Pub Date : 2024-07-29DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101568
Hans Christensen , Jeffrey Hales , Brendan O'Dwyer , Mark E. Peecher
{"title":"Accounting for sustainability and climate change: Special section overview","authors":"Hans Christensen , Jeffrey Hales , Brendan O'Dwyer , Mark E. Peecher","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101568","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101568","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 101568"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S036136822400028X/pdfft?md5=355b397db673c061f0b623400ab38de9&pid=1-s2.0-S036136822400028X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141882423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-20DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101565
Paul W. Black , Mark S. Cecchini , Andrew H. Newman
Research links intangible employee outcomes with ultimate firm performance and business press suggests peer recognition systems can positively influence such employee outcomes, including the degree to which employees feel appreciated. We collect survey data at a company both pre and post the rollout of their public peer recognition system. Contrary to company expectations, employees felt less appreciated by their peers after system implementation. We then develop and experimentally test theory to better explain why this decline likely occurred. We find that two features of public peer recognition systems, public feeds and leaderboards, induce different types of social comparisons, and each have incrementally negative effects on the average feelings of appreciation among employees, even though, in isolation, peer recognition positively influences employees’ feelings of appreciation. These results help explain the findings from our field surveys and highlight that firms should carefully consider how the features of their peer recognition systems affect employees, as some features may unintentionally harm employee outcomes.
{"title":"When being recognized makes employees feel less appreciated: Evidence regarding when and why peer-to-peer recognition could backfire","authors":"Paul W. Black , Mark S. Cecchini , Andrew H. Newman","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101565","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101565","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Research links intangible employee outcomes with ultimate firm performance and business press suggests peer recognition systems can positively influence such employee outcomes, including the degree to which employees feel appreciated. We collect survey data at a company both pre and post the rollout of their public peer recognition system. Contrary to company expectations, employees felt <em>less</em> appreciated by their peers after system implementation. We then develop and experimentally test theory to better explain <em>why</em> this decline likely occurred. We find that two features of public peer recognition systems, public feeds and leaderboards, induce different types of social comparisons, and each have incrementally negative effects on the average <em>feelings of appreciation</em> among employees, even though, in isolation, peer recognition positively influences employees’ feelings of appreciation. These results help explain the findings from our field surveys and highlight that firms should carefully consider how the features of their peer recognition systems affect employees, as some features may unintentionally harm employee outcomes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 101565"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141732211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-20DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101564
Sanaz Aghazadeh , J.Owen Brown , Laura Guichard Latiolais , Thomas J. Phillips Jr.
The rapid rise of social media enables companies to disclose information to the public instantly. Thus, auditors may initially receive client information via a client's social media account instead of through private, client-to-auditor communication. Drawing on Social Penetration Theory, we conduct an experiment to investigate how a client's initial disclosure via social media (versus private disclosure) and audience engagement of the client's posts (e.g., number of “likes,” “replies,” and “reposts”) affects auditors' perception of the auditor-client relationship and their evaluation of the client-provided information. We find that when auditors initially receive client information via social media with high audience engagement, they are less willing to accept the client's preference than when the same information is disclosed privately or publicly with minimal audience engagement. Our findings are consistent with auditors perceiving client disclosure via social media with high audience engagement as a significant violation of their communication expectations such that their relational closeness with the client weakens and causes them to respond critically. We contribute to the literature on the use of social media for corporate disclosure, which has implications for the auditor-client relationship and audit quality.
{"title":"The effects of a client's social media disclosure and audience engagement on auditor judgment","authors":"Sanaz Aghazadeh , J.Owen Brown , Laura Guichard Latiolais , Thomas J. Phillips Jr.","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101564","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101564","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The rapid rise of social media enables companies to disclose information to the public instantly. Thus, auditors may initially receive client information via a client's social media account instead of through private, client-to-auditor communication. Drawing on Social Penetration Theory, we conduct an experiment to investigate how a client's initial disclosure via social media (versus private disclosure) and audience engagement of the client's posts (e.g., number of “likes,” “replies,” and “reposts”) affects auditors' perception of the auditor-client relationship and their evaluation of the client-provided information. We find that when auditors initially receive client information via social media with high audience engagement, they are less willing to accept the client's preference than when the same information is disclosed privately or publicly with minimal audience engagement. Our findings are consistent with auditors perceiving client disclosure via social media with high audience engagement as a significant violation of their communication expectations such that their relational closeness with the client weakens and causes them to respond critically. We contribute to the literature on the use of social media for corporate disclosure, which has implications for the auditor-client relationship and audit quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 101564"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141732244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-14DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101562
Steven E. Kaszak , Govind S. Iyer , Philip M.J. Reckers
Contentious interactions can arise between a tax professional and client upon disagreement over a tax position. These interpersonal exchanges can lead to “opinion shopping” and represent a threat to voluntary tax compliance and the public interest. Opinion shopping is likely to increase in an era of rising narcissism because antagonistic narcissists are known to react aggressively to rejection of their views. To better understand drivers of opinion shopping, we conduct a quasi-experiment with 222 U.S taxpayers. We find clients with higher (lower) levels of antagonistic narcissism are more (less) likely to opinion shop and switch to another tax preparer. We also examine the efficacy of two theory-motivated moderators of client antagonistic narcissism: [1] tax professional – client social bonds and [2] persuasive messaging by the advisor. By doing so, we respond to calls to explore moderating influences on the undesirable effects of antagonistic narcissism while also providing novel insight into factors influencing taxpayer clients’ decision-making following interpersonal exchanges with a tax advisor. We find that while close social bonds and sanction warnings reduce opinion shopping among participants lower in antagonistic narcissism, they fail to do so among participants higher in antagonistic narcissism. Theory provides no basis for predicting a three-way interaction, and we find none. Contributions to the research literature, as well as implications for tax practice and policy internationally, are also discussed.
{"title":"Opinion shopping for tax advice: The effects of client narcissism, social bonds, and message framing","authors":"Steven E. Kaszak , Govind S. Iyer , Philip M.J. Reckers","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101562","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Contentious interactions can arise between a tax professional and client upon disagreement over a tax position. These interpersonal exchanges can lead to “opinion shopping” and represent a threat to voluntary tax compliance and the public interest. Opinion shopping is likely to increase in an era of rising narcissism because antagonistic narcissists are known to react aggressively to rejection of their views. To better understand drivers of opinion shopping, we conduct a quasi-experiment with 222 U.S taxpayers. We find clients with higher (<em>lower</em>) levels of antagonistic narcissism are more (<em>less</em>) likely to opinion shop and switch to another tax preparer. We also examine the efficacy of two theory-motivated moderators of client antagonistic narcissism: [1] tax professional – client social bonds and [2] persuasive messaging by the advisor. By doing so, we respond to calls to explore moderating influences on the undesirable effects of antagonistic narcissism while also providing novel insight into factors influencing taxpayer clients’ decision-making following interpersonal exchanges with a tax advisor. We find that while close social bonds and sanction warnings reduce opinion shopping among participants lower in antagonistic narcissism, they fail to do so among participants higher in antagonistic narcissism. Theory provides no basis for predicting a three-way interaction, and we find none. Contributions to the research literature, as well as implications for tax practice and policy internationally, are also discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 101562"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141324325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-14DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101563
Sebastian Firk , Nina Detzen , Jan C. Hennig , Michael Wolff
In this study, we examine how personality attributes and a coordinated compensation design jointly contribute to complementarity in the CEO–CFO dyad. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, we propose that the combination of a CEO with a promotion focus and a CFO with a prevention focus benefits firms. In such a dyad, promotion-focused CEOs bring creativity, speed, and eagerness to advancement, whereas prevention-focused CFOs attend to vigilance, helping to keep promotion-focused CEOs grounded. We further argue that the effectiveness of this CEO–CFO dyad depends on promotion-focused CEOs being open to critical advice from prevention-focused CFOs. To make CEOs more amenable to CFOs' advice, we suggest similar compensation plans that foreground common objectives. We empirically test our arguments by focusing on the CEO–CFO dyad's influence on investment spending and firm performance in a longitudinal sample covering more than 10,000 firm years. Our results indicate a positive association between CEO promotion focus and investment spending, as well as firm performance. We further find that CFO prevention focus weakens the association between CEO promotion focus and investment spending, but strengthens the association with firm performance. These moderating influences of CFO prevention focus are more pronounced for higher compensation similarity in the CEO–CFO dyad. In sum, our findings exemplify that deliberately considering CEO and CFO personality attributes and their compensation design jointly strengthens the functioning of the CEO–CFO dyad.
{"title":"Strengthening the CEO–CFO interplay: The role of regulatory focus and similar compensation plans","authors":"Sebastian Firk , Nina Detzen , Jan C. Hennig , Michael Wolff","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101563","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this study, we examine how personality attributes and a coordinated compensation design jointly contribute to complementarity in the CEO–CFO dyad. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, we propose that the combination of a CEO with a promotion focus and a CFO with a prevention focus benefits firms. In such a dyad, promotion-focused CEOs bring creativity, speed, and eagerness to advancement, whereas prevention-focused CFOs attend to vigilance, helping to keep promotion-focused CEOs grounded. We further argue that the effectiveness of this CEO–CFO dyad depends on promotion-focused CEOs being open to critical advice from prevention-focused CFOs. To make CEOs more amenable to CFOs' advice, we suggest similar compensation plans that foreground common objectives. We empirically test our arguments by focusing on the CEO–CFO dyad's influence on investment spending and firm performance in a longitudinal sample covering more than 10,000 firm years. Our results indicate a positive association between CEO promotion focus and investment spending, as well as firm performance. We further find that CFO prevention focus weakens the association between CEO promotion focus and investment spending, but strengthens the association with firm performance. These moderating influences of CFO prevention focus are more pronounced for higher compensation similarity in the CEO–CFO dyad. In sum, our findings exemplify that deliberately considering CEO and CFO personality attributes and their compensation design jointly strengthens the functioning of the CEO–CFO dyad.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 101563"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368224000230/pdfft?md5=ba15cd0e2db0cd60ceef29aa1ee2242e&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368224000230-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141323249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101552
Brant E. Christensen , Nathan J. Newton , Michael S. Wilkins
We investigate the costs and benefits of the PCAOB's risk-based inspection regime by studying how auditors respond to engagement-level inspection risk. Using an established inspection selection model, we find evidence that auditors behave consistent with accountability theory when auditing clients with elevated ex-ante inspection risk. Specifically, we observe an increased propensity to report material weaknesses, a decreased propensity to assert that previous material weaknesses have been remediated, increased audit effort, and a decreased likelihood of subsequent financial statement restatement. In general, these outcomes reflect auditors' attempts to minimize negative inspection outcomes in a way that could be beneficial to investors. However, auditors' apparent focus on relative inspection risk also creates potential costs for investors as evidenced by an increased likelihood of resignation from the client and inattention to clients with relatively lower inspection risk when auditor resources are most constrained. Importantly, several tests provide evidence that auditors' response to inspection risk is distinct from and incremental to their response to misstatement risk. Overall, our findings suggest that there are potential benefits and potential costs associated with auditors' responses to a selection approach that is primarily risk-based.
{"title":"Costs and benefits of a risk-based PCAOB inspection regime","authors":"Brant E. Christensen , Nathan J. Newton , Michael S. Wilkins","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101552","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101552","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the costs and benefits of the PCAOB's risk-based inspection regime by studying how auditors respond to engagement-level inspection risk. Using an established inspection selection model, we find evidence that auditors behave consistent with accountability theory when auditing clients with elevated ex-ante inspection risk. Specifically, we observe an increased propensity to report material weaknesses, a decreased propensity to assert that previous material weaknesses have been remediated, increased audit effort, and a decreased likelihood of subsequent financial statement restatement. In general, these outcomes reflect auditors' attempts to minimize negative inspection outcomes in a way that could be beneficial to investors. However, auditors' apparent focus on relative inspection risk also creates potential costs for investors as evidenced by an increased likelihood of resignation from the client and inattention to clients with relatively <em>lower</em> inspection risk when auditor resources are most constrained. Importantly, several tests provide evidence that auditors' response to inspection risk is distinct from and incremental to their response to misstatement risk. Overall, our findings suggest that there are potential benefits and potential costs associated with auditors' responses to a selection approach that is primarily risk-based.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101552"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141190290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-03DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101551
Christopher Flanagan, Yvonne Joyce
Drawing on interviews with accountants working at professional services firms (PSFs) in the UK, we explore how reflexivity enables accountants to recognise and negotiate class-based barriers to progression and inclusion. We identify a range of reflexive practices (including conversations with colleagues and clients, observations, mentoring, mulling over, and imagining) and show how these interact with habitus to structure the individual (mis)recognition of class-based barriers in the workplace. We find that reflexivity can engender an awareness of ‘difference’ and sense of inferiority relative to others, primarily for those from less privileged backgrounds. We provide evidence of the enabling role of reflexive practices which lead to purposive action for negotiating class-based barriers. However, we also find that reflexivity can lead to idiosyncratic strategies which support assimilation to (rather than challenging) existing practices in the accounting field. We find contradictory accounts of the effects of class, where class is recognised as a barrier, yet individuals are thought to progress through merit. We explain this tension through the limitations of reflexivity, restricted opportunities for reflexivity, and misrecognition of the effects of class in a seemingly meritocratic system. We provide examples of enduring and unrecognised class-based inequalities in accounting PSFs, including team composition and work allocation, class-segmented service lines, and the long-term consequences for those from less privileged backgrounds of having to work harder to ‘reach the same level’. Our findings suggest that PSFs must facilitate ‘difficult’ conversations aimed at breaking the culture of silence around class.
{"title":"The recognition and negotiation of class-based barriers to progression and inclusion in accounting professional services firms","authors":"Christopher Flanagan, Yvonne Joyce","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101551","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Drawing on interviews with accountants working at professional services firms (PSFs) in the UK, we explore how reflexivity enables accountants to recognise and negotiate class-based barriers to progression and inclusion. We identify a range of reflexive practices (including conversations with colleagues and clients, observations, mentoring, mulling over, and imagining) and show how these interact with <em>habitus</em> to structure the individual (mis)recognition of class-based barriers in the workplace. We find that reflexivity can engender an awareness of ‘difference’ and sense of inferiority relative to others, primarily for those from less privileged backgrounds. We provide evidence of the enabling role of reflexive practices which lead to purposive action for negotiating class-based barriers. However, we also find that reflexivity can lead to idiosyncratic strategies which support assimilation to (rather than challenging) existing practices in the accounting field. We find contradictory accounts of the effects of class, where class is recognised as a barrier, yet individuals are thought to progress through merit. We explain this tension through the limitations of reflexivity, restricted opportunities <em>for</em> reflexivity, and misrecognition of the effects of class in a seemingly meritocratic system. We provide examples of enduring and unrecognised class-based inequalities in accounting PSFs, including team composition and work allocation, class-segmented service lines, and the long-term consequences for those from less privileged backgrounds of having to work harder to ‘reach the same level’. Our findings suggest that PSFs must facilitate ‘difficult’ conversations aimed at breaking the culture of silence around class.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101551"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368224000114/pdfft?md5=deaf34e05de27d98ac74dd8a7b4a54a5&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368224000114-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140822909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-10DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101550
Jeremy D. Douthit , Steven J. Kachelmeier , Ben W. Van Landuyt
In two incentivized experiments, we investigate the potential for auditor assurance of prosocial activities akin to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) initiatives to bias the initial positions and final outcomes of subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations. This possibility arises from the psychological theory of licensing, with a prosocial activity providing the motivation for licensing, while auditor assurance provides a perceived opportunity for licensing. We find that the combination of a preliminary prosocial activity by the reporter with auditor assurance of that activity leads reporters to specify more aggressive initial negotiation positions, although it does not result in more lenient initial positions by the auditor. The final outcomes of reporter-auditor negotiations are biased in the reporter’s favor in our first experiment, in which auditor assurance of a prosocial reporter activity is of a social and collaborative nature. This result does not extend to our second experiment in which auditor assurance is not collaborative, although we still observe more aggressive reporters. Overall, our research identifies aggressive reporting as a potential unintended consequence of ESG assurance, especially when that assurance is of a more collaborative variety.
{"title":"Does auditor assurance of client prosocial activities affect subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations?","authors":"Jeremy D. Douthit , Steven J. Kachelmeier , Ben W. Van Landuyt","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101550","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In two incentivized experiments, we investigate the potential for auditor assurance of prosocial activities akin to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) initiatives to bias the initial positions and final outcomes of subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations. This possibility arises from the psychological theory of licensing, with a prosocial activity providing the motivation for licensing, while auditor assurance provides a perceived opportunity for licensing. We find that the combination of a preliminary prosocial activity by the reporter with auditor assurance of that activity leads reporters to specify more aggressive initial negotiation positions, although it does not result in more lenient initial positions by the auditor. The final outcomes of reporter-auditor negotiations are biased in the reporter’s favor in our first experiment, in which auditor assurance of a prosocial reporter activity is of a social and collaborative nature. This result does not extend to our second experiment in which auditor assurance is not collaborative, although we still observe more aggressive reporters. Overall, our research identifies aggressive reporting as a potential unintended consequence of ESG assurance, especially when that assurance is of a more collaborative variety.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101550"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140540635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-06DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101549
Wai Fong Chua , Tanya Fiedler , Christina Boedker
{"title":"Projecting, infrastructuring and calculating: From an In vitro to an In vivo carbon market","authors":"Wai Fong Chua , Tanya Fiedler , Christina Boedker","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101549","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101549"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368224000096/pdfft?md5=6f93c0eb6b1d117aaa7918c8d6d5692f&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368224000096-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-26DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2024.101548
Lindsay M. Andiola , Joseph F. Brazel , Denise Hanes Downey , Tammie J. Schaefer
Audit workpaper review is a quality control mechanism intended to detect preparer errors and professionally develop preparers. In this study, we experimentally investigate two factors that theory predicts affect the degree to which audit reviewers adopt a developmental approach: local versus international preparer office affiliation and likely versus unlikely preparer recurrence. We find that reviewers adopt a less developmental approach for international preparers but a more developmental approach for preparers likely to recur. The adoption of a more developmental approach not only results in more coaching via review comments but is associated with greater detection of seeded preparer errors. Taken together, our findings highlight the susceptibility of quality control efforts in the global audit environment and identify recurrence as a potential intervention.
{"title":"Coaching Today's auditors: What causes reviewers to adopt a more developmental approach?","authors":"Lindsay M. Andiola , Joseph F. Brazel , Denise Hanes Downey , Tammie J. Schaefer","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2024.101548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101548","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Audit workpaper review is a quality control mechanism intended to detect preparer errors and professionally develop preparers. In this study, we experimentally investigate two factors that theory predicts affect the degree to which audit reviewers adopt a developmental approach: local versus international preparer office affiliation and likely versus unlikely preparer recurrence. We find that reviewers adopt a less developmental approach for international preparers but a more developmental approach for preparers likely to recur. The adoption of a more developmental approach not only results in more coaching via review comments but is associated with greater detection of seeded preparer errors. Taken together, our findings highlight the susceptibility of quality control efforts in the global audit environment and identify recurrence as a potential intervention.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 101548"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140296032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}