Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065135
J. Jost, Tom Gries, Veronika Müller
Abstract In a target article, we introduced a formal decision-making model of ideological choice to understand how individuals choose among alternatives in electoral contexts in which multiple parties and candidates compete to address voters’ material and psychological needs. In this rejoinder we respond to very thoughtful comments by Eibach; McDermott; Zmigrod; Molnar & Loewenstein, and Osborne, Satherley & Sibley. We also seek to correct a number of misrepresentations of the current state of knowledge in political psychology based on a few of the commentaries, especially that of Costello, Clark, and Tetlock. Finally, we revisit thorny questions of rationality and irrationality in the market for belief systems.
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Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.7861/clinmed.Let.22.2.3
Oscar Jolobe
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Pub Date : 2022-01-10DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2065134
Leor Zmigrod
A quick scan of the political landscape reveals that people differ in the ideologies they embrace and advocate. Why do individuals prefer certain ideologies over others? A formal analysis of psychological needs and consumption desires suggests that it is possible to compute the subjective utility of selecting one ideology over another, as though it were a purchasing decision. Given resources, constraints, and available options, individuals can rationally choose the ideology that best matches or resonates with their interests. It is a compelling framework that can take into account how diverse ideologies satisfy people’s diverse and multidimensional psychological and material needs. This psycho-economic model is ambitious and informative, and I will argue that it can be even more encompassing and enlightening if it is expanded to incorporate two critical components of ideological cognition: (1) the nature of ideological conviction and extremism and (2) the dynamic, probabilistic mental computations that underlie belief formation, preservation, and change. Firstly, I will argue that a formal model of ideological choice cannot escape the question of the strength of ideological commitment. In other words, we need to ask not only about which ideologies individuals choose but also about how strongly they adhere to these ideologies once those are chosen. An analysis of ideological choice needs to be accompanied by an analysis of ideological conviction. Secondly, in order to build a robust sense of the rationality behind ideological thinking, it is useful to incorporate principles of uncertainty and probability-based belief updating into the formal model of ideological worldviews. Bayesian models highlight how human brains seek to build predictive models of the world by updating their beliefs and preferences in ways that are proportional to their prior expectations and sensory experiences. Consequently, incorporating Bayesian principles into the formal model of ideological choice will provide a more wholistic understanding of what happens when a mind enters the market for belief systems – and why a mind can, at times, purchase toxic doses of the ideologies that sellers and entrepreneurs offer on display.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037999
Ayelet Fishbach
In their target article, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) make a strong case for the substitutability between personal agency and social support. Across various domains, they find that perceived personal agency decreases the reliance on social support and perceived social support decreases the perceptions of personal agency. In my own research, I observed a similar substitutability between personal and social control; for example, the presence of external controls such as parental supervision undermined self-control in pursuing academic goals (Fishbach & Trope, 2005). Furthermore, research on balancing (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009) and licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001) often observed substitutability among the means to a goal. It is clear that personal agency and social support can be, and often are, substitutional means for goal achievement. This commentary starts where the target article ends— when (if ever) should we expect complementarity instead of substitutability between two means to achieving a goal? Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offer a boundary condition: agency and assistance should not undermine each other if one of them also serves as a means to another goal. Yet, I ask, when does perceiving one (agency or support) make it more likely that the person will also turn to the other? For example, when learning a new skill (such as playing tennis or speaking Yiddish), is it possible that the perception of social support makes people more confident in their personal ability, or that perceived ability increases the chances that the person will also seek assistance? Possibly, to master these skills, it is insufficient to rely on one means only. The learner would benefit from multiple routes or, alternatively, from a backup plan (i.e., if one means fails, they can rely on the other). The notion that personal agency and social support could at times complement each other is consistent with a key tenet of Goal System Theory: Equifinal means, while often imposing redundancy (“all roads lead to Rome”), also increase confidence (the traveler is pretty confident she will make it to Rome, one way or another). Thus, while the advantage of multifinal means to a goal is that they maximize attainment (“feeding two birds with one scone”), their disadvantage is that these means could undermine (“dilute”) the perceived instrumentality of each means to the goal. And while the advantage of equifinal means is that they increase confidence, the person feels that a goal is within reach; the disadvantage is that they can be substitutable. Many (but not all the) times, pursuing one of these means will trigger disengagement with the other.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037996
Paul K. Piff, Pia Dietze, Rudy M. Ceballos
Since humans have inhabited social groups, people have grappled with when to rely on others or get by on their own. In many ways, navigating this trade-off reflects one of the central conundrums of living: When should we be agentic versus turn to others for support, and what are the psychological and interpersonal ramifications of these decisions? The target article of Milyavsky et al. (this issue) offers a powerful answer to these questions. Their theory is grounded in the notion that self-reliance and social support represent alternative means of goal pursuit. The stronger the individual’s sense of personal agency, Milyavsky et al. (this issue) reason, the less likely they are to seek social assistance and the more likely they are to devalue social relationships. By contrast, the more individuals rely on social support, the weaker their motivation to be agentic, the lesser their tendency to focus on and prioritize the self, and the more attentive they become to others. There is much to like about what Milyavsky et al. (this issue) lay out. Their theory is compelling, first and foremost, in its parsimony; treating selfand other-reliance as hydraulic, dueling motivations is appealing and straightforward. Second, their theory is impressive in its explanatory range: Milyavsky et al. (this issue) marshal a varied assortment of empirical evidence across a sweeping array of domains to substantiate their claims. Third, we learn their theory is distinct from and provides value above other related theorizing, most notably on the contrast between agency and communion. Finally, their theory is empirically generative by outlining a range of open and interesting questions that should set the stage for a robust scientific inquiry into compensatory modes of goal pursuit for years to come. The notion that personal means and social means of goal pursuit represent dueling ends of a motivational continuum finds parallels in other psychological literatures. In research on social attribution, for example, dispositional or individual explanations for social behavior are frequently treated as––and empirically found to be––hydraulically related to situational or environmental explanations. As dispositional explanations (e.g., laziness) for a particular individual outcome (e.g., poverty) increase, situational explanations (e.g., structural unfairness) for that same outcome tend to decrease, and vice versa (Hunt & Bullock, 2016; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Piff et al., 2020). Similarly, the basic dynamic that selfand other-reliance are inversely related can be observed across myriad social contexts, including in research on the psychological ramifications of social class (e.g., Dietze & Knowles, 2016, 2021; Piff, 2014; Piff, Kraus, Côt e, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010, Piff, Kraus, & Keltner, 2018). At the same time––and as is the case with select findings in attribution research showing that dispositional and individual explanations are not always inversely related but can e
自从人类居住在社会群体中以来，人们一直在纠结什么时候该依赖他人或靠自己生活。在很多方面，驾驭这种权衡反映了生活的核心难题之一：我们什么时候应该成为代理人，而不是向他人寻求支持，这些决定会产生什么心理和人际影响？Milyavsky等人（本期）的目标文章为这些问题提供了有力的答案。他们的理论基于这样一种观念，即自力更生和社会支持是追求目标的替代手段。Milyavsky等人（本期）认为，个人的代理意识越强，他们寻求社会援助的可能性就越小，贬低社会关系的可能性也就越大。相比之下，越是依赖社会支持的人，他们成为代理人的动机就越弱，他们关注自我和优先考虑自我的倾向就越小，他们对他人的关注度也就越高。Milyavsky等人（本期）的观点有很多值得喜欢的地方。他们的理论是令人信服的，首先也是最重要的，因为它的吝啬；将自我和其他依赖视为水力的、决斗的动机是有吸引力的，也是直截了当的。其次，他们的理论在解释范围上令人印象深刻：Milyavsky等人（本期）在一系列领域整理了各种各样的经验证据，以证实他们的主张。第三，我们了解到他们的理论不同于其他相关理论，并提供了高于其他相关理论的价值，最显著的是代理和交流之间的对比。最后，他们的理论通过概述一系列开放和有趣的问题而具有经验生成性，这些问题应该为未来几年对目标追求的补偿模式进行强有力的科学研究奠定基础。追求目标的个人手段和社会手段代表着动机连续体的决斗终点，这一观点在其他心理学文献中也有相似之处。例如，在社会归因的研究中，对社会行为的倾向性或个人解释经常被视为——并且根据经验发现——与情境或环境解释有液压关系。随着对特定个人结果（如贫困）的倾向性解释（如懒惰）的增加，对同一结果的情境性解释（例如结构性不公平）往往会减少，反之亦然（Hunt&Bullock，2016；克劳斯、皮夫和凯尔特纳，2009年；皮夫等人，2020）。同样，在无数的社会背景下，包括在对社会阶层心理影响的研究中，都可以观察到自我和其他依赖呈负相关的基本动态（例如，Dietze&Knowles，20162021；Piff，2014；Piff、Kraus、Côt e、Cheng和Keltner，2010，Piff、克劳斯和Keltna，2018）。与此同时，正如归因研究中的一些研究结果所表明的那样，倾向性解释和个人解释并不总是相反相关的，有时甚至可以相互呈正相关（例如，见Piff et al.，2020）——社会阶层的心理学研究指向的是追求目标的社会手段不一定竞争的环境与私人的。事实上，在某些情况下，这两种动机可能同时起作用，相互加强。在这篇评论中，我们将详细说明个人能动性的差异，源于与不同社会阶级群体相关的资源生态的不平等，如何导致自我关注与关注他人的阶级差异。我们回顾了这些阶级差异是如何在一系列社会结果中表现出来的，包括对自我的评价（例如，Piff，2014；Twenge&Campbell，2002）、对他人的关注（例如，Dietze&Knowles，2016）、情绪反应（例如，Ditze&Knols，2021；Piff&Moskowitz，2018；Stellar、Manzo、Kraus和Keltner，2012）和亲社会性（Piff等人，2010；Piff＆Robinson，2017）。这些实证研究结果有力地证明了目标文章的总体框架：追求目标的社会模式可能是对个人能动性减少的补偿反应。然而，社会阶层文献中的一些研究结果也指出，社会支持实际上可能促进而不是破坏个人能动性。我们在综述中讨论了两个这样的案例，以指出Milyavsky及其同事的理论的一些潜在边界条件。最后，我们警告不要将自我和其他焦点单方面概念化为决斗动机，也不要将通常需要人（或认为不需要人）的人视为必然需要人的社会分类法。
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037995
A. Duckworth
For years, my husband Jason and I would pack the kids into the car and set off for a monthly visit to my father-in-law’s house. The 45-minute route was the same every time. From experience, I knew when we exited the highway that we had 20minutes to go. When we passed the cow pasture, we were almost there. But to this day, I cannot tell you how to get there, and without GPS I would not be able to navigate there by myself. Why not? Because my Jason always did the driving. Milyavsky et al. (this issue) argue that when a goal can be accomplished by either personal or social means, more of one results in less of the other when “no alternative goals attainable by only one of the two contrasting means are active” (p. X). In other words, the more you accomplish the goal yourself, the less you rely on others to accomplish it, and vice versa. See Figure 1. For instance, the more Jason navigated to his dad’s house, the less I took responsibility for that task. In a goal hierarchy framework, my driving and Jason’s driving would be called equifinal—substitutable means to the same end. And in the simple scenario Milyavsky et al. (this issue) consider, there are no other goals competing for attention—no alternative goals, for instance, toward which Jason or I might devote effort. The logic of Milyavsky et al.’s (this issue) so-called “hydraulic relations” model (p. 1) is watertight. The inverse relations they describe should emerge in the closed, simple system I prefer calling the ceteris paribus scenario. When all other conditions remain constant, if Jason always drives me to my father-in-law’s, why would I ever offer to do it or learn how? And if instead I preferred taking the wheel, why would I ever ask for his assistance? And yet the ceteris paribus scenario is, I think, the exception rather than the rule. More often, we are animated by a much more complex system of dynamic, interactive goals and means. I call this more complicated and common scenario mutatis mutandis, meaning “things being changed that have to be changed.” As shown in Figure 2, in life there are four complications that contribute to a positive relationship between personal agency and social assistance: (a) personal agency can increase our desire to ask for assistance from others; (b) social support can increase personal agency; (c) sometimes what is required to reach a goal is the synergistic combination of both personal action and the assistance of other people; and (d) when other people help you solve a problem, your personal agency can be applied to an alternative goal that, like the original goal, advances a superordinate goal.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037998
Agata Gąsiorowska, T. Zaleskiewicz
Commentary to Milyavsky, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M., Chernikova, M., Ellenberg, M., & Pierro, A. (2022). People Who Need People (and Some Who Think They Don’t): On Compensatory Personal and Social Means of Goal Pursuit. Psychological Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/huyb4
对Milyavsky, M, Kruglanski, A. W.， Gelfand, M.， Chernikova, M.， Ellenberg, M.， & Pierro, A.(2022)的评论。需要别人的人(和一些认为自己不需要的人):论目标追求的个人和社会补偿手段。心理调查。https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/huyb4
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2038009
Maxim Milyavsky, Marina Chernikova
We are grateful to the commentators for their insightful commentaries. Most of the commentators praised our theory highly and agreed with its basic tenets. They also drew our attention to additional data that supports our theory. Yet, some commentators pointed to data that seems to be at odds with our theory. In what follows, we will set out more clearly the main propositions of the Agency Assistance Model, discuss the new supporting data that we’ve become aware of, and try to clarify the apparent contradictions between our theory and some evidence indicated by the commentators. The starting point of our theory is the idea that human cognition is goal-driven, and that the same goal can be pursued by different means. We tried to explain the relationship between the individual and society from this point of view. To achieve goals, individuals can rely either on their own means or on the means of others. The principle of substitutability of means from Goal Systems Theory describes the relationship between equifinal means as compensatory (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Kruglanski, Chernikova, Babush, Dugas, & Schumpe, 2015). Based on this principle, we derive two hypotheses regarding the relationship between individual and social means. Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that the higher the effectiveness of personal means to achieve the goal(s) (i.e., personal agency), the more an individual can rely on himself to achieve the goal(s), and the higher will be his valuation of the self; as a result, the less s/he needs to rely on others to achieve the goal(s), which accordingly reduces their value in his/her eyes. Analogously, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that the higher the perceived effectiveness of social means for achieving the goal(s) (i.e., social assistance), the more an individual can rely on social means and the higher will become their worth in his/her eyes; as a result, the less s/he needs to rely on his/her personal means and the lower will be their valuation of the self.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037997
Gráinne M. Fitzsimons
In their article, “People Who Need People (and Some Who Think They Don’t): On Compensatory Personal and Social Means of Goal Pursuit,” Milyavsky et al. (this issue) put forward an elegant model of the interconnection of personal and social means in the process of attaining important goals. The postulates and hypotheses are consistent with several strains of theory and research across a diverse set of literatures, and the integration is creative and generative. In my commentary, I discuss how the Agency-Assistance Model (AAM) would predict behavior within a close relationship or transactive goal system. I thus attempt to consider the intersection of AAM with my own research and thinking on these issues as I have characterized them (with my colleagues Eli Finkel and Michelle van Dellen) in our work on Transactive Goal Dynamics (TGD) theory.
Milyavsky等人（本期）在他们的文章《需要人的人（以及一些认为他们不需要的人）：论追求目标的补偿性个人和社会手段》中，提出了实现重要目标过程中个人和社会方式相互联系的优雅模型。这些假设和假设与一系列不同文献中的几种理论和研究是一致的，并且这种整合是创造性的和生成性的。在我的评论中，我讨论了机构援助模型（AAM）如何预测密切关系或交易目标系统中的行为。因此，我试图考虑AAM与我自己对这些问题的研究和思考的交叉点，正如我（与我的同事Eli Finkel和Michelle van Dellen）在我们关于跨主动目标动力学（TGD）理论的工作中所描述的那样。
{"title":"Agency and Assistance in Transactive Goal Systems","authors":"Gráinne M. Fitzsimons","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037997","url":null,"abstract":"In their article, “People Who Need People (and Some Who Think They Don’t): On Compensatory Personal and Social Means of Goal Pursuit,” Milyavsky et al. (this issue) put forward an elegant model of the interconnection of personal and social means in the process of attaining important goals. The postulates and hypotheses are consistent with several strains of theory and research across a diverse set of literatures, and the integration is creative and generative. In my commentary, I discuss how the Agency-Assistance Model (AAM) would predict behavior within a close relationship or transactive goal system. I thus attempt to consider the intersection of AAM with my own research and thinking on these issues as I have characterized them (with my colleagues Eli Finkel and Michelle van Dellen) in our work on Transactive Goal Dynamics (TGD) theory.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"35 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49096240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2038001
G. McMillan, M. Milyavskaya
the Milyavsky et al. (this describe a theoretical model on the compensatory nature between personal agency and social assistance as means to attain goals. They review evidence for the assertions that (1) higher personal agency reduces the motivation to use social assistance during goal pursuit, and (2) increased reliance on social assistance decreases motivation for, and sense of, personal agency. They assert that they have applied a general analysis to a broad range of sources of agency and assistance that enable individual goal pursuit, whether those goals are con-crete or abstract. The agency-assistance model is an ambitious attempt to reconcile several disparate social psychology literatures and form a cohesive explanation for the apparent compensatory nature of personal and social means to goal pursuit. Milyavsky et al. that their model achieves par-simony and they have certainly attempted to explain a large amount of data with few assumptions. However, in doing so, they have failed to account for several theoretical per-spectives with well-established explanatory power.
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