Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106760
Jasmine B. Norman, Jacqueline M. Chen
The target article by Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) presents a thorough overview of the intergroup bias literature, honing in on issues that are both conceptual and methodological. In order to address these issues, Gawronski et al. present some new conceptual definitions and distinctions. One central definition provided is of implicit bias, defined as “unconscious effects of social category cues (e.g., cues related to race, gender, etc.) on behavioral responses” (Gawronski et al., this issue, p. 140). The target article subsequently discusses the implications of this definition for methodology in detail. Our commentary highlights important considerations for different aspects of the target article’s definition of implicit bias. First, we outline the complexity of a seemingly straightforward part of this definition: social category cues. We consider the implications of categorical ambiguity in relation to the current definition of bias. Further, we propose that disparate impact and the importance of social context must be definitional to implicit bias. We provide an argument for how social and structural context are inseparable from social category cues and behavior. Second, turning our attention to the criterion of unconsciousness, we discuss and illustrate the challenges of measuring constructs that are under awareness and, informed by other fields, attempt to provide some solutions.
{"title":"Grappling with Social Complexity When Defining and Assessing Implicit Bias","authors":"Jasmine B. Norman, Jacqueline M. Chen","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106760","url":null,"abstract":"The target article by Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) presents a thorough overview of the intergroup bias literature, honing in on issues that are both conceptual and methodological. In order to address these issues, Gawronski et al. present some new conceptual definitions and distinctions. One central definition provided is of implicit bias, defined as “unconscious effects of social category cues (e.g., cues related to race, gender, etc.) on behavioral responses” (Gawronski et al., this issue, p. 140). The target article subsequently discusses the implications of this definition for methodology in detail. Our commentary highlights important considerations for different aspects of the target article’s definition of implicit bias. First, we outline the complexity of a seemingly straightforward part of this definition: social category cues. We consider the implications of categorical ambiguity in relation to the current definition of bias. Further, we propose that disparate impact and the importance of social context must be definitional to implicit bias. We provide an argument for how social and structural context are inseparable from social category cues and behavior. Second, turning our attention to the criterion of unconsciousness, we discuss and illustrate the challenges of measuring constructs that are under awareness and, informed by other fields, attempt to provide some solutions.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41853818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106753
Joseph Cesario
The authors of the target article (Gawronski, Ledgerwood, & Eastwick, this issue) are to be commended for their important and insightful analysis on the state of implicit bias research. They introduce and discuss the critical distinction between bias on implicit measures and implicit bias itself. However, the authors want to have their cake and eat it too, and this causes them to stop short in fully applying their analysis. In this commentary, I take the authors seriously and draw out their analysis to its logical conclusion. In doing so, three points are raised:
{"title":"So close, Yet So Far: Stopping Short of Killing Implicit Bias","authors":"Joseph Cesario","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106753","url":null,"abstract":"The authors of the target article (Gawronski, Ledgerwood, & Eastwick, this issue) are to be commended for their important and insightful analysis on the state of implicit bias research. They introduce and discuss the critical distinction between bias on implicit measures and implicit bias itself. However, the authors want to have their cake and eat it too, and this causes them to stop short in fully applying their analysis. In this commentary, I take the authors seriously and draw out their analysis to its logical conclusion. In doing so, three points are raised:","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41407611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065129
A. Molnár, G. Loewenstein
Gries, M€ uller, & Jost (this issue) address a topic of great theoretical and practical importance: the origin of the ideologies that shape—and increasingly define—the current political and social climate. Adopting an economist’s perspective on ideologies, they seek to understand what purpose belief systems serve and why specific ideologies are embraced by individuals. Their answer, in a nutshell, is that people assess how well different ideologies would satisfy their psychological needs (and consumption) and choose the belief system that addresses their needs the most (subject to constraints such as limited information about ideologies and limited supply of ideologies in the “market” of belief systems). At a time when beliefs about, and behavior toward, ostensibly scientific issues such as climate change and vaccination, have become polarized as a result of being viewed through the lens of political ideologies, these questions are of existential importance. As advocates of a new wave in economics commonly referred to as “belief-based utility,” we applaud Gries et al.’s effort to apply an economic framework to understanding how people adopt, update, and abandon their belief systems. Belief-based utility is the idea that the main sources of utility are not material consumption, as economists generally assume, but rather people’s beliefs—about the world, and especially about themselves (e.g., whether they are virtuous, smart, attractive, likeable; see Loewenstein & Molnar, 2018; Molnar and Loewenstein, in press). The idea that people care about what is in their mind, and not just about material consumption, goes way back to classical economists (see Loewenstein, 1992). For example, Jeremy Bentham, who first proposed the notion of utility that became the backbone of economics, listed only a handful of material determinants of utility in his seminal work on hedonics and utility (Bentham, 1789), but a wide range of immaterial, nonphysical concepts, such as reputation, memory, imagination, or expectations—the majority of which can be labeled as beliefs. Adam Smith, likewise, made a case for the role of beliefs driving human behavior: “To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world?” Smith asked, and answered: “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages we can propose to derive from it” (Smith, 1759, pp. 108–110). Although these ideas were largely sidelined during the early to mid-20th century as a result of the ordinalist revolution in economics, behaviorism in psychology, and the ensuing exclusive focus on directly measurable goods and outcomes, economists began to re-incorporate these insights in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. For example, Thomas Schelling (1984), in a brilliant paper titled “The Mind as a Consuming Organ,” discussed how little of what we “consume” is actually observable, physical, goods (what standard economics would conceptualize as “cons
Gries、M€uller和Jost（本期）探讨了一个具有重大理论和实践意义的话题：塑造并日益定义当前政治和社会气候的意识形态的起源。采用经济学家对意识形态的观点，他们试图理解信仰体系的目的是什么，以及为什么特定的意识形态会被个人所接受。简言之，他们的答案是，人们评估不同的意识形态在多大程度上能满足他们的心理需求（和消费），并选择最能满足他们需求的信仰体系（受制于诸如意识形态信息有限和信仰体系“市场”中意识形态供应有限等限制）。当人们从政治意识形态的角度看待气候变化和疫苗接种等表面上的科学问题时，人们对这些问题的信念和行为变得两极分化，这些问题具有生存的重要性。作为经济学新浪潮（通常被称为“基于信仰的效用”）的倡导者，我们赞扬Gries等人努力应用经济框架来理解人们如何采纳、更新和放弃他们的信仰体系。基于信念的效用是指效用的主要来源不是经济学家通常认为的物质消费，而是人们对世界的信念，尤其是对自己的信念（例如，他们是否善良、聪明、有吸引力、讨人喜欢；见Loewenstein&Molnar，2018；Molnar和Loewensstein，出版）。人们关心自己的想法，而不仅仅是物质消费，这种想法可以追溯到古典经济学家（见Loewenstein，1992）。例如，杰里米·边沁（Jeremy Bentham）首先提出了效用的概念，这一概念成为经济学的支柱，他在关于享乐主义和效用的开创性著作中只列出了效用的少数物质决定因素（边沁，1789），但列出了广泛的非物质、非物质概念，如声誉、记忆、想象力或期望，其中大多数可以被标记为信仰。同样，亚当·斯密也为信仰驱动人类行为的作用提出了一个理由：“这个世界上所有的辛劳和忙碌是为了什么目的？”史密斯问道，并回答道：“被观察、被关注、被同情、自满和认可所关注，都是我们可以从中获得的优势”（Smith，1759，pp.108-110）。尽管在20世纪初至中期，由于经济学中的普通主义革命、心理学中的行为主义，以及随之而来的对直接可测量的商品和结果的专注，这些观点在很大程度上被边缘化了，但经济学家在20世纪70年代末和80年代初开始重新纳入这些见解。例如，托马斯·谢林（Thomas Schelling，1984）在一篇题为《作为消费器官的心灵》（The Mind as a Consuming Organ）的精彩论文中，讨论了我们“消费”中有多少是可观察的实物（标准经济学将其概念化为“消费”），以及其中有多少完全发生在我们的脑海中。到目前为止，基于信念的效用的各种来源的理论和模型已经被开发并应用于许多背景，如金融、医疗保健、政治或组织行为（见Molnar和Loewenstein，出版）。
{"title":"Ideologies Are Like Possessions","authors":"A. Molnár, G. Loewenstein","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065129","url":null,"abstract":"Gries, M€ uller, & Jost (this issue) address a topic of great theoretical and practical importance: the origin of the ideologies that shape—and increasingly define—the current political and social climate. Adopting an economist’s perspective on ideologies, they seek to understand what purpose belief systems serve and why specific ideologies are embraced by individuals. Their answer, in a nutshell, is that people assess how well different ideologies would satisfy their psychological needs (and consumption) and choose the belief system that addresses their needs the most (subject to constraints such as limited information about ideologies and limited supply of ideologies in the “market” of belief systems). At a time when beliefs about, and behavior toward, ostensibly scientific issues such as climate change and vaccination, have become polarized as a result of being viewed through the lens of political ideologies, these questions are of existential importance. As advocates of a new wave in economics commonly referred to as “belief-based utility,” we applaud Gries et al.’s effort to apply an economic framework to understanding how people adopt, update, and abandon their belief systems. Belief-based utility is the idea that the main sources of utility are not material consumption, as economists generally assume, but rather people’s beliefs—about the world, and especially about themselves (e.g., whether they are virtuous, smart, attractive, likeable; see Loewenstein & Molnar, 2018; Molnar and Loewenstein, in press). The idea that people care about what is in their mind, and not just about material consumption, goes way back to classical economists (see Loewenstein, 1992). For example, Jeremy Bentham, who first proposed the notion of utility that became the backbone of economics, listed only a handful of material determinants of utility in his seminal work on hedonics and utility (Bentham, 1789), but a wide range of immaterial, nonphysical concepts, such as reputation, memory, imagination, or expectations—the majority of which can be labeled as beliefs. Adam Smith, likewise, made a case for the role of beliefs driving human behavior: “To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world?” Smith asked, and answered: “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages we can propose to derive from it” (Smith, 1759, pp. 108–110). Although these ideas were largely sidelined during the early to mid-20th century as a result of the ordinalist revolution in economics, behaviorism in psychology, and the ensuing exclusive focus on directly measurable goods and outcomes, economists began to re-incorporate these insights in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. For example, Thomas Schelling (1984), in a brilliant paper titled “The Mind as a Consuming Organ,” discussed how little of what we “consume” is actually observable, physical, goods (what standard economics would conceptualize as “cons","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41801466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065132
D. Osborne, Nicole Satherley, C. Sibley
Scholars have long-debated how citizens come to adopt a political ideology. Whereas some suggest that material needs and/or self-interest motivate citizens to endorse the issue positions and ideological stances that maximize utility (see Chong, 2000; Chong & Mullinix, 2022; Sniderman, Glaser, & Griffin, 1991; Weeden & Kurzban, 2017), others argue that less rational—and even irrational—forces are at play and instead focus on the psychological needs met by (Jost, 2020, 2021; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b), as well as symbolic attachments to (Jardina, 2019; Reny & Sears, 2020; Sears, 1993; Sears & Henry, 2005), specific ideologies. It seems that the extant literature is at an impasse over the antecedents to belief systems. Are citizens rational? Or are they not? Gries, M€ uller, and Jost (this issue) reconcile these contrasting perspectives by asserting that both rational and irrational processes motivate people’s ideological preferences. To these ends, the authors develop a comprehensive model of ideological choice that incorporates both (a) psychological and (b) consumption needs which are weighted by the importance assigned to them by the individual. On the other end of the production chain, ideological entrepreneurs supply ideologies that differentially reconcile these demands and disseminate them within a larger marketplace of beliefs. Although a formal mathematical model is used to identify the ideologies available within the frontier of options that best reconcile these dual needs, Gries et al. assert that, given the informational costs associated with becoming perfectly informed, most citizens simply “try out” different ideologies until they find one that satisfices their psychological and consumption needs. In seeking to resolve the perennial quandary over the determinants of ideology, Gries et al. (this issue) make multiple important contributions to the literature. First, in our view, much of the debate over mass belief systems entails discussions where both parties talk past one another. Those in the ideological purists camp (generally comprised of political scientists) define ideology in rigid terms focused on the presence of a stable and coherent belief system as articulated by Converse (1964) and others, whereas those in the ideological minimalists camp (often comprised of psychologists) have resuscitated the competence of the average voter by treating ideology as a self-defined/identity-based concept present in the vast majority of people (Jost, 2006, 2021). Gries et al. bridge this divide by acknowledging that ideologies are comprised of a “network of attitudes and beliefs... [that are] linked together logically and/or psychologically” (p. 65). Such a compromise brings both sides of this seemingly intractable conflict together and provides the foundations for a promising resolution to one of the most enduring debates in political psychology. In a similar manner, Gries et al. (this issue) help to reconcile the debate ov
{"title":"Lost in the Supermarket? A Commentary on Gries, Müller, and Jost","authors":"D. Osborne, Nicole Satherley, C. Sibley","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065132","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have long-debated how citizens come to adopt a political ideology. Whereas some suggest that material needs and/or self-interest motivate citizens to endorse the issue positions and ideological stances that maximize utility (see Chong, 2000; Chong & Mullinix, 2022; Sniderman, Glaser, & Griffin, 1991; Weeden & Kurzban, 2017), others argue that less rational—and even irrational—forces are at play and instead focus on the psychological needs met by (Jost, 2020, 2021; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b), as well as symbolic attachments to (Jardina, 2019; Reny & Sears, 2020; Sears, 1993; Sears & Henry, 2005), specific ideologies. It seems that the extant literature is at an impasse over the antecedents to belief systems. Are citizens rational? Or are they not? Gries, M€ uller, and Jost (this issue) reconcile these contrasting perspectives by asserting that both rational and irrational processes motivate people’s ideological preferences. To these ends, the authors develop a comprehensive model of ideological choice that incorporates both (a) psychological and (b) consumption needs which are weighted by the importance assigned to them by the individual. On the other end of the production chain, ideological entrepreneurs supply ideologies that differentially reconcile these demands and disseminate them within a larger marketplace of beliefs. Although a formal mathematical model is used to identify the ideologies available within the frontier of options that best reconcile these dual needs, Gries et al. assert that, given the informational costs associated with becoming perfectly informed, most citizens simply “try out” different ideologies until they find one that satisfices their psychological and consumption needs. In seeking to resolve the perennial quandary over the determinants of ideology, Gries et al. (this issue) make multiple important contributions to the literature. First, in our view, much of the debate over mass belief systems entails discussions where both parties talk past one another. Those in the ideological purists camp (generally comprised of political scientists) define ideology in rigid terms focused on the presence of a stable and coherent belief system as articulated by Converse (1964) and others, whereas those in the ideological minimalists camp (often comprised of psychologists) have resuscitated the competence of the average voter by treating ideology as a self-defined/identity-based concept present in the vast majority of people (Jost, 2006, 2021). Gries et al. bridge this divide by acknowledging that ideologies are comprised of a “network of attitudes and beliefs... [that are] linked together logically and/or psychologically” (p. 65). Such a compromise brings both sides of this seemingly intractable conflict together and provides the foundations for a promising resolution to one of the most enduring debates in political psychology. In a similar manner, Gries et al. (this issue) help to reconcile the debate ov","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41747544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065133
Richard P. Eibach
In the opening scene of Angels in America: Perestroika, Aleksii Antedilluvianovich Prelapsarianov, “the world’s oldest living Bolshevik,” delivers a speech to the Kremlin shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Empire (Kushner, 1996). His speech glorifies the Bolshevik cause and voices disappointment with the Perestroika reformers. At first glance, Prelapsarianov seems like the very caricature of the irrational ideologue; his middle name (“before the Flood”) and last name (“before the Fall”) highlight how he is stubbornly clinging to the founding ideology of a dying system. Yet when we listen to his monologue we can see past the surface appearance of irrationality to find a compelling account of the human need for ideology. Surprisingly for a Marxist-Leninist, the character does not emphasize the value of ideology for advancing class-based material interests; rather, he focuses on how ideology can satisfy deeper cravings for things like meaning, structure, and purpose: “You can’t imagine, when we first read the Classic Texts, when in the dark vexed night of our ignorance and terror the seedwords sprouted and shoved incomprehension aside, when the incredible bloody vegetable struggle up and through into Red Blooming gave us Praxis, True Praxis, True Theory married to Actual Life” (Kushner, 1996, p. 14). He even gives a vivid analogy to suggest how lost we would be without an ideology to shield us from a threatening world: “If the snake sheds his skin before a new skin is ready, naked he will be in the world, prey to the forces of chaos” (p. 14). Prelapsarianov indicates that he is open to changing his mind if only the Perestroika reformers were able to offer a better ideological product to satisfy his needs: “[O]nly show me the Theory, and I will be at the barricades, show me the book of the next Beautiful Theory, and I promise you these blind eyes will see again, just to read it, to devour that text. Show me the words that will reorder the world, or else keep silent” (Kushner, 1996, p. 14). It is just that he is not very impressed by the ideological options that the reformers are offering: “What have you to offer in its place? Market Incentives? American Cheeseburgers? Watered-down Bukharinite stopgap makeshift Capitalism! NEPmen!” (p. 14). So, what on the surface may look like a stubborn, irrational rigidity may actually reflect commitment to the only ideological option that the individual finds reasonably satisfying. Although it is certainly ironic to depict a Bolshevik talking as if he is a customer shopping for the best available ideological product, this scenario has an intriguing resemblance to the rational choice model of ideological selection that Gries, M€ uller, and Jost (this issue) present in the target article. Their model takes seriously the familiar metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas” and combines the tools of rational choice modeling from economics with insights from theory and research on motivated social cognition to provide
{"title":"What a Capital Ideology! Framing Ideological Choice as a Capitalist Consumer Process","authors":"Richard P. Eibach","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065133","url":null,"abstract":"In the opening scene of Angels in America: Perestroika, Aleksii Antedilluvianovich Prelapsarianov, “the world’s oldest living Bolshevik,” delivers a speech to the Kremlin shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Empire (Kushner, 1996). His speech glorifies the Bolshevik cause and voices disappointment with the Perestroika reformers. At first glance, Prelapsarianov seems like the very caricature of the irrational ideologue; his middle name (“before the Flood”) and last name (“before the Fall”) highlight how he is stubbornly clinging to the founding ideology of a dying system. Yet when we listen to his monologue we can see past the surface appearance of irrationality to find a compelling account of the human need for ideology. Surprisingly for a Marxist-Leninist, the character does not emphasize the value of ideology for advancing class-based material interests; rather, he focuses on how ideology can satisfy deeper cravings for things like meaning, structure, and purpose: “You can’t imagine, when we first read the Classic Texts, when in the dark vexed night of our ignorance and terror the seedwords sprouted and shoved incomprehension aside, when the incredible bloody vegetable struggle up and through into Red Blooming gave us Praxis, True Praxis, True Theory married to Actual Life” (Kushner, 1996, p. 14). He even gives a vivid analogy to suggest how lost we would be without an ideology to shield us from a threatening world: “If the snake sheds his skin before a new skin is ready, naked he will be in the world, prey to the forces of chaos” (p. 14). Prelapsarianov indicates that he is open to changing his mind if only the Perestroika reformers were able to offer a better ideological product to satisfy his needs: “[O]nly show me the Theory, and I will be at the barricades, show me the book of the next Beautiful Theory, and I promise you these blind eyes will see again, just to read it, to devour that text. Show me the words that will reorder the world, or else keep silent” (Kushner, 1996, p. 14). It is just that he is not very impressed by the ideological options that the reformers are offering: “What have you to offer in its place? Market Incentives? American Cheeseburgers? Watered-down Bukharinite stopgap makeshift Capitalism! NEPmen!” (p. 14). So, what on the surface may look like a stubborn, irrational rigidity may actually reflect commitment to the only ideological option that the individual finds reasonably satisfying. Although it is certainly ironic to depict a Bolshevik talking as if he is a customer shopping for the best available ideological product, this scenario has an intriguing resemblance to the rational choice model of ideological selection that Gries, M€ uller, and Jost (this issue) present in the target article. Their model takes seriously the familiar metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas” and combines the tools of rational choice modeling from economics with insights from theory and research on motivated social cognition to provide ","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49630918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065137
R. McDermott
In the wake of increasing political polarization in the American body politic, and the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders more generally around the world, there has been a great deal of renewed attention to the nature and function of political ideology. Particularly in light of the recent insurrection in the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2021, and the precipitating and ensuing public debate surrounding the big lie espoused by many Republicans arguing that Trump won the 2020 election, political pundits and academics are increasingly asking how we can make politics less polarized and conflictual. The subtext in much of this discussion revolves around how best to persuade people to change their ideology to allow the possibility for greater political and social compromise. Into this fraught public and academic debate, Greis et al. offer a formalized model of ideological choice drawing on methods from economics in an effort to increase our understanding of how people decide which ideologies are best suited to their psychological and consumption needs, couched in terms of both supply and demand. This approach strives to combine psychological factors as well as economic principles to create a cohesive model of choice. In this way, Greis et al. explicitly approach the problem of how people select an ideology as a problem of decision making under conditions of uncertainty. This draws upon, and expands, earlier theoretical and empirical work by Jost and colleagues (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, van der Linden, Panagopoulos, & Hardin, 2018) that explored the effects of uncertainty on the development of conservative political beliefs in particular. There is much to applaud about this paper. As with any formal model, the challenge, of course, lies in the empirical accuracy of the assumptions posited. These challenges, to employ the authors’ categories, fall into both demand and supply side categories. What is noteworthy in the current model is not so much what is included as what is left out. Notably, much of this model seems readily applicable to the recent Trump phenomena, but it remains unclear how well it generalizes beyond seeking to explain the nature of his support. Finally, it is worth considering at least one obvious addition, if not alternative, to the nature of ideological choice that derives from the critical nature of community for both physical and emotional survival. This consideration can be incorporated in light of a different weighting for multi attribute choice. This brief commentary proceeds along these lines.
随着美国政治体制中政治两极分化的加剧，以及民粹主义和威权主义领导人在世界各地的崛起，人们重新关注政治意识形态的性质和功能。特别是考虑到最近2021年1月6日美国国会大厦发生的暴动，以及围绕许多共和党人所支持的特朗普赢得2020年大选的弥天大谎而引发的公众辩论，政治专家和学者越来越多地问我们如何才能使政治不那么两极分化和矛盾。这场讨论的潜台词大多围绕着如何最好地说服人们改变他们的意识形态，从而有可能实现更大的政治和社会妥协。在这场令人担忧的公众和学术辩论中，Greis等人借鉴经济学的方法，提供了一个意识形态选择的形式化模型，以增进我们对人们如何决定哪些意识形态最适合他们的心理和消费需求的理解，从供应和需求的角度来表达。这种方法努力将心理因素和经济原则相结合，以创建一个有凝聚力的选择模型。通过这种方式，Greis等人明确地将人们如何选择意识形态的问题视为不确定性条件下的决策问题。这借鉴并扩展了Jost及其同事早期的理论和实证工作（Jost，Federico，&Napier，2009；Jost，Glaser，Kruglanski，&Sulloway，2003；Jost、van der Linden、Panagopoulos和Hardin，2018），这些工作特别探讨了不确定性对保守政治信仰发展的影响。这篇论文值得称赞。当然，与任何形式的模型一样，挑战在于假设的实证准确性。根据作者的分类，这些挑战分为需求和供应两类。当前模型中值得注意的与其说是包含了什么，不如说是遗漏了什么。值得注意的是，这个模型的大部分似乎很容易适用于最近的特朗普现象，但除了试图解释他的支持性质之外，它的推广效果如何尚不清楚。最后，值得考虑的是，意识形态选择的本质至少有一个明显的补充，如果不是替代的话，那就是社区对身体和情感生存的批判性。这种考虑可以结合用于多属性选择的不同权重。本简短评论是沿着这些思路进行的。
{"title":"Commentary on Gries, Muller and Jost’s “The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice”","authors":"R. McDermott","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065137","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of increasing political polarization in the American body politic, and the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders more generally around the world, there has been a great deal of renewed attention to the nature and function of political ideology. Particularly in light of the recent insurrection in the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2021, and the precipitating and ensuing public debate surrounding the big lie espoused by many Republicans arguing that Trump won the 2020 election, political pundits and academics are increasingly asking how we can make politics less polarized and conflictual. The subtext in much of this discussion revolves around how best to persuade people to change their ideology to allow the possibility for greater political and social compromise. Into this fraught public and academic debate, Greis et al. offer a formalized model of ideological choice drawing on methods from economics in an effort to increase our understanding of how people decide which ideologies are best suited to their psychological and consumption needs, couched in terms of both supply and demand. This approach strives to combine psychological factors as well as economic principles to create a cohesive model of choice. In this way, Greis et al. explicitly approach the problem of how people select an ideology as a problem of decision making under conditions of uncertainty. This draws upon, and expands, earlier theoretical and empirical work by Jost and colleagues (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, van der Linden, Panagopoulos, & Hardin, 2018) that explored the effects of uncertainty on the development of conservative political beliefs in particular. There is much to applaud about this paper. As with any formal model, the challenge, of course, lies in the empirical accuracy of the assumptions posited. These challenges, to employ the authors’ categories, fall into both demand and supply side categories. What is noteworthy in the current model is not so much what is included as what is left out. Notably, much of this model seems readily applicable to the recent Trump phenomena, but it remains unclear how well it generalizes beyond seeking to explain the nature of his support. Finally, it is worth considering at least one obvious addition, if not alternative, to the nature of ideological choice that derives from the critical nature of community for both physical and emotional survival. This consideration can be incorporated in light of a different weighting for multi attribute choice. This brief commentary proceeds along these lines.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45288771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065135
J. Jost, Tom Gries, Veronika Müller
Abstract In a target article, we introduced a formal decision-making model of ideological choice to understand how individuals choose among alternatives in electoral contexts in which multiple parties and candidates compete to address voters’ material and psychological needs. In this rejoinder we respond to very thoughtful comments by Eibach; McDermott; Zmigrod; Molnar & Loewenstein, and Osborne, Satherley & Sibley. We also seek to correct a number of misrepresentations of the current state of knowledge in political psychology based on a few of the commentaries, especially that of Costello, Clark, and Tetlock. Finally, we revisit thorny questions of rationality and irrationality in the market for belief systems.
{"title":"Costs and Benefits of a Market-Based Model of Ideological Choice: Responding to Consumers and Critics","authors":"J. Jost, Tom Gries, Veronika Müller","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065135","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a target article, we introduced a formal decision-making model of ideological choice to understand how individuals choose among alternatives in electoral contexts in which multiple parties and candidates compete to address voters’ material and psychological needs. In this rejoinder we respond to very thoughtful comments by Eibach; McDermott; Zmigrod; Molnar & Loewenstein, and Osborne, Satherley & Sibley. We also seek to correct a number of misrepresentations of the current state of knowledge in political psychology based on a few of the commentaries, especially that of Costello, Clark, and Tetlock. Finally, we revisit thorny questions of rationality and irrationality in the market for belief systems.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43228231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-10DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065134
Leor Zmigrod
A quick scan of the political landscape reveals that people differ in the ideologies they embrace and advocate. Why do individuals prefer certain ideologies over others? A formal analysis of psychological needs and consumption desires suggests that it is possible to compute the subjective utility of selecting one ideology over another, as though it were a purchasing decision. Given resources, constraints, and available options, individuals can rationally choose the ideology that best matches or resonates with their interests. It is a compelling framework that can take into account how diverse ideologies satisfy people’s diverse and multidimensional psychological and material needs. This psycho-economic model is ambitious and informative, and I will argue that it can be even more encompassing and enlightening if it is expanded to incorporate two critical components of ideological cognition: (1) the nature of ideological conviction and extremism and (2) the dynamic, probabilistic mental computations that underlie belief formation, preservation, and change. Firstly, I will argue that a formal model of ideological choice cannot escape the question of the strength of ideological commitment. In other words, we need to ask not only about which ideologies individuals choose but also about how strongly they adhere to these ideologies once those are chosen. An analysis of ideological choice needs to be accompanied by an analysis of ideological conviction. Secondly, in order to build a robust sense of the rationality behind ideological thinking, it is useful to incorporate principles of uncertainty and probability-based belief updating into the formal model of ideological worldviews. Bayesian models highlight how human brains seek to build predictive models of the world by updating their beliefs and preferences in ways that are proportional to their prior expectations and sensory experiences. Consequently, incorporating Bayesian principles into the formal model of ideological choice will provide a more wholistic understanding of what happens when a mind enters the market for belief systems – and why a mind can, at times, purchase toxic doses of the ideologies that sellers and entrepreneurs offer on display.
{"title":"Mental Computations of Ideological Choice and Conviction: The Utility of Integrating Psycho-Economics and Bayesian Models of Belief","authors":"Leor Zmigrod","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065134","url":null,"abstract":"A quick scan of the political landscape reveals that people differ in the ideologies they embrace and advocate. Why do individuals prefer certain ideologies over others? A formal analysis of psychological needs and consumption desires suggests that it is possible to compute the subjective utility of selecting one ideology over another, as though it were a purchasing decision. Given resources, constraints, and available options, individuals can rationally choose the ideology that best matches or resonates with their interests. It is a compelling framework that can take into account how diverse ideologies satisfy people’s diverse and multidimensional psychological and material needs. This psycho-economic model is ambitious and informative, and I will argue that it can be even more encompassing and enlightening if it is expanded to incorporate two critical components of ideological cognition: (1) the nature of ideological conviction and extremism and (2) the dynamic, probabilistic mental computations that underlie belief formation, preservation, and change. Firstly, I will argue that a formal model of ideological choice cannot escape the question of the strength of ideological commitment. In other words, we need to ask not only about which ideologies individuals choose but also about how strongly they adhere to these ideologies once those are chosen. An analysis of ideological choice needs to be accompanied by an analysis of ideological conviction. Secondly, in order to build a robust sense of the rationality behind ideological thinking, it is useful to incorporate principles of uncertainty and probability-based belief updating into the formal model of ideological worldviews. Bayesian models highlight how human brains seek to build predictive models of the world by updating their beliefs and preferences in ways that are proportional to their prior expectations and sensory experiences. Consequently, incorporating Bayesian principles into the formal model of ideological choice will provide a more wholistic understanding of what happens when a mind enters the market for belief systems – and why a mind can, at times, purchase toxic doses of the ideologies that sellers and entrepreneurs offer on display.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41625571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037999
Ayelet Fishbach
In their target article, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) make a strong case for the substitutability between personal agency and social support. Across various domains, they find that perceived personal agency decreases the reliance on social support and perceived social support decreases the perceptions of personal agency. In my own research, I observed a similar substitutability between personal and social control; for example, the presence of external controls such as parental supervision undermined self-control in pursuing academic goals (Fishbach & Trope, 2005). Furthermore, research on balancing (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009) and licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001) often observed substitutability among the means to a goal. It is clear that personal agency and social support can be, and often are, substitutional means for goal achievement. This commentary starts where the target article ends— when (if ever) should we expect complementarity instead of substitutability between two means to achieving a goal? Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offer a boundary condition: agency and assistance should not undermine each other if one of them also serves as a means to another goal. Yet, I ask, when does perceiving one (agency or support) make it more likely that the person will also turn to the other? For example, when learning a new skill (such as playing tennis or speaking Yiddish), is it possible that the perception of social support makes people more confident in their personal ability, or that perceived ability increases the chances that the person will also seek assistance? Possibly, to master these skills, it is insufficient to rely on one means only. The learner would benefit from multiple routes or, alternatively, from a backup plan (i.e., if one means fails, they can rely on the other). The notion that personal agency and social support could at times complement each other is consistent with a key tenet of Goal System Theory: Equifinal means, while often imposing redundancy (“all roads lead to Rome”), also increase confidence (the traveler is pretty confident she will make it to Rome, one way or another). Thus, while the advantage of multifinal means to a goal is that they maximize attainment (“feeding two birds with one scone”), their disadvantage is that these means could undermine (“dilute”) the perceived instrumentality of each means to the goal. And while the advantage of equifinal means is that they increase confidence, the person feels that a goal is within reach; the disadvantage is that they can be substitutable. Many (but not all the) times, pursuing one of these means will trigger disengagement with the other.
{"title":"Personal Agency and Social Support: Substitutes of Complements?","authors":"Ayelet Fishbach","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037999","url":null,"abstract":"In their target article, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) make a strong case for the substitutability between personal agency and social support. Across various domains, they find that perceived personal agency decreases the reliance on social support and perceived social support decreases the perceptions of personal agency. In my own research, I observed a similar substitutability between personal and social control; for example, the presence of external controls such as parental supervision undermined self-control in pursuing academic goals (Fishbach & Trope, 2005). Furthermore, research on balancing (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009) and licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001) often observed substitutability among the means to a goal. It is clear that personal agency and social support can be, and often are, substitutional means for goal achievement. This commentary starts where the target article ends— when (if ever) should we expect complementarity instead of substitutability between two means to achieving a goal? Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offer a boundary condition: agency and assistance should not undermine each other if one of them also serves as a means to another goal. Yet, I ask, when does perceiving one (agency or support) make it more likely that the person will also turn to the other? For example, when learning a new skill (such as playing tennis or speaking Yiddish), is it possible that the perception of social support makes people more confident in their personal ability, or that perceived ability increases the chances that the person will also seek assistance? Possibly, to master these skills, it is insufficient to rely on one means only. The learner would benefit from multiple routes or, alternatively, from a backup plan (i.e., if one means fails, they can rely on the other). The notion that personal agency and social support could at times complement each other is consistent with a key tenet of Goal System Theory: Equifinal means, while often imposing redundancy (“all roads lead to Rome”), also increase confidence (the traveler is pretty confident she will make it to Rome, one way or another). Thus, while the advantage of multifinal means to a goal is that they maximize attainment (“feeding two birds with one scone”), their disadvantage is that these means could undermine (“dilute”) the perceived instrumentality of each means to the goal. And while the advantage of equifinal means is that they increase confidence, the person feels that a goal is within reach; the disadvantage is that they can be substitutable. Many (but not all the) times, pursuing one of these means will trigger disengagement with the other.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59940269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037996
Paul K. Piff, Pia Dietze, Rudy M. Ceballos
Since humans have inhabited social groups, people have grappled with when to rely on others or get by on their own. In many ways, navigating this trade-off reflects one of the central conundrums of living: When should we be agentic versus turn to others for support, and what are the psychological and interpersonal ramifications of these decisions? The target article of Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offers a powerful answer to these questions. Their theory is grounded in the notion that self-reliance and social support represent alternative means of goal pursuit. The stronger the individual’s sense of personal agency, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) reason, the less likely they are to seek social assistance and the more likely they are to devalue social relationships. By contrast, the more individuals rely on social support, the weaker their motivation to be agentic, the lesser their tendency to focus on and prioritize the self, and the more attentive they become to others. There is much to like about what Milyavsky et al. (this issue) lay out. Their theory is compelling, first and foremost, in its parsimony; treating selfand other-reliance as hydraulic, dueling motivations is appealing and straightforward. Second, their theory is impressive in its explanatory range: Milyavsky et al. (this issue) marshal a varied assortment of empirical evidence across a sweeping array of domains to substantiate their claims. Third, we learn their theory is distinct from and provides value above other related theorizing, most notably on the contrast between agency and communion. Finally, their theory is empirically generative by outlining a range of open and interesting questions that should set the stage for a robust scientific inquiry into compensatory modes of goal pursuit for years to come. The notion that personal means and social means of goal pursuit represent dueling ends of a motivational continuum finds parallels in other psychological literatures. In research on social attribution, for example, dispositional or individual explanations for social behavior are frequently treated as––and empirically found to be––hydraulically related to situational or environmental explanations. As dispositional explanations (e.g., laziness) for a particular individual outcome (e.g., poverty) increase, situational explanations (e.g., structural unfairness) for that same outcome tend to decrease, and vice versa (Hunt & Bullock, 2016; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Piff et al., 2020). Similarly, the basic dynamic that selfand other-reliance are inversely related can be observed across myriad social contexts, including in research on the psychological ramifications of social class (e.g., Dietze & Knowles, 2016, 2021; Piff, 2014; Piff, Kraus, Côt e, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010, Piff, Kraus, & Keltner, 2018). At the same time––and as is the case with select findings in attribution research showing that dispositional and individual explanations are not always inversely related but can e
自从人类居住在社会群体中以来，人们一直在纠结什么时候该依赖他人或靠自己生活。在很多方面，驾驭这种权衡反映了生活的核心难题之一：我们什么时候应该成为代理人，而不是向他人寻求支持，这些决定会产生什么心理和人际影响？Milyavsky等人（本期）的目标文章为这些问题提供了有力的答案。他们的理论基于这样一种观念，即自力更生和社会支持是追求目标的替代手段。Milyavsky等人（本期）认为，个人的代理意识越强，他们寻求社会援助的可能性就越小，贬低社会关系的可能性也就越大。相比之下，越是依赖社会支持的人，他们成为代理人的动机就越弱，他们关注自我和优先考虑自我的倾向就越小，他们对他人的关注度也就越高。Milyavsky等人（本期）的观点有很多值得喜欢的地方。他们的理论是令人信服的，首先也是最重要的，因为它的吝啬；将自我和其他依赖视为水力的、决斗的动机是有吸引力的，也是直截了当的。其次，他们的理论在解释范围上令人印象深刻：Milyavsky等人（本期）在一系列领域整理了各种各样的经验证据，以证实他们的主张。第三，我们了解到他们的理论不同于其他相关理论，并提供了高于其他相关理论的价值，最显著的是代理和交流之间的对比。最后，他们的理论通过概述一系列开放和有趣的问题而具有经验生成性，这些问题应该为未来几年对目标追求的补偿模式进行强有力的科学研究奠定基础。追求目标的个人手段和社会手段代表着动机连续体的决斗终点，这一观点在其他心理学文献中也有相似之处。例如，在社会归因的研究中，对社会行为的倾向性或个人解释经常被视为——并且根据经验发现——与情境或环境解释有液压关系。随着对特定个人结果（如贫困）的倾向性解释（如懒惰）的增加，对同一结果的情境性解释（例如结构性不公平）往往会减少，反之亦然（Hunt&Bullock，2016；克劳斯、皮夫和凯尔特纳，2009年；皮夫等人，2020）。同样，在无数的社会背景下，包括在对社会阶层心理影响的研究中，都可以观察到自我和其他依赖呈负相关的基本动态（例如，Dietze&Knowles，20162021；Piff，2014；Piff、Kraus、Côt e、Cheng和Keltner，2010，Piff、克劳斯和Keltna，2018）。与此同时，正如归因研究中的一些研究结果所表明的那样，倾向性解释和个人解释并不总是相反相关的，有时甚至可以相互呈正相关（例如，见Piff et al.，2020）——社会阶层的心理学研究指向的是追求目标的社会手段不一定竞争的环境与私人的。事实上，在某些情况下，这两种动机可能同时起作用，相互加强。在这篇评论中，我们将详细说明个人能动性的差异，源于与不同社会阶级群体相关的资源生态的不平等，如何导致自我关注与关注他人的阶级差异。我们回顾了这些阶级差异是如何在一系列社会结果中表现出来的，包括对自我的评价（例如，Piff，2014；Twenge&Campbell，2002）、对他人的关注（例如，Dietze&Knowles，2016）、情绪反应（例如，Ditze&Knols，2021；Piff&Moskowitz，2018；Stellar、Manzo、Kraus和Keltner，2012）和亲社会性（Piff等人，2010；Piff＆Robinson，2017）。这些实证研究结果有力地证明了目标文章的总体框架：追求目标的社会模式可能是对个人能动性减少的补偿反应。然而，社会阶层文献中的一些研究结果也指出，社会支持实际上可能促进而不是破坏个人能动性。我们在综述中讨论了两个这样的案例，以指出Milyavsky及其同事的理论的一些潜在边界条件。最后，我们警告不要将自我和其他焦点单方面概念化为决斗动机，也不要将通常需要人（或认为不需要人）的人视为必然需要人的社会分类法。
{"title":"Personal and Social Means Can Be (But Need Not Be) Opposing: The Case of Social Class","authors":"Paul K. Piff, Pia Dietze, Rudy M. Ceballos","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037996","url":null,"abstract":"Since humans have inhabited social groups, people have grappled with when to rely on others or get by on their own. In many ways, navigating this trade-off reflects one of the central conundrums of living: When should we be agentic versus turn to others for support, and what are the psychological and interpersonal ramifications of these decisions? The target article of Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offers a powerful answer to these questions. Their theory is grounded in the notion that self-reliance and social support represent alternative means of goal pursuit. The stronger the individual’s sense of personal agency, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) reason, the less likely they are to seek social assistance and the more likely they are to devalue social relationships. By contrast, the more individuals rely on social support, the weaker their motivation to be agentic, the lesser their tendency to focus on and prioritize the self, and the more attentive they become to others. There is much to like about what Milyavsky et al. (this issue) lay out. Their theory is compelling, first and foremost, in its parsimony; treating selfand other-reliance as hydraulic, dueling motivations is appealing and straightforward. Second, their theory is impressive in its explanatory range: Milyavsky et al. (this issue) marshal a varied assortment of empirical evidence across a sweeping array of domains to substantiate their claims. Third, we learn their theory is distinct from and provides value above other related theorizing, most notably on the contrast between agency and communion. Finally, their theory is empirically generative by outlining a range of open and interesting questions that should set the stage for a robust scientific inquiry into compensatory modes of goal pursuit for years to come. The notion that personal means and social means of goal pursuit represent dueling ends of a motivational continuum finds parallels in other psychological literatures. In research on social attribution, for example, dispositional or individual explanations for social behavior are frequently treated as––and empirically found to be––hydraulically related to situational or environmental explanations. As dispositional explanations (e.g., laziness) for a particular individual outcome (e.g., poverty) increase, situational explanations (e.g., structural unfairness) for that same outcome tend to decrease, and vice versa (Hunt & Bullock, 2016; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Piff et al., 2020). Similarly, the basic dynamic that selfand other-reliance are inversely related can be observed across myriad social contexts, including in research on the psychological ramifications of social class (e.g., Dietze & Knowles, 2016, 2021; Piff, 2014; Piff, Kraus, Côt e, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010, Piff, Kraus, & Keltner, 2018). At the same time––and as is the case with select findings in attribution research showing that dispositional and individual explanations are not always inversely related but can e","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42054300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：