Pub Date : 2023-06-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168183
Jack Schwartz
This article introduces the Rebel Foreign Fighter Dataset (RFFD) which can be used to expand research on civil war and foreign fighters (FFs). First, it largely expands the previously reported data on the number of FFs that have and continue to be involved in conflicts across the globe. Second, this database disaggregates FFs into the various rebel groups they inhabit as opposed to simply categorizing them as residing within a rebel movement. Third, low, high and best estimates of FFs within rebel groups have been provided as well as providing a novel FF ordinal coding mechanism. These additions allow for more accurate conclusions to be drawn on the effects of FFs on specific groups as well as on the conflict in which they reside. Using the RFFD, the link between FF inclusion and civilian sexual violence discussed in Doctor’s study will be re-examined. The new findings show that FF numbers below 1,000 do not have a significant impact on moderate levels of civilian victimization perpetrated by a rebel group and FF numbers below 100 do not have a significant impact on high levels of civilian victimization.
{"title":"The Rebel Foreign Fighter Dataset","authors":"Jack Schwartz","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168183","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces the Rebel Foreign Fighter Dataset (RFFD) which can be used to expand research on civil war and foreign fighters (FFs). First, it largely expands the previously reported data on the number of FFs that have and continue to be involved in conflicts across the globe. Second, this database disaggregates FFs into the various rebel groups they inhabit as opposed to simply categorizing them as residing within a rebel movement. Third, low, high and best estimates of FFs within rebel groups have been provided as well as providing a novel FF ordinal coding mechanism. These additions allow for more accurate conclusions to be drawn on the effects of FFs on specific groups as well as on the conflict in which they reside. Using the RFFD, the link between FF inclusion and civilian sexual violence discussed in Doctor’s study will be re-examined. The new findings show that FF numbers below 1,000 do not have a significant impact on moderate levels of civilian victimization perpetrated by a rebel group and FF numbers below 100 do not have a significant impact on high levels of civilian victimization.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43191241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-28DOI: 10.1177/00223433231164437
Matthew Rains, Daniel W. Hill
Why do states engage in violence against marginalized social groups? State violence is typically explained as a calculated response to dissent or as a means of preventing dissent. However, many instances of state violence against members of marginalized groups appear to be unconnected to dissent or anti-state mobilization. We examine this dimension of state violence and connect it to control of the government by nationalist political parties and the preferences of their voting bases. We argue that governments in which nationalist parties hold substantial influence are more likely to adopt policies that lead to abuse. Such policies include more aggressive policing of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and lax oversight and punishment of agencies responsible for policing. To test our argument, we examine the Ill-Treatment and Torture data, which record allegations of state violence and also information about the victim’s identity. We find that states with nationalist governments are more frequently accused of abuse against marginalized groups. Our results suggest that, rather than constraining abusive behavior through electoral accountability, the public in democratic countries sometimes prefer leaders who create a more abusive environment for marginalized groups.
{"title":"Nationalism and torture","authors":"Matthew Rains, Daniel W. Hill","doi":"10.1177/00223433231164437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231164437","url":null,"abstract":"Why do states engage in violence against marginalized social groups? State violence is typically explained as a calculated response to dissent or as a means of preventing dissent. However, many instances of state violence against members of marginalized groups appear to be unconnected to dissent or anti-state mobilization. We examine this dimension of state violence and connect it to control of the government by nationalist political parties and the preferences of their voting bases. We argue that governments in which nationalist parties hold substantial influence are more likely to adopt policies that lead to abuse. Such policies include more aggressive policing of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and lax oversight and punishment of agencies responsible for policing. To test our argument, we examine the Ill-Treatment and Torture data, which record allegations of state violence and also information about the victim’s identity. We find that states with nationalist governments are more frequently accused of abuse against marginalized groups. Our results suggest that, rather than constraining abusive behavior through electoral accountability, the public in democratic countries sometimes prefer leaders who create a more abusive environment for marginalized groups.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42651522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1177/00223433231164448
D. Walsh, Natascha S. Neudorfer
The inclusion of conflict parties in independent commissions through power-sharing has been found to reduce the reoccurrence of conflict. Yet, the theoretical and empirical literature explaining why independent commissions include power-sharing is very limited. Previous publications have focused on in-depth case studies that explain how power-sharing prevents conflict recurrence in specific post-conflict societies but do not provide a general argument or widescale testing beyond individual case studies. This article provides a new systematic, general theoretical argument and novel empirical testing that explains why there is power-sharing on some commissions but not others. We argue that conflict parties adopt power-sharing provisions in independent commissions because doing so allows them to overcome significant credible commitments problems that are inherent to the ending of intrastate conflict. Using a new and comprehensive dataset, Independent Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies, which includes information on 580 commissions (1990–2016), this article applies a combination of decision trees and regression analysis to test our hypotheses. The findings indicate that power-sharing is adopted where credible commitment problems are acute and show that commissions working on political or security issues and those with monitoring or verification roles, or that work on the implementation of peace agreements, are more likely to include power-sharing arrangements.
{"title":"Caring is sharing: Why independent commissions in post-conflict societies have power-sharing arrangements","authors":"D. Walsh, Natascha S. Neudorfer","doi":"10.1177/00223433231164448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231164448","url":null,"abstract":"The inclusion of conflict parties in independent commissions through power-sharing has been found to reduce the reoccurrence of conflict. Yet, the theoretical and empirical literature explaining why independent commissions include power-sharing is very limited. Previous publications have focused on in-depth case studies that explain how power-sharing prevents conflict recurrence in specific post-conflict societies but do not provide a general argument or widescale testing beyond individual case studies. This article provides a new systematic, general theoretical argument and novel empirical testing that explains why there is power-sharing on some commissions but not others. We argue that conflict parties adopt power-sharing provisions in independent commissions because doing so allows them to overcome significant credible commitments problems that are inherent to the ending of intrastate conflict. Using a new and comprehensive dataset, Independent Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies, which includes information on 580 commissions (1990–2016), this article applies a combination of decision trees and regression analysis to test our hypotheses. The findings indicate that power-sharing is adopted where credible commitment problems are acute and show that commissions working on political or security issues and those with monitoring or verification roles, or that work on the implementation of peace agreements, are more likely to include power-sharing arrangements.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48425735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1177/00223433221147943
Karin Johansson
Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is an increasingly consequential crime to perpetrate – at least if we limit our view to reactions within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Turning to the state-led forum for human rights: the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR), this study instead uncovers sparse and highly selective condemnation of CRSV. By extracting data on all bilateral shaming relating to sexual violence in the UPR since its inception in 2008, this article demonstrates that only 5% of all governments take the opportunity to condemn major sexual aggressors. The findings should adjust our expectations on the progress rate within the policy field of CRSV and advance our understanding of the challenges tainting international negotiations on the topic.
{"title":"Talk of shame: Conflict-related sexual violence and bilateral critique within the United Nations","authors":"Karin Johansson","doi":"10.1177/00223433221147943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221147943","url":null,"abstract":"Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is an increasingly consequential crime to perpetrate – at least if we limit our view to reactions within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Turning to the state-led forum for human rights: the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR), this study instead uncovers sparse and highly selective condemnation of CRSV. By extracting data on all bilateral shaming relating to sexual violence in the UPR since its inception in 2008, this article demonstrates that only 5% of all governments take the opportunity to condemn major sexual aggressors. The findings should adjust our expectations on the progress rate within the policy field of CRSV and advance our understanding of the challenges tainting international negotiations on the topic.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41334597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433231164435
Ariel Zellman, J. Fox
How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate territorial disputes? We argue that inconclusive findings in previous studies stem from inadequate consideration of the interaction between challenger state religiosity and the domestic constituencies actually invested in religiously salient territorial claims. To address this gap, this article differentiates between secular regimes, which provide minimal support to their state’s dominant religion and religious regimes, which strongly support their dominant religion. It also considers narrowly salient coreligionist populations, which appeal almost exclusively to religious audiences, versus broadly salient contested sacred sites, which appeal to much broader constituencies. We argue that the interaction between these two factors produces very different patterns of interstate conflict behavior. Secular regimes avoid escalation over narrowly salient religious claims because they do not depend upon religious constituents for support. However, they lack the necessary religious legitimacy to manage outbidding challenges that frequently arise over more broadly salient claims. Religious regimes, by contrast, enjoy high domestic religious legitimacy, enabling more peaceful engagement with broadly salient religious claims. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies incentivizes conflict when disputes involve narrowly salient religious claims. We test these propositions utilizing original data on the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 2010. Analyses, using both dichotomous and continuous measures of regime religiosity, confirm these inferences and contribute to highly nuanced understandings of how state-religion policy and religious salience interact to influence patterns of interstate violence.
{"title":"Under God, indivisible? Religious salience and interstate territorial conflict","authors":"Ariel Zellman, J. Fox","doi":"10.1177/00223433231164435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231164435","url":null,"abstract":"How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate territorial disputes? We argue that inconclusive findings in previous studies stem from inadequate consideration of the interaction between challenger state religiosity and the domestic constituencies actually invested in religiously salient territorial claims. To address this gap, this article differentiates between secular regimes, which provide minimal support to their state’s dominant religion and religious regimes, which strongly support their dominant religion. It also considers narrowly salient coreligionist populations, which appeal almost exclusively to religious audiences, versus broadly salient contested sacred sites, which appeal to much broader constituencies. We argue that the interaction between these two factors produces very different patterns of interstate conflict behavior. Secular regimes avoid escalation over narrowly salient religious claims because they do not depend upon religious constituents for support. However, they lack the necessary religious legitimacy to manage outbidding challenges that frequently arise over more broadly salient claims. Religious regimes, by contrast, enjoy high domestic religious legitimacy, enabling more peaceful engagement with broadly salient religious claims. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies incentivizes conflict when disputes involve narrowly salient religious claims. We test these propositions utilizing original data on the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 2010. Analyses, using both dichotomous and continuous measures of regime religiosity, confirm these inferences and contribute to highly nuanced understandings of how state-religion policy and religious salience interact to influence patterns of interstate violence.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"554 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64873123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433231164442
Marek K Brzezinski
Why do some jihadist organizations engage in beheadings while others do not? Although beheadings have become a signature tactic of the contemporary global jihadist movement, I show that most jihadist groups perpetrate few or no beheadings and only a minority have adopted beheading as a consistent part of their repertoire of violence. Such variation exists even among ideologically similar ‘Salafi-jihadist’ groups, suggesting that ideology alone cannot explain why such violence occurs. Instead, I argue that the use of beheadings is shaped by a combination of local strategic context and transnational ties. Beheadings are strategically useful to jihadist groups engaged in insurgency as a means of deterring civilian collaboration with the enemy, demoralizing enemy combatants and attracting foreign recruits. But the use of beheading is also costly for such groups, notably because of its tendency to alienate potential civilian supporters. Whether or not particular jihadist groups use beheadings depends largely on whether they can afford to ignore these costs. Jihadist insurgents who control significant territory are less sensitive to civilian attitudes because of their ability to obtain support through coercion and are therefore more likely to perpetrate beheadings. The use of beheadings is also shaped by transnational ties: organizations that seek formal affiliation with transnational jihadist networks are more likely to calculate that the benefits of using extreme violence to attract transnational support outweigh its costs. I test this theory using an original dataset of over 1,500 beheading events perpetrated by jihadist organizations between 1998 and 2019.
{"title":"A theory of jihadist beheadings","authors":"Marek K Brzezinski","doi":"10.1177/00223433231164442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231164442","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some jihadist organizations engage in beheadings while others do not? Although beheadings have become a signature tactic of the contemporary global jihadist movement, I show that most jihadist groups perpetrate few or no beheadings and only a minority have adopted beheading as a consistent part of their repertoire of violence. Such variation exists even among ideologically similar ‘Salafi-jihadist’ groups, suggesting that ideology alone cannot explain why such violence occurs. Instead, I argue that the use of beheadings is shaped by a combination of local strategic context and transnational ties. Beheadings are strategically useful to jihadist groups engaged in insurgency as a means of deterring civilian collaboration with the enemy, demoralizing enemy combatants and attracting foreign recruits. But the use of beheading is also costly for such groups, notably because of its tendency to alienate potential civilian supporters. Whether or not particular jihadist groups use beheadings depends largely on whether they can afford to ignore these costs. Jihadist insurgents who control significant territory are less sensitive to civilian attitudes because of their ability to obtain support through coercion and are therefore more likely to perpetrate beheadings. The use of beheadings is also shaped by transnational ties: organizations that seek formal affiliation with transnational jihadist networks are more likely to calculate that the benefits of using extreme violence to attract transnational support outweigh its costs. I test this theory using an original dataset of over 1,500 beheading events perpetrated by jihadist organizations between 1998 and 2019.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49408399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433231164443
José Kaire
Does human rights advocacy make a difference? Many are skeptical. Studies often find that advocates have an impact only under limited circumstances. I argue that these underwhelming results are a by-product of an identification problem. Research so far has effectively focused on whether shaming campaigns reduce ongoing abuse. But such cases are only part of the story. Another big aspect of advocacy is preventing abuse from ever starting. We must then pay attention to the deterred, those who chose not to violate human rights because of the threat of shaming. These cases do not repress and are never shamed. They are easy to miss because they look the same as those who never considered abuse in the first place. However, identifying deterred cases is crucial for judging the effectiveness of advocacy. I argue that we can resolve this issue by focusing on the degree of human rights monitoring in a country. Doing so allows researchers to recognize those under the scrutiny of advocates, and hence those that could have been deterred even if they were never shamed. Once we do this analytical refocus it is easy to see the positive effect of human rights advocacy. Human rights monitoring reduces abuse, and it does so in most countries.
{"title":"Get the word out: Monitoring human rights reduces abuse","authors":"José Kaire","doi":"10.1177/00223433231164443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231164443","url":null,"abstract":"Does human rights advocacy make a difference? Many are skeptical. Studies often find that advocates have an impact only under limited circumstances. I argue that these underwhelming results are a by-product of an identification problem. Research so far has effectively focused on whether shaming campaigns reduce ongoing abuse. But such cases are only part of the story. Another big aspect of advocacy is preventing abuse from ever starting. We must then pay attention to the deterred, those who chose not to violate human rights because of the threat of shaming. These cases do not repress and are never shamed. They are easy to miss because they look the same as those who never considered abuse in the first place. However, identifying deterred cases is crucial for judging the effectiveness of advocacy. I argue that we can resolve this issue by focusing on the degree of human rights monitoring in a country. Doing so allows researchers to recognize those under the scrutiny of advocates, and hence those that could have been deterred even if they were never shamed. Once we do this analytical refocus it is easy to see the positive effect of human rights advocacy. Human rights monitoring reduces abuse, and it does so in most countries.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48931770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433231158144
Melanie Sauter
2019 has been the most violent year on record for health workers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Attacks on healthcare coincided with the first-ever Ebola outbreak in an active conflict zone. Many of the attacks on the Ebola response were perpetrated by civilians who intended to disrupt the response, which in turn contributed to the spread of the virus. Why would communities attack the very people trying to protect them from disease? This mixed-method study examines the case of violence against Ebola responders during the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s tenth Ebola outbreak from 2018 to 2020. First, an ‘explaining-outcome’ process tracing reconstructs key events that led to the violent resistance of the population. I find that – contrary to popular belief – distrust alone was not the main driver. Rather, I argue that the politicization of the response provoked violent popular resistance. Second, an interrupted time-series model shows that the exclusion of three regions from the presidential election due to Ebola led to a significant increase in attacks on Ebola responders. The analysis demonstrates that the behavior of healthcare responders has limited ability to build trust when other political dynamics are at work. The article illustrates how combining process tracing with quantitative causal inference methods enables the simultaneous inquiry of cause, mechanism, and effect.
{"title":"Politicized health emergencies and violent resistance against healthcare responders","authors":"Melanie Sauter","doi":"10.1177/00223433231158144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231158144","url":null,"abstract":"2019 has been the most violent year on record for health workers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Attacks on healthcare coincided with the first-ever Ebola outbreak in an active conflict zone. Many of the attacks on the Ebola response were perpetrated by civilians who intended to disrupt the response, which in turn contributed to the spread of the virus. Why would communities attack the very people trying to protect them from disease? This mixed-method study examines the case of violence against Ebola responders during the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s tenth Ebola outbreak from 2018 to 2020. First, an ‘explaining-outcome’ process tracing reconstructs key events that led to the violent resistance of the population. I find that – contrary to popular belief – distrust alone was not the main driver. Rather, I argue that the politicization of the response provoked violent popular resistance. Second, an interrupted time-series model shows that the exclusion of three regions from the presidential election due to Ebola led to a significant increase in attacks on Ebola responders. The analysis demonstrates that the behavior of healthcare responders has limited ability to build trust when other political dynamics are at work. The article illustrates how combining process tracing with quantitative causal inference methods enables the simultaneous inquiry of cause, mechanism, and effect.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135472836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-03DOI: 10.1177/00223433231156959
Elizabeth J. Menninga
This article identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation – mediation with multiple active third parties – has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts – those providing third parties biased toward both sides of the dispute – have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebel group and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this article, I develop a measure, Mediation balance, which aggregates the mediators’ biases when multiple third parties are present. I also consider, both theoretically and empirically, how the number of mediators interacts with mediation balance to shape outcomes. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005, finding that balanced mediation efforts improve the probability of reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the strength of this effect is influenced by the number of mediators involved. Mediation balance also influences the probability the agreement halts the violence, albeit in unexpected ways.
{"title":"Bias and balance in civil war mediation","authors":"Elizabeth J. Menninga","doi":"10.1177/00223433231156959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231156959","url":null,"abstract":"This article identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation – mediation with multiple active third parties – has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts – those providing third parties biased toward both sides of the dispute – have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebel group and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this article, I develop a measure, Mediation balance, which aggregates the mediators’ biases when multiple third parties are present. I also consider, both theoretically and empirically, how the number of mediators interacts with mediation balance to shape outcomes. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005, finding that balanced mediation efforts improve the probability of reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the strength of this effect is influenced by the number of mediators involved. Mediation balance also influences the probability the agreement halts the violence, albeit in unexpected ways.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46971643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-03DOI: 10.1177/00223433231159183
Lonjezo Peter Mpinganjira Frank
Is the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) an independent actor in conflict diplomacy, or are his political interventions influenced by the parochial interests of the UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent member states – the P5? Previous studies have suggested that the political independence of the UN is constrained whenever a conflict evokes the strong parochial interests of individual P5 states. Using a newly compiled dataset, this article presents the first large-N historical study on the SG’s conflict interventions. The study quantifies the interventions while distinguishing between interventions mandated by the UNSC, which have always been high-profile in nature, and nonmandated interventions, with key emphasis on high-profile nonmandated interventions. The study ascertains whether both types of intervention were inhibited by the parochial interests of individual P5 states or whether the nonmandated interventions were uninfluenced by P5 interests. The results reveal that while parochial P5 interests have a significant bearing on UNSC-mandated interventions, they do not influence nonmandated interventions. Crucially, UN Charter dictates generally exert a greater influence on nonmandated interventions than on UNSC-mandated interventions. These findings present a strong case for the formal autonomy of the UN Secretariat and contribute to the growing literature on the role of executive heads in international organization secretariats.
{"title":"Leader or lackey? Understanding the United Nations Secretary-General’s role in conflict diplomacy","authors":"Lonjezo Peter Mpinganjira Frank","doi":"10.1177/00223433231159183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231159183","url":null,"abstract":"Is the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) an independent actor in conflict diplomacy, or are his political interventions influenced by the parochial interests of the UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent member states – the P5? Previous studies have suggested that the political independence of the UN is constrained whenever a conflict evokes the strong parochial interests of individual P5 states. Using a newly compiled dataset, this article presents the first large-N historical study on the SG’s conflict interventions. The study quantifies the interventions while distinguishing between interventions mandated by the UNSC, which have always been high-profile in nature, and nonmandated interventions, with key emphasis on high-profile nonmandated interventions. The study ascertains whether both types of intervention were inhibited by the parochial interests of individual P5 states or whether the nonmandated interventions were uninfluenced by P5 interests. The results reveal that while parochial P5 interests have a significant bearing on UNSC-mandated interventions, they do not influence nonmandated interventions. Crucially, UN Charter dictates generally exert a greater influence on nonmandated interventions than on UNSC-mandated interventions. These findings present a strong case for the formal autonomy of the UN Secretariat and contribute to the growing literature on the role of executive heads in international organization secretariats.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45835983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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