Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1177/00223433231180921
Risa Brooks, Peter B White
This article contributes to growing efforts to explain when nonviolent resistance campaigns emerge in autocratic regimes. Building from a novel framework for distinguishing civil-military relations in autocracies, it contends that regimes in which military and political leaders engage in a ‘grand bargain’ generate opportunity structures that are especially amenable to nonviolent resistance. Militaries in these regimes exhibit distinctive characteristics – they are corporate, cohesive institutions as opposed to fragmented in structure and also wield political influence in regime institutions. Consequently, these militaries are especially inclined to care about their societal reputations and to retain their institutional independence from the regime’s political leaders. These factors together can lessen expectations among activists that the military will repress protests and increase the odds of elite splits in the face of mass movements. They also render the military more receptive to nonviolent protest tactics. We operationalize the concept of grand bargains with indicators from three datasets on civil-military relations and autocratic regimes. We then test the argument quantitatively using data on the onset of nonviolent resistance campaigns, as well as events-level data on nonviolent resistance campaigns. The findings support claims that civil-military grand bargains make nonviolent resistance in autocracies more likely, contributing to scholarship on this vital topic.
{"title":"The military before the march: Civil-military grand bargains and the emergence of nonviolent resistance in autocracies","authors":"Risa Brooks, Peter B White","doi":"10.1177/00223433231180921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231180921","url":null,"abstract":"This article contributes to growing efforts to explain when nonviolent resistance campaigns emerge in autocratic regimes. Building from a novel framework for distinguishing civil-military relations in autocracies, it contends that regimes in which military and political leaders engage in a ‘grand bargain’ generate opportunity structures that are especially amenable to nonviolent resistance. Militaries in these regimes exhibit distinctive characteristics – they are corporate, cohesive institutions as opposed to fragmented in structure and also wield political influence in regime institutions. Consequently, these militaries are especially inclined to care about their societal reputations and to retain their institutional independence from the regime’s political leaders. These factors together can lessen expectations among activists that the military will repress protests and increase the odds of elite splits in the face of mass movements. They also render the military more receptive to nonviolent protest tactics. We operationalize the concept of grand bargains with indicators from three datasets on civil-military relations and autocratic regimes. We then test the argument quantitatively using data on the onset of nonviolent resistance campaigns, as well as events-level data on nonviolent resistance campaigns. The findings support claims that civil-military grand bargains make nonviolent resistance in autocracies more likely, contributing to scholarship on this vital topic.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47531159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1177/00223433231186449
Jacob S. Lewis, Brandon Ives
This article investigates the relationship between recent repression of protest and the duration of future protests. A rich scholarship examines how repression impacts dissent, highlighting dissent dimensions such as the number of future events and violent escalation. Less examined is another dimension of dissent – protest duration. We hypothesize that recent repression of protests is pivotal for longer duration of future protest events. Our expectation stems from a participant type mechanism. Recent repression of protest may generate more societal grievances but also increase protesting risks. A simultaneous jump in grievances and risks may increase the number of people protesting who are also risk-acceptant and willing to protest for longer durations. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data and hierarchal negative binomial models are used to estimate the association between recent repression of protest and subsequent protest duration. Compared to having none of the most recent three protests repressed, a protest in a location where the last three protests were repressed has a substantively longer duration. The results are consistent with the participant type mechanism and existing literature on repression’s heterogeneous effects on individuals.
{"title":"Repression, backlash, and the duration of protests in Africa","authors":"Jacob S. Lewis, Brandon Ives","doi":"10.1177/00223433231186449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231186449","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the relationship between recent repression of protest and the duration of future protests. A rich scholarship examines how repression impacts dissent, highlighting dissent dimensions such as the number of future events and violent escalation. Less examined is another dimension of dissent – protest duration. We hypothesize that recent repression of protests is pivotal for longer duration of future protest events. Our expectation stems from a participant type mechanism. Recent repression of protest may generate more societal grievances but also increase protesting risks. A simultaneous jump in grievances and risks may increase the number of people protesting who are also risk-acceptant and willing to protest for longer durations. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data and hierarchal negative binomial models are used to estimate the association between recent repression of protest and subsequent protest duration. Compared to having none of the most recent three protests repressed, a protest in a location where the last three protests were repressed has a substantively longer duration. The results are consistent with the participant type mechanism and existing literature on repression’s heterogeneous effects on individuals.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48235226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1177/00223433231186446
Matthew D. DiLorenzo, Bryan Rooney
Scholars increasingly emphasize personal biographical characteristics of leaders in explaining patterns of foreign policy behavior. This article extends insights from this agenda to study how (dis)similarities in the background characteristics of leaders at the dyadic level shape international conflict outcomes. Trust and uncertainty are central to explaining conflict via their connections to commitment- and information-related causes of war. Psychological research provides evidence that perceived similarities between individuals and groups can foment trust and cooperation. We hypothesize that leaders who share more similar backgrounds and life experiences form stronger social bonds and are more trusting of one another. As such, leaders who have more in common with one another should be able to better manage diplomatic disputes and avoid conflict. We test this hypothesis using a new measure of dyadic-leader-level similarity created with the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset and data on international conflict onset in politically relevant dyads throughout the period 1946–2004. We find that pairs of leaders with more similar backgrounds are significantly less likely to experience militarized interstate disputes at all levels of hostility even after accounting for a variety of observable and unobservable determinants of conflict. The findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of international conflict and help advance research on linkages between psychological and rationalist approaches to studying conflict.
{"title":"Leader similarity and international conflict","authors":"Matthew D. DiLorenzo, Bryan Rooney","doi":"10.1177/00223433231186446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231186446","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars increasingly emphasize personal biographical characteristics of leaders in explaining patterns of foreign policy behavior. This article extends insights from this agenda to study how (dis)similarities in the background characteristics of leaders at the dyadic level shape international conflict outcomes. Trust and uncertainty are central to explaining conflict via their connections to commitment- and information-related causes of war. Psychological research provides evidence that perceived similarities between individuals and groups can foment trust and cooperation. We hypothesize that leaders who share more similar backgrounds and life experiences form stronger social bonds and are more trusting of one another. As such, leaders who have more in common with one another should be able to better manage diplomatic disputes and avoid conflict. We test this hypothesis using a new measure of dyadic-leader-level similarity created with the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset and data on international conflict onset in politically relevant dyads throughout the period 1946–2004. We find that pairs of leaders with more similar backgrounds are significantly less likely to experience militarized interstate disputes at all levels of hostility even after accounting for a variety of observable and unobservable determinants of conflict. The findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of international conflict and help advance research on linkages between psychological and rationalist approaches to studying conflict.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42319412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1177/00223433231180924
Elsa Voytas, Benjamin Crisman
Can the legacy of state violence undermine participation in transitional justice services designed to consolidate peace after conflict? We argue that, in the aftermath of armed fighting, state-perpetrated violence leads to reduced uptake of government reconciliation policies. We leverage spatial and temporal variation in levels of civilian victimization by perpetrator and find that, in contrast to violence committed by non-state groups, violence carried out by state forces against civilians is associated with lower levels of enlistment in Colombia’s state-run victims’ registry. We replicate this relationship using survey data and present evidence linking victimization by the state to lower levels of trust in the government overall. Together, our analyses demonstrate that disaggregating the identity of armed actors can provide significant theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. In the Colombian case, the legacy of state violence leads to the systematic exclusion of certain types of victims from transitional justice and undermines trust in the institutions responsible for building durable pathways to peace. Consequently, our findings have implications for the design of transitional justice policies, the study of the legacies of conflict on political and social outcomes, and processes of post-conflict peacebuilding.
{"title":"State violence and participation in transitional justice: Evidence from Colombia","authors":"Elsa Voytas, Benjamin Crisman","doi":"10.1177/00223433231180924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231180924","url":null,"abstract":"Can the legacy of state violence undermine participation in transitional justice services designed to consolidate peace after conflict? We argue that, in the aftermath of armed fighting, state-perpetrated violence leads to reduced uptake of government reconciliation policies. We leverage spatial and temporal variation in levels of civilian victimization by perpetrator and find that, in contrast to violence committed by non-state groups, violence carried out by state forces against civilians is associated with lower levels of enlistment in Colombia’s state-run victims’ registry. We replicate this relationship using survey data and present evidence linking victimization by the state to lower levels of trust in the government overall. Together, our analyses demonstrate that disaggregating the identity of armed actors can provide significant theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. In the Colombian case, the legacy of state violence leads to the systematic exclusion of certain types of victims from transitional justice and undermines trust in the institutions responsible for building durable pathways to peace. Consequently, our findings have implications for the design of transitional justice policies, the study of the legacies of conflict on political and social outcomes, and processes of post-conflict peacebuilding.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47548713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-13DOI: 10.1177/00223433231178849
Dongshu Liu, L. Shao
How can autocrats boost public support for wars? Previous studies have suggested that in democracies, the public changes its war attitude either through rational cost–benefit calculations or simply by following cues from political elites. This article argues that autocrats can follow a similar logic to manipulate public support for war via nationalist propaganda. Based on two online survey experiments with textual and musical propaganda materials in mainland China, this article finds that nationalist propaganda bolsters public support for war, regarding a potential military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Evidence shows that propaganda increases respondents’ expected return on winning wars, arousing national pride, and reducing respondents’ sensitivity to war costs. However, people’s confidence in winning a given war remains unchanged. These findings suggest that nationalist propaganda can boost support for war by increasing the perceived benefits of the war and reducing their sensitivity toward war costs without changing their perceived probability of winning. It also demonstrates that nationalist propaganda does not need to be explicit about war in order to boost war support in autocracies. This study also reveals the changing dynamic of public opinions in China regarding war for unification over the Taiwan Strait, which has significant implications for security and geopolitics in East Asia.
{"title":"Nationalist propaganda and support for war in an authoritarian context: Evidence from China","authors":"Dongshu Liu, L. Shao","doi":"10.1177/00223433231178849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231178849","url":null,"abstract":"How can autocrats boost public support for wars? Previous studies have suggested that in democracies, the public changes its war attitude either through rational cost–benefit calculations or simply by following cues from political elites. This article argues that autocrats can follow a similar logic to manipulate public support for war via nationalist propaganda. Based on two online survey experiments with textual and musical propaganda materials in mainland China, this article finds that nationalist propaganda bolsters public support for war, regarding a potential military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Evidence shows that propaganda increases respondents’ expected return on winning wars, arousing national pride, and reducing respondents’ sensitivity to war costs. However, people’s confidence in winning a given war remains unchanged. These findings suggest that nationalist propaganda can boost support for war by increasing the perceived benefits of the war and reducing their sensitivity toward war costs without changing their perceived probability of winning. It also demonstrates that nationalist propaganda does not need to be explicit about war in order to boost war support in autocracies. This study also reveals the changing dynamic of public opinions in China regarding war for unification over the Taiwan Strait, which has significant implications for security and geopolitics in East Asia.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48740499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-13DOI: 10.1177/00223433231177727
Azusa Katagiri
Nuclear proliferation literature typically differentiates supply-side and demand-side factors influencing the spread of nuclear weapons. These distinct approaches to the proliferation puzzle raise the following empirical questions: Does nuclear supply stimulate states’ demand for nuclear weapons? Conversely, does the demand for nuclear weapons really facilitate the acquisition of nuclear supply? If such endogeneity exists between the demand-side and supply-side determinants, how would it cause empirical bias in the estimation of their effects on nuclear proliferation? This article aims to unpack endogenous mechanisms of nuclear demand and nuclear supply over the course of nuclear proliferation. In particular, it examines two potential sources of endogeneity: (1) simultaneous interactions between states’ nuclear development decisions and nuclear technological capability and (2) selection bias in nuclear development. To address each source of endogeneity, simultaneous equation models and the duration models with selection are estimated, respectively. Contrary to what recent supply-side literature suggests, the empirical analyses reveal that states’ nuclear demand is primarily driven by external security threats instead of their existing nuclear technology, and that their successful acquisition of nuclear technology mainly follows as the result of nuclear development efforts but does not necessarily depend on individual supply-side factors. This article addresses the typical inference issues in nuclear proliferation research and contributes to our synthetic understanding of proliferation mechanisms.
{"title":"Revisiting the puzzle of endogenous nuclear proliferation","authors":"Azusa Katagiri","doi":"10.1177/00223433231177727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231177727","url":null,"abstract":"Nuclear proliferation literature typically differentiates supply-side and demand-side factors influencing the spread of nuclear weapons. These distinct approaches to the proliferation puzzle raise the following empirical questions: Does nuclear supply stimulate states’ demand for nuclear weapons? Conversely, does the demand for nuclear weapons really facilitate the acquisition of nuclear supply? If such endogeneity exists between the demand-side and supply-side determinants, how would it cause empirical bias in the estimation of their effects on nuclear proliferation? This article aims to unpack endogenous mechanisms of nuclear demand and nuclear supply over the course of nuclear proliferation. In particular, it examines two potential sources of endogeneity: (1) simultaneous interactions between states’ nuclear development decisions and nuclear technological capability and (2) selection bias in nuclear development. To address each source of endogeneity, simultaneous equation models and the duration models with selection are estimated, respectively. Contrary to what recent supply-side literature suggests, the empirical analyses reveal that states’ nuclear demand is primarily driven by external security threats instead of their existing nuclear technology, and that their successful acquisition of nuclear technology mainly follows as the result of nuclear development efforts but does not necessarily depend on individual supply-side factors. This article addresses the typical inference issues in nuclear proliferation research and contributes to our synthetic understanding of proliferation mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43770503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-17DOI: 10.1177/00223433231178848
Michael Weintraub, A. Steele, Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios, H. Nygård, Marianne Dahl, H. M. Binningsbø
This article introduces the Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) dataset, which provides rich survey data from more than 12,000 respondents in Colombia. Our panel survey – carried out in two separate waves in 2019 and 2021 – is representative at the level of each ‘Program for Development with a Territorial Focus’ (PDET, for its acronym in Spanish), the most war-affected regions and those targeted for peace agreement implementation. We describe the sample and compare support for the peace agreement in MAPS to other recent surveys in Colombia, showing how MAPS reveals regional variation obscured in nationally representative surveys. Regression analyses illustrate how the panel data allow us to explore how and why people’s perceptions of the agreement shift over time. The MAPS data will enable scholars to gain insights into the microfoundations of peacebuilding over time and across space.
{"title":"Introducing the Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) dataset on the Colombian peace process","authors":"Michael Weintraub, A. Steele, Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios, H. Nygård, Marianne Dahl, H. M. Binningsbø","doi":"10.1177/00223433231178848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231178848","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces the Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) dataset, which provides rich survey data from more than 12,000 respondents in Colombia. Our panel survey – carried out in two separate waves in 2019 and 2021 – is representative at the level of each ‘Program for Development with a Territorial Focus’ (PDET, for its acronym in Spanish), the most war-affected regions and those targeted for peace agreement implementation. We describe the sample and compare support for the peace agreement in MAPS to other recent surveys in Colombia, showing how MAPS reveals regional variation obscured in nationally representative surveys. Regression analyses illustrate how the panel data allow us to explore how and why people’s perceptions of the agreement shift over time. The MAPS data will enable scholars to gain insights into the microfoundations of peacebuilding over time and across space.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46524120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-13DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168192
Seraphine F. Maerz, Amanda B. Edgell, M. Wilson, S. Hellmeier, Staffan I. Lindberg
This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation that allows scholars to address democratization and autocratization as related but obverse processes. We introduce a dataset that captures 680 episodes of regime transformation (ERT) from 1900 to 2019 and offers novel insights into regime change over the past 120 years. The ERT has three main advantages over other approaches. First, it avoids problematic assumptions of unit homogeneity and constant as well as symmetric effects. Second, it integrates key insights from qualitative studies by treating regime change as a gradual and uncertain process. Third, the ERT is based on a unified framework for studying regime transformation in either direction. The dataset differentiates between four broad types of regime transformation: liberalization in autocracies, democratic deepening in democracies, and autocratization in both democracies and autocracies (democratic and autocratic regression). It further distinguishes ten patterns with distinct outcomes, including standard depictions of regime change (i.e. democratic transition or breakdown). A minority (32%) of ERTs produce a regime transition, with the majority of episodes either ending before a transition takes place or not having the potential for such a transition (i.e. further democratization in democratic regimes or further autocratization in autocratic regimes). We also provide comparisons to other datasets, illustrative case studies to demonstrate face validity, and a discussion about how the ERT framework can be applied in peace research.
{"title":"Episodes of regime transformation","authors":"Seraphine F. Maerz, Amanda B. Edgell, M. Wilson, S. Hellmeier, Staffan I. Lindberg","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168192","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation that allows scholars to address democratization and autocratization as related but obverse processes. We introduce a dataset that captures 680 episodes of regime transformation (ERT) from 1900 to 2019 and offers novel insights into regime change over the past 120 years. The ERT has three main advantages over other approaches. First, it avoids problematic assumptions of unit homogeneity and constant as well as symmetric effects. Second, it integrates key insights from qualitative studies by treating regime change as a gradual and uncertain process. Third, the ERT is based on a unified framework for studying regime transformation in either direction. The dataset differentiates between four broad types of regime transformation: liberalization in autocracies, democratic deepening in democracies, and autocratization in both democracies and autocracies (democratic and autocratic regression). It further distinguishes ten patterns with distinct outcomes, including standard depictions of regime change (i.e. democratic transition or breakdown). A minority (32%) of ERTs produce a regime transition, with the majority of episodes either ending before a transition takes place or not having the potential for such a transition (i.e. further democratization in democratic regimes or further autocratization in autocratic regimes). We also provide comparisons to other datasets, illustrative case studies to demonstrate face validity, and a discussion about how the ERT framework can be applied in peace research.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48892715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-07DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168187
S. Döring, Katariina Mustasilta
Communal violence is a major source of insecurity within and across borders, sparking significant displacement flows and disturbing livelihoods. While conflict literature has shed light onto its causes, the existing research has paid little systematic attention to the spatial dynamics of communal violence. We distinguish between spillover of violence and spillover of predictors. Spillover of violence is defined as conflict incidences occurring as a direct response to communal violence in a nearby location. Spillover of predictors describes instances of communal violence that occur due to nearby conflict-inducing factors. We clarify theoretical pathways for both spillover processes, focusing on drought exposure affecting not locally but in nearby areas. Applying spatial models, we test the expectations regarding nearby violence breeding violence and nearby drought increasing violence with data on incidences of communal violence for sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2014). Our results demonstrate that communal violence explains nearby communal violence through different spillover processes. We also find evidence for an increase in violence due to exposure from neighborhood droughts as well as other conflict-inducing factors.
{"title":"Spatial patterns of communal violence in sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"S. Döring, Katariina Mustasilta","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168187","url":null,"abstract":"Communal violence is a major source of insecurity within and across borders, sparking significant displacement flows and disturbing livelihoods. While conflict literature has shed light onto its causes, the existing research has paid little systematic attention to the spatial dynamics of communal violence. We distinguish between spillover of violence and spillover of predictors. Spillover of violence is defined as conflict incidences occurring as a direct response to communal violence in a nearby location. Spillover of predictors describes instances of communal violence that occur due to nearby conflict-inducing factors. We clarify theoretical pathways for both spillover processes, focusing on drought exposure affecting not locally but in nearby areas. Applying spatial models, we test the expectations regarding nearby violence breeding violence and nearby drought increasing violence with data on incidences of communal violence for sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2014). Our results demonstrate that communal violence explains nearby communal violence through different spillover processes. We also find evidence for an increase in violence due to exposure from neighborhood droughts as well as other conflict-inducing factors.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46509456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-05DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168190
L. Garbe
Does increasing Internet access and use challenge authoritarian elections? I argue that Internet access provides both opposition supporters and government authorities with new means to shape electoral conduct. Opposition supporters can use the Internet to report on electoral malpractice and mobilize for support. At the same time government authorities can use the Internet to monitor antiregime sentiment prior to the elections and disrupt Internet access to selectively repress regime opponents during the elections. Studying Uganda’s 2016 presidential elections, evidence from election monitoring and survey data suggests that electoral violence is significantly higher in opposition strongholds with greater Internet access prior to the Internet disruption and is targeted specifically at voters. Insights from qualitative interviews with politicians, journalists and activists underline that the disruption of Internet access indeed hindered opposition supporters to effectively challenge electoral malpractice. Overall, the results stress the important role that Internet access can play for opposition actors in authoritarian elections. At the same time, they highlight their susceptibility to manipulation by government authorities.
{"title":"Pulling through elections by pulling the plug: Internet disruptions and electoral violence in Uganda","authors":"L. Garbe","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168190","url":null,"abstract":"Does increasing Internet access and use challenge authoritarian elections? I argue that Internet access provides both opposition supporters and government authorities with new means to shape electoral conduct. Opposition supporters can use the Internet to report on electoral malpractice and mobilize for support. At the same time government authorities can use the Internet to monitor antiregime sentiment prior to the elections and disrupt Internet access to selectively repress regime opponents during the elections. Studying Uganda’s 2016 presidential elections, evidence from election monitoring and survey data suggests that electoral violence is significantly higher in opposition strongholds with greater Internet access prior to the Internet disruption and is targeted specifically at voters. Insights from qualitative interviews with politicians, journalists and activists underline that the disruption of Internet access indeed hindered opposition supporters to effectively challenge electoral malpractice. Overall, the results stress the important role that Internet access can play for opposition actors in authoritarian elections. At the same time, they highlight their susceptibility to manipulation by government authorities.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41532043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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