transnasal endoscopic approaches, many surgeons still rely on open approaches to repair frontal sinus fractures.</p>","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"59 1","pages":"24-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10874201/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73095361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433231225814
Jelena Vićić, Erik Gartzke
Russia’s cyber-enabled influence operations (CEIO) have garnered significant public, academic and policy interest. 126 million Americans were reportedly exposed to Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US election on Facebook. Indeed, to the extent that such efforts shape political outcomes, they may prove far more consequential than other, more flamboyant forms of cyber conflict. Importantly, CEIOs highlight the human dimension of cyber conflict. Focused on ‘hacking human minds’ and affecting individuals behind keyboards, as opposed to hacking networked systems, CEIOs represent an emergent form of state cyber activity. Importantly, data for studying CEIOs are often publicly available. We employ semantic network analysis (SNA) to assess data seldom analyzed in cybersecurity research – the text of actual advertisements from a prominent CEIO. We examine the content, as well as the scope and scale of the Russian-orchestrated social media campaign. While often described as ‘disinformation,’ our analysis shows that the information utilized in the Russian CEIO was generally factually correct. Further, it appears that African Americans, not white conservatives, were the target demographic that Russia sought to influence. We conclude with speculation, based on our findings, about the likely motives for the CEIO.
{"title":"Cyber-enabled influence operations as a ‘center of gravity’ in cyberconflict: The example of Russian foreign interference in the 2016 US federal election","authors":"Jelena Vićić, Erik Gartzke","doi":"10.1177/00223433231225814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231225814","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s cyber-enabled influence operations (CEIO) have garnered significant public, academic and policy interest. 126 million Americans were reportedly exposed to Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US election on Facebook. Indeed, to the extent that such efforts shape political outcomes, they may prove far more consequential than other, more flamboyant forms of cyber conflict. Importantly, CEIOs highlight the human dimension of cyber conflict. Focused on ‘hacking human minds’ and affecting individuals behind keyboards, as opposed to hacking networked systems, CEIOs represent an emergent form of state cyber activity. Importantly, data for studying CEIOs are often publicly available. We employ semantic network analysis (SNA) to assess data seldom analyzed in cybersecurity research – the text of actual advertisements from a prominent CEIO. We examine the content, as well as the scope and scale of the Russian-orchestrated social media campaign. While often described as ‘disinformation,’ our analysis shows that the information utilized in the Russian CEIO was generally factually correct. Further, it appears that African Americans, not white conservatives, were the target demographic that Russia sought to influence. We conclude with speculation, based on our findings, about the likely motives for the CEIO.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"94 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139988582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-22DOI: 10.1177/00223433231211770
Lindsey Pruett, Alex Dyzenhaus, Sabrina Karim, Dao Freeman
During highly uncertain, post-conflict elections, police officers and youth-wing party activists often engage in low-intensity electoral violence, which cannot be readily explained by national-level, institutional, elite-level strategic incentives for violence. Responding to calls to examine ‘non-strategic’ election violence, this article examines both the key actors most likely to perpetrate violence on-the-ground, and the micro-level perceptions underlying their decisions. In post-conflict contexts, police and youth-wing party activists operate within uncertain, information-poor and weakly institutionalized settings. Consequently, their pre-existing attitudes towards the use of violence, democracy, electoral institutions and towards other political actors influence how and when they engage in electoral violence. We proposed two different paths for reducing this uncertainty and improving attitudes: a) civic engagement programs and b) experience with ‘crucial’ elections, which we defined as the first post-conflict election following the withdrawal of external guarantors of electoral security. We employed a unique, locally led field experiment and panel data collected during the 2017 Liberian election to demonstrate how a ‘crucial election’ improved attitudes of both police and youth activists, while civic engagement programming did not. The findings suggested that elections following major structural reforms may reinforce democratization by improving the attitudes of the actors most likely to participate in violence.
{"title":"Election violence prevention during democratic transitions: A field experiment with youth and police in Liberia","authors":"Lindsey Pruett, Alex Dyzenhaus, Sabrina Karim, Dao Freeman","doi":"10.1177/00223433231211770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231211770","url":null,"abstract":"During highly uncertain, post-conflict elections, police officers and youth-wing party activists often engage in low-intensity electoral violence, which cannot be readily explained by national-level, institutional, elite-level strategic incentives for violence. Responding to calls to examine ‘non-strategic’ election violence, this article examines both the key actors most likely to perpetrate violence on-the-ground, and the micro-level perceptions underlying their decisions. In post-conflict contexts, police and youth-wing party activists operate within uncertain, information-poor and weakly institutionalized settings. Consequently, their pre-existing attitudes towards the use of violence, democracy, electoral institutions and towards other political actors influence how and when they engage in electoral violence. We proposed two different paths for reducing this uncertainty and improving attitudes: a) civic engagement programs and b) experience with ‘crucial’ elections, which we defined as the first post-conflict election following the withdrawal of external guarantors of electoral security. We employed a unique, locally led field experiment and panel data collected during the 2017 Liberian election to demonstrate how a ‘crucial election’ improved attitudes of both police and youth activists, while civic engagement programming did not. The findings suggested that elections following major structural reforms may reinforce democratization by improving the attitudes of the actors most likely to participate in violence.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-22DOI: 10.1177/00223433241226559
Nadiya Kostyuk
Understanding the diffusion of military capabilities is a central issue in international relations. Despite this, only a few works attempt to explain this phenomenon, focusing on threats. This article explains why threats alone cannot account for cybercapacity-development diffusion and introduces a more consistent explanation: the role of alliances. Allies with cybercapacity help partner-countries without cybercapacity start developing their own capacity to increase the alliance’s overall security by reducing mutual vulnerabilities in cyberspace. Partner-countries that lack cybercapacity are eager to accept this option because it is more favorable than developing cybercapacity on their own. Partner-countries may also start investing in cybersecurity to reduce the likelihood of being abandoned in other, conventional, domains. My new cross-sectional time-series dataset on indicators of a state’s cybercapacity-development initiation for 2000–18 provides robust empirical support for this argument and offers important implications for scholarship on arms, allies, and diffusion.
{"title":"Allies and diffusion of state military cybercapacity","authors":"Nadiya Kostyuk","doi":"10.1177/00223433241226559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241226559","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the diffusion of military capabilities is a central issue in international relations. Despite this, only a few works attempt to explain this phenomenon, focusing on threats. This article explains why threats alone cannot account for cybercapacity-development diffusion and introduces a more consistent explanation: the role of alliances. Allies with cybercapacity help partner-countries without cybercapacity start developing their own capacity to increase the alliance’s overall security by reducing mutual vulnerabilities in cyberspace. Partner-countries that lack cybercapacity are eager to accept this option because it is more favorable than developing cybercapacity on their own. Partner-countries may also start investing in cybersecurity to reduce the likelihood of being abandoned in other, conventional, domains. My new cross-sectional time-series dataset on indicators of a state’s cybercapacity-development initiation for 2000–18 provides robust empirical support for this argument and offers important implications for scholarship on arms, allies, and diffusion.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-22DOI: 10.1177/00223433231220272
Yelena Biberman, Christopher B Mann
What is the relationship between governance and security? What impact, if any, does state presence have on civilians’ perceptions of security in militarized conflict zones? The existing literature suggests that government control over a restive region means order and security for the local population. We propose a ‘mental mapping’ framework for the relationship between state presence and security perceptions in militarized ethnic peripheries, drawing on prior research in urban planning about how attitudes are shaped by living environments. We use a survey experiment to measure the effect of the physical presence of government institutions on civilians’ sense of how safe they imagine their city to be, demonstrating a mental mapping mechanism between the physical presence of the state and perceptions of safety. We show that residents who encounter images of state institutions on a map of Srinagar – the largest city and summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, India – are more likely to perceive their city as less secure than those who encounter a map without images or a placebo map. This experimental evidence implies that government security presence is not always perceived as security by the civilian population.
{"title":"The effects of state presence on the mental mapping of security: Evidence from an experiment in Kashmir","authors":"Yelena Biberman, Christopher B Mann","doi":"10.1177/00223433231220272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231220272","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relationship between governance and security? What impact, if any, does state presence have on civilians’ perceptions of security in militarized conflict zones? The existing literature suggests that government control over a restive region means order and security for the local population. We propose a ‘mental mapping’ framework for the relationship between state presence and security perceptions in militarized ethnic peripheries, drawing on prior research in urban planning about how attitudes are shaped by living environments. We use a survey experiment to measure the effect of the physical presence of government institutions on civilians’ sense of how safe they imagine their city to be, demonstrating a mental mapping mechanism between the physical presence of the state and perceptions of safety. We show that residents who encounter images of state institutions on a map of Srinagar – the largest city and summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, India – are more likely to perceive their city as less secure than those who encounter a map without images or a placebo map. This experimental evidence implies that government security presence is not always perceived as security by the civilian population.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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