Pub Date : 2024-07-01Epub Date: 2023-04-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433231153902
Yuleng Zeng
Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce as it renders states incapable of committing to existing peaceful deals. I argue the scope condition hinges on the existing power imbalance and the security externalities of trade, defined as states' abilities to translate trade gains into (potential) military power. For countries where the existing power gap is not extreme, the impact of bilateral strategic trade is contingent upon a country's trade externality relative to its opponent's. Although increased bilateral trade can be peace-promoting when the relative externality is small, the pacifying effects can dissipate as a relatively weaker state becomes more capable of exploiting trade gains. Building on recent work in network analysis, I propose a new measurement of trade externalities to test the above theory and find supporting results.
{"title":"Microchips and sneakers: Bilateral trade, shifting power, and interstate conflict.","authors":"Yuleng Zeng","doi":"10.1177/00223433231153902","DOIUrl":"10.1177/00223433231153902","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce as it renders states incapable of committing to existing peaceful deals. I argue the scope condition hinges on the existing power imbalance and the security externalities of trade, defined as states' abilities to translate trade gains into (potential) military power. For countries where the existing power gap is not extreme, the impact of bilateral strategic trade is contingent upon a country's trade externality relative to its opponent's. Although increased bilateral trade can be peace-promoting when the relative externality is small, the pacifying effects can dissipate as a relatively weaker state becomes more capable of exploiting trade gains. Building on recent work in network analysis, I propose a new measurement of trade externalities to test the above theory and find supporting results.</p>","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11324387/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47913370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-24DOI: 10.1177/00223433241249329
Kyosuke Kikuta, Yuta Kamahara
Although civil war devastates the environment, we still do not understand the role of environmental policies in post-war countries and often have a pessimistic view without empirical evidence. This study challenges this view by arguing that the introduction of independent monitoring mechanisms can make environmental regulations effective even in post-war countries and also by exploiting analytical opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 2011–2013, the government implemented independent monitoring mechanisms to lessen the side effects of mining activities on deforestation. The reform, however, only applied to mining permit zones, which had arbitrary grid-based shapes. This allows combining a geographic regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences to a difference-in-geographic-discontinuity (DiGD) design. With satellite-based data available at every 30 metres for over 40 million cells in the DRC, the analysis indicates that the 2011–2013 reform decreased deforestation rates immediately inside the mining permit zones. The effect existed even in the areas of continuing armed conflicts. Further analysis of causal mechanisms suggests that the 2011–2013 reform facilitated the compliance of existing operators and also screened out incompliant operators. Overall, these findings imply that the environmental effects of civil war can depend on post-war policies — a missing link in the literature on environmental security.
{"title":"Environmental protection after civil war: A difference-in-geographic-discontinuity approach","authors":"Kyosuke Kikuta, Yuta Kamahara","doi":"10.1177/00223433241249329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241249329","url":null,"abstract":"Although civil war devastates the environment, we still do not understand the role of environmental policies in post-war countries and often have a pessimistic view without empirical evidence. This study challenges this view by arguing that the introduction of independent monitoring mechanisms can make environmental regulations effective even in post-war countries and also by exploiting analytical opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 2011–2013, the government implemented independent monitoring mechanisms to lessen the side effects of mining activities on deforestation. The reform, however, only applied to mining permit zones, which had arbitrary grid-based shapes. This allows combining a geographic regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences to a difference-in-geographic-discontinuity (DiGD) design. With satellite-based data available at every 30 metres for over 40 million cells in the DRC, the analysis indicates that the 2011–2013 reform decreased deforestation rates immediately inside the mining permit zones. The effect existed even in the areas of continuing armed conflicts. Further analysis of causal mechanisms suggests that the 2011–2013 reform facilitated the compliance of existing operators and also screened out incompliant operators. Overall, these findings imply that the environmental effects of civil war can depend on post-war policies — a missing link in the literature on environmental security.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141448684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-14DOI: 10.1177/00223433241249328
Morten Egeberg
Well-functioning states are often seen as great pacifiers in the sense that serious societal disputes within their respective territories are usually solved without violence. On the other hand, deep conflicts between states may more easily result in violent situations due to the partly anarchical character of the international system. One could therefore expect that studies of war and peace focused extensively on various ways of organizing interstate relations and the potential for replacing anarchy with political order. However, although several peace studies deal with the role of international organizations (IOs), this research is surprisingly absent in review literature. One reason for this absence may be that findings on the peacemaking role of IOs among member states seem to be ambiguous. The purpose of this review essay is to increase our understanding of under what conditions international institutions could matter in this respect. The fierce debate between realists and institutionalists only marginally touches upon the effect that the various ways of organizing IOs might have on interstate peace. Arguably, the only international organization so far that in its structure and work clearly transcends a basically intergovernmental arrangement is the European Union (EU). This could make the EU, and EU-like structures, more able to avoid polarization along the territorial dimension since its organization structure activates cross-cutting cleavages and a system-wide perspective among policymakers, arguably tying together rather than splitting the system. Interestingly, the peculiar organizational structure of the EU seems very much ignored in the IO literature in general, and in peace research on IOs in particular.
{"title":"International organizations, the EU and peace among member states: Bringing organization structure in","authors":"Morten Egeberg","doi":"10.1177/00223433241249328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241249328","url":null,"abstract":"Well-functioning states are often seen as great pacifiers in the sense that serious societal disputes within their respective territories are usually solved without violence. On the other hand, deep conflicts between states may more easily result in violent situations due to the partly anarchical character of the international system. One could therefore expect that studies of war and peace focused extensively on various ways of organizing interstate relations and the potential for replacing anarchy with political order. However, although several peace studies deal with the role of international organizations (IOs), this research is surprisingly absent in review literature. One reason for this absence may be that findings on the peacemaking role of IOs among member states seem to be ambiguous. The purpose of this review essay is to increase our understanding of under what conditions international institutions could matter in this respect. The fierce debate between realists and institutionalists only marginally touches upon the effect that the various ways of organizing IOs might have on interstate peace. Arguably, the only international organization so far that in its structure and work clearly transcends a basically intergovernmental arrangement is the European Union (EU). This could make the EU, and EU-like structures, more able to avoid polarization along the territorial dimension since its organization structure activates cross-cutting cleavages and a system-wide perspective among policymakers, arguably tying together rather than splitting the system. Interestingly, the peculiar organizational structure of the EU seems very much ignored in the IO literature in general, and in peace research on IOs in particular.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141342638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-09DOI: 10.1177/00223433241254983
Lu Liu, Manuel Eisner
Despite the common perception viewing kidnappings as means to generate ransom income and to obtain political concessions, it remains unclear why kidnappings are disproportionately employed by some violent insurgent groups but not by the others. Combining data from the Global Terrorism Database and the Big Allied and Dangerous Insurgency Dataset, we empirically examined this question with a theoretical focus on the possible role of insurgents’ performance of state-like functions, which may necessitate the use of kidnappings as an illicit form of ‘policing’ and punishment for social control. Our analyses mainly focused on three aspects of quasi-state activities: extraction; provision of public services; and warring activities. A series of negative binomial regressions were conducted to examine the effects of insurgents’ quasi-state activities on their kidnapping activities over a base model with only group capacity and resource factors. We found that the initial effects of territory-control and membership size disappeared when variables measuring quasi-state activities were included into the model. This suggests that the influence of group capacity and resources on kidnappings may be an indirect one via insurgents’ strategic need for coercive control when contending for quasi-state status.
尽管人们普遍认为绑架是赚取赎金和获得政治让步的手段，但仍不清楚为什么一些暴力叛乱组织过多地采用绑架手段，而其他组织却没有。结合全球恐怖主义数据库（Global Terrorism Database）和大型盟国与危险叛乱数据集（Big Allied and Dangerous Insurgency Dataset）的数据，我们对这一问题进行了实证研究，并从理论上关注了叛乱分子履行类似国家职能的可能作用，这可能需要使用绑架作为一种非法的 "维持治安 "和惩罚形式来进行社会控制。我们的分析主要集中在准国家活动的三个方面：榨取、提供公共服务和战争活动。我们进行了一系列负二项回归，以考察叛乱分子的准国家活动对其绑架活动的影响，而基础模型仅包含群体能力和资源因素。我们发现，将衡量准国家活动的变量纳入模型后，领土控制和成员规模的初始效应消失了。这表明，团体能力和资源对绑架活动的影响可能是通过叛乱分子在争夺准国家地位时对强制控制的战略需求而产生的间接影响。
{"title":"Why insurgents engage in kidnappings: A coercive strategy in quasi-state governance and control?","authors":"Lu Liu, Manuel Eisner","doi":"10.1177/00223433241254983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241254983","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the common perception viewing kidnappings as means to generate ransom income and to obtain political concessions, it remains unclear why kidnappings are disproportionately employed by some violent insurgent groups but not by the others. Combining data from the Global Terrorism Database and the Big Allied and Dangerous Insurgency Dataset, we empirically examined this question with a theoretical focus on the possible role of insurgents’ performance of state-like functions, which may necessitate the use of kidnappings as an illicit form of ‘policing’ and punishment for social control. Our analyses mainly focused on three aspects of quasi-state activities: extraction; provision of public services; and warring activities. A series of negative binomial regressions were conducted to examine the effects of insurgents’ quasi-state activities on their kidnapping activities over a base model with only group capacity and resource factors. We found that the initial effects of territory-control and membership size disappeared when variables measuring quasi-state activities were included into the model. This suggests that the influence of group capacity and resources on kidnappings may be an indirect one via insurgents’ strategic need for coercive control when contending for quasi-state status.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141366672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433241243178
Omer Zarpli, Dursun Peksen
Do elections matter for sanction effectiveness? Scholars have long highlighted the importance of domestic political factors in target (i.e. sanctioned) states in explaining when economic sanctions work. This line of research, however, has primarily focused on political regime characteristics and interest groups that are relatively low time-variant during sanction episodes. Building on this literature, we explore the effect of temporal proximity to elections. While the impact of elections have been examined in the context of military conflicts, their possible effects on sanction effectiveness have not been subject to systematic scrutiny. We argue that target governments are more likely to comply with sender demands as elections loom near in order to avoid the likely political costs of sanctions. The effect of elections, however, is likely to vary across different election characteristics and political regime types. We assess the empirical merits of our claims using data on over 1,000 sanction cases between 1950 and 2020. The results from a battery of empirical tests, including those that account for potential selection bias, support our hypotheses. We find that elections have a positive effect on sanction success, and this effect is more prominent in less democratic states that hold competitive elections. This suggests that even if sanctions have a relatively low success rate against non-democratic polities, elections may provide a window of opportunity for senders to extract concessions from target states.
{"title":"Election proximity and the effectiveness of economic sanctions","authors":"Omer Zarpli, Dursun Peksen","doi":"10.1177/00223433241243178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241243178","url":null,"abstract":"Do elections matter for sanction effectiveness? Scholars have long highlighted the importance of domestic political factors in target (i.e. sanctioned) states in explaining when economic sanctions work. This line of research, however, has primarily focused on political regime characteristics and interest groups that are relatively low time-variant during sanction episodes. Building on this literature, we explore the effect of temporal proximity to elections. While the impact of elections have been examined in the context of military conflicts, their possible effects on sanction effectiveness have not been subject to systematic scrutiny. We argue that target governments are more likely to comply with sender demands as elections loom near in order to avoid the likely political costs of sanctions. The effect of elections, however, is likely to vary across different election characteristics and political regime types. We assess the empirical merits of our claims using data on over 1,000 sanction cases between 1950 and 2020. The results from a battery of empirical tests, including those that account for potential selection bias, support our hypotheses. We find that elections have a positive effect on sanction success, and this effect is more prominent in less democratic states that hold competitive elections. This suggests that even if sanctions have a relatively low success rate against non-democratic polities, elections may provide a window of opportunity for senders to extract concessions from target states.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141159666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-18DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231868
Kathrin Bachleitner
While the international arena is littered with events of war and atrocities, the memory of the Holocaust was institutionalized as the ultimate benchmark of human suffering within the liberal world order. Against the backdrop of such a global memory landscape, this article explores how different memories of trauma interact. Building on literature within international relations, sociology and social psychology, as well as survey data collected from a sample of Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis, its analysis explores how victims of political violence compare their suffering with that of others and why such comparisons slip easily into competition. The analysis found that individuals were competitive with their memories when they showed high levels of patriotic attachment and a real and perceived, yet unrecognized, sense of victimhood. This article thus offers insight into a key issue in peace and conflict studies: the links between traumatic memory, victimhood, international recognition and conflict.
{"title":"Trauma in world politics: Memory dynamics between different victim groups","authors":"Kathrin Bachleitner","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231868","url":null,"abstract":"While the international arena is littered with events of war and atrocities, the memory of the Holocaust was institutionalized as the ultimate benchmark of human suffering within the liberal world order. Against the backdrop of such a global memory landscape, this article explores how different memories of trauma interact. Building on literature within international relations, sociology and social psychology, as well as survey data collected from a sample of Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis, its analysis explores how victims of political violence compare their suffering with that of others and why such comparisons slip easily into competition. The analysis found that individuals were competitive with their memories when they showed high levels of patriotic attachment and a real and perceived, yet unrecognized, sense of victimhood. This article thus offers insight into a key issue in peace and conflict studies: the links between traumatic memory, victimhood, international recognition and conflict.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-18DOI: 10.1177/00223433241243194
Roseanne W McManus, Tuba Sendinç
When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.
{"title":"Sending the B team: The impact of lesser signals of resolve","authors":"Roseanne W McManus, Tuba Sendinç","doi":"10.1177/00223433241243194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241243194","url":null,"abstract":"When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433241231849
Sou Shinomoto
The military’s compliance with civilian control – a requisite of democracy – is believed to be a key determinant of public confidence in the military. However, this claim is empirically inconclusive, and its analytical framework is underdeveloped at an institutional and individual level. Furthermore, most extant studies focus on the USA, and its validity in other environments is unknown. Hence, this study examined the causal relationship via an online survey experiment using hypothetical scenarios in Japan, an established democracy with a considerable armed force and civil–military norms imported from the USA decades ago. The results showed that the Japanese participants significantly lost their trust in the military for incompliance with civilian control amid an armed conflict. However, the magnitude of the impact was context-dependent; it substantially differed per the directions of incompliance (arbitrary action or inaction), the actors involved in the control (the prime minister and legislature), and the respondents’ attributes (partisanship). These findings reduce empirical inconclusiveness regarding the mechanism of public confidence in the military and could help to detect ominous signs regarding public attitudes toward democratic principles in modern society. Moreover, this study provides clues to understanding what people in Japan think about the aspect of control of their de facto military and how they evaluate this organization. These findings have significant implications for understanding international security dynamics, particularly at a time when Japan is launching its largest arms build-up since World War II to make its defense budget the third-largest worldwide, after the USA and China.
{"title":"Does the military lose public confidence without compliance with civilian control? Experimental evidence from Japan","authors":"Sou Shinomoto","doi":"10.1177/00223433241231849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241231849","url":null,"abstract":"The military’s compliance with civilian control – a requisite of democracy – is believed to be a key determinant of public confidence in the military. However, this claim is empirically inconclusive, and its analytical framework is underdeveloped at an institutional and individual level. Furthermore, most extant studies focus on the USA, and its validity in other environments is unknown. Hence, this study examined the causal relationship via an online survey experiment using hypothetical scenarios in Japan, an established democracy with a considerable armed force and civil–military norms imported from the USA decades ago. The results showed that the Japanese participants significantly lost their trust in the military for incompliance with civilian control amid an armed conflict. However, the magnitude of the impact was context-dependent; it substantially differed per the directions of incompliance (arbitrary action or inaction), the actors involved in the control (the prime minister and legislature), and the respondents’ attributes (partisanship). These findings reduce empirical inconclusiveness regarding the mechanism of public confidence in the military and could help to detect ominous signs regarding public attitudes toward democratic principles in modern society. Moreover, this study provides clues to understanding what people in Japan think about the aspect of control of their de facto military and how they evaluate this organization. These findings have significant implications for understanding international security dynamics, particularly at a time when Japan is launching its largest arms build-up since World War II to make its defense budget the third-largest worldwide, after the USA and China.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140967996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433241227759
Andreas Juon
Does power-sharing reduce or increase ethnic salience? Drawing on social psychology, I identify two countervailing mechanisms that help reconcile previously opposed findings. First, prolonged power-sharing practices attenuate between-group inequalities. Thereby, they gradually reduce the usefulness of ethnic identities as ‘rules of thumb’ and decrease their salience. Second, extended periods during which individuals live under ethnically differentiated power-sharing institutions render ethnic identities more accessible and thereby increase their salience. To test these expectations, I rely on the most extensive collection of mass surveys used in the empirical literature on ethnic salience so far, encompassing more than 900,000 respondents from a total of 132 countries. I show that power-sharing affects individuals’ self-identification and vote intentions in accordance with my arguments. As my findings are based on specifications that incorporate fixed effects at the group- and group-year levels, they are unlikely to be endogenous to the provision of power-sharing to groups whose identities are most salient in the first place. My findings have important implications for efforts to institutionalize peace in divided societies and for the literature on ethnic conflict.
{"title":"The long-term consequences of power-sharing for ethnic salience","authors":"Andreas Juon","doi":"10.1177/00223433241227759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241227759","url":null,"abstract":"Does power-sharing reduce or increase ethnic salience? Drawing on social psychology, I identify two countervailing mechanisms that help reconcile previously opposed findings. First, prolonged power-sharing practices attenuate between-group inequalities. Thereby, they gradually reduce the usefulness of ethnic identities as ‘rules of thumb’ and decrease their salience. Second, extended periods during which individuals live under ethnically differentiated power-sharing institutions render ethnic identities more accessible and thereby increase their salience. To test these expectations, I rely on the most extensive collection of mass surveys used in the empirical literature on ethnic salience so far, encompassing more than 900,000 respondents from a total of 132 countries. I show that power-sharing affects individuals’ self-identification and vote intentions in accordance with my arguments. As my findings are based on specifications that incorporate fixed effects at the group- and group-year levels, they are unlikely to be endogenous to the provision of power-sharing to groups whose identities are most salient in the first place. My findings have important implications for efforts to institutionalize peace in divided societies and for the literature on ethnic conflict.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140969557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1177/00223433241235852
Miguel Alberto Gomez, Gregory H Winger
The transnational nature of cyberspace alters the role of third-party countries (TPCs) in international conflict. In the conventional environment, military operations are primarily confined to the boundaries of the combatants or a designated war zone. However, during cyber conflicts, operations may occur on the digital infrastructure of states not otherwise involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, within the cyber conflict literature, little is said about TPCs who, by virtue of interconnectivity, may find themselves involved in a conflict not of their own making. Consequently, we examine the political and diplomatic hazards of cyber operations involving these actors. Through survey experiments involving participants from the United Kingdom and Canada, we assess the public opinion impact of an offensive cyber operation’s revelation on a TPC population. We find that while these incidents are viewed negatively, prior authorization and the involvement of an ally reduces this tendency. Such conditions lead the public to perceive these operations as corresponding with their national interest while suppressing fears of the possible consequences following their indirect involvement.
{"title":"Third-party countries in cyber conflict: Public opinion and conflict spillover in cyberspace","authors":"Miguel Alberto Gomez, Gregory H Winger","doi":"10.1177/00223433241235852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241235852","url":null,"abstract":"The transnational nature of cyberspace alters the role of third-party countries (TPCs) in international conflict. In the conventional environment, military operations are primarily confined to the boundaries of the combatants or a designated war zone. However, during cyber conflicts, operations may occur on the digital infrastructure of states not otherwise involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, within the cyber conflict literature, little is said about TPCs who, by virtue of interconnectivity, may find themselves involved in a conflict not of their own making. Consequently, we examine the political and diplomatic hazards of cyber operations involving these actors. Through survey experiments involving participants from the United Kingdom and Canada, we assess the public opinion impact of an offensive cyber operation’s revelation on a TPC population. We find that while these incidents are viewed negatively, prior authorization and the involvement of an ally reduces this tendency. Such conditions lead the public to perceive these operations as corresponding with their national interest while suppressing fears of the possible consequences following their indirect involvement.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140910673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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